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ARMY HISTORY

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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Issue Cover: *Halt!* An automobile arriving from the eastern sector of Berlin is stopped by West Berlin police in 1953. /Photo by Ralph Crane, courtesy of Time Life

JOURNAL

The Winter 2018 issue of *Army History* offers its readers something a bit different from the journal's usual content. While we still present two article-length pieces, the second of these is actually a "preview chapter" from a recently released Center of Military History publication.

The first article, by Dr. Thomas Boghardt, examines the little-known history of the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE), during the early years of the Cold War in Germany. The piece draws on numerous sources, including Army materials at the National Archives, memoirs of ASAE veterans, official histories of the U.S. Army in Europe, and some secondary sources. Most importantly, the author has mined thousands of recently declassified Army Security Agency records.

The next piece is an excerpt from CMH's recently published volume, *The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949,* by Donald A. Carter and William Stivers. Chapter 3, The Road to Berlin, chronicles the Army's movement into the city at the conclusion of World War II and the establishment of a military government. In early July 1945, two months after the German surrender in World War II, American troops entered Berlin to take over their assigned sector as part of the occupation forces of the German capital. That action concluded a long and complex negotiation among the victorious Allies and led to a series of confrontations that would turn the conquered city into a symbol of the emerging Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West.

This issue also includes an Artifact Spotlight, which continues the story of Bashford Dean and the development of uniquely American helmets and armor during World War I that was featured earlier in the Summer 2017 issue. Additionally, we provide a construction update on the National Museum of the United States Army as four large, or "macro," artifacts were recently installed as the structure is built around them.

In his Chief's Corner, Mr. Charles Bowery discusses the Center's education and commemoration efforts as the Vietnam War fiftieth anniversary is upon us. Mr. Jon Hoffman, in his Chief Historian's Footnote, talks about the implementation of a new process for writing and producing books at CMH. Additionally, we present an excellent crop of engaging book reviews.


As usual, article submissions are highly encouraged, as are requests to review books from our list of available titles (http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/books.html). I look forward to receiving your constructive comments about this issue and *Army History* in general.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor

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Winter 2018




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
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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

VIETNAM AT 50

A NEXUS OF EDUCATION AND COMMEMORATION

As we prepare to turn the calendar over to 2018, the U.S. Army enters the most meaningful phase of the fiftieth anniversary of its service in the Vietnam War. Fifty years ago, we were heading toward the peak of American participation in the war, with 543,000 men and women of all services—the vast majority of whom were Army personnel—in Vietnam by 1969. The year 1968 saw two significant events in our Army's history, the Tet offensive in January and the My Lai Massacre in March, making the next six months especially poignant.

During this upcoming anniversary period, the Army Historical Program will mobilize a variety of resources to ensure that our force learns from the Army's experience in Vietnam, while remembering and honoring the service of thousands of men and women. The Center of Military History's (CMH) official account of the Army's role in the Tet offensive will be published in late December as you are reading this issue of *Army History*, and the new Virtual Army Museum gallery on Ia Drang 1965 will continue to be available on the National Museum of the United States Army's Web site, www.thenmusa.org. This online museum experience gives visitors access to some of the most precious Army artifacts and documents from the Vietnam era and builds awareness of our National Museum. Our Vietnam campaign pamphlet series will keep expanding, and the authors of the final volumes in our Vietnam War series—covering combat operations from 1969 through 1973, Army logistics in Vietnam, and advisory support to South Vietnam in the mid-1960s—continue to research and write. The latter topic is especially relevant as the Army forges ahead with establishing Security Force Assistance Brigades in our force structure.

Over the next few months, CMH will host three seminars on Vietnam topics. In January, we will introduce the Tet volume, authored by Erik Villard, and examine the offensive and the aftermath from a distance of fifty years. In March, CMH, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Lt. Gen. Charles N. Pede, and the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic at West Point will host a discussion of My Lai. CMH and the Chief of Army Public Affairs, Brig. Gen. Omar Jones, will conduct a seminar in April examining the Army and the news media in Vietnam. We hope that these publications and events will further the Army as a learning organization. Finally, in late June, the Army Birthday Week and Army Birthday Ball will have a Vietnam Fiftieth Anniversary theme, with numerous opportunities to honor and remember the Vietnam generation.


I encourage all of the members of our community, whether involved in training and education, or in direct support to the operational and generating force, to work to foster interest and discussion within your commands about the Vietnam War, especially as we still have so many members of the Vietnam generation still with us. We should not let this teachable moment pass us by. Let's continue to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve!

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NEWS NOTES

New Publication Coming Soon from the Center of Military History

In early January 2018 the Center of Military History will publish the latest addition to its U.S. Army in Vietnam series. *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967–September 1968*, by Erik B. Villard, describes the twelve-month period in which the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies embarked on a new and more aggressive strategy that shook the foundations of South Vietnam and forced the United States to reevaluate its military calculations in Southeast Asia. Hanoi's general offensive–general uprising brought the war to South Vietnam's cities for the first time and disrupted the allied pacification program that was just beginning to take hold in some rural areas once controlled by the Communists. For the enemy, however, those achievements came at a staggering cost in casualties and materiel; more importantly, the Tet offensive failed to cripple the South Vietnamese government or convince the United States to abandon its ally. As the dust settled after the Viet Cong attacks, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered his military commanders to press ahead with their current strategy unchanged apart from some short-term tactical adjustments and a modest increase in the U.S. troop deployment. His decision to stay the course seemed to bear fruit as the allies repaired their losses and then forged new gains throughout the summer and autumn of 1968. Even so, the allied situation at the end of this period appeared to be only marginally better than it had been in late 1967; the peace talks in Paris had stalled, and American public opinion had turned decisively against the war. This book is 748 pages and contains numerous maps, illustrations, and an index. It will be issued as CMH Pub 91–15 (cloth) and 91–15–1 (paper) and will also be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.



Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

The Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History will be held 5–8 April 2018 at the Galt House Hotel in Louisville, Kentucky, and is being hosted by the University of Louisville's College of Arts and Sciences and Department of History. The theme of the conference is "Landscapes of War and Peace." Additional information, including registration instructions, hotel reservations, and points of contact, can be found at the society's Web site, http://louisville.edu/history/events/smhc.


Army Historical Foundation 2017 Distinguished Book Awards

The Army Historical Foundation is currently accepting nominations for its 2017 Distinguished Book Awards program. Candidates may be nominated in one of seven general categories: Biography; Journals, Memoirs, and Letters; Operational/Battle History; Institutional/Functional History; Unit History; Reference; and Reprint. Nominees' submissions will be judged against other books in the same category. The recipients of a Distinguished Book Award will receive a distinctive plaque and nominal cash prize. The winners will be publicly recognized at the annual Army Historical Foundation members meeting in June 2018. To nominate a book, please send two copies to the Army Historical Foundation, Attn: Awards Committee, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201. Nominated books must be received by 15 January 2018.

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
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Thomas Boghardt is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Oxford, was a visiting professor at Georgetown University from 2002 to 2004, and served as the historian of the International Spy Museum from 2004 to 2010. Dr. Boghardt has published extensively on contemporary and historical aspects of intelligence. He received the CIA's *Studies in Intelligence Award* for his work on Soviet and East German intelligence operations during the Cold War. His two most recent books are *Spies of the Kaiser* (New York, 2005) and *The Zimmermann Telegram* (Annapolis, Md., 2012). He is currently working on an official history of U.S. Army intelligence operations in early Cold War Germany.



An Army Security Agency operator on duty at the field station in Herzogenaurach, Germany.

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SEMPER VIGILIS

THE U.S. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY IN EARLY COLD WAR GERMANY[1]

BY THOMAS BOGHARDT

The interception and decryption of foreign communications, or signals intelligence (SIGINT), provided the U.S. government with vital knowledge about the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War. As the historian Matthew M. Aid has argued, SIGINT "was not only the most important source of intelligence—it was practically the only reliable intelligence source for the United States and its Western European allies about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain."[2] Even though documents pertaining to SIGINT are among the most highly classified government records, historians and journalists have managed to publish numerous accounts of the Cold War operations of America's biggest SIGINT agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland. The NSA, however, was not established until 1952, and even after that date it only gradually assumed authority over the American SIGINT community.

During the early Cold War years, the SIGINT services of the U.S. Army and the Navy provided the type of information that NSA would produce in later years. Of the two, the Army Security Agency (ASA) was the larger service. The ASA had two regional headquarters, the Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAP), in Manila, Philippines (later, Tokyo, Japan), and the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE), in Frankfurt, Germany. Due to its strategic location on the edge of the emerging rift between East and West, ASAE found itself in a unique position to collect information on developments in Europe and on Soviet capabilities and intentions behind the Iron Curtain. By the 1950s, the agency had grown to what probably amounted to the largest Western intelligence service in Europe, and it engaged in wide-ranging intercept operations inside and outside Germany. However, in spite of its size and its central role in U.S. intelligence collection activities in early Cold War Europe, the agency has attracted very little attention from historians.

The absence of literature on ASAE may be partly due to the fact that the public generally is more interested in human intelligence operations, including espionage, than in the technical and impersonal world of SIGINT. The recent large-scale release of intelligence records in the United States and Germany, intended to shed light on the subject of Western intelligence cooperation with former Nazi officials, has further stimulated research on early Cold War human intelligence. Because American SIGINT agencies, including ASAE, played only a peripheral role in the collaboration of U.S. intelligence officials with former Nazis, few of their records were included in these releases. For many years, the

Composite Image: An intercept section at Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia /U.S. Army

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
inaccessibility of primary sources has remained the biggest obstacle to the compilation of a comprehensive, unclassified history of early Cold War U.S. SIGINT operations in Europe.

This article is intended as a first step to write such a history for the early years of ASAE. It draws on scattered documents: Army SIGINT records in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; memoirs of ASAE veterans; official histories of the U.S. Army in Europe; and occasional references to the agency in secondary literature. Most important, this article uses several thousand recently declassified original ASA records that the NSA released to this author in response to a mandatory declassification review request. These documents include the annual histories of the ASA for the 1940s and early 1950s as well as a special ASA study on the agency's first three years. Based on those records, this article seeks to give readers a general sense of the agency's broad scope of operations at a time and place that defined the Cold War in Europe.

The World War II Origins of Army SIGINT

World War II revolutionized American SIGINT. Before the war, the military regarded the interception and decryption of foreign communications as an arcane and technical intelligence subspecialty. In 1939, the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service focused on breaking the codes and ciphers of less than a handful of foreign governments, while the U.S. Navy ran its own separate SIGINT service. The two organizations were small, had few resources, and rarely exchanged information. These factors contributed to the lack of advance warning about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. After the United States had entered the war, the military began a major overhaul of its SIGINT apparatus. While the Navy focused on foreign naval radio traffic, the Army took the lead on intercepting and decrypting foreign army and diplomatic communications.

In the spring of 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recruited a New York attorney, Alfred McCormack, to reform the Army's SIGINT organization. Stimson had deliberately picked a government outsider for this job, and in due course, McCormack introduced sweeping organizational changes. With regard to operations, he insisted that the United States could not afford to limit itself to monitoring only the military communications of its enemies, but that the nation "must know as much as possible about the objectives, the psychology and the methods of our enemies and potential enemies (and of our Allies as well)."[3] The Army embraced McCormack's all-encompassing approach to SIGINT. As Col. Carter W. Clarke, a senior military intelligence officer who worked closely with McCormack, noted, "our primary task is to paint for our superiors as completely a realistic picture as possible of the activities 'behind the arras' of all those associated with and against us." Putting words into action, by the end of the war the Army's Signal Security Agency (SSA) operated eleven major intercept stations around the world, processed over 380,000 intercepts in a month, and eavesdropped on the secret communications of nearly every government in the world, including those of several American allies such as the Soviet Union and the Free French government under General Charles de Gaulle.[4]



Alfred McCormack, shown here as a colonel, c. 1944




Colonel Clarke

American codebreakers also showed a passing interest in the ciphers of its closest ally, Great Britain, but given their cordial intelligence partnership with London the Americans had no need to spy on the British.[5] Indeed, the strategic wartime alliance with Britain's Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park became another key element in the Army's global SIGINT dragnet. Because the British had entered the war before the Americans, they were several years ahead in technical expertise, and their global empire allowed them to operate intercept stations around the world. In 1943, the U.S. War Department and GC&CS signed the Britain–United States of America Agreement that provided for an exchange of personnel, expertise, and intercepts between the two nations.[6] While the British aimed their efforts principally against German and Italian communications, the Americans directed their main codebreaking effort at Japan. Army SIGINT personnel detached to Bletchley Park worked closely with their British counterparts and had access to their intelligence products. They also formed the organizational nucleus of the Army's postwar SIGINT organization in Europe.

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U.S. and British codebreaking of Axis communications made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, considered the intelligence derived from communications intercepts "of priceless value."[7] Since SIGINT operations had proven most effective when conducted on a comprehensive, continuous basis, the Army saw little reason to abandon its vast intercept and cryptanalytic organization when hostilities ended. In fact, leading Army intelligence officers began contemplating the peacetime role of SIGINT in Europe well before the end of the war. In September 1944, the chief of the Military Intelligence Service, Brig. Gen. Ross A. Osmun, suggested to the Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, the establishment of a large, permanent postwar SIGINT organization that would adopt the same "vacuum cleaner" approach to SIGINT the Americans had employed so successfully during the war. Postwar operations, Osmun argued, ought to target not only "clandestine traffic throughout the occupied territories of Europe," but also those of "all the [European] governments [currently] in exile." Moreover, Osmun noted, "the question of studying and researching the traffic of some of our present Allies merits deep consideration."[8] In effect, Osmun's target list included the communications of most European nations.

Allied victory enabled the Army to realize this ambitious goal. Impressed by the accomplishments of the codebreakers, President Harry S. Truman sanctioned the continuation of their activities in the postwar period.[9] On 15 September 1945, the War Department replaced the wartime SSA with the Army Security Agency (ASA) under Brig. Gen. W. Preston Corderman. The transformation formalized the central role into which SIGINT had grown during the war. While the SSA had operated under the dual supervision of the Signal Corps and the Army's intelligence division, the ASA reported exclusively to the latter. The new agency also assumed control of the various tactical signal intelligence units that had been under the theater commanders during the war. The ASA thus consolidated all Army signal intelligence and signal security functions into one agency that was fully integrated into the Army's intelligence organization.[10]



General Bissell



General Corderman



General Eisenhower (far left) confers with ASA Chief General Corderman (center), William Friedman, the head of the Armed Forces Security Agency (far right), and two unidentified officers.

The ASA had a strong interest in continuing the wartime SIGINT exchange with the British, who operated intercept stations throughout their global empire. In March 1946, the two sides signed the so-called UKUSA agreement that extended their cooperation into the postwar period.[11] To coordinate the exchange of SIGINT between the two nations, the ASA set

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up the U.S. Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in London in the spring of 1946.[12] Meanwhile, the ASA continued to operate its own fixed intercept stations: Vint Hill Farms Station in Virginia; Two Rock Ranch Station in California; Heiemano on Oahu, Hawaii; Fairbanks in Alaska; Las Piñas in the Philippines; and Asmara in Eritrea. In Germany, where a number of mobile Army SIGINT units had moved at the end of the war, ASA intended to operate "as long as possible."[13]

Establishment and Early Operations of ASA

Running an intelligence agency in a foreign country generally carries the risk of exposure and legal complications, but in postwar Germany, American intelligence encountered an ideal operational environment. With the Third Reich defeated, the Allies took over the administration of the country, and the U.S. Army assumed control in the zone assigned to the United States. Under military government, a U.S. State Department memorandum noted, "the Occupying Powers could, simply stated, conduct whatever intelligence activities they deemed advisable."[14] This included control and exploitation of German communications networks for intelligence purposes. As early as January 1945, the Allies banned German telephone and telegraph operations, and placed the mail under strict censorship.[15] In addition, the Americans built their own communications network. Because the Allied bombing campaign had destroyed much of the German telecommunications structure, the U.S. Army Signal Corps ran hundreds of miles of new telephone, teletype, and telegraph cables, all connected to the United States Forces in the European Theater (USFET) headquarters in Frankfurt.[16] By the end of the war, therefore, the Army legally and logistically controlled a major telecommunications hub at the center of Europe.

Taking advantage of the unique operational opportunities provided by the defeat of Japan and Germany, ASA established two regional theater headquarters. On 25 November 1945, it activated ASAP in Manila (later moved to Tokyo). Two days later, it activated ASAE, with Col. Earle F. Cook as its first chief. A West Point graduate, Cook had served as director of the Army's Signal Intelligence Division in Europe during World War II. Like many other Army agencies in occupied Germany that set up shop in existing buildings, ASAE headquarters moved into the huge I.G. Farben Building in Frankfurt. According to the recollections of an ASAE veteran, the agency occupied the seventh floor of the building's west wing next to the main entrance. Most of the staff was billeted in the Gutleutkaserne, a former *Wehrmacht* (German Army) installation near the Frankfurt central railway station, about two miles south of the Farben Building. In line with the ASA's centralized structure, ASAE operated under the command of the ASA director, rather than the European theater commander, however, the agency was attached to the Army's European Command (EUCOM) for administration and discipline. Because EUCOM had specific SIGINT requirements, ASAE collaborated closely with the European theater commander and his intelligence division. An ASAE representative regularly participated in the executive council meetings of EUCOM, and some ASAE units were expressly allocated to the command.[17]

ASAE headquarters included two divisions, the Administrative and the Operations Divisions. The latter, in turn, consisted of two branches.



U.S. Army

The I.G. Farben Building, c. 1954


U.S. Army

The Gutleutkaserne in Frankfurt, c. 1950

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Gateway to the ASAE Headquarters in the I.G. Farben Building

The Security Branch was in charge of communications security for Army organizations throughout Europe and operated a cryptologic repair school for the maintenance of the agency's technical equipment. The Intelligence Branch was responsible for the collection of SIGINT. The branch received intercepts from field stations in Germany and Europe and scanned them for items of immediate intelligence value. ASAE then forwarded all intercepts to ASA headquarters at Arlington Hall in northern Virginia where analysts collated messages from Army intercept stations across the globe, sought to decipher those that were encrypted, compiled summaries of the collected intelligence, and forwarded this information to the Army's intelligence division at the Pentagon.[18]

Upon its activation, ASAE took over all Army SIGINT units in Germany. In February 1946, the agency also temporarily assumed responsibility for SIGINT in the Mediterranean and Austria. ASAE had five operating units at its inception: the 114th Signal Service Company at Sontra in northeastern Hesse; the 116th Signal Service Company at Scheyern in central Bavaria; the 2d Army Air Forces Squadron Mobile at Bad Vilbel near Frankfurt; the Signal Intelligence Service Division at Caserta in Italy; and Detachment A at Gross Gerau near Frankfurt. Over time, ASAE added and expanded units in the American zone of occupation. The ASAE units at Gross Gerau moved to Herzo Base in Herzogenaurach, a former German Luftwaffe installation, where the Army completed construction of a large intercept station in 1948.[19]

The number of soldiers and civilians working for ASAE underscores the importance of SIGINT in Europe to the United States and the Army, especially when put into the context of the overall American presence in Germany. Postwar demobilization put pressure on all Army agencies to release personnel. Although the Office of Military Government, United States, employed nearly 12,000 soldiers and civilians in Germany in September 1945, this number had fallen to 2,104 by the end of the occupation four years later. Similarly, the Army's European Theater command shrank from nearly 2.5 million soldiers at the end of the war to a little over 83,000 in July 1949. Demobilization affected the Army's intelligence agencies as well. At Arlington Hall, the ASA had to let go of a large portion of its military personnel, even though the agency managed to soften the blow by rehiring many of them immediately as civilians. Nevertheless, civilian strength at ASA headquarters dropped from 5,720 in July 1945 to 2,317 a year later.[20] In November 1945, the commanding officer of USFET in Frankfurt wrote that the authorized strength of three ASAE units outside headquarters amounted to a total of 28 officers and 572 enlisted men.[21] By the end of the occupation, the ASA annual history gives the per-



Arlington Hall, c. 1942

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sonnel strength of the agency as 90 officers and 840 enlisted; in addition, Herzo Base employed 524–580 German civilians, and the 116th Signal Service Company used 102–121 local employees.[22] Thus, while the Army's overall presence in Germany shrank significantly during the occupation, ASAE personnel strength increased.

Even though ASAE bucked the downward trend of postwar demobilization in terms of numbers, the retention and recruitment of qualified personnel posed a significant challenge. During the war, Army SIGINT drew on recruits who scored in the highest percentile of the Army's aptitude test. Consequently, the wartime draft swelled the ranks of Army SIGINT with highly intelligent individuals, but many conscripts returned to civilian life as soon as they were eligible for discharge, and ASA could not easily replace their linguistic and cryptologic skills.[23] In Europe, many slots remained unfilled due to the lack of qualified recruits. In 1949, all ASAE units together had only 72.6 percent of operational strength because, as the ASA's annual history for that year notes laconically, "[i]t was difficult to get the personnel for operative missions."[24] In the 1950s, ASA mitigated this problem somewhat by aggressively recruiting civilians. For example, when ASA officers received word that the General Electric Company in Schenectady, New York, was reducing its staff, they made plans to approach affected engineers and entice them to join the agency.[25] Moreover, the Korean War (1950–53) once again expanded the draft, and ASA attracted some of the brightest Army recruits, many from the ranks of those who preferred peacetime service in Europe over combat duty in Asia.

ASAE personnel received their training before being deployed to Europe. In 1942, the Army's SIGINT service opened a cryptographic school for enlisted men at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia. Officers received training at Arlington Hall. When the ASA was established, it assumed control of the school, and in 1948, the agency consolidated training for officers and enlisted men at






U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

Entrance to ASAE Field Station Herzogenaurach

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Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania. When the school outgrew the available facilities there, the Army moved it to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in 1951. The school trained students in communications analysis, communications security, radio intelligence, morse and nonmorse interception, and cryptography equipment maintenance. In 1955, it added training in electronic intelligence and electronic warfare. In addition to these technical skills, ASAE personnel could attend language courses at the U.S. Army Language School in Monterey, California. While this school taught mostly Japanese language skills during World War II, it offered over thirty languages in the late 1940s, with Russian having the largest enrollment.[26]



ASA operators working at Vint Hill Farms Station

ASAE's core mission, the collection of SIGINT, showed a remarkable degree of continuity from war to peace. As they had during the war, American cryptanalysts were eavesdropping on the secret communications of most foreign governments after hostilities had ended. By February 1946, the ASA was reading the diplomatic codes and ciphers of over forty-five governments, and by 1949, of over fifty. Only the targets changed. "Indeed," noted the agency's annual history, "wartime activity . . . differed [from peacetime activity] neither in volume nor urgency but merely in the direction of the attack."[27] Following the Allied victory, the importance of the communications of Japan and Germany declined. At the same time, the U.S. government sought to learn more about the internal deliberations of its wartime allies who would be its principal interlocutors in forging the peace.[28] While the ASA displayed some interest in the communications of the British Commonwealth, the agency seems to have refrained from large-scale interception and decryption of British messages.[29] As in World War II, close collaboration with London probably gave the Americans sufficient access to what they needed to know about British policy and intelligence know-how. Similar restraints did not apply to France, however.

In August 1945, U.S. SIGINT officials singled out the communications of France as a target of particular value.[30] On 15 January 1946, the Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence assigned "the French military cryptanalytical problem" to ASAE.[31] The Americans had several reasons for singling out one of its wartime allies. For one, France presented a target of opportunity, as ASA easily intercepted messages from the far-flung French communications network and American cryptanalysts had little trouble decrypting them, having completely mastered French codes and ciphers. Moreover, France still had aspirations of being a global power, and its internal communications promised to deliver information that was of more than regional significance. Also, ASA noted that, because "of the penchant of the French for discussing their affairs, their communications contained considerable information of interest."[32] The American interception of French communications quickly yielded results. By 1948, the ASA was reading traffic on several French diplomatic and intelligence circuits. Summaries of the messages were regularly circulated to American policymakers, and provided them with firsthand information on French policy objectives and French assessments of American policy. ASA also gleaned information from geographic areas in which France had a stronger diplomatic presence than the United States, such as the East European and Balkan countries.[33]

Besides France, international conferences provided another convenient target for American codebreakers. The reconfiguration of the international order in the wake of World War II generated a host of such gatherings, and the Army's SIGINT service eavesdropped on the communications of foreign delegations at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco (April–June 1945), the Potsdam Conference near Berlin (July–August 1945), the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in London (August 1945), the Peace Conference in Paris (July–October 1946), and several others. These broad cryptanalytic attacks on the diplomatic communications of foreign officials served a dual purpose. First, ASA provided the decrypts to the U.S. Department of State, and American diplomats thus learned a great deal about the negotiating position of other delegations, secret conferences they arranged, and sub-rosa agreements they entered into. The State Department valued this assistance greatly. In September 1946, when a shrinking military budget threatened personnel cuts at ASA, the State Department expressed its concern over this possibility to the War Department, noting that the SIGINT product "was of the highest

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importance in the conduct of foreign relations." Second, the interception of foreign diplomatic communications provided the ASA with a Rosetta stone that helped them break into previously unsolved cipher systems. Because conference speeches were delivered in public, ASA codebreakers could compare the plain text to the intercepted enciphered version. The juxtaposition of the plain and enciphered texts provided cryptanalysts with important clues about how a cipher system was constructed, facilitating future cryptanalytic operations.[34]

At its inception, ASAE assumed two additional duties not directly linked to its SIGINT mission. One included the exploitation of German SIGINT expertise, the other, the support of the Army's civil censorship activities in the American zone.[35] The Allied targeting of German SIGINT began before the end of the war. In the summer of 1944, after the successful Allied invasion of Normandy, American and British SIGINT agencies began planning for the exploitation of German cryptologic knowledge. They created the so-called Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) that identified targets of cryptologic interest to the Allies in Germany. When ASAE was established, it became the Army's lead agency at TICOM, and it directed this effort through 1949.

TICOM formed several teams that followed the victorious American and British armies into Germany and captured enemy SIGINT documents, equipment, and personnel. The first team entered Germany in April 1945. In short order, the teams collected 4,000 documents of the German SIGINT services, captured numerous cryptographic machines and devices, and compiled nearly two hundred reports on the interrogation of German SIGINT personnel. In the mid- to late-1940s, American and British intelligence officers interrogated hundreds of German SIGINT personnel. They included Erich Hüttenhain, head of the cipher department of the German Army; Wilhelm Fenner, a leading German cryptanalyst; and Ostwin Fritz Mentzer, a developer of cryptologic equipment. Initially, the Americans interrogated the Germans at a secret detention center at Kransberg Castle, code-named DUSTBIN, about twenty miles north of Frankfurt. After DUSTBIN closed, they conducted interviews at the sprawling 7707 European Command Intelligence Center at Oberursel, located between Kransberg and Frankfurt.[36]



The captured documents and cryptologic hardware, and the interviews with former German SIGINT personnel revealed that the Allies had been superior to the Germans in this realm. Although the Germans had been able to intercept numerous unencrypted telephone conversations between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the most part they had not succeeded in breaking U.S. and British ciphers. Moreover, they had remained unaware of the extensive and successful Allied effort to break into German communications. In particular, they had failed to detect the Allied success in breaking the most widely used German military communications system, the Enigma machine. The Allies were careful not to publicly disclose the vulnerability of the Enigma as other nations or companies might continue to use the machine to encipher their communications after the war, thus opening them up to cryptanalytic attacks by the Americans and British. Probably with this in mind, ASAE in the late 1940s began making discreet inquiries about the activities of German companies that had produced Enigma machines before 1945.[37]

Through its work with former German SIGINT personnel, ASAE contributed directly to the resurgence of Germany's postwar SIGINT capabilities. In 1946, the Army's European intel-



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ligence division set up an intelligence organization staffed with former German intelligence personnel and headed by Reinhard Gehlen, a lieutenant general who had run the analytical section of the German army's intelligence service on the eastern front (*Fremde Heere Ost*, or Foreign Armies East). Operation RUSTY, as the Army code-named the project, constituted an espionage organization that sent agents into the Soviet zone of occupation, however, ASAE officers selected, equipped, and trained a small group of German SIGINT personnel in postwar interception and cryptanalysis. Eventually, this group joined Gehlen and his men. By 1947, Operation RUSTY's cryptoanalytic section intercepted and decrypted radio traffic from the Soviets as well as "possibly" from other European countries, according to American intelligence. Several of these German SIGINT veterans, including Hüttenhain and Fenner, would make up the core of the cryptoanalytic branch of RUSTY's successor organization, the West German federal intelligence service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, or BND).[38]

ASAE's other special task in postwar Germany pertained to American civil censorship operations and the monitoring of communications in the U.S. occupation zone. Shortly after Allied troops entered Germany, the Army set up a censorship branch to control German communications and collect information of interest to the occupation authorities. This measure included the monitoring of mail as well as telephone and teletype lines. In July 1945, the Army's intelligence division assumed responsibility for this task, establishing the 7742d Civil Censorship Division as its executive agency. In 1947, the division handed this responsibility to the 7746th Communications Intelligence Service Detachment (CISD), headquartered in Frankfurt. After the Federal Republic attained sovereignty in 1955, the unit was officially renamed U.S. Army Operations and Research Detachment in December 1956, although the previous designation also remained in use.[39]

Even though censorship remained organizationally separate from SIGINT, ASAE participated in this effort from early on. For several months in late 1945 and early 1946, the agency detailed specialists to the censorship division to help them examine suspicious mail for secret inks and cryptographic messages.[40] ASAE broadened its participation in the operations of the censorship division as the latter expanded its activities against the backdrop of growing U.S.-Soviet tensions. By 1948, CISD had deployed teams in German telecommunications centers and repeater stations in Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart. In the span of three months, they monitored 681 telephone circuits and 27,134 phone calls while examining 45,271 telegraphic messages and 3,684 postal communications.[41] The detachment was especially interested in "subversive" communications, which increasingly meant those pertaining to the German Communist Party. Because many international telephone and telegraph wires passed through Germany, censorship also provided an opportunity to collect intelligence on developments in other countries, especially from the Soviet zone and subsequently, the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[42]

THE SOVIET TARGET

At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union remained allies, and the U.S. administration expected to shape the postwar order in collaboration, rather than in competition with Moscow. Inter-allied cooperation appeared particularly urgent in Germany, as the victorious powers had agreed to govern and determine the future of the defeated Reich jointly. In the months and years after the end of the war, however, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western powers deteriorated as the two sides' vision of the postwar order proved incompatible. While Moscow installed pro-Soviet regimes in territories liberated by the Red Army, and sought to expand its sphere of influence as far as possible into Western Europe and South East Asia, the West strove for an internationalist order that opened the world to democratic ideas and free trade. Within two years of the end of the war, intense suspicion and a strident rivalry had replaced the U.S.-Soviet alliance. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States must "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The containment of the Soviet Union and international communism became official U.S. policy, and the military capabilities and political intentions of Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union emerged as the principal target of American intelligence.

The operations of ASA and its European headquarters reflected this change in American foreign policy from World War II through the late 1940s. During the war, the Axis powers constituted the principal targets of Anglo-American SIGINT, and the monitoring of Soviet communications played only a minor role in the war effort. Only in February 1943 did Army cryptanalysts begin focusing on encrypted Soviet messages that the Americans had intercepted since 1939 from various sources. Few original records shed light on the Army's decision to initiate this intrusion, but according to an official history of American SIGINT, the Army took the decision to target Soviet communications after codebreakers had read a reference in a decrypted Japanese message that discussed the vulnerability of Soviet ciphers.[43] This would suggest that Army cryptanalysts did not primarily seek to break Soviet communications because they regarded the USSR with suspicion, but rather, that they seized an opportunity that presented itself. In other words, the Army targeted Soviet cables because it could, a policy in line with McCormack's demand that American SIGINT cast a wide net.[44] Initially, the work of Arlington Hall's Russian section remained of little importance to the American war effort, and the unit was smaller than other sections dealing with non-Axis communications, such as the Spanish-Portuguese and the French-Swiss desk.[45] Given the complexity of the Soviet ciphers, Army cryptanalysts did not break the first intercepts until 1946. The decrypted messages turned out to be wartime instructions by Soviet intelligence to some of their spies in North America, a finding that retroactively confirmed the wisdom of the Army's decision

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to examine the secret communications of a wartime ally. The discovery prompted American codebreakers to continue working on the encrypted Soviet messages. This project, codenamed VENONA, eventually produced approximately 3,000 decrypted Soviet spy messages and ended only in 1980.[46]

As the war drew to a close, the Western powers began coordinating their SIGINT efforts directed at the Soviet Union. In February 1945, the SIGINT services of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army initiated Project RATTAN, a joint operation aimed at the interception and decryption of Soviet communications. Five months later, the British joined this effort, and the project name changed to BOURBON.[47] For ASA, the Soviet Union quickly emerged as the principal target in the postwar period, a prioritization reflected in the agency's personnel policy. Even though ASA personnel strength dropped from 27,000 at the end of the war to 4,000 by the summer of 1946, the section devoted to solving Soviet communications tripled its strength to 283 personnel in the same time period. By 1949, about two-thirds of American SIGINT personnel were working on decrypting enciphered Soviet communications.[48]

Although the ASA's European headquarters found itself ideally located to monitor Soviet communications, initially ASAE contributed little to solving the "Soviet problem." One of Arlington Hall's top cryptanalysts, Stephen Wolf, who was assigned to ASAE from August to November 1946, noted that, while the agency's intelligence branch had a Soviet analysis section, none of the field stations intercepted Soviet traffic.[49] The lack of intercept activities against Soviet communications had technical as well as operational reasons. For one, by late 1945, the United States was interested in gaining access to a broad range of European communications, an approach that diffused the limited resources of ASAE. Moreover, having relied mostly on the British for wartime cryptanalysis in Europe, the Americans in late 1945 lacked the technical equipment and adequately trained personnel to intercept communications from deep within Soviet-controlled areas of Europe. Therefore, the ASA Pacific and the British Government Communications Headquarters produced the bulk of Soviet intercepts processed at Arlington Hall in 1945 and 1946.[50]

Overall, the intercept operations of ASAE in late 1945 and 1946 lacked a certain focus, and were rather low-key. According to the ASA annual report, the intercept station at Gross Gerau monitored some European military circuits as well as suspected German clandestine radio traffic in late 1945, though this activity tapered off in November. Detachment A produced radio intercepts from nine rather disparate sources, including France, Russia, Syria, and Germany. Presumably, this was unencrypted, low-level traffic of little intelligence value. For the most part, ASAE limited itself to intercepting wireless traffic within easy reach, refrained from attempts to decrypt enciphered messages, and forwarded the raw intercepts to Arlington Hall. The French military cryptanalytic problem, assigned by ASA to its European headquarters in January 1946, represented a notable exception to his low-level approach.[51]

One of ASAE's most important contributions to solving the "Soviet problem" in the immediate postwar period derived from its involvement with TICOM. While initially American and



An ASA operator manning his position, c. 1950

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British interrogators interviewed captured German SIGINT personnel on Axis operations against British and U.S. communications, they quickly shifted their attention to German knowledge of Soviet ciphers, and the usefulness of this information in the postwar period. The Germans had broken numerous Soviet encrypted communications during the war, and many interviewees willingly shared their knowledge with the Americans and British. As early as 23 May 1945, a TICOM team encountered a group of German SIGINT personnel at Rosenheim in southern Bavaria. The Germans led the Americans into the basement of a building where they kept their equipment, and launched a demonstration of their expertise. To the astonishment of the TICOM party, the Germans began "intercepting Russian traffic right while we were there." In fact, the Germans had broken into the encrypted communications of the Soviet high command, dubbed "Fish" by the Allies. Interviews with other German SIGINT personnel gave the Allies information about the encryption of several additional Soviet communication systems. They also learned from the Germans that the Soviets were using a number of foreign-made cryptosystems, some of which the Allies had already broken. Since the Soviets continued to use several of these systems into the postwar period, American SIGINT was able to target and decrypt these communications.[52] In addition, the Army's European intelligence division directly employed a group of former German signal intelligence personnel. In early 1948, this group began producing low-echelon Soviet military traffic for ASAE.[53]

By this time, ASAE had built up its own intercept capabilities for the large-scale monitoring of communications across Eastern Europe. In 1948, the agency completed construction of a major listening post at Herzo Base. The location of the base, fifty miles south of the Soviet zone and seventy miles west of Czechoslovakia, made it an ideal intercept post for traffic from those areas. By the summer of 1949, the 114th Signal Service Company, which was based at Herzo Base, handled 420,000 intercepted cipher groups a month. At Scheyern, the 116th Signal Service Company operated a direction finding and intercept station that handled another 171,000 to 251,000 cipher groups. In addition, ASAE prepared three panel trucks for mobile intercept operations along the borders. ASAE headquarters at Frankfurt also expanded and, in addition to collecting and exchanging raw intercepts with Arlington Hall, began to decrypt intercepted messages locally. ASAE processed messages from a wide range of sources, including the Hungarian border police; the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav police; the Yugoslav Air Force; as well as low-level Red Army and Soviet Air Forces communications intercepted from the Soviet occupation zone.[54]

ASAE intercepted different types of traffic from Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. While the agency forwarded highly encrypted messages for decryption to Arlington Hall, analysts at European headquarters quickly developed an ability to work on low-grade intercepts in Frankfurt. In addition, American codebreakers intercepted large amounts of so-called plaintext messages: unencrypted traffic from nonmilitary and nonpolitical organizations in the Soviet Bloc. A single message from a low-level Soviet trade agency might not reveal much about the state of affairs in the Soviet Union, but when analyzed en masse, these messages became a valuable source for estimating economic and administrative trends in the Soviet Bloc. ASA and ASAE also managed to produce a good deal of information on the force structure and movements of the Red Army in Eastern Europe by studying patterns of Soviet military communications, even if they were unable to read the content of the messages. As the Soviets and their allies tightened their communications security procedures in the late 1940s, this approach, known as traffic analysis, emerged as a particularly valuable source of information on Soviet forces in Germany.[55]

The year 1948, when several crises roiled Europe and brought the Soviet Union and the United States to the edge of war, demonstrated the importance of, as well as the need for improving, the capabilities of SIGINT. In February, the Communist Party staged a coup in the previously neutral Czechoslovakia, aligning that country firmly with the Soviet Union. For the most part, Western intelligence did not see this event coming. The American military attaché in Prague, Col. Egmont F. Koenig, had warned in general terms in June 1947 about the deteriorating situation in Czechoslovakia, and raised the alternate possibility of a right-wing coup d'état, a "civil war, followed by Russian intervention," or "a forceful seizure of power by the Left."[56] The coup itself, however, took the Americans by surprise. SIGINT had not provided any advance warn-



Courtesy of Patrick Garrison

Entrance to the 116th Signal Service Company station at Scheyern, Germany


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ings. As the Communist Party seized power in Prague, the U.S. Embassy had difficulty informing Washington of events in a timely manner.[57] American authorities in Germany first learned of the coup on 24 February, when agents of the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps in Bavaria stationed along the border reported that the Prague government had prohibited any border crossings for persons without clearance from Czechoslovak authorities.[58]

SIGINT acquitted itself slightly better during a crisis in Germany that erupted shortly thereafter, the Berlin Blockade. Having failed to reach agreement over the future of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted conflicting policies. The Americans were keen on stabilizing the Western sectors of Germany through economic reform, including a new currency. Afraid of seeing their influence in Germany diminished, the Soviets reacted in early 1948 by tightening access of the Western Allies to their sectors of Berlin, which were enclosed by the Soviet occupation zone. On 24 June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on the Western sectors. In response, the Allies established an airlift to supply their garrisons and the population of Berlin. During the following months, as Western diplomats sought to find a way out of this standoff, the U.S. government worried about Soviet plans to interfere with the airlift, or to launch an attack on West Berlin, which could easily escalate to a global war.


In March 1948, the American military governor of Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, wrote to the director of the Army's intelligence division at the Pentagon, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, that he (Clay) had hitherto considered war unlikely, but that within the last few weeks, "I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me the feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness."[59] The message "fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb" in Washington, according to the journalist Walter Millis. Some historians have argued that Clay sent the telegram in response to pressure from military leaders in Washington, who had solicited a fear-mongering message from Clay as a tool in the congressional fight for the reintroduction of universal military training.[60] Others have suggested that the message reflected real concerns of the general about heightened Soviet aggression.[61] Whatever prompted Clay to send this explosive telegram, his reasoning could not have been based on SIGINT.

The Allies had multiple SIGINT sources on the Soviets during the crisis. The ASAE listening posts at Herzo Base and Scheyern had monitored low-level Soviet military communications in Germany since 1947, and in March 1948, ASAE ratcheted up



Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial

Stephen Chamberlin, shown here as a colonel, c. 1942



Courtesy of the German Historical Museum

General Clay (right) with an unidentified officer

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its intercept operations aimed at the Soviet forces. In the same month, ASA began issuing highly classified "Berlin Intelligence Warning" messages, conveying the latest intelligence estimates concerning the Berlin crisis to top military leaders, including General Clay in Berlin and Generals Bradley and Chamberlin at the Pentagon. An ASAE-trained and -equipped group of former German SIGINT officers, operating from Kransberg Castle as part of Operation RUSTY, intercepted Soviet Air Force traffic.[62] CISD secretly intercepted Soviet and East German landline traffic passing through the repeater station in Frankfurt and the main telephone exchange in western Berlin. Moreover, ASAE asked CISD to intercept international telegraph traffic on ten circuits at their section in Nuremberg. The detachment obliged, and within a few weeks, sent twenty-seven rolls of tapes with intercepted telegraph messages, consisting of 24,000 feet.[63] In addition, the British provided intercepts from Soviet communication systems in Europe, and ASA Pacific kept an eye on the location of Soviet units in East Asia, whose transfer westward might indicate that Moscow was preparing for a military confrontation in Germany. According to former U.S. Army and SIGINT officials, ASA headquarters at Arlington Hall, where all this data was collected and analyzed, produced "moderately good to excellent intelligence reporting on Soviet military activities in East Germany prior to and during" the blockade.[64]

To be sure, SIGINT did not constitute the U.S. government's only source of information on Soviet capabilities and intentions during the Berlin Blockade. By 1948, the intelligence division of the U.S. Army had an extensive network of agents in the Soviet Zones, which delivered a wide range of information on political, economic, and military matters. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) at Potsdam proved a particularly valuable source during the blockade. Established in April 1947, the mission consisted of fourteen U.S. military officers who resided in Potsdam inside the Soviet Zone. Originally set up to facilitate a liaison between the Soviet and U.S. military forces in Germany, members of the mission could travel freely across the Soviet Zone, and used their special status to monitor and report on Moscow's forces there. During the blockade, officers from the mission conducted daily "field trips" to determine the location and strength of specific units.[65]

Intelligence collected by spies, USMLM officers, ASAE, and other sources suggested that the Soviets were indeed moving military units across their occupation zone in the spring of 1948. Some American officials construed these moves as indicators that the Soviets were preparing to attack Berlin or interfere with the airlift, however, U.S. intelligence sources indicated that the Soviets were not adding any troops to their forces from outside Germany, but were simply moving units across their occupation zone. Throughout 1948, Army intelligence estimated the strength of Soviet forces in Germany at 324,000 to 350,000.[66] These numbers were remarkably close to actual Soviet troop strength, which amounted to 350,000 during this time period.[67] Since Moscow was not increasing its troop strength in Germany, the shifting of forces across their zone suggested that the Soviets were trying to create the impression of imminent military action in order to force the Allies out of Berlin, while in reality they had no intention of attacking. Careful monitoring of Soviet communications confirmed that the Soviets were neither preparing for an attack, nor for interference with the airlift. In the words of one intelligence historian, therefore, the blockade represented "a Russian hoax from beginning to end." General Clay later wrote in his memoirs that intelligence that came to his desk did not suggest the Soviets were planning an attack, and two former NSA officials recalled that decrypts of Soviet military traffic were important in helping convince senior White House and Pentagon officials that Soviet military threats in Germany and around Berlin "were nothing more than a highly elaborate bluff."[68] Indeed, when Stalin realized that the blockade had failed to force the Allies out of Berlin, he chose to end it, rather than resort to military action.

PUTTING ASAE ON A PERMANENT FOOTING

The U.S. State Department replaced the Army as the top American occupation authority in 1949, but in the context of the Cold War, Army leaders were keen on maintaining their extensive intelligence collection apparatus in Germany beyond that date. Already in the spring of 1947, General Chamberlin asked General Clay to ensure that "certain communication intelligence facilities [would remain] under American control" after the military occupation had ended.[69] In February 1948, ASA chief Col. Harold G. Hayes referred to the "paramount importance" of ASAE, and urged "that every effort should be made to continued functioning of these installations."[70] These efforts bore fruit. The occupation statute of May 1949 ensured that U.S. intelligence agencies, including ASAE, would not be restricted by local laws when the Army handed over the reins to the civilian Allied High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG), and



General Hayes, c. 1955

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the Federal Republic of Germany was established, in September 1949.[71]

With its institutional and operational continuity under HICOG assured, ASAE set about expanding its facilities and increasing its personnel. In 1950, ASAE established a permanent intercept station at Rothwesten in northern Hesse, about ten miles from the border with the GDR.[72] Two years later, the agency stood up a unit at Bad Aibling, which in 1955 absorbed ASAE personnel who left newly independent Austria.[73] During this time ASAE also set up minor stations in Heilbronn, Bamberg, Heidelberg, Mt. Schneeberg, and Seckenheim. In 1955, the agency established the 22d ASA Detachment in West Berlin, inaugurating the long-term presence of American SIGINT in that city. Initially consisting of five officers and thirty enlisted men, the detachment identified, intercepted, and processed electronic intelligence.[74] In 1950, ASAE had a personnel strength of 84 officers and 1,177 enlisted men.[75] In 1952, the number of agency personnel totaled 3,800 persons,[76] and by 30 June 1954, this figure had increased to about 4,500.[77] This made ASAE one of the largest, if not *the* largest, American intelligence agency in Western Europe. By comparison, the Central Intelligence Agency, the organization nominally in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence community, purportedly had 1,700 staff employees in Germany in the early 1950s.[78]

As HICOG prepared for West German sovereignty, American authorities began negotiating the legal framework of U.S. intelligence in West Germany with the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. From these talks resulted two secret memoranda of understanding that spelled out the legal authority of Allied intelligence operations after the Federal Republic gained limited sovereignty in 1955. In them, the Adenauer government agreed that the Western Allied intelligence agencies would have the ability to continue their operations with few restrictions. This authority included the conduct of SIGINT operations on West German territory. The need of the Allies to protect their military forces in Germany served as the legal rationale for this agreement. As the Army's European Command noted with satisfaction in its annual report for 1952, the two secret memoranda "provided for the retention of most of the rights considered essential in intelligence operations."[79]

Indeed, the formal end of the Allied occupation in 1955 hardly disrupted or restricted Allied SIGINT operations in Germany. In the 1950s, ASAE established fixed and mobile radio intercept stations in the British Zone, along the border of the newly established GDR, while the Americans granted the British permission to establish a high-frequency direction-finding station in Landsberg in southern Bavaria, in the U.S. Zone.[80] Likewise, CISD and ASAE continued their intercept operations inside West Germany and Berlin. In the month of October 1954 alone, CISD intercepted almost 700,000 cable and teletype messages on behalf of ASAE. In 1955, the detachment tapped more than 500 telephone lines and 250 teletype machines in West Germany.[81] By 1957, the Allies monitored over 5 million telephone conversations in West Germany per year. In addition, they greatly expanded their mail interception operations, which they carried out with the help of local Deutsche Post offices. In 1960 alone, they checked 4.6 million mail items.[82]

Cold War tensions led ASAE to continue focusing its resources on the Soviet forces in Germany throughout the 1950s. On 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea launched a surprise attack on the pro-Western Republic of South Korea. Given the division of Germany into a pro-Western and a pro-Soviet state, many West Germans feared a similar attack from the East, causing widespread fear and panic among the population. German citizens begged the American high commissioner for air tickets out of the country, and in Bonn, the capital of the Federal Republic, Chancellor Adenauer requested 200 automatic pistols to defend his office building.[83] Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence sought to detect any signs of an impending attack from the East. As it turned out, the Soviet troops stayed in their barracks, but in the wake of the Korean War the Army's European intelligence division directed ASAE to build a system for early warning indications of the imminence of hostilities based on Soviet troop movements. The agency established rapid means of communications to quickly relay any signs of an impending attack, and assigned a special liaison officer to the Army's intelligence headquarters at Frankfurt.[84]

By the mid-1950s, ASAE had become one of the most powerful tools of the U.S. government for the gathering of intelligence from Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. Events



An ASAE truck and antenna field in Germany

Courtesy of Walter Elkins

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in Hungary in 1956 illustrated the agency's value. In that year, an uprising shook the Communist government of Hungary, and the political future of the country came to depend on the reaction of the Soviet forces based there. As the riots in Hungary continued, the ASAE listening post at Bad Aibling on 24 October picked up an order to the 2d Guards Mechanized Division of the Soviet forces in Hungary. The message ordered the unit, stationed fifty miles outside Budapest, to move on the capital and use its tanks' cannon against the rebels. Other intercepts suggested that, after heavy street fighting in Budapest, Soviet forces pulled back before regrouping and, with massive reinforcements, moved once again on the capital on 2 November, this time crushing the rebellion for good.[85]

East German Communications

In addition to Soviet communication networks in Eastern Europe, the GDR emerged as another important ASAE target during the early Cold War. Established in 1949, the state was home to the largest concentration of Soviet forces outside the USSR, and in case of war, the West expected the main thrust of a Soviet attack to come from East Germany. By monitoring the communications of East German institutions and organizations, the Americans sought to collect military, political, and economic intelligence in this strategically important Soviet satellite country.

ASAE profited from the fact that East German government organizations generally failed to practice good communications during the early Cold War. For example, the East German police (*Volkspolizei*) used the World War II era Enigma machine to encipher its radio traffic until at least 1956. Because the Allies had broken this system during the war, Western codebreakers had no difficulty reading intercepted police messages.[86] The structural weakness of the East German communications network provided another opportunity for ASAE interceptors. Many telegraph and telephone wires in Germany had been destroyed during the war. In the American occupation zone, the U.S. Army's Signal Corps quickly rebuilt critical facilities and landlines, creating a secure communications network for the American occupation authorities. In the Soviet Zone, the opposite happened. The Soviets removed machinery and other hardware on a grand scale from their occupation zone after the war. This effort included parts of the telephone communications network. An East German engineer who had fled to the West told the Americans that the Soviets had systematically dismantled telephone and telegraph cables, and shipped them to the USSR, without replacing them.[87] For several years, therefore, East German authorities had to rely on what little remained of the severely damaged wartime wire network for internal communications. A popular uprising against Communist rule in the GDR in 1953 demonstrated the inadequacy of this system when government communications broke down in many places, hampering the regime's ability to deal with the rebellion. As the East German security apparatus buckled under popular pressure, Soviet forces had to move in to squash the uprising.

In the wake of the 1953 uprising, the Communist East Berlin government decided to establish its own, wireless communications system that would be less vulnerable in times of upheaval. This network, known as *Richtfunknetz der Partei* (RFN, "directional transmission network" of the Communist Party), rested on a series of so-called "A-Towers" across East Germany. The towers enabled party headquarters in Berlin and local centers to communicate with each other by means of microwave links that relayed telephone and teleprinter signals, so they did not have to rely on the damaged and partially dismantled cable wire system. The RFN system allowed for reliable and instantaneous communications, and in the 1960s, the East German Army adopted its use as well.[88]

The Americans quickly learned of the existence of the RNF, and ASAE managed to intercept transmissions between individual A-Towers from locations in West Berlin and West Germany. ASAE voice operators supervised large numbers of voice-activated tape recorders that sprang into action as soon as a Communist official in East Germany picked up their phone. As a Berlin-based ASAE voice intercept operator recalled: "Any time someone in the Central Committee picked up a phone, one of the recorders in my bank of recorders would click on. I didn't totally understand how they did it, but we were warned that if the East Germans found out they could shut it down very easily."[89] Eventually, the East German Ministry for State Security became aware of these



Courtesy of Andreas Fränzel

A modern-day photo of a former East German "A-Tower"

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activities. East German officials limited their use of the system, however, they apparently did not end it altogether. The RFN thus continued to provide the Americans with information on a range of aspects of East German political, economic, and military issues for much of the Cold War.[90]

Other Western intelligence agencies operating against East Germany also profited from ASAE expertise. In the mid-1950s, the CIA and the British intelligence service, SIS, dug a tunnel from West Berlin into East Berlin, in an effort to surreptitiously tap East German and Soviet communication cables (Operation GOLD). The operation was the brainchild of the CIA's Berlin station chief, William King "Bill" Harvey. Although the National Security Agency provided SIGINT support to Operation GOLD , Harvey considered a former ASAE officer, detailed to the CIA, his most important asset. As Harvey's biographer noted, the former ASAE man "was Bill Harvey's soul mate. They worked almost literally hand in glove." For over a year, the tunnel produced a steady flow of intercepts, until the East Germans "accidentally" discovered it after a British double agent betrayed the operation to Soviet intelligence.[91]

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

The value of an intelligence agency is measured not only by the amount of information it collects, but by how well it protects its operations from foreign penetrations. Most intelligence services have counterintelligence departments designed to do just that, and ASAE was no exception. Its Operations Division included a security branch, headquartered at Frankfurt, and small security detachments were attached to ASAE units throughout Germany. The branch maintained a cryptologic repair school for the maintenance of the agency's technical equipment. Its mission included the monitoring of communications security of ASAE as well as of Army organizations throughout Europe. The branch reported to the ASAE director and worked closely with the security branch at ASA headquarters, Arlington Hall.[92]

Security started at the most basic level with the physical protection of ASAE sites. Military police and the 4086th Labor Supervision Company, made up of Polish nationals, guarded ASAE's biggest installation—Herzo Base. The company manned guard towers constructed at intervals along the perimeter fence and equipped with floodlights. Enlisted Army personnel secured ASAE headquarters at Frankfurt. Regular checks ensured that the guard system worked satisfactorily.[93]

The maintenance of physical security included the safeguarding of the agency's cryptomaterial. The ASAE's Command Issuing Office at Frankfurt served as the central repository of ciphering equipment for Army units across Europe. In times of peace, this location was considered secure, but as the outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950 conjured up the specter of a sudden Soviet invasion, the Army in October decided to move its sensitive SIGINT equipment to London, into a block of buildings near Grosvenor Square.[94] In the following years, ASAE drew up plans for an emergency evacuation of its headquarters and three field stations, in Herzogenaurach, Scheyern, and Baumholder, to London. As the Korean War crisis subsided, however, the agency did not activate this plan, and remained in Germany.[95]

Monitoring the loyalty of its personnel constituted another safeguard



William Harvey

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against penetrations by foreign intelligence services. During the immediate postwar period, the security branch did not investigate ASAE personnel who had previously served in the military for ten years or more. As ASAE grew, however, the agency adopted stringent security regulations.

As of 18 September 1946, military ASAE personnel were barred from having an "intimate connection" with a foreigner. Employees had to be U.S. citizens, "preferably native born, with trustworthy character and unquestioned financial habits."[96] In September 1949, a new regulation mandated that all personnel assigned to SIGINT duties undergo a thorough security review, and that the security clearance of an individual be revoked as soon as they applied for marriage to a foreign national. Moreover, while other American intelligence agencies operating in Europe employed a fair number of Germans or individuals with a German background, ASAE preferred to recruit American-born individuals and train them in language and cryptanalytic skills before they came to Europe.[97] As one ASAE veteran recalls: "ASA never trusted any German nationals. Absolutely no Germans were allowed in any ASA activities, duties, etc. linguistic-oriented or non-language-oriented jobs. The only jobs I ever saw where Germans worked were in security such as guarding outward perimeters of installations."[98] In addition, the agency barred U.S. intelligence personnel with a foreign background from access to its product. Peter M. F. Sichel, the German-born postwar deputy chief of the CIA station in Berlin, notes: "I was never cleared for signal intelligence, no one who was foreign born was at the time."[99]

The central mission of the security branch focused on the maintenance of the Army's cipher equipment and making sure that units practiced good communications security. To ensure this, the branch regularly intercepted unencrypted and encrypted Army messages to determine whether communications personnel handled their equipment according to regulations and whether they enciphered messages properly. These checks revealed that breaches were common. For example, in the first half of fiscal year 1949 alone, security violations totaled 2,359 out of 3,745 intercepted messages. The fact that the number declined in the second half of the fiscal year, to 710 out of 2,841 messages, suggests that the checks helped improve the situation. In early 1947, the branch also examined unenciphered messages sent between the War Department and European headquarters at Frankfurt to determine how much an adversary might be able to learn from this information.[100]

As part of its security mission, the branch monitored not only communications of the Army in Europe at large, but those of ASAE personnel as well. These monitoring operations, too, revealed or confirmed security breaches. For example, a communications security intercept operator with the 319th Army Security Agency Battalion at Würzburg recalled that "we caught a sergeant in the Division Signal unit providing Signal Security codes to an East German spy via wiretap." Occasionally, ASAE security personnel used their tools to fix issues that lay outside the realm of national security. The same specialist of the 319th Army Security Agency Battalion recalled the following incident:

> I was doing a wiretap at one of the Kasernes [military installations] of 3rd [*sic*] Div Signal units and one of the lines I was monitoring was of an individual that had been giving us a little "grief". The wiretap board that I was using had cords and jacks that allowed me to select different lines and had a toggle switch arrangement to sync into my head phones. If I happened to flip a toggle on one line say "up" and another line "down" the two lines could hear each other. Well, this particular individual received a phone call from his wife and the company clerk who received the call put her on hold. I happened to note that this individual was on another line talking to his German girlfriend. Yep, so I "accidently" [*sic*] on purpose flipped the toggles so that his wife was able to listen to him speaking to his Girl Friend.[101]

All these security measures, however, would have counted for little if the intelligence services of the Soviet Union or one of its satellites had managed to insert a spy into ASAE, who could have betrayed the agency's modus operandi and its ciphers. Soviet bloc penetration would not have been extraordinary as Soviet and East German intelligence agencies succeeded in penetrating several major Western secret services during the early Cold War. Soviet intelligence ran high-level spies in the British service, and both the Soviets and East Germans had several sources within West Germany's federal intelligence service. The CIA, too, quickly fell victim to Soviet espionage when its first station chief in Moscow succumbed to the lures of his Russian housemaid, who turned out to be a Soviet intelligence operative.[102] Neither did ASAE's parent organization, the ASA, remain immune to foreign espionage.

Sometime before World War II, Soviet intelligence recruited a Russian-born American Communist sympathizer, William Weisband, as a courier for Moscow's agents in New York. During the war, Weisband joined the Army's SIGINT service, and in 1945, he transitioned to the Army Security Agency where he became a lead translator for decrypted Soviet messages. The Soviets broke off contact with Weisband at the end of the war, for fear that he might be exposed, but they reactivated him in early 1948, and handled him under the codenames "Zhora," "Link," and "Vasin."[103] The revival of Weisband's espionage career coincided with one of the biggest Western SIGINT setbacks of the early Cold War. For several months, ASA had noted that the Soviets were continuously improving their communications security, making it harder for American codebreakers to read Moscow's traffic.[104] Between Friday, 29 October, and Monday, 1 November 1948, the Soviets then suddenly changed virtually all their ciphers on their military, naval, and police networks. In addition, they shifted much of their communications traffic from radio to landlines, placing it out of reach of Western interceptors. This move constituted the shutting down of a major source of information, and became known as "Black Friday"

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among U.S. SIGINT personnel. In a damage assessment, the chief of ASA, Colonel Hayes, suspected that "leakage of information"—that is, espionage—"had been the primary cause." Subsequent investigations identified two spies inside Western intelligence, including Weisband, who had knowledge of ASA's cryptanalytic work against the Soviets.[105] In 1950, the ongoing decryption of Soviet wartime intelligence messages (Project VENONA), led the FBI to identify Weisband as a wartime Soviet spy. Since the government feared that Weisband would reveal top secret intelligence in court, he escaped a trial for espionage, but he had to leave government service, and eventually served one year in prison for contempt of court when he failed to appear for a federal grand jury hearing on the Communist Party of the USA.[106]

If Weisband's case demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. SIGINT to foreign espionage, to date no comparable case has come to light with regard to the European headquarters of the ASA. In fact, there is a good amount of circumstantial evidence to suggest that Soviet intelligence and their allies had only a hazy sense of ASAE's existence and mission. For one, available Soviet intelligence documents make no mention of ASAE. Although the number of accessible Soviet intelligence records remains decidedly limited, they do confirm many cases of penetration of Western secret services, including the CIA, the NSA, and MI6, but not ASAE.[107] Moreover, no documents have yet emerged from the archives of the East German intelligence service that would suggest a successful penetration of ASAE. In their book on U.S. intelligence operations in Germany during the Cold War, two former East German counterintelligence officers mention ASA only in passing. They reveal that their service managed to recruit a source inside ASAE's successor organization, the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), in the 1980s. Their failure to mention any East German intelligence operations against American SIGINT in Germany prior to that date suggests that there may have been none.[108]

The lack of references to ASAE in both the East and West German press is another indicator that the agency managed to shield itself from prying eyes. From the early 1950s, the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) collected reams of sensitive or compromising information about Western intelligence services, such as the names of individual officers, the location of safe houses, or on specific operations. They passed some of this information on to journalists who published it in the newspaper of the East German Communist Party, *Neues Deutschland*, or in monographs, in an effort to expose the activities of the Western services.[109] The CIA and the BND constituted the principal targets of these campaigns, but the revelations included references to other services as well, such as the U.S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps as well as British and French intelligence agencies. Yet they did not reference ASAE. Because there is no obvious reason why the Stasi would have withheld information on the ASAE, the lack of relevant leaks might indicate that the East German spies did not have anything to share.

The West German press, too, relished the publication of stories about western intelligence services, especially when it came to the Gehlen organization and its successor, the BND. As early as 1954, Gehlen himself made it onto the front page of the Federal Republic's premier weekly magazine, *Der Spiegel*, a dubious accomplishment for the chief of a secret service.[110] Yet one looks in vain for explicit references to ASAE in the proliferating stories on intelligence in the West German press of the 1950s. Only in 1960 did the press in Germany refer directly to U.S. SIGINT activities, after two employees of the National Security Agency had defected to Moscow, and gave a press conference.[111] They revealed nothing publicly about ASA operations in Europe, however. Not until 1963 did the West German press refer obliquely to U.S. SIGINT activities in Germany. In that year, the weekly magazine *Die Zeit* published an article that took aim at the Federal Republic's domestic security service, the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV), for employing former Nazi officials as well as for monitoring mail and telephone calls. In an aside, the article noted that the Allies had the contractual right to intercept mail and telephone calls in West Germany, however, *Die Zeit* did not pursue this angle, and mentioned neither CISD's nor ASAE's involvement in these activities.[112]

Ultimately, the answer to the question how much Soviet and East German intelligence agencies knew about the operations of ASAE in early Cold War Europe lies in the Soviet and East German intelligence archives in Moscow and Berlin. Until records surface that indicate otherwise, the available evidence suggests that they



A mobile ASAE station near St. Andreasberg, Germany, c. 1960

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knew very little about the agency's operations in Europe. Several reasons may account for the comparative impenetrability of ASAE. First, ASAE practiced better security than other Western agencies, and these measures might have worked. Second, ASAE avoided exposure to Soviet bloc espionage by keeping heavily penetrated West German intelligence agencies, such as the BfV and the BND, at arm's length. Third, human intelligence agencies such as the CIA and the Gehlen organizations relied heavily on German nationals in their operations, and the Soviets and East German services excelled at recruiting and turning some of these individuals into double agents. Since SIGINT collected information by technical means, not through humans, it remained largely immune from this vulnerability. Fourth, the Soviets and East Germans themselves greatly favored human intelligence over SIGINT collection. Therefore, they may have been more inclined to penetrate their foreign counterparts, rather than a SIGINT service whose modus operandi they did not fully comprehend. Whatever the case, until proven otherwise, it appears that ASAE managed to keep its operations secret to a larger degree than its various Western sister services.

Mission Accomplished?

Established in 1945, the ASAE held a near-monopoly on American SIGINT operations in Europe for seven years. Following the creation of the National Security Agency in 1952, ASAE continued to staff and operate intercept stations, while the NSA gradually assumed control of and integrated the American SIGINT effort. The life span of the ASA and its European headquarters as America's premier SIGINT agency was thus limited. Nevertheless, the agency functioned during a momentous and dangerous time period, during which the wartime alliance collapsed, and the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on the edge of war as each side sought to shape the new postwar world order to its own advantage.

ASAE did not run flawlessly. Originally, the agency had not been designed to focus its capabilities almost exclusively on the Soviet Union and its satellites, and it took ASAE several years to produce intercepts on a large scale and on a regular basis from behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, especially in the late 1940s, the agency faced personnel issues, as it struggled to find and retain qualified cryptanalysts and interceptors to staff its stations in Germany. And while ASA and NSA worked closely with their British counterpart, they kept German intelligence agencies at a distance, leading West German government circles to grumble about American uncooperativeness.

Yet for all their imperfections, ASA and ASAE managed to produce large amounts of accurate, timely, and pertinent intelligence on the Soviet Union and its armed forces just as the Cold War in Europe was heating up. Moreover, the agency provided the critical link that ensured organizational continuity between the American SIGINT effort during World War II and its Cold War operations led by the NSA. By 1952, Western observers had few illusions about the longevity of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and thanks to the continued operations of ASA and ASAE, the NSA did not have to start operations from scratch, but could draw on the facilities and trained personnel of its Army predecessor. If SIGINT constituted one the most important providers of secret information to American policymakers during the Cold War, ASAE should be considered one of the most relevant American intelligence agencies in early Cold War Europe.

Editor's Note

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Notes

1. *Semper Vigilis* (Vigilant Always) was the official motto of the Army Security Agency.

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3. David Alvarez, "Trying to Make the MAGIC Last: American Diplomatic Codebreaking in the Early Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 5 (2007): 868.

4. James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan, eds., *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), p. 96.

5. Alvarez, "Trying to Make the MAGIC Last," pp. 866–69, note 8.

6. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America's Most Secret Intelligence Organization* (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 397.

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10. *Post War Transition Period: The Army Security Agency, 1945–1948* (Washington, D.C.: Chief, Army Security Agency, 1952), p. 8.

11. Matthew M. Aid, *The Secret Sentry: The Secret History of the National Security Agency* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), p. 11.

12. *Post War Transition Period*, p. 14.

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14. Memo, Office of the Coordinator and Special Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Bonn, sub: Sketch of U.S. Formal Intelligence Relationships with West Germany (1945–56), 15 Jun 1956, folder GFA 10 – Intelligence (1956), Office of German Affairs, Records Relating to Negotiations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Germany, 1954–1959, RG 59, NACP.

15. Joseph Foschepoth, *Überwachtes Deutschland: Post- und Telefonüber-wachung in der alten Bundesrepublik* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), p. 275.

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16. Richard G. Davis, *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993), p. 510; George R. Thompson and Dixie E. Harris, *The U.S. Army in World War II. The Signal Corps: The Outcome* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), p. 173.

17. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946*, p. 27; *Post War Transition Period*, pp. 19, 48; information on location of ASAE headquarters within I.G. Farben Building provided by ASAE veteran Bill Wagner, http://www.usarmygermany.com.

18. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1949*, p. 2.

19. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946*, p. 27; *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1948*, p. 41; *Post War Transition Period*, p. 72.

20. Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany* (Darmstadt: USAREUR Historical Office, 1953), p. 33; Department of War/Department of the Army, *Strength of the Army* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942 ff.), pp. 6, 14; *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946*, pp. 8–9.

21. Msg, CO USFET Frankfurt, Germany, to CO USFET Rear, Paris, France, 27 Nov 1945; *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946*, appendix. ASAE employed additional personnel at headquarters and other field units, but exact numbers for the first few months are hard to come by because personnel strength fluctuated widely due to the consolidation of Army signals intelligence units in Germany and large-scale demobilization.

22. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1949*, p. 64.

23. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946*, p. 28.

24. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1949*, p. 64.

25. *Army Security Agency Summary Report, Fiscal Year 1950*, p. 15.

26. Lori Tagg, "A Brief History of Training in Army Intelligence," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 38, no. 3 (July–September 2012): 89–91.

27. *Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1947*, p. 24.

28. ANCICC Subcommittee on Intercept [*sic*], 20 Jun 1945, National Security Archive. This target priority list included "Great Britain, Russia, France, Netherlands, China, Argentina, and colonies" in the top category ("A"), and Germany and Japan in the second-last category ("C").

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
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U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

Protecting the Doughboys

The Development of American Body Armor During World War I

By Carrie Gabarée

After the American entrance into the Great War, the Army General Staff was determined to outfit doughboys for this new industrialized warfare by reintroducing body armor. Professor Bashford Dean, the curator of arms and armor at New York City's Metropolitan Museum of Art, was commissioned as an Army major in the Ordnance Department and named chairman of the National Research Council's Committee on Helmets and Body Armor. At the time, Dean was a leading American expert on armor and metallurgy.[1]

Although the committee's primary mission was to create a practical and uniquely American helmet that maximized protection, Dean also set out to create a full body suit of armor, which would be the first time since the 1600s that such suits had been utilized. Dean worked with the Metropolitan Museum of Art's armorer, Daniel Tachaux, to create prototypes. General John J. Pershing, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, supported the development of body armor and, consequently, the Ordnance Department reviewed approximately thirty prototypes, a select number of which were sent overseas. However, research does not indicate that any of the armor received successful ratings.[2]

The two main types of armor were heavy and light. The advantage of the heavy was that it protected the wearer from rifle and machine gun fire, however, its weight restricted movement, making it primarily useful for sentinels, machine gunners, and those defending shell holes. The heavy armor illustrated here is .185 inches thick and weighed about twenty-seven pounds. The reverse shows the bands that held the armor pieces in place and helped distribute that weight across the torso.

The light body armor was more comfortable but only offered protection against shrapnel and pistol fire. It consisted of multiple plates connected by leather straps and was considered to be custom fitted with the potential removal of a plate. The steel was not more than .04 inches thick and weighed less than eight pounds.[3]

Designers also created leg and arm (not pictured) coverings because of the high number of wounds in the extremities that were occurring with trench warfare. However, only about fifty pairs of leg armor were made; they received negative feedback, which halted further efforts. The armor that covered the entire leg could stop a revolver bullet from a distance of ten feet and weighed seven and a half pounds.

For each arm the armor was made up of five individual plates, which weighed a total of about eleven pounds. Like the armor for other parts of the body, the sections were connected by strips of leather. In terms of protection, the arm defenses provided the same security as the leg armor. Arm armor was tested in limited numbers overseas and, similar to the leg armor, received poor marks.[4]

None of Dean's body armor prototype designs were officially approved or issued during World War I, but his work created a foundation for successors who continued the mission of creating an ideal body armor for U.S. troops.[5]

Carrie Gabarée serves as a museum curator at the Museum Support Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

AH

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NMUSA Feature

"The Big Four" Move In!

By Dr. Patrick R. Jennings

Once completed, the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) will host nineteen large artifacts referred to as "macros," or "macro-artifacts," that will serve as cornerstones in telling the Army's history. Over the summer, during the early stages of the museum's construction, the four largest of these artifacts were installed.

The Renault Light Tank known as the "Five of Hearts" is the only surviving U.S. tank that saw combat in World War I. In October 1918, it participated in an attack near Exermont, France. Due to strong enemy defenses, fresh troops had to replace wounded crewmen twice during the intense action. Today, the "Five of Hearts," scheduled for display in the museum's Nation Overseas gallery, shows scars from hundreds of enemy rounds. Its first driver, Cpl. Horatio Roberts, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism during the battle.[1]

The experiences of the U.S. Army Tank Corps in World War I were not dismissed with the end of that conflict. During World War II, the Army was quick to learn the strengths and weaknesses of its armor doctrine and designs. Tanks were modified in both the factory and field to improve their performance. One of the final products of that innovation is the M4A3E2 Sherman tank. The tank, named "Cobra King," was the first to break through German lines surrounding the beleaguered soldiers at Bastogne in the winter of 1944. "Cobra King" is displayed in the Global War gallery as part of a tableau showing the moment of the breakthrough.[2]

Another iconic artifact from World War II is the flat-bottomed boat known as a Landing Craft Vehicle–Personnel (LCVP), or simply the "Higgins Boat." Designed to be built quickly and cheaply, it was used in every theater of World War II. A veteran of the landings at Utah Beach on 6 June 1944, the LCVP featured here is displayed in the Global War gallery and is marked as a vessel from the troop transport USS *Joseph T. Dickman* (APA-13).[3]

The next macro placed on site is the ubiquitous M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, assigned to Troop A, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry. In 2003, this M3 led the advance from Kuwait to the edge of Baghdad. From there, Troop A swept north of the city to screen the now famous "Thunder Run." There they destroyed twenty enemy T72 tanks and blunted all enemy counterattacks, thus allowing the Army to secure the Baghdad airport and open the door to Iraq's capital city. This M3 is on display in the Changing World gallery.

NMUSA refers to these artifacts as "the Big Four," and they are currently encased in protective structures as the museum is being built around them. Although important to the construction timeline, they are just four of more than 1,300 items that will be on display in the six Fighting for the Nation galleries and the adjoining Army and Society gallery; each artifact is as important as the next in helping tell the story of the U.S. Army. Construction of the museum is progressing and it is slated to open in late 2019.

Dr. Patrick R. Jennings is the chief of programs and education at the National Museum of the United States Army.

AH


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Visit www.theNMUSA.org for more information about the National Museum of the United States Army project, and the Army Historical Foundation's Web site for construction updates at www.armyhistory.org.

NATIONAL MUSEUM
UNITED STATES
ARMY



This August 2017 photo of the NMUSA construction site shows the macro artifacts in place and protected by the white box-like structures. /Aerial photography courtesy of Col. Duane Lempke (USA, Ret.)

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Renault FT17 Tank, "Five of Hearts"











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M4A3E2 Sherman Tank, "Cobra King"











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Landing Craft Vehicle–Personnel, "Higgins Boat"











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M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle











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PREVIEW CHAPTER


CHAPTER 3:
THE ROAD TO BERLIN

FROM *THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL: THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF BERLIN, 1945–1949*

BY DONALD A. CARTER AND WILLIAM STIVERS

On 4 July 1945, an epilogue to World War II in Europe unfolded in Berlin. Assembling on the grounds of the former Prussian Military Cadet Academy, the onetime home of Hitler's SS bodyguard regiment in the western district of Steglitz, one company of American armored troops lined up opposite one company of Soviet infantry. Having arrived just the day before, the Americans symbolized the larger force that would enter the U.S. Sector over the following days. Soviet Brig. Gen. Nicolai Baranov was the first to speak. He lavished praise on the "great American democracy," extolled its role as "arsenal of the United Nations," and lauded the "gallant American forces" who destroyed the enemy on the Western front. He tempered his encomiums, however, by claiming that the Soviets had guaranteed that success when they "broke the back of the German Army" in 1943–1944 and "nailed down" its "chief forces" in the East. He then relinquished the sector to the United States. General Omar N. Bradley, who had flown from Frankfurt especially for the occasion, accepted on behalf of General Dwight D. Eisenhower with words of praise for the Red Army and hopes of lasting friendship. As the parade ground resonated to the playing of national anthems, the Soviet flag was lowered and the American flag raised. The Soviet company then departed, followed by its band playing a Soviet march.[1]

The ceremony at the cadet academy culminated the long advance of U.S. forces from the Normandy beachhead into the enemy's capital. At the same time, it marked a symbolic transition into their postwar mission of occupation and political control. The preparation for that mission had been underway many long months before the fighting ceased.





Colonel Howley, deputy commandant and head of U.S. Office of Military Government in Berlin

MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR BERLIN

In October 1944, Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1, then serving in Paris, received the mission of forming the U.S. military government for Berlin. After learning the news, the unit's commander, Col. Frank L. Howley, decided to transfer his men to the countryside for a period of training and classroom education. Already familiar with the Paris region from his years as a student of art at the Sorbonne, Howley selected an exclusive resort chalet in the village of Barbizon, near Versailles. The motive for this action, as Howley put it, "was to live like gentlemen, study like scholars, and train like soldiers," while "recovering physically from the joys of Paris."[2] After billeting in Troyes in November and December, Howley's unit first occupied the facility in early January and remained until the end of March 1945. During their sojourn in the two French towns, the detachment's officers studied German politics, history, society, and language as well as the administrative organization of Berlin, its public utilities, and its system of food handling. Walter Dorn, a civil-

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ian adviser to the Office of Strategic Services, helped to design the program of instruction and furnished a library assembled from materials confiscated in the occupied eastern Rhineland.[3]

An advertising executive in civilian life, Howley was no obvious choice to lead the U.S. military government in Berlin. Although fluent in French, he spoke no German and had little prior knowledge of German affairs. Nonetheless, he was politically shrewd, quick to learn, and a talented propagandist. As he led his unit from its first assignment in Cherbourg, then to Paris, and ultimately to Berlin, he attracted glowing mention from American newsmen and diligently saved his clippings. In Paris, he even managed good reviews from the Communist Party newspaper *L'Humanité*.[4] Throughout 1945 and into 1946, Howley would cast himself as a tough dealer who got on with the Russians and made quadripartite government work by meeting them on level ground with lusty drinking and roughhouse give-and-take.[5]

While in Barbizon, the detachment grew toward its authorized strength of 227 officers and enlisted personnel. Although no one was as flamboyant as the commander, the men resembled him in several key respects. Most were professionals in early middle age—on average 42-years-old. Few were career soldiers, and fewer still possessed expertise on Germany or a workable command of the German language. Instead, their strengths lay in technical areas—medicine, justice, law enforcement, journalism, education, and engineering—generically useful in managing a city. To help compensate for language deficiencies—scarcely remediable in only six months of part-time instruction—Howley took special pains to requisition a troop of interpreters and translators before leaving Barbizon.[6]

The unit's organization paralleled the administrative structure of Greater Berlin. Its main sections—Economic Affairs, Public Safety, Public Works and Utilities, Education and Religious Affairs, Communications, Finance, Justice, and Public Health—corresponded to the executive departments of the city's government, while six local subdetachments, consisting of four to eight officers, corresponded to the district administrations of the American Sector. The only sections with no parallels in city government were Intelligence and Information Services Control.[7]

For guidance on the objectives and conduct of the occupation, detachment members could look to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) December 1944 "Handbook on Military Government in Germany." Written under General Walter Bedell Smith's direction during the autumn, it drew in part from the earliest iteration of the Treasury, State, and War Department joint directive on Germany, JCS 1067, and in part from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Field Manual, FM 27-5.[8] Because the former source emphasized punishment and control and the latter restoration, the handbook itself displayed a strain of inconsistency. Following JCS 1067, it called for the elimination of "Nazism, Fascism, German militarism, the Nazi hierarchy and their collaborators," proscribed the retention in office of "active Nazis or ardent sympathizers" even for the sake of expediency, and ruled out steps toward economic rehabilitation. "Germany," it declared, "will always be treated as a defeated country and not as a liberated country." By contrast, in line with Army civil affairs doctrine, it promulgated the principle of "indirect rule." After the removal of all objectionable officials, military governments would utilize "the civil administrative, judicial and law enforcement structure . . . to the full extent possible." Accordingly, detachments would "have the responsibility of controlling the German administrative system, not of operating it themselves," and in discharging their functions, German provincial and municipal officials would "be given full responsibility, and in consequence must be accorded some freedom in the selection of their associates."[9]

The handbook offered no instruction on the ultimate goal of the occupation—and had no basis for doing so. The first iteration of JCS 1067, dated 24 September 1944, was intended to provide short-term guidance pending the formulation of long-term policies by the Allied governments, and the field manual was a primarily a guide to the maintenance of order and public services. Whether the occupation government would retain an essentially negative character, as opposed to fostering a positive reconstruction of German society, was an unsettled question. Arguably, the answer emerged more through action and experience than through formal policies and principles.

With the preparations of military government already three months in progress, on 31 January 1945, Smith issued a directive to the commander of the Fifteenth Army, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, naming him commanding general (designate) of the Berlin occupation force, to be termed the Berlin District. A U.K.-U.S. "nucleus staff" would draw up plans for Berlin while providing the kernel of a future headquarters. Initially, this headquarters would operate jointly before splitting into separate U.S. and British organizations on the dissolution of SHAEF. Two divisions—one British, one American—would garrison the Western sectors of the city. Smith requested that the nucleus staff, designated Plans Group G, submit an outline plan by 15 March. He wanted preparations for four different cases: (1) an Anglo-American capture of Berlin in combat operations; (2) a Soviet capture of Berlin in a "fighting advance"; (3) an airborne entry into Berlin after Germany's surrender; (4) an Anglo-American overland entry into Berlin after German surrender, preceded or followed by the Soviets.[10]

After moving into office space in Versailles on 8 February, the nucleus staff went to work on the plan. Two officers made the forty-mile trip to Barbizon twice a week to coordinate their drafts with Howley.[11] On 22 February Smith issued revised instructions. Instead of preparing for four cases, the planners should assume "that the Russians would occupy Berlin before ourselves."[12]

The staff submitted its finished work to SHAEF on 13 March. After restating Smith's assumption that the Soviets would initially occupy Berlin, the paper proceeded to assess the situation in Germany's capital. While admitting the impossibility of foreseeing the consequences of a battle inside the city, the planners presumed that Berlin would

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still be functioning despite the devastation of the air war. Unlike intelligence analysts alarmed over possible German resistance in an Alpine redoubt, they anticipated no organized resistance in the capital. To the contrary, Berlin's citizens would "probably turn to the Allies to help them out of their difficulties."[13] In such a case, however, they proposed to limit assistance to medical supplies and soap. An estimated 400,000 displaced persons—mainly conscript workers—lived in the Western sectors, and they would have sole claim to imported food, blankets, and clothing. The Germans would have to feed themselves, asserted the planners; only in case of famine would Anglo-American relief goods be released to the general population. The normal provision of external supplies "required to maintain the essential life of the city" would be a responsibility of the Soviets.[14]

The plan went on to describe the structure of Berlin's government. Berlin, it explained, was *Reichsregierungsbezirk* (at the same time a municipality, a Prussian province, and a prefecture) of the Reich. It foresaw appointing an acceptable *Stadtpräsident* (the chief of the prefecture) as the supreme German official in Berlin. The Allies would charge him with responsibility for the civil government, which he would constitute according to German law. The military government would supervise German officials "at all levels." However, if the Soviets had been in the city for "some weeks" before arrival of Western forces, they might have already set up administrative machinery. In that event, the Western Allies would "fall in" with the Soviet arrangement.[15]

The plan specified four stages of movement into Berlin: preliminary reconnaissance, detailed reconnaissance, relief of Soviet troops in the Western sectors, and the final buildup. Depending on the initial availability of housing in the U.S. Sector, some troops might have to bivouac in the city park until they moved into permanent structures. In view of the anticipated length of the occupation and "the need to impress Germans," accommodations should be "the best available."[16] Engineering parties would earmark building materials for Allied use, and the military government would conscript German laborers to repair damaged buildings, paying them at the official wage rate.

As a scheme of deployment, the outline plan checked all the requisite boxes. But in other respects the porridge was thin. The plan's laissez-faire attitude in respect to food presumed not only that the city's distribution system would continue to operate, but also that Pomeranian and East Prussian farms would remain productive despite the flight of population before the Red Army. Where it derived the notion that the Soviets would take sole responsibility for external supplies was anyone's guess. The section on Berlin's administration was especially weak. Only three paragraphs long, its chief prescription was to appoint an acceptable prefect to restore municipal government. The plan failed to account for the probability that all authority would have collapsed, and that the Allies would have to reconstitute the governmental bodies themselves.

On 28 March, Plans Group G expressed further thoughts on the timing of Allied movements. The planners had hitherto envisioned that the Western powers would be entering Berlin almost immediately after its capture by the Soviets. But much had changed in the two weeks since they had submitted their paper. Following the Allied breakthroughs over the Rhine, Western armies were driving toward Central Germany. Thus, in light of that new situation, the entry of Anglo-American forces into the capital would, they thought, depend on a Soviet invitation that might not appear "until the whole of Germany is overrun and the three Allied forces have met in the middle."[17]

This prediction of delay was prescient, even if the reasons were more complicated than the planners imagined. When the fighting stopped, just five weeks later, Eisenhower's armies held one-third of the Eastern Zone of occupation. The movement of Western troops into Berlin, therefore, could occur only as part of a mutual redeployment into assigned areas. Yet, it was not apparent how and when the movements should begin—and no one was willing to start the shift without clear certainty that the other side would follow suit.

Redeployments

Franklin D. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. President Harry S. Truman had been in office a scant six days when a cable arrived from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The issue of Allied withdrawals from the Soviet Zone of occupation weighed on the prime minister's mind, and he sought Truman's ear. He began with some dubious history: "These occupational zones were outlined rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944 when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany." Although the zones could be altered only with Soviet consent, Churchill asserted, one condition should be filled before the Allies withdrew their armies, for the Americans had a "not very satisfactory proportion of food to feed the conquered population. And we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts which are, like ours, in normal times large importers of food." Therefore, until the powers had resolved this "tiresome question," the Western armies should not "move from tactical positions we have at present achieved."[18]

Churchill's message elicited a furious riposte from Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. In a memorandum to the White House chief of staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, Stettinius drew attention to the "disturbing" implications of Churchill's words. The zones of occupation, he noted, had resulted from "long and careful study and negotiation." If the U.S. or British government refused to withdraw to the agreed boundaries of their zones pending either a modification of boundaries or an agreement on food, the Soviets would consider such a bargaining position a "repudiation of our formal agreement and the resultant Soviet course of action and Soviet policy would be difficult to foresee."[19] Stettinius urged that the president and prime minister contact Joseph Stalin to settle on a date and procedure for withdrawal.[20]


Churchill bridled at the idea of retreat. In a cable to Truman on 24

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April, the prime minister abandoned the pretense of being concerned about food. Instead, he invoked naked geopolitics: "It is your troops who would suffer the most by this, being pushed back about 120 miles in the centre and yielding up to unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory."[21] He continued his barrage into early June. Coupling apocalyptic imagery with proposals for a strategic master stroke, he pressed Truman to hold U.S. forces in their "tactical" positions. Whereas a withdrawal would unleash a "tide of Russian domination," the use of those forces as "powerful bargaining counters" could force a "peaceful" settlement on Western terms.[22] Therefore, he insisted, American forces should not retreat until the Western powers had gained satisfaction over Poland, had assured themselves of the "temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany," and had ensured acceptable conditions in "Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans."[23]

In the end, Churchill could not persuade Truman to risk the repercussions of scrapping Allied commitments. When the president and his secretary of state designate, James F. Byrnes, read the minutes of the Yalta negotiations in order to determine the substance of the agreements on Poland and Eastern Europe, they perceived many ambiguities and concluded that the Soviet interpretation was at least partly credible.[24] The Yalta communiqué, which obligated the signatories to "assist" states of Central and Eastern Europe in the establishment of "broadly representative governments," appeared to be an especially elastic document.[25] The need to transfer troops and materiel from Europe to the Pacific theater spoke for caution as well, as did a Soviet promise, at Yalta, to enter the war against Japan.

Unconvinced of Churchill's arguments, Truman sent Roosevelt adviser Harry Hopkins to Moscow for talks with Stalin. In wide-ranging discussions over a twelve-day period beginning 26 May, the two men managed to paper over the Polish dispute. Stalin made a welcome concession on the issue of procedural vetoes at the United Nations, and Truman and Stalin set the



place and date—"the vicinity of Berlin" around 15 July—for a tripartite summit.[26] Although Churchill desired an earlier date, he reluctantly agreed with the decision for July.[27] Nonetheless, beacuse Truman had still proposed no date for withdrawals, the prime minister continued to hope for some way to use the American armies as a political hammer in Central Europe.

In the end, it took the intervention of Eisenhower to bring an end to Churchill's scheming. Accompanied by his deputy for military government, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Eisenhower had flown to Berlin from his headquarters in Frankfurt on 5 June, just as Hopkins was wrapping up his discussions with Stalin. The British and French Commanders in Chief, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, arrived at the same time. Eisenhower's mission on his first trip to the capital was twofold. He would meet with Soviet General Georgy Zhukov to sign declarations, prepared in the European Advisory Commission, on the assumption of supreme authority in the absence of a German government. He would also convene an immediate meeting of the commanders' deputies for military government—Clay, General Vasily D. Sokolovsky, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks, and Lt. Gen. Louis Marie Koeltz—to establish the Allied Control Council.

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Zhukov signed the declarations but bridled over establishing the control council. Any such measure, he asserted, "must await withdrawal into the agreed zones," for he could not discuss administrative problems in Germany when he did not control his own zone and was unfamiliar with its problems.[28]

In a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff written by Clay, Eisenhower expressed understanding for Zhukov's position. He stated flatly that until the Allies had resolved the question of withdrawal, any further discussion of control machinery would be pointless.[29] On 8 June, Eisenhower expressed his concerns to a receptive Hopkins, who had stopped in Frankfurt on his way home from Moscow. Hopkins dashed off a message to Truman, urging a quick end to the uncertainly. He warned the president that the indeterminate status of the withdrawal date had exposed Eisenhower to considerable embarrassment because it would be inevitably misunderstood by the Soviets. In that light, he urged Truman to send a cable to Stalin stating his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from the Soviet Zone on 21 June, subject to concurrent movement of American forces into Berlin, plus guarantees for access to Berlin by air, rail, and highway.[30]

With Eisenhower pressing for action, Truman finally dictated a course to the prime minister. In an 11 June message he reminded Churchill that the zones of occupation had been approved "after long consideration and detailed discussion with you."[31] In view of this, the United States could no longer delay the withdrawal of American troops to exert pressure on other issues. Instead, following Hopkins's approach, Truman proposed sending a message to Stalin calling for a definite date of 21 June for the start of Allied withdrawals into their own zones, coupled with simultaneous movement of national garrisons into Berlin and the provision of free access to Berlin for U.S. forces. Replying three days later, Churchill bowed to the inevitable: "Obviously we are obliged to conform to your decision."[32]

On 14 June, Truman conveyed his proposals for mutual redeployments to Stalin. Within two days, Stalin accepted, subject to a minor postponement; Marshal Zhukov, was going to be in Moscow along with all other commanders for a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, followed by a victory parade. Because the marshal would not be back before 28–30 June, and mine-clearing work still remained, Stalin requested that the removal of troops begin on 1 July. In a message to the Soviet leader on 18 June, Truman confirmed the date of 1 July. At the same time, he said, he was assuming that a "sufficient number" of American troops would be in Berlin at an earlier date to prepare for the upcoming conference.[33]

All this time, with scant knowledge of the diplomatic battles being fought at higher levels—and with no inkling of an actual date for redeployment—U.S. planners and field commanders had been working feverishly to prepare the movement of American occupation forces into Berlin.[34] On 7 May, one day before the German surrender, SHAEF relieved General Gerow from his responsibilities as commander of the Berlin District. Selected in his stead was General Lewis H. Brereton, now head of the purely American "First Airborne Army," which, despite its name, was no more than a headquarters staff. Over the next week, Brereton reshaped and expanded that staff into the Headquarters and Headquarters Command, Berlin District, with the addition of personnel from Plans Group G. At the general's insistence, the newly formed organization bore the designation, "U.S. Headquarters Berlin District and Headquarters First Airborne Army."[35]

Officially organized on 15 May at Maison-Lafitte in France, the Berlin District moved by steps toward Berlin, stopping in the Westphalian city of Bielefeld on 22 May. There, it joined up with Howley, who had already moved his detachment in late April. At this point, the military government became the political affairs (G–5) section of the Berlin District's general staff. From 15 to 25 June the command moved to its final staging area, the Soviet Zone city of Halle in U.S.-occupied Saxony-Anhalt. Over the next four days, it rapidly assembled subordinate units from other locations to constitute the much larger force that would enter Berlin. By 29 June, around 26,000 soldiers—combat and support units combined—had arrived in Halle. The 2d Armored Division, which had no association with the First Airborne Army, provided the nucleus of combat forces eventually numbering some 16,000 troops.[36]


National Archives

General Parks, first U.S. military governor in Berlin

Brereton left for the United States just as the headquarters staff reached Bielefeld. Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks succeeded him.[37] In addition to the customary duties of military command, Parks would soon be serving as Eisenhower's negotiator with the Soviets, as first U.S. commandant in the Kommandatura, and as commander of the occupation force.

Potsdam Interlude

On 15 June, three days before President Truman's last message to Stalin confirming their agreement of mutual evacuations, U.S. officials in Moscow passed on a request from General Eisenhower for permission to send an advance party to Berlin to initiate preparations for the Big Three conference.[38] The request was reasonable on its merits, as was Truman's "assumption," expressed in his message, that a "sufficient number" of Americans be allowed into Berlin to begin the work.[39] Both men ignored, however, the sticky matter of reciprocity. Under the terms of Truman's agreement with Stalin, the entry

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of U.S. forces into Berlin would be part of a simultaneous movement of all forces into their assigned areas of occupation, and that movement would begin on 1 July after Marshal Zhukov had returned from Moscow. The Americans, however, wanted to dispatch troops to Berlin to begin preparing for the conference prior to 1 July. On 16 June, before the Soviets had responded to Eisenhower's request, General Parks received instructions to proceed with a staff by air to the German capital. His job was to confer with Soviet representatives on the use of a "neutral meeting area" for the tripartite meeting scheduled for 15 July. In the absence of a general agreement on the entry of U.S. forces in Berlin, he would "induce" the Soviets to set aside an area to accommodate the U.S. delegation.[40] Beacuse the writers of the instruction assumed that his location would lie in the American Sector of the city, they suggested that the advance group should find and prepare for the delegation facilities that the Americans could later use as headquarters for the occupation. This, they argued with some innocence, would accomplish two tasks at once and save a lot of future work. In other words, in addition to preparing for the conference, Parks' men would be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.[41]

On 19 June, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman sent a letter to Assistant Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Andrei Y. Vishinsky elaborating on General Eisenhower's plans for the mission: General Parks would head a party of 70 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 trucks, with the trucks and enlisted men motoring up the Dessau-Berlin autobahn while Parks and the officers traveled by air. After first replying that the matter could await Zhukov's return to Berlin, the Soviets relented in face of a White House threat to postpone the conference. Meeting with Harriman on 31 June, Vishinsky grudgingly agreed to let Parks embark on his assignment. Vishinsky tendered a letter stating that the Soviet command would meet the American party and render all necessary assistance.[42]

In his communications with Truman, through Vishinsky, Stalin never mentioned Berlin as the conference venue. He used instead the terms "suburbs of Berlin," "vicinity of Berlin," and "Berlin area." Exactly what he meant by these expressions remained unclear until Vishinsky's discussion with Harriman on 21 June, when the commissar finally named specific sites. Each delegation, he explained, would stay in separate zones in the town of Babelsberg; the negotiations would take place in Cecilienhof Palace—the home of the Hohenzollern Crown Prince—in nearby Potsdam. The American advance party, he continued, would learn more when it arrived. A quick parsing of Vishinsky's words shows that he was talking about a party arriving in Babelsberg, not Berlin. The Americans, it turns out, set off with different expectations.

At 0900 on 22 June, Parks, in Frankfurt, received a phone call from SHAEF informing him that the Soviets had authorized his reconnaissance mission, to comprise exactly the number of men and vehicles requested by Eisenhower. This was Parks' first knowledge of the intended size of the group. Shortly thereafter, he got another call directing him to set off by air that same afternoon. Parks promptly phoned his headquarters staff in Halle with orders to send the ground party toward Berlin at 0600 the following day. At 1100 he met with Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks from SHAEF. Rooks instructed him to negotiate with the Soviets over the accommodations President Truman would occupy at the conference. If it proved impossible to enter the American Sector of Berlin, he was to agree to any adequate arrangement and to leave the matter of entering Berlin for the future. This was the first intimation Parks received that he might not be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

Parks took off from Frankfurt at 1600 in a delegation totaling fourteen officers. Two hours later, he landed at Berlin's Tempelhof airport. Only then did he learn for certain his destination. Soviet Lt. Gen. Nicolai S. Vlasik escorted the U.S. visitors to Babelsberg, making a circuitous tour over the Unter den Linden, the Brandenburg Gate, Tiergarten, and the Grünewald Forest. Once in Babelsberg, Parks conferred with Col. Gen. Sergei N. Kruglov, an internal security commissar. Kruglov announced that the Soviets had selected the town to house the official parties because it was lightly damaged, contained many commodious residences, and was near the Crown Prince's palace. Leaving nothing for inference, Kruglov went on to assert that his authority extended only to arrangements for the conference and was thus geographically confined to the area of Babelsberg-Potsdam. He could not discuss the entry of American forces into the U.S. Sector of Berlin.[43]



Colonel Howley's treasured Horch roadster

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The motor convoy departed for Berlin the morning after Parks's arrival in Babelsberg. As convoy commander, an exuberant Howley sought to stage a "spectacular" movement. He assembled a cavalcade of some 500 officers and men and 114 vehicles—jeeps, trucks, and machine gun-armed half-tracks. The vehicles had been newly painted with a glossy lacquer to replace the wartime flat finish; the personnel were scrubbed up to look sharp—"everyone in natty Eisenhower jackets with ribbons in place, equipment and vehicles all shined up, fender flags flying."[44] Accompanied by the Berlin District headquarters commander, Brig. Gen. Stewart Cutler, who hitched a ride at the last minute to participate in the excitement, Howley rode at the head of the column in a gleaming black Horch roadster—a vehicle he selected "because of its flashy appearance."[45] His men had discovered the car, the former property of a high Nazi official, hidden in a barn. No one had informed Howley of the size limits of the convoy. Nor did Howley know its true mission. As far as he was concerned, his party would be preparing the American Sector for the arrival of U.S. occupation forces several weeks later.


Howley's convoy made its way on schedule to the Elbe crossing at Dessau, around thirty-two miles from Halle. After a Soviet guide brought it over a one-lane pontoon bridge into Soviet-occupied territory, it proceeded to the local Soviet headquarters, located "in a shabby German house."[46] There it remained for seven hours. The commander, said to be one "Colonel Gorelick," first offered a toast with German champagne but then raised a problem: The party had too many men. Allowing for the 14 officers already in Babelsberg with Parks, the Americans could bring in only 36 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles. While many hours passed in trying to establish telephone contact with Babelsberg, Cutler and Howley remonstrated that they had orders to go to Berlin and could not be delayed. Two higher ranking Soviet officers, a major general and colonel general, joined the altercation. Cutler warned of "international repercussions" if the Americans did not proceed.[47] At last, word came from Babelsberg. According to the Soviets, General Parks had ordered Cutler to take the convoy excess back to Halle; Howley was to proceed to Berlin with the prescribed 36 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles.[48]

Parks' diary reveals that the Soviets had, in fact, correctly transmitted his instructions. Parks had spent the morning of 23 June surveying the American billets in Babelsberg. While conferring with General Kruglov at 1130, he learned of the problem with the size of Howley's convoy. Parks, who—unlike Howley—understood the formal terms of the mission, told Kruglov to pass only the approved number of vehicles and personnel. Thus ended the first Soviet-American standoff over Berlin. It had been more parody than drama, but it was still a harbinger of future misunderstandings.

After surveying the Cecelienhof Palace in the early afternoon, Parks left for Tempelhof for his return flight to Frankfurt. Marshal Zhukov's chief of staff, Col. Gen. Mikhail S. Malinin, met him in the airport in order to discuss conference logistics. Although Malinin could let no more than fifty vehicles into Soviet-occupied territory, he would permit the fifty trucks arriving in Babelsberg to operate a shuttle in order to bring in more supplies and rations. Parks departed at 1600, taking a route that passed directly over the highway toward Dessau. Looking from his low-flying C-47, he recognized Howley's vehicle, the Horch, at the head of the convoy, now some four miles east of the Elbe.[49]

Howley's party proceeded toward Berlin, so Howley thought, led by a ramshackle Soviet car along a secondary road parallel to the autobahn. Its members saw a countryside empty of Germans. As they approached Berlin, wrote Howley in his diary, "Russian troops were all around, and the dirtiest I have ever seen . . .a mob . . . the army of Genghis Khan."[50] A the end of the journey, around 1830, Howley found himself in Babelsberg. He was met by a colonel from SHAEF, part of Parks' group, who had remained in Babelsberg to begin work on the conference. At that point he learned that he was not leading a reconnaissance party to Berlin but had come to Babelsberg to "do a housekeeping job." He scoffed: "Everyone was in a dither wondering how they could get it ready for the Big Three party. . . . This seemed much more important to them than the Berlin District Military Government job."[51]

Having arrived in Babelsberg with three of his men, Howley saw no reason to stay if he could not reconnoiter Berlin, and he was concerned lest the



A U.S. convoy under way to Berlin with Colonel Howley's Horch in the lead

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housekeeping party expropriate both his group and the Horch. The party received orders to return to Halle four days later. The colonel's only satisfaction from the episode, he would later declare, was to have "chiseled" a two and one-half hour trip to Berlin on 26 June.[52] On the pretext of conferring with an American aircrew in Tempelhof, Howley and his executive officer, Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis, took a circuitous route that traversed five of the six districts of the U.S. Sector. Their Soviet guide, an internal security officer, knew little of Berlin's layout, and so did nothing to restrict the itinerary. Indeed, he proved unusually talkative. He informed Howley and Maginnis that the Soviets were feeding Berlin's population from *Wehrmacht* food stocks and that the sewer system was operating fairly well. On the other hand, he stated, Red Army dismantling crews had sent much machinery and equipment to the Soviet Union. Although the outlying districts had escaped massive damage, the Americans observed a scene of utter devastation in the city center—skeletons of buildings, streets blocked with rubble, the stench of decaying bodies on every block. In Howley's eyes, Berlin "didn't look like a city anyone would deliberately come into."[53] Maginnis agreed: "I was forced to wonder, from what I had seen, whether this ruined city was really worth bothering with."[54]

On 28 June, Howley's military government officers boarded his roadster and set off to rejoin their unit. The colonel was by then convinced that "any dealings with the Russians was [*sic*] impossible. . . . O]nly a fool would come to Berlin to run Berlin on any kind of basis on which we would have to work with them before anything could be done."[55] As the journey progressed, he told Maginnis that the United States would never occupy Berlin, and that the detachment should find good accommodations in the area of Halle, in order to settle in for a long stay. Maginnis disagreed: It might take some time for Berlin to open up but ultimately it would. Howley remained unswayed. "He [Howley] was fed up with our situation," Maginnis wrote, for which he blamed American "higher echelons" as well as the Soviets.[56] Thus, the moment he returned from Babelsberg, the colonel instructed his officers to "locate some big estate or some chateau to which A1A1 could be moved where we could live in comfort based on the fact we would not be ordered into Berlin." They found a huge chateau six miles from Halle—"magnificent," declared Howley, "the most luxurious of all A1A1 establishments." The detachment received authorization to move in on 1 July.[57]

Howley had, however, drawn false conclusions from his frustrations, mistaking legalism for hostile intent. The Soviets were adhering precisely to agreements, granting no more than the wording allowed but also no less. Truman and Eisenhower had asked to send an advance party only in connection with the tripartite conference, not to begin the occupation of Berlin. The numbers of men and vehicles approved for passage to Babelsberg were contained in Eisenhower's request to Moscow. Soviet insistence that deployments to Berlin await Zhukov's return simply matched the terms of the Stalin-Truman correspondence of 14–18 June. That correspondence had also spoken of "simultaneous" movement.[58] Because no Soviet advance parties had entered the U.S. Occupied Eastern Zone, an advance movement of U.S. forces into Berlin, however reasonable and appropriate, would have violated strict reciprocity by giving the Americans something for nothing.

The Move

From 27 to 30 June, just as Howley was preparing to plant himself in his "magnificent" chateau, Clay and Parks were pursuing critical negotiations with Marshal Zhukov. These talks would end the deadlock over redeployments and trigger a hurried rush of U.S. forces into Berlin. On 27 June General Parks returned to Babelsberg to continue preparations for the Big Three conference. At 1730 he learned that Marshal Zhukov had returned from Moscow and would see him at 2000. Parks made the thirty-mile trip to Karlshorst—Zhukov's office was just a few steps from the scene of Germany's surrender—in the company of Colonel General Kruglov and Lieutenant General Vlasik.

Zhukov said he had still not received any information on his forthcoming meeting with Clay and the British representative, General Weeks. He had obtained the U.S. agenda but nothing from the British. Parks offered to help get the information to him the following day and to work out a date and time with the U.S. and British conferees. Zhukov expressed a preference for 29 June but could also meet late on the evening of 28 June. Parks said that U.S. forces had orders to move on 1 July, and that roughly 25,000–30,000 troops would occupy Berlin. Zhukov accepted this date, "providing an agreement on all points could be reached at the conference and the move could be begun simultaneously." Before then, no troops could enter the U.S. Sector. The conversation then shifted to preparations for the Big Three conference. Parks asked for more space to accommodate American service and communications personnel; he also wanted to add another 125 vehicles and 750 men to those already in Babelsberg. Zhukov instantly granted both requests. The speed of his approval suggests that Howley might have been able to bring in a larger party from the start if Eisenhower had initially asked for it.[59]

Shortly after noon the next day, Parks received a call from SHAEF. Generals Clay and Weeks would be arriving at Gatow airport, on the outskirts of Berlin, at 1130 on 29 June. The British had combined their agenda with the U.S. agenda and would send it by wire later in the day. Parks instructed his interpreter to ask Soviet commanders in Babelsberg to telephone Karlshorst and arrange a conference there with Marshal Zhukov for 1430 on 29 June.[60]

General Clay would soon be stepping onto the stage of high diplomacy, far exceeding the scope of purely military affairs. He was fully disposed to the task. During his long service in the Corps of Engineers, he had distinguished himself in multiple capacities as a manager and or-

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ganizer skilled in political maneuver. In the early 1930s, he had thrived in the hothouse of New Deal innovation, acting as the Corps of Engineers contact officer with Congress, the White House, and the National Emergency Council, Roosevelt's coordinating body for domestic affairs. In 1940 the Corps reassigned him from an enormous water management project in Texas to head Roosevelt's emergency airport construction program. When the United States entered the war, he became chief of Army procurement and the Army's representative to the War Production Board. After a brief time in Europe, where he served as chief of logistics in Normandy, Eisenhower sent him back to Washington to grapple with munition shortages. James F. Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, promptly snatched him into service as his deputy responsible for war production. Clay's role was to decide resource allocation issues in Byrne's name. He became virtual czar of the American war economy.

Clay brought three key attributes to his talks with Zhukov. The first was an impatiently analytical mind that got to essentials, abhorred cavil, and sought quick results. The second was a determination to make the quadripartite system work. The third was the lack of preconceived anti-Sovietism. All these distinguished him from America's career diplomats, whose legalism and hard-line views might well have precluded agreement, if negotiations had been left to them.[61]

The delegations arrived at the appointed time. Eschewing small talk, Zhukov went straight to the agenda. The first and principal item was the shift of Allied forces into Berlin and the Soviet occupation of Germany to the west of the capital. After Zhukov inquired as to the anticipated strength of the U.S. and British garrisons—30,000 for the United States, a maximum of 25,000 for the U.K.—he began a discussion of dates. Clay stated that the United States could start its withdrawal from the Soviet Zone on 1 July and complete it in nine days. Zhukov asked whether the Americans could not vacate the Soviet area more rapidly. Clay agreed, subject to General Bradley's approval, that the United States would evacuate in four days. There followed a discussion of coordinated, phased movements. The Soviets would send reconnaissance parties into their zone on 1 July to survey ground installations; airfield reconnaissance would occur on 2 July; and on 4 July, the exchange of territories would be complete. Correspondingly, the United States would conduct ground reconnaissance in Berlin on 1 July and airfield reconnaissance the next day. The main body of troops would start moving from Halle on 3 July and finish its move on 4 July. British movements into Berlin would follow a similar timetable.[62]

Having obtained Bradley's concurrence, Clay confirmed these arrangements the following day. General Parks communicated the news in a meeting at Soviet headquarters with Zhukov's deputy, General Vasily D. Sokolovsky. At Parks' request, Sokolovsky agreed to extend the withdrawal deadline to 7 July. While the 2d Armored Division would have to clear the Halle area on schedule, U.S. service troops could stay in Halle another three days and retain the use during that time of the Halle-Berlin autobahn.

Access to Berlin

After briefly discussing the treatment of displaced persons—Zhukov's main desire was to rid himself of responsibility for the care of non-Russian returnees—the three generals turned to the issue of Western access to Berlin. Zhukov brought up Anglo-American requests, contained in the U.S.-U.K. joint agenda, for two autobahn routes, two railway lines, and two air corridors. He declared that all roads and lanes cut across Soviet Zone territory and involved significant administrative difficulties; moreover, one autobahn and one railway line seemed enough to supply a garrison totaling 50,000 American and British troops. Zhukov offered an autobahn route through Magdeburg, a railway line through Magdeburg, and an air route through Magdeburg and Goslar. Although allied vehicles would be subject to Soviet traffic regulations and document checks, there would be no inspection of cargo and no limitations on the amount of vehicular traffic. If the Americans did not like the route



General Clay confers with Robert D. Murphy.


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through Magdeburg, they could choose another, Zhukov said. He had proposed it because it was a central lane, reasonable to both the Americans and British, and the most economical. Besides, at a later time, the Allies could change "possibly all points" discussed at the present conference.[63]

Clay briefly defended the request for several routes on the grounds that the Americans were spread between a port in Bremen, an occupation area in the southwest, and an administration in Berlin, but he dropped the argument, accepting Zhukov's offer while reserving his right to reopen the question at the Control Council should the single routes prove unsatisfactory.[64] The alacrity with which he yielded to Zhukov's views manifests not only his willingness to compromise, but also suggests that Zhukov had persuaded him on the technical merits of the Soviet position. If so, experience validated both Zhukov's assertion and Clay's judgment. The single routes met all Allied requirements, from the initial phase of the occupation until its very end.

Toward the end of the meeting, the conferees discussed control over airports. Weeks and Zhukov could not agree on who should have Staaken or Gatow—Staaken's buildings were in the British Sector but not the landing field—and decided to consider the issue later. The parties readily agreed, however, to give the United States exclusive use of Tempelhof.[65] Although this massive facility—the largest in the world—lay in the American Sector, it was not self-evident that Zhukov would relinquish it entirely, for it was Berlin's main airport.

Weeks and Clay then agreed on Zhukov's offer of an air lane from Berlin to Magdeburg. From that point, the lane would fork into two paths, one turning southwest to Frankfurt and the other toward Hannover. The single route soon proved unsatisfactory from the standpoint of flight safety. Hence, on 30 November 1945, the Control Council approved the recommendations of its Air Directorate to establish three corridors over the Soviet Zone to Berlin and to develop strict flight rules for all aircraft using them.[66] Unlike the earlier agreements, the decision over air corridors was a formal act of the Control Council, and thus became a solemnized obligation.



The land access arrangement, however, remained a gentlemen's accord between Zhukov, Weeks, and Clay. It never took shape as a protocol. The U.S. record of it was contained in notes prepared by General Parks. Clay and his political adviser, Robert D. Murphy, kept copies in their office files, but few others saw them. Parks first sent his notes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 April 1948, and Murphy followed with a copy to the State Department six days later. In his letter of transmittal Murphy wrote:

> A number of decisions were taken regarding the practical features of the quadripartite occupation of Berlin and the use of the corridor Berlin-Helmstedt by railroad and air. As you understand, this agreement was never formalized, each party having made its own notes. However, during the interval that has elapsed since June 29, 1945, the lines of agreement have become established by daily usage and practice.[67]

The very lateness of the access talks—two days before the initial movement of allied forces into Berlin—as well as the informal nature of the agreement, are perplexing, and beg the question as to why the European Advisory Committee had not settled the issue as part of the agreement on zones. The answer is threefold. First, the War Department regarded the matter as a military issue that should be resolved by commanders on the basis of prevailing circumstances. How could anyone foresee American military requirements or know which roads would be most suitable or even passable? In effect, lacking

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War Department approval to settle the matter in advance, the U.S. delegation in London had no leave to negotiate. Second, the Soviet delegation's head, Ambassador Gousev, worked to keep the access question off the commission's agenda. At the same time, he asserted that access across the Soviet Zone was already implied in the zonal protocol and stated flatly that "arrangements for transit facilities will be made, providing the United States and United Kingdom forces and control personnel full access to the Berlin zone across Soviet-occupied territory."[68] Third, Ambassador Winant was eager to complete the zonal protocol and did not want further complications. He vehemently rebuffed an effort by Murphy to define access rights through the protocol.[69] Free access to Berlin was implicit in the U.S. right to be there, Winant argued, and to raise the question at that point would upset the hard-won agreement and impede additional settlements.[70]

Murphy revived this argument when his memoir, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, appeared in 1964. He asserted: "[T]he deliberate decision not to seek a specific understanding on the Berlin access question had a disastrous aftermath."[71] He laid the greatest blame on Winant—a Republican supporter of the New Deal, three-term governor of New Hampshire, and first head of the Social Security Board—but insinuated that the ambassador had Roosevelt's explicit backing. Murphy attributed the failings of both men to their misplaced desire to build trust with the Soviets and to their theory that individual relationships—Roosevelt's with Stalin and Winant's with Gousev—could somehow "determine national policy."[72]

Murphy's critique had the air of personal score-settling, tinged, as it was, with a professional's disdain for political interlopers. Apart from its tendentious groundings, however, its chief shortcoming was its reference to a "disastrous aftermath" that never occurred. In fact, for most of the Cold War era, the access regime functioned smoothly and met all military and civilian requirements in Berlin. The Soviets challenged it twice—once physically, during the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949; and once verbally, during the Berlin Crisis of 1958. These two confrontations had political origins and ramifications unrelated to the existence or nonexistence of written access guarantees for Allied forces in West Berlin, and in neither case were the outcomes disastrous. In extremis, the Soviets could have violated a written protocol just as quickly as a gentlemen's accord. The geography was the same in either circumstance, and pretexts were always available.

The Americans Arrive

On 29 June the military government detachment A1A1 was preparing to occupy its new quarters near Halle. An avid equestrian, Howley discovered two big stables with many fine horses, which he dreamed of taking to Berlin as part of "my horse-show team."[73] Maginnis took the day to survey Leipzig. While there, he claimed two Opels and one Mercedes from a collection of automobiles gathered by U.S. officers who were combing the countryside for "prise de guerre" before the Soviets arrived.[74]

In the morning of the following day, 30 June, Parks issued orders for U.S. forces to start moving out of Halle on 1 July, with all main units to be completely clear of the city within three days. For those who had never been privy to the high-level discussions, the order came like a bolt of lightning. It had "caught us in the middle of many schemes and plans," wrote Howley, who was still astounded by the wealth of the area the Americans were leaving. Because the movement involved not only the Berlin District Headquarters but also the 2d Armored Division and all supporting troops, the units were submerged in a roar of activity, packing equipment, coordinating departure times, and planning road movements.[75] This frenetic surge of effort resembled a Soviet practice known as "storming"—waiting until the last day to do a whole month's work. Truman, after all, had informed his commanders on 18 June of the date of redeployment.

A preliminary reconnaissance party, which numbered approximately 2,000 men and 434 vehicles, departed Halle at 0600 on 1 July, just as Soviet reconnaissance units were arriving. The military government detachment, with light vehicles, took the lead, once again with Howley's prized Horch. The convoy operated under quartermaster rules, with all vehicles moving down the autobahn in a tightly packed line at



A U.S. military government detachment camps in the Grünewald after the initial convoy into the city.

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twenty miles per hour, the speed of the slowest trucks. Unlike Howley's trip to Babelsberg ten days earlier, the journey was uneventful, slowed only by crossings of the Elbe and Mulde Rivers. The lead group reached Berlin at 1700.[76] A humorous entry to Maginnis' personal diary described the first night American occupation forces spent in Berlin:

> With no billets to go to, we would end up in the Grünewald, that great forest park in the southwestern area of the city. We had to set up pup tents in the mud and rain, and crawl into them for the night. . . . I had managed to avoid pup tents throughout World War II, yet here I was, with the war over and making a triumphal entry into Berlin, established in that dreaded form of shelter under the most dreary and uncomfortable conditions.

"This was," as Maginnis wryly noted, "undoubtably history's most unimpressive entry into the capital of a defeated nation by a conquering power."[77]

11

Editor's Note

This preview chapter has been edited and rewritten by the author to conform to the style of this journal and to put this stand-alone piece into context. Any references to this material should cite the published book and not this extract.

Notes

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8. A copy of the first draft of JCS 1067 is found in Smith's files. Draft Dir, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, sub: Directive for Administration of Post-Defeat Military Government in Germany, Encl to JCS 1067, 24 Sep 1944, in Box 35, Walter Bedell Smith Collection of WWII Documents, 1941–1945, DDEL. For a summary of Field Manual 27–5, see Ziemke, *Occupation of Germany*, pp. 20–21, 84–85.

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10. Memo, Smith for Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, 31 Jan 1945, sub: Planning Directive for the Organization of Berlin District, file AGTS/8/6, OMGUS, BAK.

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12. Memo, Smith, for Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, 22 Feb 1945, sub: Planning Directive for the Organization of Berlin District, file AGTS/8/6, OMGUS, BAK.

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
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BOOK REVIEWS

The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia



By John Maass
The History Press, 2015
Pp. 203. $21.99

Review by J. Britt McCarley

Virginia is famous for military history sites, especially American Civil War battlefields that contribute to the state's acclaimed tourism. By contrast, virtually unknown are Virginia's numerous Revolutionary War sites. Thanks to historian John Maass and his study of the British invasion of Virginia of 1780–1781, we now have an insightful narrative packed with primary source citations (many useful for staff rides), dozens of maps of roads and byways traversed by the adversaries, and abundant modern photographs of key locations. The author's compilation of this information has produced the best, most concise history of Lt. Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis' campaign that spread havoc across the Tidewater and Piedmont regions in the spring and summer of 1781.

Maass begins by assessing the war's Southern Campaign strategy. Despite expectations of timely and decisive victory in Georgia and the Carolinas beginning in 1778–1779, the British war effort there deadlocked by 1780. The crown's North American commander-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, and his second-in-command, Cornwallis, held diametrical visions of Southern strategy, with the former favoring crushing leftover resistance in the Carolinas and Georgia, and the latter advocating turning northward and overrunning Virginia and the Middle Colonies, ending with the New England seat of rebellion. After failing to win a decisive battlefield victory in the Carolinas and without coordination with Clinton, his superior in New York City, Cornwallis marched from North Carolina in April 1781, entered Virginia, and immediately began a campaign of despoliation over much of the southeastern and central parts of the state, intending to knock it out of the war and deprive American forces to the south of the logistics sustaining operations there. Earlier British raids and expeditions had targeted the Tidewater's tobacco economy, which financed supplies and weapons not otherwise available or produced.

When Cornwallis arrived in Petersburg in mid-May, the British had been operating along the lower James River since the previous autumn. Largely untouched by war since 1779, Virginia was now unprepared to defend itself, with the few militiamen and Continentals scattered around and Governor Thomas Jefferson unable to coordinate the state's government for defense. Lt. Gen. George Washington, the Continental Army commander checking the British garrison at New York City, sent Maj. Gen. Marquis de Lafayette and most of the American light infantry south in March to oppose Cornwallis. Too weak to resist the British directly, the Frenchman wisely chose, Maass asserts, to "keep his distance from his powerful foe while retiring toward [Brig. Gen. Anthony] Wayne's expected line of march [of his southward trekking Continental line infantry]" (p. 57).

As the Americans put central Virginia's numerous rivers between themselves and the British and protected the state's manufacturing resources around Fredericksburg, Cornwallis dashed westward against two American centers of gravity: state politicians gathered around Charlottesville and supply caches along the upper James River, feebly protected by Maj. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's understrength and undertrained Continentals and militia. While Cornwallis succeeded only partially in both cases, Lafayette and Wayne united and gave chase to the British. Maass maintains that, needing to retain access to the Tidewater and the Royal Navy's succor, "Cornwallis's operations [now assumed] a defensive quality compared to his destructive expedition in May and June" (p. 135). For the rest of the Virginia Campaign, American and British forces continued their cat-and-mouse game, fighting the state's largest, yet indecisive, battle at Green Spring on 6 July 1781—all ending with Cornwallis holing up at the Yorktown tobacco port futilely awaiting reinforcement or redirection from Clinton, and Lafayette again remaining safely distant and waiting for reinforcement from Washington and his French countrymen allied with the Americans. Maass' history ends anticipating the 1781 Siege of Yorktown, which essentially ended the military phase of the American War of Independence and provided the precondition for peace negotiations that led to the creation of an independent United States of America.


One of the author's greatest contributions to the Virginia Campaign's historiography is his clarification of how many of the state's enslaved people were attached to the British Army, either because they ran away from their masters or because Corn-

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wallis' men freed them. Other histories put that number upwards of 10,000 -12,000, which Maass concludes is "inconsistent with the enormous logistical burden this would have placed on the British Army providing the runaways with even meager provisions" (p. 100). Employing convincing evidence, he reduces the likely total to a more sustainable 3,000–4,000.

This reviewer found only two secondary sources that could add depth to Maass' study. Robert Fallaw and Marion W. Stoer's "The Old Dominion Under Fire: The Chesapeake Invasions, 1779–1781" chapter in Ernest M. Miller's (ed.) *Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution* (Centreville, Md., 1981) covers the indecisive but significant "tobacco wars" preceding Cornwallis' 1781 arrival. Also, Charles E. Hatch Jr.'s 1945 article in *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, "The Affair Near James Island (or, "The Battle of Green Spring) July 6, 1781," details the selfsame engagement. These bibliographic quibbles notwithstanding, Maass' campaign history of Virginia's 1781 tribulation expertly fills a critical gap in the American Revolution's historiography.

Dr. J. Britt McCarley holds a Ph.D. in history from Temple University. He is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) chief historian and the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Program director. He is the author of the Center of Military History's Civil War Sesquicentennial pamphlet entitled *The Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns, 1864* (Washington, D.C., 2014); the 2016 Emerging Civil War Digital Shorts entitled *"Supplies are the Great Question": Union Logistics and Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, 1864*; "'The Great Question of the Campaign Was One of Supplies': A Reinterpretation of Sherman's Generalship During the 1864 March to Atlanta in Light of the Logistic Strategy," in *Beyond Combat: Essays in Military History in Honor of Russell F. Weigley* (Philadelphia, Penn., 2007); and a contributor to *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations* DESERT SHIELD *and* DESERT STORM (Washington, D.C., 1995).



By Earl J. Hess
University of North Carolina Press, 2015
Pp. xv, 288. $35

Review by Mark L. Bradley

Fought on 28 July 1864 during the American Civil War, the Battle of Ezra Church was the third sortie for Atlanta launched by the Confederate Army of Tennessee since General John Bell Hood assumed command ten days earlier. Starting in early May, Hood's predecessor, General Joseph E. Johnston, had conducted a fighting retreat from Dalton in north Georgia to the gates of Atlanta. Hood knew that his reputation for audacity was the reason President Jefferson Davis had chosen him to replace the more cautious Johnston. So far, however, Hood had failed to defeat Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army group in the assault at Peachtree Creek on 20 July or in the Battle of Atlanta two days later. At Ezra Church, Hood hoped to block Sherman's movement to capture East Point, where the Atlanta and West Point Railroad met the Macon and Western Railroad. The loss of those key supply lines would mean nothing less than the loss of Atlanta itself.

The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta is Earl J. Hess' second book on the Atlanta Campaign, following his 2013 study on the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. In addition, he has written almost two-dozen books on other Civil War topics. In his latest work, the author notes that the commanders of the Union and Confederate forces converging west of Atlanta were both new to their jobs. The commander of Hood's old corps, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, was young, inexperienced, and a recent arrival in the Army of Tennessee. Just two weeks before Ezra Church, Lee had launched a series of disjointed attacks against a Federal force at Tupelo, Mississippi, only to incur heavy losses for no gain. Hess notes that "the Battle of Tupelo was an eerie foreshadowing of what was to come at Ezra Church." As a corps commander, Lee was thrust into a position for which he was, "at the least, not prepared and, at the worst, ill-suited to fill" (p. 21).

Lee's adversary was Union Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, the newly promoted commander of the Army of the Tennessee (named for the river, not the state for which the Confederate Army of Tennessee was named). Historians tend to be critical in their treatment of Howard, but Hess is a conspicuous exception. While conceding that Howard had blundered at Chancellorsville and Pickett's Mill, Hess counters that "every commander, Sherman included, committed a mistake or two for every success he achieved in the war" (p. 16). There was also the matter of Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, the acting commander of the Army of the Tennessee, whose long association with that organization made him the obvious choice in the eyes of his soldiers. But Hess observes that Sherman regarded Logan as a politician first and soldier second, whereas the West Point–educated Howard was a thorough professional who "had all the qualifications for handling both the administrative and the operational tasks associated with the command" (p. 18).

Hood's orders to Lee were to check the enemy "and not to attack unless the enemy exposes himself in attacking us" (p. 54). Instead, Lee "made a snap decision to launch a major attack on the Federals and drive them away." Hess condemns Lee's decision as a "tragic mistake" that generated thousands of casualties "in a battlefield endeavor with dubious

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prospects" (p. 56). Lee did not bother to inform Hood of his decision, nor did he seek the advice of his subordinates. Worse yet, he did not know his command, the strength of the Union position his men were about to attack, or even the terrain they were about to cross.


Lacking entrenching tools, Union troops constructed a rude breastwork of rails, logs, stones, and even knapsacks, giving them a distinct advantage over the Confederates, who attacked across mostly open ground. In his eagerness to strike the enemy, Lee fed each of his units into the assault as they happened to arrive on the field, a modus operandi that all but ensured failure. This piecemeal deployment resulted in about 3,300 Confederate casualties compared with just 632 Union losses. Despite the 5-to-1 disparity, some Federal soldiers claimed that Ezra Church "was the most stubbornly contested and bloodiest battlefield of the campaign." Hess notes that one of the rebel brigades briefly captured a portion of the Federal line, while other Confederates "engaged in hand-to-hand combat across the Union breastwork" (p. 195). In any event, the hotly contested fight was a lopsided defeat that cost the Confederates dearly, knocking out of action "half of the Confederate corps commanders, one-fourth of the division leaders, and three of the fourteen officers who held brigade command on the field" (p. 201). After Ezra Church, Hood ceased offensive operations and "adopted Johnston's defensive policy of merely blocking Union moves behind Confederate works to save manpower" (p. 203).

Historians place some of the blame for the Confederate fiasco at Ezra Church on Hood for failing to guide the actions of his youngest and least-experienced corps commander. Instead, Hood allowed Lee to repeat the mistakes committed in his futile attack at Tupelo and then approved his independent action. Hood himself was guilty of launching a similar disjointed attack at Kolb's Farm a month earlier with a comparable lack of information regarding the enemy's strength and position. The result was a bloody repulse. Hess notes that both Lee at Ezra Church and Hood at Kolb's Farm had the option of sending out heavy skirmish lines instead of launching full-scale assaults, but he partially absolves their judgment by noting the repeated failure of the Army of Tennessee to "skirmish properly" during the Atlanta Campaign (p. 197). On the other hand, the author praises Howard for his skillful handling of his new command, and he notes that the skirmishers of the Union XV Corps dominated the opening phase of the battle, buying invaluable time for the troops on the main line to fortify their position.

Hess is of that rare breed of author who manages to be prolific while maintaining a uniformly high standard of scholarship. Yet even the best scholars sometimes overreach, as in the case of Hess' contention that "the rate of Union rifle fire at Ezra Church dwarfed that of nearly every other battle in the Civil War" (p. 199). He bases his argument on the statement of a Union Army chaplain that the 26th Illinois Infantry fired a total of 40,000 rounds during the battle. He then multiplies this figure forty-three times to reflect the number of Union regiments that participated in the battle, and arrives at a total of 1,720,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. This tenuous extrapolation is a slender reed on which to base such a sweeping argument, but its chief strength is that it cannot be disproved without more concrete evidence. This is a minor lapse in an otherwise excellent study, however, and this reviewer hopes the author will continue his outstanding work on the Atlanta Campaign.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina* (Lexington, Ky., 2009). His current book project is the official Army history of logistical support in Vietnam.

Turning Point 1917: The British Empire at War



Edited by Douglas E. Delaney and Nikolas Gardner
University of British Columbia Press, 2017
Pp. x, 249. $37.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

As 1917 began, the British Empire had been at war with the Central Powers for almost two and a half years, but the bloody fighting in the main theater—the Western Front—had yielded little more than horrendous numbers of casualties, and not much was going right in the outlying theaters as well. As the losses mounted, Britain alone could hardly replace the large numbers of new soldiers, sailors, and airmen required, so the "young lions"—countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—composing the empire were called on to help the "old lion" defy his foes (note the illustration on the book's dust jacket). In April, the old lion's spirits were also greatly bolstered when the United States declared war on Germany. *Turning Point 1917: The British Empire at War*, a collection of nine essays edited by two faculty members of the Royal Military College of Canada, examines several of the problems that faced the Imperial war effort in 1917.

An interesting piece titled "The Africanization of British Imperial Forces in the East African Campaign," written by Canadian historian Tim Stapleton, looks at how the British

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began using more African troops in their fighting in German East Africa (modern-day Burundi, Rwanda, and mainland Tanzania). The British initially depended on white troops, primarily raised in South Africa, but these soldiers did not respond well to the hot and humid environment and were ravaged by disease. For example, the 9th South African Infantry Battalion started with 1,135 men in February 1916, but had only 116 effectives by October. The solution was to begin using black soldiers of the King's African Rifles (KAR), who were better able to survive in the jungle conditions. The KAR had been raised before the war "to patrol the frontiers and provide internal security for the British territories of Uganda, Kenya, and Nyasaland" (p. 146). The force was greatly expanded with black soldiers recruited from communities with imagined martial traditions, and their white officers were seconded from the British Army. The KAR was officially an all-volunteer force, but colonial officials assigned quotas to local chiefs, who used some forms of coercion to gather sufficient recruits. African carriers (porters) were also essential to logistically support military operations, and by the end of the war almost one million carriers had been employed. Sadly, around 100,000 of these men died, mainly from disease and exhaustion. The British chose not to use African troops in Europe, but the French used about 130,000 black soldiers from western Africa on the Western Front.


New Zealand Defence Force historian John Crawford provides an engaging essay with "The Willing Horse is Being Worked to Death: New Zealand's Manpower Problems and Policies During 1917." Although New Zealand's population was only just over one million in 1917, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) ended the year with a strength of almost 63,000 men (an infantry division and a mounted rifle brigade), even after suffering almost 14,000 casualties that year (more than the previous years of the war combined). The NZEF wound up substantially overreinforced, and New Zealanders began to feel that they were contributing disproportionately to the Imperial war effort. This led their government to limit further manpower commitments. The author concludes: "New Zealand did not cease to be a willing horse, but it was a horse that balked at being ridden too hard" (p. 133).

"The Egyptian Expeditionary Force [EEF] in 1917" is a contribution from the late Australian historian Jeffrey Grey. The Middle East was the second-most important British theater of operations throughout the war, and Grey writes that "1917 provides a dividing line for understanding the British war in the Middle East" (p. 102). Unfortunately, the senior officer in Egypt "could never be certain that he either had resources sufficient to complete the tasks and directions that London assigned or that he could rely upon keeping what he did possess for any period of time" (p. 104). In 1917, success finally came to the EEF after General Sir Edmund Allenby arrived in Cairo from France in June. Allenby effectively worked with what resources he had, reorganized his Australian, British, and New Zealand troops into three corps (two infantry and one mounted), and was able to successfully defeat his Ottoman enemies, advancing northward through Palestine and capturing Jerusalem before the end of the year. In addition to being an outstanding leader who cultivated excellent relationships with his notoriously ill-disciplined Australian and New Zealand troops, General Allenby also benefitted from the gradual degradation of the Ottoman Army.

The remaining six essays examine other diverse facets of the Imperial war effort in 1917: the challenges of the seemingly interminable war, the Admiralty's naval blockade of Germany (strengthened by the U.S. Navy's entry into the war), the Imperial Munitions Board and merchant shipbuilding in Canada, the relationship between the British General Headquarters and the Dominions, Montreal's anticonscription disturbances (May–September), and how the British media handled the image of the Empire. All of the writings are well chosen, and they underscore the fact that there is much more to properly understanding World War I than just focusing on the Western Front. The volume would have benefitted from more illustrations and maps—four of the essays have none—but for aficionados of the Great War, *Turning Point 1917* is a must-read.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.

Sky Pilots: The Yankee Division Chaplains in World War I



By Michael E. Shay
University Press of Missouri, 2014
Pp. xxii, 216. $50

Review by Peter L. Belmonte

Since 1918, numerous memoirs, diaries, and letters of World War I veterans have appeared in print. Through those

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writings, we may learn a little about what it was like to be an infantryman, artilleryman, or engineer. However, an interested reader will be hard pressed to find firsthand accounts of military chaplains. A notable exception is Father Francis Duffy, the well-known chaplain of the U.S. Army 165th Infantry Regiment, 42d Division, who wrote his memoir in 1919. Otherwise, one must search through regimental histories or other records to glean bits of information, and even in those chronicles, chaplains, if they are mentioned at all, are either praised or vilified; rarely are they given their own voice.

Michael E. Shay, a senior superior court judge in Connecticut with family connections to the 26th (Yankee) Division, has written several books about the unit and its controversial commander, Maj. Gen. Clarence Edwards. His latest effort, *Sky Pilots: The Yankee Division Chaplains in World War I,* begins to fill the historical lacuna about U.S. military chaplains in the Great War. Shay mined public and private archives and uncovered chaplains' correspondence and other pertinent documents. He also scoured a wide variety of unit histories and memoirs to find references to Yankee Division chaplains. The author used these sources, along with newspaper articles and military records, to give the reader an idea of how the chaplains worked, what they thought about their mission and their men, and the struggles they faced.

In the first chapter, Shay relates a brief history of the U.S. Army chaplaincy. Like most other aspects of national defense, the chaplain corps was not prepared for the onset of war in 1917. During that year, according to the author, "in the Regular Army itself, there were a total of seventy-four chaplains, along with an additional seventy-two in the National Guard" (p. 3). Indeed, it wasn't until 3 March 1918, that the first Army Chaplain School class convened. A large number of patriotic ministers joined the military, and others served through private religious organizations. Still, the Army was not able to recruit enough chaplains to adequately serve its men during the war.

In subsequent chapters, Shay highlights the experiences of many of the Yankee Division chaplains against the backdrop of the general history of the division, with chapters based on events in the Toul Sector, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Troyon, and Verdun. A chaplain's typical duties included conducting religious services, addressing the men's spiritual and physical needs, comforting the sick and wounded, and burying the dead. While tending to the wounded under fire, chaplains were exposed to the same hazards as the men they were accompanying. One cleric, Captain Walton Danker, assigned to the 104th Infantry Regiment, was killed in action in June 1918 when he was hit by a shell fragment in the Toul Sector. Other chaplains were wounded, including 1st Lt. Ray Anderson, who described his encounter with mustard gas while serving with the 103d Infantry Regiment: "My eyes were slower in swelling, but Monday night I couldn't lie down, and I just about went wild and more from the mustard gas in my eyes. It was just like two red hot stove pokers being pushed into your brain" (p. 103).

There was no doubt that some chaplains blurred the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. During part of the action in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1st Lt. Robert Campbell Jr., with the 101st Field Artillery Regiment, "went from gun to gun, loading the shells and pulling the lanyard" (p. 102). Campbell likely was not alone in giving way to his zeal and excitement in the heat of battle.

Many World War I chaplains were recorded as having great affection for their "boys." Writing to a fellow minister, Anderson said, "I wish you could know my men; they are outward 'bums' but inward saints and all heroes. I never knew God made such wonderful fellows before" (p. 92). Of course, such feelings and experiences were not universal. Consider the address given by Father (1st Lt.) John Tucker to soldiers of the 103d Field Artillery Regiment soon after the Armistice: "You ought to be ashamed to go home and face your friends and families after the sort of lives you have been living over here" (p. 116).

The book's final chapter is devoted to giving brief accounts of the postwar lives of thirty-two chaplains. Most of the men returned to the ministry in some form; several, their health compromised by their strenuous wartime service, died within a decade or so after the war. Especially interesting is an account of Guthrie Speers, who served as a chaplain in the 102d Infantry Regiment. The unit had received many replacements who were draftees from the Midwest, and Speers spent a great deal of time traveling throughout the region to visit the families of his men who had been killed in action.

Any book that deals with some aspect of the 26th Division in World War I must inevitably address the controversy surrounding General Edwards, the division's commander during most of the war. Shay, an overall advocate of Edwards, addresses the general's removal from command in October 1918 with a single paragraph. Admitting that Edwards was "opinionated, often critical of fellow officers, including his superiors, and sometimes [Edwards] ignored orders" (p. 106), Shay concludes "there was no excuse for [General John J.] Pershing's vindictive action at that stage of the war" (p. 106).

The book contains thirty-five illustrations, including photographs of many of the chaplains. Shay also includes a roster of thirty-five men who served as chaplains with the Yankee Division in France, and another three who served with the unit stateside. He gives each man's religious affiliation, rank (if military), unit of assignment, and some other biographical information. Of these, thirty-two were military officers, and the others were associated with a civilian religious organization such as the YMCA, Knights of Columbus, or Jewish Welfare Board. Most were Catholic or Protestant, but there also were two Jewish chaplains (one a commissioned officer, the other a civilian). At least thirteen were cited for gallantry or earned medals ranging from the Distinguished Service Cross and *Croix de Guerre* to the later-awarded Silver Star and Purple Heart. Ten chaplains were immigrants, an indication of the demographic makeup of the Army itself.

Shay has not intended this work to be a scholarly treatment of the Army chaplaincy in the 26th Division during


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the war. Rather, he tells the chaplains' story largely in their own words, and in the words of those whom they served. The 26th is well covered by division and regimental histories and memoirs, and this book is a fine addition to that historiography.

Peter L. Belmonte is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and freelance historian. A veteran of Operation DESERT STORM, he holds a master's degree in history from California State University, Stanislaus. He has written several books: *Italian Americans in World War II* (Chicago, Ill., 2001); *Days of Perfect Hell: The U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, October–November, 1918* (Atglen, Pa., 2015); and *Calabrian-Americans in the US Military During World War I*, Volumes 1 and 2 (2017). His next book, as a coauthor, is about foreign-born soldiers in the U.S. Army during World War I; it is due out in 2018.

II

A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People's Armies



By Spiros Tsoutsoumpis
Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. viii, 275. $ 105

Review by Panagiotis Delis

The 1940s are the most researched period of modern Greek history, and the fact that Spiros Tsoutsoumpis' book *A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People's Armies* offers new insights makes it a meaningful contribution. Until recently, scholars have tried to analyze the phenomenon of resistance as a political process and have viewed guerrillas as the apostles of a new era that fought explicitly for ideology. In contrast, Tsoutsoumpis writes about Greece's two largest World War II resistance organizations, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), and the Greek Democratic National Army (EDES), but neither idealizes nor demonizes them. The main goal of his study is to depict a more nuanced image of the resistance on the mainland and to underline the specific circumstances that made those groups the leading forces in Axis-occupied Greece. The author attempts this by trying to understand the everyday life of the guerrillas, their perceptions, and their relations with the social context in which that they operated.

Chapter 1 outlines the chief reasons for the delay in the creation of an armed resistance movement and describes how the first year of the occupation shaped the situation in favor of the peasantry. Famine, the dependence of the urban centers on the countryside, social disintegration, and the collapse of the prewar elites for the first time gave the upper hand to the people living in villages. The penetration of the resistance networks in these closed communities would have been impossible without kinship, regional affiliation, and family ties. The gradual involvement of the villagers in the resistance shaped their initial motives, and the exercising of political agency gave it new meaning. Nevertheless, one of the main differences between the peasants and the guerrillas was that the sole concern of the former was to preserve the safety of their families, and this might explain their reluctance to support ELAS and EDES. The effort by the resistance to monopolize violence and protect the villagers from the numerous bands that flourished in the first year of the occupation gave them a degree of legitimacy. The instrumental role of mayhem altered the old ties of the communities and created a climate of fear that, in the end, allowed the guerrillas to dictate their own terms.

The second chapter addresses the issue of recruitment and how the resistance proliferated. Territorial expansion and the militarization of ELAS and EDES gave them an initial boost. On a personal level, ideology and access to material wealth and prerogatives were important incentives for potential enlistees. Becoming a guerrilla also entailed a rise in prestige because these fighters saw themselves as superior to ordinary civilians. As the gap between various resistance organizations intensified, the people found themselves in a precarious position that left them no choice but to align with the one or other faction.

Chapter 3 is perhaps the most groundbreaking because it covers the neglected aspect of the popular culture of the fighters. The author analyzes the language of symbolism in detail and carefully follows the process of creating new identities. The new warrior, in the tradition of the Greek Revolution of 1821, was the ideal man who cannot be compared with the simple peasant. He wears a specific uniform and embraces a special code of honor. Masculinity was the key element of acceptance, and the resistance provided an opportunity for many youth to escape the traditional confines of their families for the first time. The complete disregard for civilian life and the constant transgressive actions underpinned the resistance's sense of superiority *toward* ordinary people. The brutalizing effect of combat generated a culture that celebrated violence and ultimately downgraded the role of the common people even more. These groups possessed their own rituals, and their violent nature could also be explained by their composition. Unlike the regular army, they included a large proportion of people who came from the criminal underground and found the prospect of violence appealing. Inevitably, the whole process of expansion of the resistance resulted in large-scale social mobility, and for the first time, many lowland peasants came in contact with people from the mountains.

In the fourth chapter, the author explores the world of rituals and the


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role of religion, as well as the ties that were forged among the guerrillas. The common misconception of the resistance armies as political forces has led scholars to marginalize the role of Christianity. Tsoutsoumpis defends the importance of religion, which he presents through several examples. He explains the organic role regarding the bond that Christianity offered between old and new members. Music also played an important role, likely because many songs presented an idealized image of the future, giving meaning and a sense of purpose to people living in extremely harsh conditions. The absence of a home front and increasing isolation further enhanced personal ties and rendered each individual responsible for the primary group. The turning point that reversed this process occurred when ELAS and EDES were transformed into regular armies, and the detrimental effects of this transition were multiple: it deprived the junior cadres of the necessary freedom of movement and it nearly destroyed the regional character of the units. As the war was intensifying, influential leaders were more prone to use their power to access benefits, while new factors such as coercion, fear, and religion became the forces that made men resilient to hardship.

The last chapter deals with the establishment of control in the areas run by the guerrillas. In contrast to the approach that sees the formation of the resistance authority as the end of the clientelist networks and patronage, the author demonstrates that the corruption of National Liberation Front (EAM) officials not only involved clientelism, but reinforced it. Both ELAS and EDES created their own systems of justice—mainly in the form of the peoples' or revolutionary courts—and their own police, which consisted of reserves until 1944. One of the central qualitative differences between ELAS and EDES regarding the state building process was that EDES operated with a more decentralized model. Its leaders remained loyal to their regional priorities until the end, and it did not have a unifying ideology. In contrast, EAM possessed a more coherent ideological framework and was more willing to use violence because it was legitimized as a means to bring about a social revolution. The author identifies the fierce antipartisan operations of the *Wehrmacht* and the failure of the guerrillas to protect locals as the main reasons behind two crucial outcomes: a growing resentment toward the resistance and the emergence of a series of collaborationist formations. In particular, the second outcome created a series of new problems for the peasantry because it intensified local fragmentation and violence—a result of all sides demanding unconditional support and equating neutrality with treason. Nevertheless, the resistance's rule in free Greece sparked groundbreaking social transformations, enabled women and young people to participate as political agents, and permanently destabilized the power relations within the conservative rural communities.

Overall, Tsoutsoumpis' work is an important study that offers a social "history from below" and successfully manages to illuminate themes that have hitherto not attracted scholars' attention. The book is a must-read for researchers and students interested in World War II, modern Greek history, and guerrilla warfare.

Panagiotis Delis is a Ph.D. candidate at the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Centre for Hellenic Studies at Simon Fraser University. He holds degrees in history and finance from the University of Athens. He also has a master's degree in the history of international relations from the London School of Economics and a master's degree in comparative history from Central European University. His current project is focused on a comparative analysis of the participation of Greece and Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.



By Charles R. Shrader
University Press of Kentucky, 2015
Pp. xvi, 488. $60

Review by Chris Buckham

The War in Indochina is perhaps best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. However, the conflict that led up to that rout was protracted, brutal, and new—new in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the impact the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. In *A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945–1954,* author Charles R. Shrader has approached the war from an unconventional perspective—one that has been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war—that of logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the defeat of the French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants' respective logistics capabilities and doctrines.

Shrader has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the psychology and hubris of the post–World War II French and their assumption of superiority over the Viet Minh. This mindset, combined with an unstable national approach of the French government, precluded the assignment of manpower and material that ultimately were required for success.

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The author leads into the Viet Minh's successful recognition of the need to not only outfight the French, but also to outlast them. The three-stage operational approach combined with a successful utilization of the strength of the Vietnamese people—human capital—enabled a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.

Shrader discusses at length how heavy weapons and combined arms operations heavily based on the lessons learned during European conflicts served as the French forces' central method of engagement. Artillery, armor, aircraft, and naval contingents enabled the French to control set points, but they surrendered the countryside—and by extension, the initiative—to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy logistics requirement that was difficult to meet. Strategically, long lines of support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands. Operationally, the French need to establish isolated forward operating bases to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and supplies required a reliance on air or naval resupply methods that were costly, inefficient, and resource intensive.

Conversely, the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader identifies how Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example, required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements of his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of the typical demands of the respective forces is enlightening to the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the Viet Minh adjusted their tactics according to their logistics capability and expertise.


The book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology compared to that of the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine, and thereby able to manipulate their procedures far faster than their adversary. Unlike the French, who were, for the most part, confined to preexisting Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a national level mobilization process whereby noncombatants were obliged to support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures were created to facilitate the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one section to the next through transfers between regionally assigned porters. The Viet Minh also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.

Shrader makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a lack of logistics flexibility, an unresponsive doctrine, an inaccurate paradigm of their adversary based on preexisting hubris, a unsupportive national government, and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theater. French forces were able to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh, and their use of air and riverine resupply systems supported off-road operations well. Unfortunately, the depth of capacity was heavily in favor of the Viet Minh because their effort was viewed as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand during some periods of the conflict—most notably, when they successfully cut off Viet Minh access to critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as supply for the Viet Minh). However, the logistics limitations suffered by the French were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.

Shrader's book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a vast majority of the conflict, French technology heavily outweighed the Viet Minh; that the French were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the Viet Minh to offset French advantage through nontraditional tactics and supply doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for operators and supporters alike.

Maj. Chris Buckham is an active duty logistics officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force. He is presently head of curriculum design at the International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya.

Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State



By Seth G. Jones
Oxford University Press, 2017
Pp. ix, 336. $29.95

Review by Jon B. Mikolashek

Seth Jones, the author of *Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York, 2009), has

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produced a great work on insurgencies, insurgent groups, and how to counter them. *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State* is intended to "better understand how [insurgent] groups start, wage, and end insurgencies" (p. 4). The book focuses on four main points that include the rise of insurgent groups, key components of insurgences, factors that contribute to ending insurgencies, and what all this analysis means for counterinsurgency and counterinsurgents. Jones is correct in stating that there is a massive divide between academics (and their theories) and practitioners (p. 4). *Waging Insurgent Warfare* is an attempt—and successful one—in narrowing that gap.

While the author is well versed in the current state of insurgencies, the scope of the book covers the end of World War II to 2015. This time frame is more manageable for the reader and serves as a guide for academics and practioners alike. Since the end of the Second World War, 181 insurgencies have been fought, each lasting an average of twelve years. It is interesting to note that following the end of the Cold War, the number peaked, but by 2015, the total had dwindled to thirty-eight (p. 5). Of those events occurring since 1945, the insurgent group has won 35 percent of the time. Twenty-nine percent of insurgencies ended in a draw, while 36 percent concluded with the rebels' defeat (p. 9).

The author takes great care in defining what constitutes insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. While his definitions are not perfect, they are simple and free of buzzwords and other conjecture. He defines an insurgency as "a political and military campaign by a nonstate group (or groups) to overthrow a regime or secede from a country" (p. 7). Likewise, counterinsurgency is "a political-military campaign to prevent insurgent groups from overthrowing a regime or seceding from a country" (p. 9). These straightforward definitions are an example of Jones' ability to take agile and complex issues and make them easy to understand. This is a vital element that will certainly help shrink the divide between academics and practioners and make the book more appealing to readers.


The majority of the book is spent analyzing both successful and unsuccessful insurgencies, their strategies, and tactics. The author does not focus on one or two events, but instead writes in generalities and offers copious amounts of data to support his arguments. While some will take issue with what he labels as victory or defeat, the writer's approach is common sense and objective. Jones lumps all insurgent strategies under three concepts: guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and punishment. He defines punishment as the deliberate killing of noncombatants in order to raise societal costs of resistance and coerce governments to concede to insurgent demands (p. 47). Insurgents rarely rely on just one strategy, and often use of a mix of at least guerrilla and conventional war strategies. The author makes a startling point that "no insurgent group that has utilized suicide terrorism has yet won an insurgency that has ended" (p. 59). With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the recent suicide bombing in Manchester, England, this focus on suicide terrorism is timely and important.

The text also deals with numerous tactics and organizational structures used by insurgent groups. The role of social media is discussed as well, but only in one chapter. That is not a flaw with the study, but readers wanting more on that topic will have to look elsewhere. To the book's credit, the study does discuss the role of Facebook and Twitter and how insurgents have quickly adapted their propaganda message to that medium. Jones does a great job arguing for and against some long-held notions about insurgencies, and he downplays the role of safe havens in insurgents' success. Such sanctuaries are important, but according to the author, insurgents only won 38 percent of the time if they enjoyed a safe haven (p. 148). The author also makes the accurate claim that there is no road map to start an insurgency, and that each one is nuanced and different (p. 171). This is important to understand, not only for the academic, but also for the practitioner who lives in a world of doctrine. Lastly, Jones makes a bold statement that is well supported by his data: the biggest keys to winning an insurgency include access to great power–combat support; working with other insurgent groups in some capacity; and waging of anticolonial wars. The last key means that insurgent groups that are fighting to overthrow a colonial government have a greater chance of success than a group trying to secede (p. 169). Algeria and Vietnam are mainly used to prove this last point.

Waging Insurgent Warfare is a great attempt at understanding insurgencies and how they start, win, or lose their wars. The book is complimented with charts that make the massive amounts of quantitative data easier to absorb. This volume is an improvement on *Graveyard of Empires* and is much more persuasive and encompassing. The work should appeal to both academics and practitioners and lead to a very healthy debate about how to counter insurgencies. For those interested in this field, this is a must-read.

Dr. Jon B. Mikolashek is the author of several articles on World War II and the Global War on Terrorism. He is also the author of *General Mark Clark: Commander of U.S. Fifth Army and Liberator of Rome* (Havertown, Pa., 2013). He is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

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Review by William A. Taylor

In *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order,* author Sean McFate, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., discusses the recent growth of the private military industry and argues, "The United States has opened the proverbial Pandora's box, releasing mercenarism back into international affairs" (p. 49). McFate served as an officer and paratrooper in the U.S. Army 82d Airborne Division and also worked as a private security contractor in Africa for DynCorp International. His book should prove useful for policymakers, scholars, and students interested in the re-emergence of the private military industry, the contemporary international security environment, and the relationship between the two.

The author's purpose is to chart the evolution of modern private security contractors. In less than two decades, the industry has exploded from a million-dollar to a multibillion-dollar one. Such growth sparks searing questions, and McFate directly engages them: Why have strong countries such as the United States elected to employ private military forces after centuries of their prohibition? Does the privatization of war change warfare, and if so, does it affect strategic outcomes? What does the privatization of military force augur for the future of international relations" (p. xii)? Ultimately, McFate explains why the industry has flourished, how it has done so, and what that development means for both national and international security. He utilizes a vast array of reports from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and U.S. government agencies, and augments these sources with references from congressional hearings, magazines, and newspapers. The author also synthesizes prominent books and journal articles on the topic, many of them limited in either scope or detail. Finally, he provides useful annexes that contain sample contracts and timelines.

McFate has organized his book into twelve chapters. In Chapter 1, he looks at the relationship between profit and warfare that produces the phenomenon of contract warfare. Next, he analyzes the contemporary private military industry, much of it spurred by U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the third chapter, the writer explores the close relationship between the United States and the private military industry, something he characterizes as "A Codependency Problem" (p. 19). He considers what preceded this revolution, including such political agreements as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, technological advances like the advent of muskets, and social changes such as the emergence of conscription. As a whole, these shifts allowed states to gain a monopoly on power and the use of force. In Chapter 5, McFate explains how the push for free markets articulated by University of Chicago economists Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, and others, combined with President Bill Clinton's post–Cold War drawdown of the U.S. military that cut both budgets and personnel by more than a third, spurred a modern resurgence of the private military industry. The author reminds readers that there are precedents to such dynamics. He examines the Middle Ages in Europe using examples of condottieri and landsknechts, illustrating the historical propensity of the private military industry to enlarge itself and to perpetuate war. He also warns of related moral hazards, including plausible deniability and opacity. In Chapter 7, the writer details how all these factors contributed to the modern international security system, beginning with the conclusion of the Thirty Years War and characterized by a state monopoly on power, equality among states, and recognition of the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other states. It also led to the eventual outlawing of mercenaries. McFate outlines the relationship of the private military industry to neomedievalism, something he describes as "a non-state-centric, multipolar international system of overlapping authorities and allegiances within the same territory" (p. 73). Drawing from the work of international relations expert Hedley Bull and others, McFate relates globalization, regional integration, transnational organizations, weak and failing states, and the erosion of state sovereignty directly to a monopoly on force. In Chapter 9, the author highlights the likely contours of warfare under this new system, including an increase in civilian casualties and the resurgence of contract warfare. He presents two revealing case studies: DynCorp International raising and training a new Armed Forces of Liberia beginning in 2004 and the mercenary market in Somalia spurred by heightened piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. The chaos in Somalia resulted in the presence of nearly 200 private security companies, enough to form their own trade association known as the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI). McFate argues that the first case study in Liberia demonstrates the positive potential of the industry, while the second case study of Somalia portends a troubling warn-

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CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE



BOOK PROCESS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

In my first Footnote, I observed that the Center of Military History (CMH) was embarking on a wide array of initiatives to improve how it accomplishes its missions. Since then we have successfully implemented the Graduate Research Assistant program, which has expanded to five schools with the addition of contracts with Texas Tech University and Texas A&M University. We are in the midst of achieving another significant change involving how CMH researches, writes, and produces its official history volumes. This grew out of the realization that many of our books took well in excess of a decade to complete. The sheer scale of some of the projects contributed directly to the long timelines, but it also increased the likelihood that an author would take another job, retire, or otherwise leave the project before it was finished, resulting in added time to identify a replacement and get them up to speed.

This new effort began with development of a Book Process Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which went through a number of drafts and internal reviews prior to the Center adopting it as policy in February. We are now turning that document into operational reality. The SOP summarizes the key conditions to meet the objective of ensuring that CMH is "the premier publisher of official history in the federal government." Those requirements include "hiring and nurturing the best researchers/writers, ensuring that they can focus on their projects, providing timely and clear editorial guidance, and efficiently producing well-regarded books that prove valuable to the Army, academia, and the American public."

The first and easiest fix contemplated in the SOP is scoping projects so they can be researched and written in a period of about five years. To that end, several volumes already in progress are being recast. Work on a book covering Vietnam logistics, for instance, got under way in the 1980s, but the initial author was sidetracked by his promotion into a supervisory position, and later retired. Another author has been at work on it (with a diversion for the Civil War commemoration series) since 2007. The current partial manuscript is already several hundred pages long, but only takes the story into 1968, so it would be years before this book saw the light of day. Given that other topics in the Vietnam series are dealt with in multiple volumes (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Military and the Media, and Advice and Support), it made sense to devote two volumes to the equally large and important topic of logistics. (In fact, as originally envisioned in the 1970s, it was supposed to be three volumes!) The author has developed a new prospectus for a book covering the period up to the end of 1967, and he will have a revised manuscript within a year. Likewise, the Center has a 900-page manuscript covering combat operations from 1969 through the end of the war, but it was left incomplete when the author took a new job outside CMH. This project will be divided into two, with each part assigned to new authors (probably by contract), so that it can be wrapped up in a more timely manner. A project that is just getting under way—the Army in Europe from 1945 through 1950—will be more narrowly focused on Germany, with a subsequent volume looking at Army activity in the Mediterranean area.

As is evident from these examples, we are not going to delete swaths of history to make the books shorter, but instead more tightly focus each book so that it is likely to be completed by a single author. The rest of the topic will be covered in a second volume. Authors are warming to this aspect of the SOP because they see "light at the end of the tunnel" (to borrow a phrase appropriate to the ongoing Vietnam fiftieth commemoration) on projects that previously seemed to stretch into the distant future.

The graduate research assistants are playing a significant role in speeding up the process, as they will provide considerable help during the research and production phases. They are able to comb secondary literature for relevant sources, wade through large numbers of archival boxes to identify those holding the most relevant records, search for photographs, check footnotes, and perform other tasks that can shave many months off the author's schedule.

In the next issue, I'll cover other aspects of the Book Process SOP.

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ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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ARMY HISTORY

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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ARMY HISTORY

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Issue Cover: Silhouette of troops at Pandu Ghat moving from the Ramgarh Training Center to Myitkyina, Burma, 25 October 1944. /National Archives

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Spring 2018 issue of *Army History*, with a layout not unlike the Winter 2018 issue, we present two pieces covering actions of the Army during World War II and the Vietnam War. Once again, while both are article-length contributions, the second of these is another "preview chapter" from a recently published Center of Military History (CMH) volume.

In the first article, author Christopher L. Kolakowski argues that the fighting in north Burma during 1944 foreshadowed the coming of what we would now consider "modern warfare" in the latter half of the twentieth century and even into the twenty-first. The Allied campaign in Burma saw the establishment of outposts that would be more commonly known during the Vietnam War as firebases, the widespread use of indigenous troops, adaptation to difficult terrain, and a refinement of insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics.

The second article is an excerpt from a recent CMH publication, *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968*, by Erik B. Villard. Chapter 2, Opening Moves: Battles North and West of Saigon, examines the planning for a new American and South Vietnamese dry season offensive and the numerous battles that took place in the final months of 1967 through January 1968. Some of the actions covered in this chapter include Operations SHENANDOAH II and YELLOWSTONE, as well as the battles at Loc Ninh, CAISSON VI, and Firebase BURT.This issue also contains an Army Art Spotlight featuring the work of Sgt. Howard Brodie. In his sketch, *Under Fire*, Brodie, an artist for *Yank* magazine, captured the raw emotions shared between two soldiers while fighting in Germany in early 1945.

In his Chief's Corner, Mr. Charles Bowery discusses the efforts under way to revise the regulations that govern the Army's history programs. AR 870–5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, was last updated over a decade ago and AR 870–20, *Army Museums, Historical Artifacts, and Art*, has not been amended for almost twenty years.

Mr. Jon Hoffman, in his Chief Historian's Footnote, follows up on his piece from the previous issue, elaborating further on CMH's new standard operating procedure for writing books at CMH.

In addition, this issue contains eight excellent book reviews, a brief update on the construction of the National Museum of the United States Army, and a farewell to a member of the CMH team who passed away on 14 October 2017.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor

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


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The Coalition War in North Burma, 1944

By Christopher L. Kolakowski





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Opening Moves
From *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968*

By Erik B. Villard

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

UPDATING THE REGULATORY FOUNDATION OF ARMY HISTORY

Happy New Year to all of you in the community of Army historians. The year 2018 will see two notable Army anniversaries, with the Vietnam Fiftieth and the World War I Centennial hitting their high points over the coming spring and summer. Even during this busy time, many of you will be engaged in much-needed collaboration with the Center of Military History (CMH) to update our community's two most important regulations. Army Regulation (AR) 870–5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, and AR 870–20, *Army Museums, Historical Artifacts, and Art*, are currently under revision by teams composed of stakeholders from across the Army History community. CMH's Field Programs and Historical Services Directorate, under the leadership of Ken Foulks, is leading the AR 870–5 rewrite, which is off to a great start after a weeklong offsite hosted by the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Col. Greg Baker and the Army Museum Enterprise (AME) Directorate are conducting the AR 870–20 rewrite, and this cross-functional team reports to the AME General Officer Steering Committee. Both revised regulations should go out for Army-wide staffing this summer, with publication at the end of Fiscal Year 2018.

I am excited and energized by the level of collaboration and engagement that I have seen thus far in both cases. This speaks both to the passion and commitment that all Army historians bring to our craft, and to the serious need for improvement of both of these core documents. AR 870–5 was last amended over a decade ago, and much has changed across the Army, particularly in our institutional base. We need a foundational regulation that acknowledges this new reality in terms of staffing levels, budgets, and the acceleration of change in the digital age. The December 2016 signature of the Army directive creating the AME instructed CMH to revise AR 870–20 to account for these changes in our management construct for museums. It is vital that we revise both regulations in a transparent and collaborative way, so that all Army historians and museum professionals have regulations that facilitate their activities. Thanks to all of you in advance for participating in this process. Let's continue to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve in 2018!

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NOTES

NATIONAL MUSEUM UNITED STATES ARMY

National Museum of the United States Army: Construction Update

As 2017 came to a close, the building of the National Museum of the United States Army achieved several key milestones. The construction of the 185,000-square-foot building began in March 2017. The concrete foundation was finished by early summer, four oversized macro artifacts were installed in August, and the last steel structural beam was placed in November. Crews are moving toward the next major goals of completing the roof and assembling exterior architectural elements. Infrastructure work, including the installation of roads, water and sewer lines, and other utilities, also continues. The Army Historical Foundation is privately funding the construction of the museum and Clark Construction Group, LLC, is the building firm.

"This is an exciting time in the construction of the National Army Museum because the building's exterior is visibly changing every week," remarked the museum's director, Tammy E. Call. "The Army's exhibit staff and contractors are also hard at work for when they get the go-ahead to move in and start turning the building into a museum."

For more information on the National Museum of the United States Army, visit www.theNMUSA.org and follow construction progress at www.armyhistory.org.


In Memoriam: James A. Speraw Jr. (1955–2017)

James "Jim" Allen Speraw Jr. was born in Waterbury, Connecticut, and began a three-year enlistment in the U.S. Army in June 1973 immediately after graduating from high school. He attended basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and was assigned to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, in 1974.

Jim began volunteering at the Fort Meade Museum in 1975 and one year later joined the Connecticut Army National Guard, where he served until 1978. In 1980 he was hired as a museum technician at Fort Meade and in September 1981 joined the Maryland Army National Guard as a sergeant, eventually attaining the rank of staff sergeant.

During the Persian Gulf War, Jim volunteered for active service as part of the U.S. Army special property recovery team, for which he earned the Bronze Star. After his release from active duty on 12 September 1991, he reported to his new position as staff curator at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) and in 1994 deployed to Haiti as the Department of Defense liaison for historic property during Operation Uphold Democracy. After the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Jim served with the joint service recovery team for historic property. In 2002, he helped build the Maryland National Guard Museum at the Fifth Regiment Armory in Baltimore, and in October of the same year retired from the Maryland National Guard. Jim deployed to Iraq in 2003 as an Army curator with the 101st Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2010, Jim, a staff curator with CMH's Collections Branch, Museum Division, moved from 14th Street NW, Washington, D.C., to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. His final assignment for the Army came when he returned to where he started his civilian career at the Fort Meade Museum, which he helped prepare for permanent closure.

Having served the U.S. Army for a combined total of forty-four years, Jim was unsurpassed in his knowledge of Army weaponry, uniforms, and equipment. He was always more than willing to provide a helping hand to all his colleagues, but he is best remembered for being a loving and caring individual. No matter what the circumstances, he never hesitated to assist people in some way. Jim passed away on 14 October 2017 and was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery on 29 December 2017.



Aerial photography courtesy of Colonel Duane Lempke (USA Ret.)

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher L. Kolakowski is the director of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia. He received his bachelor's degree in history and mass communications from Emory & Henry College and his master's degree in public history from the State University of New York at Albany. Kolakowski has worked with the National Park Service, the New York State government, the Rensselaer County Historical Society, the Civil War Preservation Trust, Kentucky State Parks, and the U.S. Army. He is the author of *The Civil War at Perryville: Battling for the Bluegrass* (Charleston, S.C., 2009); *The Stones River and Tullahoma Campaign: This Army Does Not Retreat* (Charleston, S.C., 2011); *Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941–May 1942* (Jefferson, N.C., 2016); and *The Virginia Campaigns, March–August 1862* (Washington, D.C., 2016), a pamphlet in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Campaigns of the Civil War series. He is currently working on a book about the 1944 India-Burma Campaigns which is scheduled for release in 2020.



A ten-year-old Chinese soldier at Myitkyina airfield, 5 December 1944

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"The Coming of MODERN WAR"

The Coalition War in North Burma, 1944

By Christopher L. Kolakowski

In 1956, British Army Field Marshal Sir William Slim wrote his memoirs detailing his time in Burma and India during World War II. At the end of the book, he included a few final reflections. "Some campaigns have more than others foreshadowed the coming of modern war," he wrote. "I believe that ours in Burma was one of these."[1]

On the surface, this is an arresting statement about an area that has been largely overlooked in histories of World War II. But a closer examination shows the validity of Slim's comment. The operations in and around Burma represented the first large-scale U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Operations involved air mobility, air resupply, jungle bases (precursors to Vietnam's firebases and modern forward operating bases), American advisers to Chinese forces, and other elements recognizable in modern warfare.

The war in Burma was also a true coalition war, involving a mix of nationalities and objectives that required careful managing to pursue operations against the Japanese. "In this case," recalled British Maj. Gen. Derek Tulloch, a Burma veteran, "there was *no* unified High Command with a firm purpose. The Americans, British, and Chinese all had completely diverse objects in view." It was also one of the first times a U.S. general, in this case Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, held top command while directing forces that were primarily not of his nationality. Stilwell's objective was to reopen a land route to China, which meant conducting a campaign from India into the mountains and jungles of North Burma. To liberate this area, he had at his disposal a small number of U.S. combat troops, several Chinese divisions, and various British units with British and U.S. air support. Stilwell's ability to conduct his North Burma advance from December 1943 to August 1944 depended on his determination

Composite Image: A joint patrol in Burma including one American soldier and one British soldier with Kachin Rangers, March 1944/National Archives

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General Slim



Chiang Kai-shek (left) and Mao Zedong



General Stilwell (left) with Admiral Mountbatten

and ability to balance the differing politics, tactics, and cultures of his coalition partners. His experiences in North Burma offer an example of how the schemes of coalition politics can affect a campaign.[2]

Personalities and Nationalities

After the Pacific war's outbreak in December 1941, Japanese forces pushed through Thailand into Burma. In a fast campaign over the first months of 1942, the Japanese *Fifteenth Army* drove a mixed force of Chinese, Indian, and British troops almost completely out of the country. At the same time, other Japanese forces secured Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. The *Fifteenth Army*'s advance stopped at the Indian and Chinese borders, where poor communications and monsoon rains forced a pause. Except for remote Fort Hertz in far northern Burma, the entire country belonged to the Japanese.[3]

After these defeats, the Allies began planning operations to reverse the Japanese gains, but geography presented a formidable problem to any Allied offensive. Burma is the size of Texas, and Allied forces at Ledo in India and Fort Hertz in Burma stood 700 miles from Rangoon, Burma's capital and commercial center. The Bay of Bengal bounds Burma in the south, and jungle-covered mountains border the rest of the country. Most road and rail connections ran from Rangoon into the interior before stopping; very few land routes, most of poor quality, connected Burma with India and China across the mountains. The sole exception was the all-weather Burma Road from Lashio to Kunming, which had been closed by the Japanese advance. Burma's climate also presented problems; from May to October every year, a severe monsoon season floods the area with an average of 200 inches of rain per year.[4]

Lack of resources and strategic disputes prevented large-scale operations for much of 1943, but by the end of the monsoons the Allies were preparing new campaigns. During the summer of 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff created the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) to unify efforts. SEAC's 43-year-old supreme commander, Royal Navy Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, took command in November in Delhi. A member of the British royal family, Mountbatten possessed a boyish charm and enthusiasm that attracted attention but also gave the impression of a lack of depth; many contemporaries thought him overpromoted. He could also be vain, fond of luxury, and was a philanderer. He came to SEAC having most recently commanded Combined Operations in London, which included preparing the raids on St. Nazaire and Dieppe and developing specialized equipment (later famous as "Hobart's Funnies") for the invasion of Normandy.[5]

The appointment of a Royal Navy officer hinted at British plans, which sought to use a sea maneuver to strike for Singapore and beyond. Mountbatten repeatedly proposed invasion plans across the Bay of Bengal, but lost out to higher priorities elsewhere, especially with the looming Normandy invasion. "[Prime Minister] Winston [Churchill] had sent me out primarily to conduct amphibious operations to beat the Japs quickly," Mountbatten later said. "[But] we seemed fated to slog our way through the Burmese jungle and the worst terrain in the world."[6]

General Stilwell, a 1904 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, became SEAC's deputy supreme commander and was one of the most complex American commanders of World War II. He and his contemporary General Douglas MacArthur were the Army's top experts on Asia in 1941. David Rooney, a British intelligence officer in Burma and a Stilwell biographer, noted the general's fierce American patriotism and deep personality—introspective, but very much in tune with the people and cultures around him. He had an excel-

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lent command of language, and spoke fluent Chinese. Stilwell held himself to a code of values that stressed modesty, loyalty, and duty above all; anyone who violated Stilwell's code met with public and private venom, the latter usually expressed in his diary.[7]


Since leaving Burma in May 1942, Stilwell's objective had not changed: capture North Burma, build a road from Ledo to the Burma Road at Lashio, and reopen land communications with China so lend-lease supplies could get through in quantity. As it stood at the moment, American supplies flew across "the Hump" of the Himalaya Mountains from India to Kunming, a dangerous and limited route subject to adverse weather and Japanese interception. President Franklin Roosevelt told Stilwell in 1942 to "help China," and opening land communications was, to the general, the best way to achieve that objective. Liberating North Burma would also eliminate the Japanese airfield at Myitkyina (pronounced MITCH-in-a), a major threat to Hump flights.[8]

There was a third major personality involved in Burma strategy: Chiang Kai-shek, China's leader and supreme commander of the China Theater. His country had been at war with Japan since 1937 and had lost most of its eastern third to Japanese forces before the battle lines stabilized. Chiang, governing from Chongqing, also faced a Communist insurgency in the north led by Mao Zedong; both Chiang and Mao knew that after the war they would fight a final showdown. Chiang centralized as much power as he could and by 1944 had weathered several internal challenges to his supremacy. He resisted Stilwell's plans to professionalize the Chinese Army, which would weaken his control, but needed U.S. lend-lease material for his war efforts. Chiang also advocated on behalf of U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, whose Fourteenth Air Force (composed of elements of the former Flying Tigers) offered a way to keep lend-lease supplies flowing while fighting the Japanese with minimal Chinese effort.[9]

In addition to Stilwell's responsibility to SEAC, he was the lend-lease administrator to China, chief of staff and commander of any Chinese units Chiang chose to assign to him, and



General Chennault



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commanding general of all U.S. troops in the China–Burma–India (CBI) Theater. Depending on which role he filled, Stilwell answered to Chiang, Mountbatten, or the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; these multiple hats thus gave him considerable influence and power beyond his positions in the chain of command. "To watch Stilwell," remembered Slim, "when hard pressed, shift . . . from one of the several strong points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American, and Chinese offices, to another, was a lesson in the mobile offensive-defensive."[10]

Strategy for SEAC came to the forefront in the fall of 1943 at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences. After much high-level discussion, leaders shelved Mountbatten's plans in favor of a multipronged overland advance into Burma from India and China under the code name CHAMPION. This broad directive set the stage for the 1944 operations.

PLANS AND FORCES

CHAMPION called for a converging attack on North Burma. A Sino-American command under Stilwell, X Force, would advance from Ledo into North Burma, aiming for Mogaung and Myitkyina. In support of the south would be Slim's Fourteenth Army, with the British Army IV Corps advancing from Imphal and XV Corps from Chittagong through the Arakan. From Burma's eastern side, the all-Chinese Y Force of eleven divisions with American advisers would attack down the Burma Road from China toward Lashio. In contrast to previous years, fighting would continue through the monsoon season.[11]

The X Force numbered approximately 35,000 men, almost all of them contained in the Chinese 22d, 30th, and 38th Divisions. Most of these units had retreated into Burma in 1942 and all had since been retrained and equipped with U.S. weapons. In support was the battalion-sized Sino-American 1st Provisional Tank Group under Col. Rothwell Brown. The overall command had an array of names: the Chinese called it the New 1st Army, the Americans named it the Chinese Army in India, and SEAC dubbed it X Force, then Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) beginning in late January 1944. Two thousand American support troops and advisers accompanied the Chinese, but without command authority except over supplies; only two American officers, Brown and Stilwell, received approval from Chiang to directly command Chinese units.[12]

General Stilwell described his planned advance as needing to "go in through a rat hole and dig the hole as we go." His men had to advance south from



General Stilwell confers with Colonel Brown (right) and an unidentified Chinese soldier



M4 Shermans, with Chinese crews, from the 1st Provisional Tank Group



Colonel Peers



Lewis A. Pick, shown here as a lieutenant general, c. 1959

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Shingbwiyang through the Hukawng Valley, cross the Jambu Bum Ridge, and through the Mogaung Valley to reach Mogaung (150 miles away) and the railroad to Rangoon. Forty miles east of Mogaung was the key Japanese base at Myitkyina, which needed to be taken to protect Hump flights and to provide a vital link to roads leading to Lashio. Behind NCAC's frontline troops came a small legion of U.S. engineers numbering 9,000 troops and led by Col. Lewis A. Pick; 60 percent of this force was African American in segregated units. As the front advanced, part of Pick's command would widen the trails into roads, while others would improve drainage and run pipelines along the corridor. In this way, the Ledo Road (nicknamed "Pick's Pike" by the men) moved ahead toward Lashio.[13]

Supporting Stilwell's eastern flank was the Kachin Rangers, a scattered guerrilla force of local tribesmen trained and equipped by Detachment 101, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an American unit commanded by Lt. Col. William R. Peers, who had just taken over when the detachment's original commander, Col. Carl F. Eifler, had been medically evacuated home. Eifler and Peers had set up a network of OSS agents assigned to a base at Nazira in the Indian border; these agents organized the local anti-Japanese Kachin tribes to provide intelligence, rescue downed Allied airmen, and harass the Japanese forces in North Burma. In December 1943, Stilwell ordered this force, which by war's end numbered 10,000 Kachins and 500 American officers, to have 3,000 guerrillas ready to support his advance and help liberate the area south of Fort Hertz. Peers traveled with NCAC's headquarters staff throughout the campaign, and Stilwell conferred with him often.[14]

While Stilwell's men kept pressure on the Japanese from the front, another force would gnaw on the enemy's rear communications. These troops came under Fourteenth Army and were officially designated 3d Indian Division or Special Force, but best known by its nickname of Chindits. In 1943 the brigade-sized Chindits marched into Burma from Imphal and spent three months har-



Imperial War Museum

General Wingate



Courtesy of Carl F. Eifler

Colonel Eifler

rassing Japanese rear areas before coming out in scattered groups. The Chindit expedition provided a tonic of victory, but with a cost: the men had left a third of their number behind as casualties, including a large number of wounded who could not be evacuated. Churchill ordered reinforcements, and in 1944 the Chindits numbered six brigades of 4,000 men each, and planned for a longer operation in the Japanese rear, including rotating brigades every 90 days.[15]

The Chindit commander, British Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate, was one of the greatest characters ever encountered by the American military. He achieved infamy fighting Arabs in Palestine in the late 1930s, and later leading Anglo-Ethiopian forces into Addis Ababa against the Italians in 1941. He created the Chindits and directed their 1943 expedition into Burma. Wingate drove himself and his men hard with a single-minded determination to win that infused his Chindits with a very high esprit de corps. Wingate was also deeply eccentric in appearance, wearing an old pith helmet and an alarm clock. Churchill brought him to a high-level strategy conference in Canada in 1943, and Wingate famously showed up wearing the same stained uniform he used in the Burma jungle. He also would receive visitors naked, regularly ate onions because of their supposed curative properties, and ordered his officers to always move at a run. Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, one of Wingate's closest lieutenants, described him as "a broad-shouldered, uncouth, almost simian officer who used to drift gloomily into the office for two or three days at a time, audibly dream dreams, and drift out again . . . he had the ear of the highest, [and] we paid more attention to his schemes. Soon we had fallen under the spell of his almost hypnotic talk."[16]

Wingate captivated more people than just Fergusson. His appearance in Canada and his proposals impressed American leaders, and both U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Army Air Forces Chief General Henry H. Arnold agreed to support Wingate with U.S. troops and planes for a larger and longer penetration into Burma. Marshall combed the Army and sent a unit of 3,000 infantrymen to India under the code name GALAHAD, officially the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). Arnold sent two of his best young officers, Lt. Cols. Philip Cochran and John Alison, to India with whatever aircraft they could find. Their 1st Air Commando departed with 30 P–51 Mustangs, 30 B–25s, 32 C–47 transports, 225 gliders, 100 L–1 and L–5 liaison aircraft, and 6 prototype Sikorsky helicopters. Aviation engineers of the 900th Field Unit also joined the burgeoning Chindit support force.[17]


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General Scoones



General Giffard



Brigadier Fergusson

In addition to Stilwell's forces and the Chindits in North Burma, Slim's Fourteenth Army of over 500,000 men would push into south central Burma to join with Chinese General Wei Li-huang's Y Force advancing into Burma from the east. "Hundred Victories" Wei had 100,000 men with American advisers. Slim's spearhead, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Scoones' IV Corps at Imphal, contained 70,000 men.[18]

The planned convergence of these offensives created questions regarding the overall coordination of operations. Most of the forces were from SEAC, but Y Force was in China and therefore under Chiang's direct command. Further, Stilwell refused for national and personal reasons to serve under General George Giffard, the commander of SEAC's land forces in 11th Army Group. Matters came to a head at a conference of SEAC senior commanders in Delhi on 18 November 1943. After considerable wrangling, Stilwell proposed to serve under Slim for the campaign until he reached Kamaing. The two men, who regarded each other with great respect, left the room and worked out a handshake deal. Stilwell outlined his plans to Slim. "Tactically we were in agreement," recalled Slim, "and, wisely, we avoided strategic discussion. . . . I assured him that, as long as he went on those lines, he would not be bothered by a spate of directives from me." The two men returned and reported their solution. As the conference ended, Stilwell saluted Slim and asked, "Sir, as Fourteenth Army commander, do you have any orders for me?" With a smile, Slim replied, "No, sir. As Deputy Supreme Commander, do you have any orders for me?" "Not on your life," replied the American with a grin. Their personal relationship solved the command issue.[19]

Another command problem came from Chiang. After the Cairo Conference, it became clear that an amphibious landing was not to happen in 1944; once Stilwell broke this news to him, Chiang became reluctant to support the advances of any of his troops in either X Force or Y Force. After much wrangling, he gave in on 18 December. "Surprise," Stilwell wrote in his diary. "I really command the X-Force.



Colonels Cochran (left) and Alison, commanders of the 1st Air Commando Group



General Wei

Without interference! And with the power to hire and fire." "For the first time in history," an exultant Stilwell told his wife, "a foreigner was given command of Chinese troops with full control over all officers and no strings attached. Can you believe it?" Stilwell departed Chongqing for Ledo two days later.[20]

As these discussions went on among the Allied partners, the Japanese in Burma also laid plans for 1944. Lt. Gen. Kawabe Masakazu's *Burma Area Army* held the country with forces scattered

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General Kawabe



General Mutaguchi



General Sakurai



General Tanaka

along the major invasion routes. Opposite XV Corps stood Lt. Gen. Sakurai Shozo's *Twenty-Eighth Army* with the *54th*, *55th*, and *2d Divisions*, the latter having just recovered from a mauling at the Battle of Guadalcanal. In central Burma, the *Fifteenth Army* under Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya faced IV Corps with the *15th*, *31st*, and *33d Divisions* supported by the division-sized *Indian National Army (INA)*. The independent (and elite) *18th "Chrysanthemum" Division* under Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi opposed NCAC, while Maj. Gen. Matsuyama Yuzo's *56th Division* held the Burma Road against Y Force.[21]

Wingate's 1943 Chindit operation inspired Mutaguchi about the feasibility of advancing across the mountains to Imphal. A veteran senior commander, Mutaguchi felt that a victorious invasion of India would be a desirable object for both personal and national prestige, especially given the many reverses Japan suffered in the Pacific in 1943. He won approval for an attack in the Arakan by the *Twenty-Eighth Army* followed by a three-pronged advance on Imphal, Kohima, and Dimapur by the *Fifteenth Army*. The Arakan drive would start in February, with Mutaguchi's army advancing in early March.[22]

As 1943 drew to a close, these men and their units would together determine the course of operations in Burma during 1944.

Stilwell's Advance Begins

General Stilwell arrived at X Force headquarters on 21 December 1943. To Stilwell, the top priority was to help China by opening land communications; to do this meant a land campaign in North Burma under his personal attention to ensure success. Consequently, he would spend almost the next seven months in the field and leave other tasks to his deputies in Chongqing and Delhi. This decision, which may have resembled an abdication of responsibility, generated considerable comment. "Personally, I think he was right," said Slim. "The most important thing of all was to ensure that the American-trained Chinese not only fought, but fought successfully. No one could do that as well as Stilwell himself. Indeed, he was the only American who had authority to actually command the Chinese."[23]

Stilwell found X Force's divisions in some disarray. Lt. Gen. Sun Li-jen's 38th Division was inside Burma, facing the Japanese *18th Division* along the Tarung River at the Hukawng Valley's north end. Japanese forces surrounded three battalions of the division that were receiving supplies by air. Behind Sun, Lt. Gen. Liao Yu-sheng's 22d Division was moving up from Ledo. Brown's tankers were en route to the battlefield, while Lt. Gen. Hu Su's 30th Division remained in Ramgarh to complete the last of its training. Stilwell did not like the pace and aggression of operations. "No action for past ten days. Sun's 'attack' would have been a bust," he confided to his diary. "How long would they have sat on their asses here?"[24]

On Christmas Eve, X Force started the drive to Myitkyina. Stilwell understood that the Chinese Army in general had a poor offensive combat record against the Japanese; this translated into a lack of confidence and

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highlighted the need for an initial success. In consultation with Sun, Stilwell ordered the 114th Regiment to attack in succession each of the Japanese companies that blocked connection with the surrounded battalions. The attack started with a preparatory artillery bombardment, followed by an infantry assault signaled by a bugle call. Sun's men wiped out all Japanese in thirty-six hours of fighting and restored the position. Chinese morale soared, while Tanaka realized that these Chinese "were far superior in both the quality of their fighting and their equipment" to previous Chinese units he had encountered in China.[25]

General Stilwell led from the front, which made a deep impression on the Chinese troops. Sun and Stilwell had a "heart to heart talk" on 26 December. Sun "swears they are trying to do a good job for the *liao hsien sheng* [Old Man]," recorded Stilwell. "The troops are all bucked up to have me with them, but commanders are uneasy for fear I get hit and they be held responsible. Insistent that I stay back and let them do it. Says everybody appreciative of my backing and interest in them."[26]

The Chinese advance continued on 28 December. Sun attacked the Japanese at Yupbang Ga, securing it in heavy fighting. However, a flanking force against the Japanese left moved too slowly, and Tanaka escaped the trap by retreating southward. Meanwhile a regiment of Liao's division secured X Force's west flank by methodically clearing the Taro Valley. Sun probed the Japanese position at Taipha Ga before advancing on 17 January supported by Brown's newly arrived tank force. Taipha Ga fell in heavy fighting, but flanking forces again failed to move fast enough to trap Tanaka's men. Stilwell temporarily relieved one of Liao's regimental commanders and threatened himself to resign, but these efforts failed to appreciably speed up the advance. By late January 1944, these multiple Chinese offensives only pushed the front line forward a distance of ten to fifteen miles from where it had been on Christmas Eve 1943.[27]

The sluggish Chinese pace was attributable to several factors. "The Chinese-



Generals Hu and Stilwell at Myitkyina, Burma, 18 July 1944



A Chinese mortar regiment marching through the entrance to the Ramgarh Training Center, c. June 1944



General Stilwell inspecting Chinese troops in India accompanied by Generals Sun (far left) and Zhuoying Lo.

soldier is doing his stuff, as I knew he would if he had half a chance," Stilwell wrote his wife. "It's only the higher-ups who are weak." Sun and Liao were capable leaders and proved themselves in battles between 1937 and 1943. But they and their senior commanders understood that they belonged first to Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang visited them in November and counseled caution; he also indicated that he felt the campaign shouldn't start until February. Chiang clarified his comments as only opinions, but they carried weight with the Chinese officers. Chiang also secretly communicated with his commanders during the campaign, although Sun denied it when Stilwell confronted him. On top of all this, there was the question of face: as Sun told Trevor N. Dupuy, a liaison with his headquarters, he had never lost a battle and was not about to start now.[28]

While this campaign raged, Wingate finalized plans for his Chindit op-

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General Wei (center), and other unidentified Chinese officers, greet General Wedemeyer (right), c. 1944.



U.S. Army

General Boatner stops to speak to a wounded Chinese soldier in Burma, c. January 1944.

eration, code-named THURSDAY and scheduled for early March. Wingate and Stilwell met on 4 January 1944, and Stilwell successfully assigned GALAHAD to NCAC under the command of Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill, one of Stilwell's longtime staff officers. The press seized on the alliterative possibilities combined with GALAHAD's rough reputation and quickly dubbed the unit "Merrill's Marauders." Stilwell ordered Merrill to join him by early February.[29]

As his men regrouped for the next round against Tanaka's Japanese in front, Stilwell faced a battle in the rear as Mountbatten tried once again to get the CHAMPION plan revoked. SEAC headquarters again proposed cancellation of Burma operations in favor of amphibious offensives in the Bay of Bengal and against Sumatra under the code name CULVERIN. Mountbatten created an Anglo-American delegation to advocate for these plans in London and Washington. U.S. Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer would head the mission, named AXIOM.[30]


Mountbatten convened a conference in Delhi on 31 January 1944 to discuss CULVERIN. Stilwell left the field to attend. "The limies are welshing," he wrote in his diary. At the conference, Wedemeyer predicted that Stilwell's Ledo Road campaign was impossible to complete before 1946. Wedemeyer also proposed to halt all operations before the monsoons and conserve strength for the CULVERIN attack to come that fall. It all seemed to Stilwell nothing more than "fancy charts, false figures, and dirty intentions." Stilwell responded, "To hell with logistics," and argued forcefully for continuation of the overland advance into North Burma. He also reminded the attendees—almost all British—that Maj. Gen. Robert Clive had conquered India with just 123 soldiers. "Dead silence," recorded Stilwell, and the meeting broke up soon after. That night Stilwell returned to Burma.[31]

At the end of the meeting, Mountbatten promised that Stilwell's views would be carried forward by the AXIOM mission. Stilwell suspected differently, and used his authority as a U.S. theater commander to send a mission of his own to Washington under Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner. Boatner arrived in Washington ahead of AXIOM, and he spoke directly with the U.S. Joint Chiefs and President Roosevelt. Their conversations confirmed Roosevelt's inclination to reject CULVERIN, despite Churchill's support for the plan. When AXIOM arrived in Washington from London, it met a cold reception. Stilwell's North Burma campaign would continue.[32]

In February Stilwell again clashed with Mountbatten. As Chinese forces pushed steadily southward against Japanese resistance and through heavier-than-usual rain, the first stage of Mutaguchi's offensive got underway in the Arakan. The 55th Division pinned two Indian divisions, surrounding elements of the 7th Indian Division headquarters in a hedgehog defense position called the Admin Box. Slim ordered a stand, and requested transport aircraft and parachutes to supply the men. The only ones available were those earmarked to go over the Hump to China. Twice Stilwell refused; finally Mountbatten diverted thirty aircraft on his own authority, an action later backed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on an emergency authorization. After two weeks of heavy fighting, the Japanese withdrew back to their lines as XV Corps pursued. The diversion failed to attract Slim's reserves from Imphal, and also represented the first failed Japanese offensive in Southeast Asia.[33]

As these high-level maneuvers took place, Merrill's men marched in along the Ledo Road. "What we saw of the Ledo Road," remembered Lt. Charlton Ogburn, "was a great, broad, raw gash through the forest dipping, rising, winding, cutting back, going on days without end." He was struck by how "some of the world's most diverse

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strands [came] into juxtaposition" as Indian, Chinese, Burmese, and American troops all intermingled at stations along the way. The Marauders arrived in position on 21 February, and Stilwell paid them a visit. "Tough looking lot of babies," noted the general that night.[34]

Two days later Stilwell gave his orders for the next movement against the *18th Division*. His plan envisioned the surrounding and annihilation of Tanaka's division between two forces. While the 22d Division, parts of the 38th Division, and tanks pressed in from the north, the Marauders, supported by the 38th Division's 113th Infantry, would circle around the Japanese and cut their main line of retreat at Walawbum. Merrill received great discretion in how to execute his mission. However, the 113th was independent of Merrill's command, despite requests from Sun and Merrill to combine the units.[35]

On 24 February the Marauders set out on their first operation. Sustained by airdrops, the Americans pushed beyond the Japanese flank and started south through the hilly jungle. Along the way they picked up some Kachin Rangers as guides. "The Marauders took an immediate and lasting fancy to the Kachins," remembered Ogburn. In addition to their pleasant and open dispositions, the Rangers "not only knew the country and the trails, but they also knew better than anyone but the Japanese where the Japanese were."[36]

Tanaka was thrown off guard with the NCAC advance, and his division started falling back. As Chinese infantry pressed in from the north and west, Brown's tanks (supported by a battalion of Chinese infantry) slashed southeast against the Japanese right flank. Communications breakdowns hindered Tanaka's movements, and his division became disorganized; at one point, Brown's tanks brushed against division headquarters and scattered Tanaka's staff via fire from across a creek, but the surprised tankers were unable to press their advantage.[37]

After eight days of marching, Merrill sent his three battalions forward on 3 March against Walawbum. The Americans achieved total surprise, and quickly cut the road. But Tanaka acted quickly, sending half of his force against Merrill. Confused fighting lasted over three days as "Americans and Japanese were running into each other on every side," remembered a participant. "There was no front to speak of." Both sides disengaged on the 6th, and Merrill moved further east and south as the 113th arrived and took over the Marauder positions.[38]

During the battle one of the Marauders' Nisei interpreters, Sgt. Roy H. Matsumoto, tapped into the *18th Division*'s phone network. His translations yielded valuable intelligence about Japanese locations and intentions, including Tanaka's order to withdraw via jungle trails to the south and southwest. Merrill radioed many of Matsumoto's reports to Stilwell, who decided to act. He ordered what he called a "squeeze play," a converging attack by all units against the *18th Division*. The attack did not quite work out as planned due to communications and terrain difficulties; Tanaka's forces escaped—but not before some tough fighting. By 9 March, NCAC owned all of Burma

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Chinese soldiers march along a narrow section of the Burma Road toward Salween front.



Sergeant Matsumoto

north of the Jambu Bum. Stilwell's forces were halfway to Mogaung.[39]

As these battles played out, Stilwell again faced a conflict in his rear. Boatner's mission to Washington combined with the wrangle over transport planes to produce a near break between Mountbatten and Stilwell. Stories in the press that implied NCAC was the only formation doing any fighting did not help the situation. General Marshall in Washington ordered Stilwell to meet with Mountbatten and iron out their differences. On 6 March Stilwell left the front to greet Mountbatten in Taipha Ga. The SEAC commander flew in with an escort of sixteen fighters, four times the number of NCAC's support aircraft. Stilwell wore a plain U.S. uniform with a Chinese Army cap; Mountbatten looked crisp with full shoulder boards and ribbons. The men talked for ninety minutes, and Stilwell "ate crow," as he informed Marshall. "We are great personal friends." Mountbatten agreed, writing after the meeting that Stilwell "really is a grand old warrior but only the Trinity could carry out his duties which require him to be in Delhi, Chongqing, and the Ledo Front simultaneously."[40]

The next day the two men toured the nearby battlefields, which still showed the scars of war. "Louis much impressed," recalled Stilwell. "Doesn't like corpses." Mountbatten drove his own jeep back to Taipha Ga; as often, he was going very fast and this time a bamboo splinter struck his eye. The supreme commander was rushed to an American hospital in Ledo, where he remained with eyes bandaged and in complete darkness for a full week. Mountbatten thus became the only Allied supreme commander in the war seriously injured while on duty. He remained in command, transacting his business orally.[41]

Meanwhile another drama opened in India. On 5 March Wingate prepared to kick off Operation THURSDAY, the Chindits' invasion of Burma and the largest airborne operation of World War II to date. THURSDAY had three objectives: "1. To help the advance of combat troops (Ledo Sector) [NCAC] to the Myitkyina area by drawing off and disorganizing the enemy force opposing them and prevent the reinforcement of these forces. 2. To create a favorable situation for the Chinese [Y Force] advance westwards across the Salween. 3. To inflict the maximum confusion, damage, and loss on the enemy forces in Burma."[42]

One of Special Force's six brigades (16 Brigade under Brigadier Bernard Fergusson) had set off on a 450-mile march from Ledo a month earlier. Now Wingate planned to fly in two brigades (77 under Brigadier Mike Calvert and 111 under Brigadier W. D. A. "Joe" Lentaigne) to join 16 Brigade near Indaw in the Japanese rear, holding the other three brigades in reserve. The 1st Air Commando would handle air support and glider operations. Planners identified three landing zones in the jungle, all within forty miles of Indaw and the railroad that served as Tanaka's supply line. The zones were code-named BROADWAY, PICCADILLY, and CHOWRINGHEE; each was large enough to house a C–47 airstrip, and offered good access to Indaw.[43]

Wingate also envisioned a system of fixed bases for his men to use behind enemy lines. Called strongholds, these fortified centers would hold airstrips, supplies, and artillery. Floater units would operate nearby to ambush the Japanese and if possible draw them into the stronghold itself. "The Stronghold," instructed Wingate, "is an orbit around which columns of the brigade circulate.... The motto of the Stronghold is 'No Surrender.'"[44]

On the afternoon of 5 March, Calvert's 77 Brigade and part of 111 Brigade stood at Lalaghat Airfield ready to board the sixty-one gliders that would take them into Burma. Slim, who the day before had briefed Stilwell on Wingate's plans, was also present. The planes were scheduled to take off at 1800 for a night landing by the light of a near-full moon.

Suddenly at 1630 an intelligence officer appeared with new photos of the

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
British National Army Museum

Mike Calvert, shown here as a captain



Imperial War Museum

General Lentaigne




landing zones. Logs blocked one, but the reason was unknown; the other zones were clear. Was this an ambush? Nobody was sure, and there was no time to investigate. Postponement was not an option; they had to go that night or cancel. Slim and Wingate stepped aside to confer. "The decision is yours," said Wingate, THURSDAY's commander, to Slim.[45]

"I knew it was," recalled Slim. "Not for the first time I felt the weight of decision crushing in on me with an almost physical pressure. . . . On my answer would depend not only the possibility of a disaster with wide implications on the whole Burma campaign and beyond, but the lives of these splendid men, tense and waiting around their aircraft. At that moment I would have given a great deal if Wingate or anybody else could have relieved me of the duty of decision. But that is a burden the commander himself must bear." After some discussion, they modified the plan so as to fly all of Calvert's men into BROADWAY that night. Slim signaled his assent. The planes took off at 1812.[46]

The BROADWAY landing did not go smoothly, as Calvert soon discovered ruts in the land undetectable from the air. After a string of glider crashes, he closed the field for the night with the second wave en route. The next morning U.S. Army engineers of the 900th Field Unit, who made it in with most of their equipment, began smoothing out the field. By nightfall BROADWAY was back open; Wingate himself arrived for a look in one of the sixty-four C–47s to land on the night of 6–7 March. Over the next week relays of C–47s came in to BROADWAY and CHOWRINGHEE (opened 10 March) while light aircraft flew out casualties. "In a few days," remembered Calvert, "we had 12,000 men, 2,000 mules, masses of equipment, anti-aircraft and field guns all established behind the enemy lines."[47]

As Allied aircraft roared back and forth overhead, Mutaguchi's forces in western Burma made their final preparations for the advance into India. Although Tokyo portrayed the *Fifteenth Army*'s advance as a "March on Delhi," and Mutaguchi himself entertained dreams of larger goals, Mutaguchi's orders limited him to taking Imphal and the surrounding area.

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Military History Institute

While the *15th* and *33d Divisions* and the *INA* attacked Imphal from three sides, the *31st Division* would secure the north flank by capturing Kohima. For his part, Slim knew this offensive was coming; he planned a phased withdrawal to Imphal to fight the decisive battle there. General Scoones, the IV Corps commander headquartered at Imphal, was to decide the timing of the withdrawal.[48]

On 6 March the first of Mutaguchi's forces moved forward, with the rest following in stages over the next nine days. The battle developed gradually, causing Scoones to order the withdrawal at a point almost too late. Moving with speed and ferocity, the Japanese soon pressed IV Corps back toward Imphal. South of town, the 17th Indian Division fought its way out of encirclement twice to reach Imphal. At the end of March, Japanese forces cut the Imphal-Kohima Road, isolating IV Corps.[49]

Slim realized Scoones needed help, and asked for air transport. From his hospital room, Mountbatten stretched his emergency authorization for transport aircraft and directed the 5th Indian Division be flown into Imphal from the Arakan. In one of the first strategic air movements of its type, two brigades and the divisional troops flew into Imphal over seven days, 19–26 March. The division's third brigade, the 161st, diverted to Dimapur and Kohima, and arrived in early April to assist the defense.[50]

Meanwhile, Wingate set his Chindits to raising havoc. Calvert's 77 Brigade moved south toward Indaw while 111 Brigade fanned out north and east of CHOWRINGHEE. Wingate flew in two of his reserve brigades, 3 West African and 14, closed down CHOWRINGHEE, and set up two more strongholds: WHITE CITY near Mawlu, and ABERDEEN northwest of Indaw. These efforts cut the railroad and panicked the Japanese rear area troops. However, efforts to take Indaw itself

Colonel Hunter (right), Lt. Col. William Combs (left), and Maj. Frank Hodges (center) plan the attack on Myitkyina airfield.

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failed in the face of stiff Japanese resistance. It soon became clear that the Chindits had attracted attention from Japanese garrison units and reserves marked for the India offensive.[51]

Just as Operation THURSDAY was developing further, the Chindits suffered a key casualty. On the evening of 24 March, while returning from a series of visits to his commanders, General Wingate's B–25 crashed in the hills west of Imphal; there were no survivors. At a stroke, all Chindit plans were thrown into the air. "Wingate's death," recalled Tulloch, "could not have come at a worse time." On 27 March Slim appointed Lentaigne to take Wingate's place; Maj. John Masters assumed command of 111 Brigade.[52]

Wingate's operations also affected the situation in North Burma. Tanaka and his *18th Division* found their supply lines cut, and were forced to live off accumulated stocks—which they had been doing since January as the buildup for the India attack received all supply priority. Operation THURSDAY commenced just as supply and replacement shipments were about to resume to the *18th Division*. "Tanaka's supply position," noted a later analysis, "was fundamentally compromised by the Chindit fighting along the railway to North Burma."[53]

Stilwell's NCAC also resumed its advance. The 22d Division and Brown's tanks advanced against the Jambu Bum on 15 March, making slow progress despite heavy rain and Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, Merrill's infantry, supported again by the Chinese 113th Infantry, moved into the steep hills to the east of the Jambu Bum in an effort to get around the Japanese flank. The flank operations involved two movements: a close-in flank march of fifty miles by the GALAHAD 1st Battalion supported by the 113th against Shaduzup, and GALAHAD's 2d and 3d Battalions swinging wider and deeper into the enemy rear toward the village of Inkangahtawng.

It was slow going in the hills, especially because men had to hack trails out of the jungle, but air supply sustained the Marauders. The 2d and 3d Battalions, despite facing a march over three times longer than that of their compatriots, made better time using river valleys and reached Inkangahtawng on 23 March. Initially surprised, Tanaka reacted quickly and sent two battalions and scratch division troops after the Americans. Fearing being cut off, Merrill pulled back into the hills toward the hamlet of Nhpum Ga. Farther north, the 1st Battalion averaged two miles a day, and reached Shaduzup on 27–28 March. After some brisk fighting, the Japanese retired southward while pursued by the Chinese.

Tanaka received reinforcements from the *56th Division*, and sent an infantry force north from Kamaing to fight the Marauders. Stilwell ordered the Americans to hold, rather than pull them back as before; such moves resulted in a loss of face for Americans in Chinese eyes. With General Merrill having been evacuated due to heart trouble, Col. Charles Hunter conducted the battle, which quickly developed into a hilltop siege of the 2d Battalion lasting eleven days. The lines were so close that Japanese commands were audible; Sgt. Matsumoto and his Nisei comrades translated orders and shouted commands that sowed confusion in Japanese ranks. The Japanese conceded defeat and retreated on Easter Sunday, 9 April. Thus concluded six weeks of steady marching and fighting that exhausted GALAHAD and reduced the unit to 1,600 of the original 2,997—but during that time the front line moved thirty miles forward. At the same time the Chinese lost 5,000 men to all causes, while Tanaka's division approached 40 percent losses in many combat units.[54]

In the middle of this fighting Stilwell flew to China and then India to discuss strategy. In early March Chiang wired Stilwell asking about his plans and urging caution; from 28 to 30 March the pair held a series of discussions. Stilwell successfully pried away two more divisions, the 14th and 50th, to be flown across the Hump and equipped in India as reinforcements for NCAC. Chiang resisted Stilwell's urgings for a Y Force attack; Stilwell appealed to General Marshall, who in turn asked President Roosevelt to intercede with Chiang as one head of state to another. Roosevelt threatened to cut off lend-lease to Y Force if it didn't attack, and on 12 April Chiang agreed to send the force forward.[55]

The Japanese drive into India also concerned Stilwell; it threatened to sever the Bengal and Assam Railway, which was the supply lifeline for Fourteenth Army, the Hump flights, and NCAC. Stilwell requested a meeting of SEAC leadership, which occurred on 3 April in Jorhat, India. Slim and Stilwell met privately beforehand. Stilwell offered Slim Sun's 38th Division, but warned "it would mean stopping his advance, probably withdrawing, and certainly not getting Myitkyina before the monsoon," recalled Slim. "I was sure this was Stilwell's great opportunity. I, therefore, told him to retain the 38th Division . . . and to push on to Myitkyina as hard as he could go." In March Stilwell had told Slim of a secret plan to strike across the mountains to Myitkyina, and now affirmed he expected to execute it by 20 May. Slim agreed to keep it secret. In the plenary session, Mountbatten approved Slim's directives that NCAC should continue its advance, and directed the Chindits to assist.[56]

The 161st Brigade reached the Kohima area the same day as this conference, and after some confusion took position in and near the town. That evening the Japanese *31st Division* attacked in force. They surrounded the Kohima garrison, with the bulk of the 161st Brigade isolated on a hilltop two miles to the west. For thirteen days the Japanese compressed the Kohima perimeter, while the garrison barely survived on airdropped supplies. Fighting was at close quarters; in one sector, only the length of a tennis court separated the two sides. Giffard and Slim called forward via rail and air the XXXIII Corps headquarters under Lt. Gen. Montagu G. N. Stopford, the Chindit 23 Brigade of Special Force, the 2d British Division, and the 7th Indian Division to relieve Kohima. On 16 April the 2d Division broke through and raised the siege; both divisions then set about the arduous task of retaking the Kohima area and opening the road to Imphal.[57]

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


Generals Stilwell and Merrill (right)

Meanwhile, Mountbatten renewed his efforts to short-circuit the North Burma advance. Several times in April he requested the halting and pullback of NCAC so as to free transport aircraft for the Imphal-Kohima emergency. He again argued that Stilwell's plans were impossible, and advocated for an amphibious operation against Rangoon. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were divided on these proposals. In a series of messages starting 16 April, Marshall (via his direct channel through CBI Theater) shared the U.S. position with Stilwell: possession of Myitkyina was essential to enhancing communications with China and would facilitate land and air operations in China in support of the Pacific offensives. On 3 May those views turned into a directive from Marshall, setting these objectives for U.S. forces in the CBI Theater. The first key task was taking Myitkyina.[58]

Marshall's directive was the clearest break between the British and American strategies in Burma. In effect, it overruled the SEAC directives and set U.S. and Chinese forces on their own mission into North Burma. Whatever happened from here, U.S. forces would act with a degree of independence that Mountbatten could never counter.

Stilwell was all too happy to oblige. His operation against Myitkyina, code-named END RUN, was already underway.





Chinese troops advance through jungle terrain toward Myitkyina, c. July 1944.

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General Stopford

End Run and Endgame

Stilwell had been thinking of a dash for Myitkyina for some time. British and American scouts advised him of a little-known trail over the rugged Kumon Range that connected the Shaduzup area with Myitkyina; the trail was insufficient for a supply route, but a sizable force could move down it if needed. Stilwell assigned the Chinese 88th and 150th Regiments to the Marauders, and formed three groups—approximately 5,000 men total—to make the movement. Kachins would guide the forces; they refused to work with Chinese, but welcomed the Americans. General Merrill, now recovered, would lead the attack with Hunter in tactical command; their specific objective was the Myitkyina airstrip. Both men also let it be known to the Marauders that this was the last effort before withdrawal for rest. On 28 April End Run jumped off.[59]

As Merrill's force set off, Stilwell directed NCAC's Chinese forces, again composed of the 22d and 38th Divisions, to advance south from the Shaduzup area. However, these orders ran afoul of a nervous Chiang, who told his commanders (including Stilwell) to move slowly and "avoid undue losses." In a replay of the December and January battles, the Chinese moved with power but lethargy, especially when Stilwell directed flank marches. The front line stopped at Inkangahtawng and refused to move. Stilwell pressured Liao to advance, but the only part of the 22d Division that moved forward was Liao's personal headquarters. Finally Chiang gave permission to attack, and the Chinese divisions inched forward.[60]

Stilwell knew the monsoon was coming, and anxiously awaited news from Merrill. "Depression days," he wrote in his diary on 1 May. "Commander's worries. . . . The die is cast, and it's sink or swim. But the nervous wear and tear is terrible." Rain slowed the march, but on 14 May NCAC received a message from Hunter indicating they were forty-eight hours away from the objective. On the morning of 17 May Merrill's vanguard erupted from the jungle hills and swarmed the Myitkyina airstrip and environs. At 1530 Hunter sent the code words Stilwell was waiting for: MERCHANT OF VENICE. It signaled complete success. "WILL THIS BURN UP THE LIMIES!" crowed Stilwell in his diary.[61]



A road sign on the newly opened and renamed Stilwell Road

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The news of Stilwell's achievement quickly shot around the world. Churchill demanded that Mountbatten explain how "the Americans by a brilliant feat of arms have landed us in Myitkyina." However, things immediately began to go wrong. First, the expected reinforcements and supplies did not arrive, replaced instead at the initiative of air force commanders with antiaircraft units. Hunter sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment into Myitkyina late on the 17th; the units got into a firefight with each other and withdrew. A second expedition the next day had the same result. These failures enabled the Japanese to reinforce the town's garrison to 3,500 men. Chinese infantry and American combat engineers, plus half-trained American replacements, also flew into the battle. Merrill suffered another heart attack and was evacuated; his replacement lasted ten days before being incapacitated by illness. General Boatner came forward to take command, and sent his Chinese and American troops, weakened by casualties and disease, into repeated attacks. During one battle on 27 May, a Marauder battalion commander fainted three times at his post. "GALAHAD," confessed Stilwell, "is just shot."[62]

By early June the situation at Myitkyina reached effective stalemate. The airfield stood only 1,500 yards from Japanese lines, and was frequently shelled. This, plus the monsoon rains that started in earnest on 1 June, made air operations (supply and support) unpredictable. The mud and wetness added to the general air of misery and frustration. Supplies ran low; often, Boatner had just one to two days of rations on hand in reserve for his troops. Thirteen wrecked transport planes littered the field, while shortages of tents and other equipment forced improvisations. Lieutenant Ogburn recalled tents made out of colored parachutes, noting "the effect . . . was an odd one, giving the scene an appearance of fair grounds—one in hell, attended by an army of the condemned."[63]

On 17 May the Chindits came under Stilwell's command, and he directed them northward closer to Mogaung. With Fergusson's brigade having flown out, the four remaining brigades moved north. Masters established 111 Brigade in a stronghold at BLACKPOOL, a clearing near the railway some thirty miles southwest of Mogaung; almost immediately Japanese forces started attacking the position. Movement delays meant other brigades did not arrive to be floater units as expected. On 25 May 111 Brigade evacuated BLACKPOOL after an epic but ultimately futile struggle. Masters' men carried their wounded to Indawgyi Lake, where flying boats and light aircraft flew them to India. Three of the four Chindit brigades stayed in this area to protect this lifeline.[64]

Two days after the fall of Myitkyina airfield, Sun announced, "We go to take Kamaing now." The Chinese were again on the move. While Liao's division (reinforced with part of 50th Division) kept Tanaka's *18th Division* occupied in front and on the left, Sun sent his division around the Japanese right flank. One regiment, the 112th, headed for Seton, south of Kamaing, while another, the 114th, struck out for Mogaung. The 112th caught the Japanese by surprise, effectively surrounding the *18th Division*. Tanaka threw everything he could at the Seton position, but the Chinese held on in bitter fighting. In early June Tanaka pulled out of the trap to the southwest of Mogaung. He had 5,000 men left in his division, less than 40 percent of the number he had in January.[65]

Meanwhile Calvert's Chindits marched to Mogaung. Although his 77 Brigade was down to 535 effectives from the 4,000 he had in March, Calvert reconnoitered the town in early June. It rained an inch each day, and his men had to move through waist-deep water. Too weak to attack, he awaited the Chinese troops. Once the 114th arrived and took position south of Mogaung, Calvert sent his exhausted men forward. Mogaung fell after a sharp battle lasting from 23 to 26 June.[66]

As the North Burma campaign climaxed in May and June, fighting elsewhere turned in the Allies' favor. Wei's Y Force attacked on 12 May,



General Stilwell at Myitkyina



Myitkyina airfield shortly after its fall to Allied forces


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moving slowly westward through steep mountains and against determined resistance. By August the front approached the China–Burma border. In India, May and June were filled with heavy fighting around Imphal and Kohima. At Kohima, the 2d British Division cleared the hills around the town, and then XXXIII Corps began pressing south toward Imphal. Scoones' IV Corps meanwhile fended off Mutaguchi's last desperate attacks, and in early June started attacking northward to meet the relief column. The two corps joined forces on 22 June 1944. In early July Mutaguchi ordered a general retreat, and his battered forces limped back to Burma, having suffered an 85 percent casualty rate in their failed March on Delhi.[67]

At Myitkyina the situation remained worrisome as June turned into July. Stilwell canceled all infantry attacks temporarily. He promised Marshall he would "keep an American flavor in the fight," and the Marauders and engineers thus stayed in line. The Chindits also remained in the field. Coalition politics prevented Stilwell, who'd been promoted to full general on 7 July, from appearing to show favor for one nationality over another. All had to fight to the finish.[68]

In late June Brig. Gen. Theodore F. Wessels took over for the ailing Boatner. A former infantry school staffer, Wessels planned a methodical battle; after a short buildup he renewed attacks on 12 July. The Japanese perimeter slowly shrank under continuous pressure from Wessels' 12,000 American and Chinese troops. In early August the last 1,000 Japanese tried to escape, while the Myitkyina commander committed suicide.

Myitkyina fell on 3 August. The siege cost 5,383 Allied casualties and an additional 1,168 sick. Eight hundred Japanese escaped, 187 were captured, and the rest killed. This victory concluded the North Burma Campaign, which cost a total of 13,618 Chinese and 1,327 American casualties. However, it also represented, reported Slim, "the largest seizure of enemy-held territory that had yet occurred."[69]



An aerial view of treacherous switchback curves on the road near Qinglong, China, c. 1944

Conclusion

After the war, Slim analyzed the North Burma Campaign in his memoirs. "The capture of Myitkyina, so long delayed, marked the complete success of the first stage of Stilwell's campaign," he wrote. "When all was said and done, the success of the northern offensive was in the main owing to the Ledo Chinese divisions—and that was Stilwell." North Burma was indeed a personal triumph for Stilwell. He successfully prosecuted his campaign despite British opposition, Chiang's interference, and a general local belief that it was an impossible task. Stilwell's ability to navigate the differing and conflicting personalities, nationalities, and objectives to get the job done, especially in a theater where the United States contributed relatively few combat troops, is a lesson in how one U.S. senior officer can leverage resources to shape a campaign.[70]

Once the monsoon season passed, a renewed advance linked with Y Force near Bhamo. On 28 January 1945 the first truck convoy entered China over the new road from Ledo. Chiang christened the route the Stilwell Road, "in memory of his distinctive contribution and of the signal part in which the Allied and Chinese forces under his direction played in the Burma campaign and in the building of the road." The Stilwell Road still exists today, a monument to American ingenuity and leadership.[71]

The coalition war in North Burma affected geopolitics in Asia in several ways. First, it helped establish the strategic primacy of the United

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States in World War II's conduct and aftermath. It also represented the first major U.S. foray into Southeast Asia, foreshadowing jungle battles two decades later in Vietnam. But the campaign's biggest impact may have been on China. "By keeping intact the blockade of China for another year," one U.S. Army history notes, "the *18th Division* and Tanaka may have profoundly affected the history of Asia. If Stilwell had won a speedy victory in North Burma, the position of [Chiang's] government in China could have been greatly strengthened by the return of good Chinese troops and the delivery of trucks and artillery in 1944." A stronger Chinese Army would have been a great asset in the 1945 China campaigns and the subsequent Chinese Civil War, perhaps altering the outcome of the latter.[72]

Today Britain remembers Imphal and Kohima among its greatest victories of all time. The U.S. military carries the lineage of Merrill's Marauders, the 1st Air Commando, and other U.S. units from CBI forward to the present. The militaries of India and Pakistan also recall the victories of 1944. In China, the memory of World War II is used to link the People's Republic with the United States. General Stilwell's headquarters in Chongqing is now a museum, which recalls him as a friend to China, and a new Flying Tigers museum recently opened near the former Kweilin airfield complex. Seven decades after the guns fell silent, the war in Burma continues to inform the present and influence the future.

Author's Note

The author wishes to thank John Easterbrook for his perspectives and for permission to quote from the Stilwell diaries.

Notes

1. William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Cassell, 1961), p. 444. The original edition was published in 1956 while Slim was Governor-General of Australia. Burma is today also known as Myanmar; place names in this article are rendered as they stood in 1944.

2. Derek Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War* (London: MacDonald, 1972), p. 255. Emphasis is in the original.

3. Excellent popular histories of the Burma operations in World War II are Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984) and Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster Into Triumph 1942–45* (London: Vintage, 2011). For official accounts, see Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan Volumes I–V* (London: H. M. Stationery Office 1957–1969, Naval & Military Press reprint 2004); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954); and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1958). All references to Kirby are to *Volume III*.

4. McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 5–6, 8–9.

5. Richard Hough, *Mountbatten: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 1981), passim. Mountbatten's father was First Sea Lord at the beginning of World War I, and the family was forced to change its name from "Battenberg" to "Mountbatten." For Mountbatten's time heading Combined Operations, see pp. 138–61; Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 444; McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 183–94.

6. Hough, *Mountbatten*, pp. 184–88. The quote is on p. 187. Mountbatten's plans included an invasion of the Andaman Islands called BUCCANEER, an invasion of Sumatra called CULVERIN, and various lesser operations.

7. David Rooney, *Stilwell the Patriot: Vinegar Joe, the Brits, and Chiang Kai-shek* (London: Greenhill, 2005), p. 13. For other insights into Stilwell's background and personality, see Larrabee, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 509, 516–21; Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), passim. General Stilwell's diaries and papers are in the Hoover Institute Archives at Stanford University, while a selection of his writings from 1941 to 1944 were edited by Theodore White and published as *The Stilwell Papers* in 1948. The latest version is Joseph Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: Da Capo, 1991), (hereafter cited as *SP*).

8. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience*, pp. 415–16.

9. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 538–47.

10. McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, p. 187; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, p. 178. U.S. Army Forces CBI troop strength increased from 105,000 in January 1944 to 188,000 in September 1944. The vast majority of Stilwell's troops were Air Force or supply and support units. Counting advisers, approximately 10,000 men served in ground combat capacities. British forces in SEAC, by contrast, numbered over a million personnel of all types.

11. Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 66.

12. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience*, pp. 418–19; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 122–24, 142. The 1st Provisional Tank Group operated M3 and M4 tanks manned mostly by Chinese crews and maintained by the U.S. Army 527th Ordnance Company. As more Americans joined X Force, it was redesignated NCAC in late January 1944. NCAC was the most commonly used name by all the Allies.

13. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience*, p. 416. For Ledo Road efforts, see Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1965), pp. 609–18 and U.S. Army Engineer Office publication EP-870-1-42, *Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II*, pp. 327–45.

14. David W. Hogan Jr., *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), pp. 98–112. In 1969, Peers led the investigation of the My Lai massacre and cover-up.

15. McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 136–58; Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War*, pp. 160–74.

16. Bernard Fergusson, *Beyond the Chindwin* (London: Pen and Sword, 2009), p. 20; Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War*, passim; McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 69–71. For an alternate perspective on Wingate, see Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 217–23.

17. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 547–52; Charlton Ogburn, *The Marauders*, (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 14–15. The 1st Air Commando was known as the 5318th Provisional Air Unit until 25 March 1944.

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18. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience,* pp. 416–19.

19. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 178–80; McLynn, *The Burma Campaign,* pp. 242–44. See also Stilwell's diary entry for 18 Nov 1943, in which he sums up this discussion as "Long squabble over command. Finally told them, O.K. at Kamaing. Knocked down arguments of Giffard and Peirse [SEAC air commander]." (Stilwell's diary will hereafter be cited as *SD.*)

20. Stilwell, *SD,* entry for 18 Dec 1943, emphasis in original; Stilwell, *SP,* pp. 262–67.

21. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 71–81. The *54th* and *2d Divisions* arrived in Burma in stages throughout the first months of 1944. General Mutaguchi commanded the *18th Division* until being promoted to command of *Fifteenth Army.* In April 1944 the *18th* and *56th Divisions* came under the newly created *Thirty-Third Army.*

22. Ibid., pp. 75–81; A. J. Barker, *The March on Delhi* (Dehra Dun: Natraj, 1990), pp. 80–82.

23. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 217–18.

24. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 119–24; Stilwell, *SD,* entry for 22 Dec 1943. Sun Li-jen was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, while Liao had graduated from the French military academy at St. Cyr.

25. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 125–27.

26. Stilwell, *SD,* entry for 26 Dec 1943.

27. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 127–38.

28. Stilwell, *SP,* p. 277; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 133–34.

29. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 34–36; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 64–65.

30. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 161–63; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience,* pp. 427–31.

31. Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 30 and 31 Jan 1944; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience,* pp. 427–31. The Ledo Road carried its first traffic to China on 28 Jan 1945, precisely 362 days after Wedemeyer's prediction.

32. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience,* pp. 427–31; See also Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 8, 17, and 20 Jan 1944, which show some of Stilwell's thinking regarding Boatner's mission. AXIOM went first to London because Mountbatten reported to the British Chiefs of Staff. Only after obtaining their endorsement could the mission proceed to Washington. Boatner represented an American theater commander to his superiors in Washington, and therefore could bypass London. He later played an important role in resolving the Kojedo prison situation in 1952.

33. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 206–12; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 166–69; Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 15 and 20 Feb 1944.

34. Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 79–81; Stilwell, *SD,* entry for 21 Feb 1944.

35. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 142–48; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 88–93.

36. Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 24 and 26 Feb 1944; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 102–06.

37. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 148–55; See also Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 24 Feb to 2 Mar 1944, inclusive, for Stilwell's brief account of this operation.

38. Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 110–34.

39. Ibid.; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 155–59.

40. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 169–70.

41. Ibid.; Hough, *Mountbatten,* p. 191. Mountbatten was treated at the 20th General Hospital in Ledo. Dwight Eisenhower sustained a leg injury while in charge of SHAEF in September 1944, and Archibald Wavell, while leading ABDACOM, injured his back in Singapore in February 1942; neither man was hospitalized for any appreciable length of time with their injuries.

42. Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War,* pp. 193–94.

43. Ibid., pp. 194–96. The landing zones were named for the major commercial streets in London (PICCADILLY), New York (BROADWAY), and Calcutta (CHOWRINGHEE).

44. Wingate laid out the stronghold concept in Special Force Commander's Training Note No. 8. It is quoted in full in Michael Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope* (London: Leo Cooper, 1971), pp. 282–88.

45. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 225–28; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope,* pp. 21–24. The intelligence officer who took the photos was U.S. Army Air Forces Lt. Charles Russhon, who later was technical adviser on the first James Bond films. He arranged, among other things, the filming of *Goldfinger* at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

46. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 225–26.

47. Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope,* pp. 27–33; Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War,* pp. 207–08, has statistics on glider operations of the night 5–6 March 1944.

48. Allen, *Burma: The Longest War,* pp. 150–55, 188–90; Barker, *The March on Delhi,* pp. 15–16.

49. Barker, *The March on Delhi,* pp. 93–130. The 17th Indian Division was nicknamed the "Black Cats"; during the withdrawal they successfully fended off the *33d Division,* nicknamed "White Cats."

50. Ibid., pp. 120–25. See also Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* Appendixes 25 and 26, for details and statistics related to air transport operations in Burma and India from February through August 1944.The 5th Indian Division had no airborne training, and many of its men had never flown before.

51. Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War,* pp. 209–34, 265. See also Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope,* pp. 47–106. WHITE CITY earned its name because of the white parachutes that festooned the surrounding jungle.

52. Ibid, pp. 235–41, 265. Upon hearing the news over the radio of Wingate's death, General Mutaguchi prayed for the soul "of this man in whom I had found my match." The nine people killed included Wingate, an aide, two British war correspondents, and five American aircrew. Individual bodies were unidentifiable after the crash and resulting fire. Because the majority of those lost were American, the commingled remains were sent to Arlington National Cemetery and buried in a common grave in 1950.

53. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* p. 197.

54. This and the preceding two paragraphs are based on Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 175–91; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 136–220; and James C. McNaughton, *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2006), pp. 276–80. Some of the Nisei with NCAC and the Marauders were from the same part of Kyushu where the *18th Division* had been raised.

55. Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 27–31 March 1944; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 176–77, 297–314.

56. Stilwell, *SD,* entry for 3 April 1944; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* pp. 235–37.

57. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 295–312; Barker, *The March on Delhi,* pp. 170–[illegible]. See also Arthur Swinson, *The Battle of Kohima* (New York: Stein and Day, 1967), passim. The 7th Indian Division came from the Arakan while XXXIII Corps HQ and 2d British Division came from southwest India, where they had been training for amphibious operations.

58. Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 13 April–6 May 1944; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 200–202.

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59. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 223–25.

60. Ibid., pp. 204–13.

61. Stilwell, *SD,* entries for 1, 14, and 17 May.

62. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief,* p. 567; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 229–44; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* pp. 245–64; Allen, *Burma: The Longest War,* pp. 362–68. The Japanese reinforcements came from the *56th Division.* The British 36th Division was available to Stilwell, but he refused to have it flown in to Myitkyina. Louis Allen, an intelligence officer in SEAC and later historian of the campaign, explained why: "After 'burning up' the Limeys, and with a dozen war correspondents describing to the world his great American triumph, it was unthinkable for Stilwell to call on the British to pick his chestnuts out of the fire."

63. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* p. 401; Ogburn, *The Marauders,* p. 266. The 1st Air Commando withdrew to refit at this time.

64. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 279–96, 401–08. U.S. L–5 aircraft provided a majority of these flights for the duration of Chindit operations. One of these missions was the first helicopter medevac in history, on 23–24 April 1944 near Aberdeen.

65. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 215–20.

66. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 408–09. See also Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope,* pp. 175–221. The capture of Mogaung was announced as a Chinese victory. "Chinese reported taking Mogaung," Calvert signaled in response. "My brigade now taking umbrage."

67. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 329–60; Barker, *The March on Delhi,* pp. 194–227; Swinson, *The Battle of Kohima,* pp. 105–245. See also Kirby and Slim. In 2013 a poll of scholars and visitors by Britain's National Army Museum named Imphal–Kohima the greatest battle ever fought by the British Army.

68. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* pp. 233, 238–48. See also Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* pp. 403–15 and Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope,* pp. 245–46 for Chindit conditions. This example of coalition politics is well discussed by Gary J. Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in North Burma in 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), passim.

69. Kirby, *The War Against Japan,* p: 415; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 244.

70. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 244.

71. Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs out in CBI,* pp. 77–141; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience,* pp. 510–11.

72. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems,* p. 220.

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U.S. Army Art Spotlight

Sgt. Howard Brodie, *Under Fire*

Pencil on paper, Hottorf, Germany, 1945

By Sarah Forgey

Within the U.S. Army Art Collection, certain works exemplify singular themes or emotions of the combat experience. Howard Brodie's World War II sketch *Under Fire* highlights the comfort that a fellow soldier can provide during a moment of extreme stress.

Howard Brodie (1915–2010) was an artist for *Yank* magazine during World War II, covering Guadalcanal and the European theater. While well-known for his combat sketches, Brodie is perhaps better remembered for his courtroom illustrations of significant twentieth-century events, including the trial of the anti–Vietnam War protesters dubbed the Chicago Seven, debates leading to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Watergate hearings. As a newspaper artist, Brodie also covered the Korean and Vietnam Wars and accompanied French Foreign Legion troops to Indochina. For his last assignment in the late 1990s, he sketched troops training at Fort Irwin, California.

Throughout his long and prolific career, Brodie captured raw emotion by producing quick, spontaneous drawings. According to his notes on this featured sketch, the stirring moment took place inside a grain shed "with 88's and tank fire (MG [machine gun] tracers and shells) coming through the walls." The two soldiers huddle together on the ground, one sobbing and the other embracing him. Brodie focuses on this personal interaction by omitting background details and by placing the two soldiers' faces at the peak of the compositional triangle, drawing the viewer's eye to the grief and compassion shared between the two. While the facial expressions of the soldiers are rendered in detail, their bodies are composed of rough lines, often dark and forceful, as if the artist was also caught up in the sensations of the event.

In an interview for the 2000 documentary *They Drew Fire,* Brodie recalled, "I remember the young soldier well, he screamed, he was just out of control and he screamed and so forth, and there was another soldier next to him who consoled him and embraced him. That was a moving moment for me, to see that compassion in combat. And these are the things that a person feels when he's in proximity to death, his buddy, that next human being, that person in the foxhole is the most important person in your life."[1]

Along with the rest of the *Yank* magazine sketches and cartoons from World War II, Brodie's work is part of the Army Art Collection and preserved at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. As a captivating example of battlefield camaraderie, this sketch will be displayed in the inaugural art exhibit at the National Museum of the U.S. Army in spring 2020.

Sarah Forgey is the chief art curator of the U.S. Army Museum Enterprise.

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Notes

1. Brian Lanker and Nicole Newman, *They Drew Fire: Combat Artists of World War II* (New York: TV Books, 2000), p. 133.

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U.S. Army Art Collection

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PREVIEW CHAPTER


CHAPTER 2:
OPENING MOVES
BATTLES NORTH AND WEST OF SAIGON

FROM *COMBAT OPERATIONS: STAYING THE COURSE, OCTOBER 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1968*


By Erik B. Villard

Home to South Vietnam's capital, the III Corps Tactical Zone was in many ways the heart of the Republic of Vietnam. Consisting of eleven provinces spread across 200 square kilometers of forested hills, trackless jungle, marshland, small farms, and vast rubber plantations, the zone linked the nation's rice bowl—the Mekong Delta—with the rest of the country. Although the outlying provinces were sparsely populated, Saigon and the provinces adjacent to it—Gia Dinh, Long An, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa—contained about a third of the nation's population as well as the core of its political administration and logistical infrastructure. Neither side believed that the Republic of Vietnam could survive without Saigon, and hence both had striven to control it since the insurrection's earliest days.

By the time U.S. ground troops arrived in 1965, the zone was clearly in trouble. The government maintained a firm grip inside the capital, but otherwise Saigon was a city besieged. Communist agents wielded significant influence over much of the region's population and territory. Supporting them were several major enemy units that staged out of a series of heavily fortified bases that virtually ringed the city. With Communist forces farther south interfering with the flow of food from the Mekong Delta into the city, the inhabitants lived in a state of perpetual crisis. U.S. Army General Westmoreland, the commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), responded by deploying many of the troops that arrived from the United States in 1965 to guard the approaches to the city. Initial priority had gone to securing the four key installations without which U.S. intervention in South Vietnam would not be possible—the air bases at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa (six and thirty kilometers from Saigon, respectively), the port of Vung Tau about sixty kilometers to the southeast, and the port of Saigon itself, the nation's largest. As his numbers grew, he had launched a series of raids into the enemy bases that threatened the city from the north and northwest, particularly War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province and War Zone D centered in Phuoc Thanh Province. He likewise had sought to interfere with the flow of supplies from Cambodia into III Corps (*Map 4*).[1]



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Map 4

By 1966 a web of U.S. installations ringed Saigon, with Westmoreland pushing farther into the interior. By 1967, the general had sufficient numbers to launch a series of major offensives into War Zone C, the most notable of which was Operation JUNCTION CITY. These actions had bloodied the enemy and kept him off balance as Westmoreland pushed the ring of U.S. camps and forward logistical areas farther out from Saigon, thereby laying the groundwork for additional thrusts toward the Cambodian border on a more sustained basis. Guiding all these operations was Westmoreland's notion that the best way to defend Saigon was to push into the outer provinces of III Corps north and west of Saigon to destroy the Viet Cong logistical system as close to the Cambodian border as possible. This approach would compel enemy main force units to give battle in remote areas, thereby relieving pressure on the South Vietnamese pacification effort and sparing the population from the worst of the fighting.

As U.S. soldiers had expanded the shield out from Saigon, South Vietnamese forces had filled in behind to execute the second element of allied strategy—that of territorial control. The allies had declared the provinces immediately adjacent to Saigon to be National Priority provinces for the receipt of pacification resources. Although the Vietnamese carried the brunt of this effort, U.S. combat forces had contributed by executing a myriad of military and security operations in and around areas targeted for pacification, and by performing humanitarian and civil improvement activities collectively known as civic action. By late 1967, the Americans had made their presence felt, but the allies were still locked in an as-yet indecisive politico-military conflict with the enemy, fighting the same Communist formations over the same pieces of ground. Control over, and the support of, the rural inhabitants continued to hang in the balance.

Planning the Dry Season Offensive

As the MACV commander solidified his plans in the fall of 1967, weather continued to dominate the ebb and flow of events. The dry season, which brought firm ground and clear skies from October to May, was just beginning. This was the traditional time for the allies to launch their major offensives into the interior. These attacks would have to be largely completed by the time seasonal rains complicated the movement of men and materiel between May and October.

The man responsible for U.S. forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone was the commander of II Field Force, Lt. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand. A lanky Californian widely respected in U.S. military circles, Weyand controlled thirty-three U.S. Army and six Free World forces combat maneuver battalions organized into three infantry divisions and several independent brigade-size elements. He arrayed these forces in ten major bases that formed a rough circle around Saigon. Situated thirty and sixty kilometers out from the city, the bases were close enough to defend the approaches to Saigon while still remaining in striking distance of the enemy bases and units clustered in III Corps' outer provinces. Two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division screened the flat and fertile provinces to the south of Saigon and Highway 4, which was the main line of communications to the Mekong Delta. The 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, the 11th

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Armored Cavalry, and the 1st Australian Task Force screened the provinces to the east and southeast of Saigon. Immediately outside the capital itself, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Light) was preparing to relocate from Gia Dinh Province to Bien Hoa Province, where it would help the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division guard the important Bien Hoa–Long Binh military complex from Communist units based in the wilderness known as War Zone D north of the Dong Nai River. Farther north and west, the 1st Infantry Division operated along Highway 13, an all-weather, two-lane road that traveled through almost 130 kilometers of farmlands, rubber plantations, and dense forest near the Cambodian border. Finally, to the west of Saigon, the 25th Infantry Division performed a mix of pacification and offensive operations. Backing those maneuver units were twenty-one additional U.S. Army combat battalions representing two artillery groups, an air cavalry squadron, a helicopter-rich aviation group, and an engineer group. Already numbering about 90,000 men, II Field Force expected the arrival of the rest of the 101st Airborne Division around the turn of the year.[2]

In addition to his duties as combat commander of II Field Force, General Weyand also served as the senior military adviser to Lt. Gen. Le Nguyen Khang, head of South Vietnam's III Corps. Considered one of the best generals in the South Vietnamese Army, Khang controlled some 45,000 regulars organized around three light infantry divisions (the 5th, 18th, and 25th), a ranger group, an armored cavalry squadron, and a handful of independent artillery groups. He allocated roughly a third of his infantry battalions to province chiefs who used them to defend Revolutionary Development areas. The rest of the regulars performed reserve, garrison, and limited offensive operations. Also present in III Corps, but under the command of the province chiefs and not the corps commander, were 45,000 Regional and Popular Forces soldiers who performed security and pacification support duties.[3]



General Weyand

For the 1967–1968 dry season, Westmoreland and Weyand intended to mount a large-scale offensive to cut the three main infiltration routes that entered III Corps from Cambodia. The 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division and the bulk of the 11th Armored Cavalry would push into Binh Long Province to cut the Adams Trail. This route began at Base Area 351 on the Cambodian side of the Phuoc Long provincial border, tunneled its way south through a triple-canopy rainforest, skirted the eastern edge of Song Be, and then passed through the western half of War Zone D. Operated by the *70th Rear Service Group*, the trail terminated in northern Bien Hoa Province at a base area known to the Americans as the Catcher's Mitt.

Once the 2d and 3d Brigades of the 101st Airborne Division had arrived from the United States around the end of the year, Weyand planned to attack the enemy's second major trail network, the Serges Jungle Highway. Operated by the *86th Rear Service Group*, this route began some forty kilometers west of the Adams Trail on the boundary line between Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. It ran south along the full length of the provincial border and then veered east into War Zone D.

Meanwhile, two brigades from the 25th Infantry Division would strike northwest to interdict the third corridor, the Saigon River Trail. This route wound its way from Cambodia through Tay Ninh and Binh Dinh Provinces to the outskirts of Saigon. Success against the Saigon River corridor was critical, as it was the largest and most important of the three routes. If all went according to schedule, by January 1968 General Westmoreland would have seven U.S. combat brigades arrayed across the northern rim of III Corps to interdict the three routes that threatened Saigon from the north and west. Given the enemy's developing plans—as yet undetected by the allies—to attack Saigon in the coming year, the outcome of these operations would have particular significance.[4]

The Other Side of the Hill

Just as Westmoreland had plans for the upcoming dry season, so too did the enemy, and as it turned out, these ran directly counter to MACV's design. When Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai had assumed command of the *Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)* in September 1967, he found that the *B2 Front*'s staff had already developed a scheme for the coming months. The plan called for an offensive in an area the Communists termed *Military Region 10*, essentially Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces—two of the three provinces that Westmoreland intended to attack. Just as the allies wanted to cut the Adams and Serges Trails, *B2 Front* wanted to further secure and expand those networks by eliminating one or more of the border surveillance camps that kept tabs on those infiltration routes. Since the Politburo had yet to decide on the timing and objectives of the general offensive–general uprising, Thai decided to go ahead with the regional offensive. Besides, any success in securing the trails would strengthen his position if and when the government in Hanoi ordered a general offensive.

Thai had at his disposal some 50,000 combat soldiers and 10,000 rear service troops that operated within the territorial limits of III Corps and the northeastern corner of IV Corps. His primary strike force consisted of three light infantry divisions each with a strength of between 6,000 to

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8,000 soldiers. The *7th People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) Division* and the *9th People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) Division* ranged across the provinces to the north of Saigon, while the *5th PLAF Division* operated to the east of the capital. *COSVN* also controlled the *101st PAVN Regiment*, a unit recently detached from the *7th Division* to defend the Iron Triangle area of southwestern Binh Duong Province. The heavily forested base area, located between Phu Cuong to the south and Lai Khe to the north, with the Saigon River to its west and Highway 13 to its east, contained a maze of underground tunnels and bunkers that the enemy intended to use as a forward staging area for an eventual assault on Saigon. The *Dong Nai Regiment*, another unit directly controlled by *COSVN*, guarded the western approaches to War Zone D. A dozen local force battalions and many small guerrilla units operated under provincial or subregion control, most within twenty kilometers of Saigon. Adding to Thai's strength were the *69th Artillery Group*, which controlled the *84A PLAF Artillery Regiment*, armed with 122-mm. rockets and 120-mm. mortars, and the *52d* and *58th PLAF Artillery Battalions*, armed with 120-mm. mortars.[5]

General Thai chose the *9th PLAF Division*, his most experienced fighting force, to spearhead the offensive in Binh Long Province. Commanded by Senior Col. Hoang Cam, an experienced officer who had fought U.S. forces many times over the past two years, the three-regiment *9th Division* would receive support from the *84A PLAF Artillery Regiment* and the *208th Anti-Aircraft Battalion*, the later armed with dozens of 12.7-mm. heavy machine guns. Two regiments from the *5th PLAF Division*, the *88th PAVN* and the *275th PLAF*, would take the lead role in neighboring Phuoc Long Province. Finally, General Thai would use part of his *7th Division*, the *165th PAVN Regiment*, to interdict Highway 13 in the region around An Loc. *COSVN*'s remaining main force regiments—the *101st PAVN*, the *141st PAVN*, the *274th PLAF*, and the *Dong Nai*—were to spend the final months of 1967 defending base areas and lines of communications in central III Corps.[6]

Thai's initial target was Loc Ninh, a district capital in Binh Long Province that the *9th Division* had attempted to overrun in late 1966. The town of 6,000 inhabitants was located in the middle of a large rubber plantation roughly twelve kilometers south of the border. A border surveillance camp and a small airfield lay on the southeastern edge of town. The camp contained eleven U.S. Special Forces soldiers and around 400 Montagnard CIDG troops, their heaviest weapons being several 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars. Located at the northwest end of the airfield was a South Vietnamese district headquarters, a figure-eight compound of sandbags and wooden bunkers that was manned by around 200 Regional Forces soldiers, the South Vietnamese district chief, and one U.S. adviser. A few mortars and machine guns were their main firepower.[7]

General Thai had several reasons for choosing Loc Ninh as the initial target of *COSVN*'s winter-spring offensive. First, he wanted to embarrass the newly elected President Thieu by capturing a district capital just days before he was scheduled to take office. Second, Thai wanted to neutralize the Special Forces camp at Loc Ninh because it served as a staging point for intelligence-gathering missions along the border. Finally, the operation would give Colonel Cam and his staff their first chance to command the entire *9th Division* in battle. As enervating as guerrilla warfare was for the allies, Communist leaders believed that only large conventional



An overview of a CIDG compound and airstrip at Loc Ninh

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forces would be able to destroy allied military forces and conquer South Vietnam. The operation would thus be a major step for *COSVN* on its quest to develop a conventional army that could execute complex, corps-size campaigns.[8]

The terrain around the district capital was well suited for the fight that Cam envisioned. Neat rows of mature rubber trees obscured the low rolling hills and gently flowing streams yet allowed easy movement for his foot soldiers. Some of the plantations were still in operation, while others had been abandoned during the war. The high weeds and tangled underbrush that choked these neglected sections offered extra opportunities for concealment. Beyond the plantations, a sea of jungle stretched outward in every direction. The tall trees and thick vegetation hid an elaborate network of trails that Colonel Cam could use to move troops rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another and with small risk of being detected. Moreover, there were few clearings in the jungle large enough to accommodate helicopters, so his troops would have an easier time predicting where the Americans were likely to land their forces. With both the Americans and the Communists planning operations in Binh Long Province, the stage was set for a major confrontation.[9]

The Battle for Loc Ninh

General Weyand officially launched his dry season campaign on 29 September 1967 with Operation Shenandoah II—a two-brigade effort to secure and repair the entire length of Highway 13. The II Field Force commander needed to have the highway reliably open at least during the day before he could start placing his brigades along the Cambodian border. Simply put, the airfields in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces were too small and too few in number to handle the quantity of supplies he would need for sustained combat operations.

During the first weeks of October, the 1st and 3d Brigades from Maj. Gen. John H. Hay Jr.'s 1st Division secured the length of highway between Lai Khe and Chon Thanh along the border of Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces. His forces also swept through the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, an enemy base area some fifty kilometers north of Saigon just west of the road. This action inadvertently interfered with the enemy's plans. As it happened, Colonel Cam's most reliable unit, the *271st Regiment*, was in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, waiting for a rice shipment as it returned from a mission in central Binh Duong Province. The commander of the *271st Regiment*, feeling that there was no way to evade the Americans, struck first. On 17 October, the *271st Regiment* lured the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, into a devastating ambush near Ong Thanh, a small stream near the Binh Duong–Binh Long boundary. The enemy killed fifty-six U.S. soldiers, but the *271st Regiment* lost many of its men to air and artillery strikes as it fled north to Cambodia after the battle. As a result, the battered and exhausted unit was in no condition to fight in the upcoming campaign.[10]



Generals Westmoreland and Hay

The next stage of Shenandoah II called for General Hay's 1st and 3d Brigades to secure Highway 13 through An Loc, Binh Long's capital, and up to Loc Ninh twenty-five kilometers farther north. Hay could then build a stockpile of supplies at Quan Loi, a forward base just east of An Loc, giving him the resources to support several brigades in the formerly inaccessible territory of northern Binh Long Province. Weyand put these plans on hold, however, as evidence grew that *COSVN* was preparing to launch a major offensive in northern III Corps.[11]

In late September and early October, small teams of Montagnard irregulars led by U.S. Special Forces soldiers based at the Loc Ninh border surveillance camp had discovered an engineer company from the *9th Division* building what appeared to be a large hospital on the Song Be River several kilometers west of town. The patrols had also found elements of the *84A Artillery Regiment* camped within a few kilometers of Loc Ninh. This unit never operated without significant backup and usually only appeared during major battles. Most ominous of all, the allies obtained a document that claimed the *9th Division* would begin a major operation in Binh Long Prov-

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ince on or about 25 October. These findings, supplemented by radio intercepts, aerial infrared scans, and the recent clash with the *271st Regiment*, led General Weyand to warn II Field Force units on 22 October that there was a "definite threat" to Loc Ninh and possibly to Song Be, a district capital in Phuoc Long Province some forty kilometers to the east. Weyand instructed General Hay to prepare a contingency plan should he need to defend either district capital.[12]


Colonel Cam opened the Communist dry season campaign in *Military Region 10* shortly after midnight on 27 October when the *88th Regiment* attacked Song Be. Mortar crews shelled the town, while two North Vietnamese battalions attacked the base camp of the South Vietnamese 5th Division that was located several kilometers southeast of the capital. Although the camp contained no more than 200 soldiers, their new battalion commander proved to be an aggressive leader. The government troops stood their ground with help from U.S. fighter-bombers and eventually threw the enemy back into the forest. When the defenders searched the battlefield at first light, they found 134 North Vietnamese dead as well as 2 wounded soldiers. Government troops also collected seventy-three abandoned weapons, including three flamethrowers and ten machine guns. South Vietnamese losses amounted to twelve killed, of whom seven were civilian laborers.[13]

Later that day, a South Vietnamese ranger battalion flew into Song Be, as did the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, a unit from the 1st Infantry Division that was based at Lai Khe in southern Binh Duong Province. When its commander, Lt. Col. Richard E. Cavazos, led his men through the surrounding countryside, they found recently used trails but no enemy soldiers. With the scent gone cold, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, returned to Lai Khe on the afternoon of 28 October.[14]

After darkness had fallen, Colonel Cam unleashed the *9th Division* against Loc Ninh. At approximately one hour past midnight, a salvo of 122-mm. rockets and 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortar rounds slammed into the Special Forces camp and the South Vietnamese district headquarters. Some hit the town and set it ablaze. The defenders responded with their own mortar fire as news of the attack flashed from Loc Ninh to MACV headquarters (*Map 5*).

An hour later, a group of sappers emerged from the rubber trees west of the district headquarters. They sprinted across the open ground and detonated their satchel charges in the wire on the northern side of the compound before the defenders could drive them off. Two battalions from the *273d Regiment* then charged out of the trees and scrambled through the openings. Buckling under the weight of the onslaught, the defenders pulled back into the southern square of the compound through a narrow connecting passage where they continued the fight.

First on the scene to help the defenders was a pair of U.S. Army UH-1B Huey helicopter gunships, each equipped with side-mounted, forward-oriented 7.62-mm. machine guns. The gunships strafed the Viet



Map 5

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Cong troops attacking the compound, using the patchwork of burning fires on the ground to orient their runs. The helicopters were soon joined by an AC–47 Spooky, a two-engine transport aircraft of World War II vintage that had been modified to carry a trio of six-barreled 7.62-mm. miniguns. The motorized Gatling-style guns that pointed out the left side of the aircraft were each capable of firing 6,000 rounds a minute. As the lumbering aircraft banked into a shallow counterclockwise turn, the weapons roared to life, sending ribbons of fire into the trees that concealed the enemy reserve force.

The aerial punishment was savage to behold but had no effect on the enemy soldiers who were already inside the compound. In desperation, the South Vietnamese district chief called an artillery barrage down on his own position. The shells he requested were not ordinary ones, however. The high-explosive rounds were armed with proximity fuses. Detonated by a radio signal a fraction of a second before hitting the ground, the shells filled the air with white-hot fragments that did no harm to the defenders in their bunkers but sowed havoc on the Viet Cong fighting in the open. When the barrage ended, U.S. F–100 Super Sabre fighter-bombers dropped cluster bombs into the trees west of the compound to prevent enemy reinforcements from coming up. The combination of artiilery and air strikes finally broke the enemy's endurance. The main body of the *273d Regiment* withdrew around 0400.[15]

When the sun rose, the South Vietnamese defenders discovered that some of the bunkers in their compound still contained Viet Cong troops. The worn-out Regional Forces soldiers waited until a Montagnard company from the Special Forces camp and two companies of regulars flown in from the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division showed up to finish the job. The U.S. advisers brought armloads of M72 light antitank weapons from their camp to help clear out the bunkers. The job took several hours to complete; not a single Viet Cong soldier surrendered.


U.S. Air Force

An AC–47 Spooky gunship at Nha Trang Air Base

Of the 135 enemy bodies that the allies recovered in Loc Ninh after the battle, 92 came from the northern half of the district compound. The South Vietnamese lost eight killed and thirty-three wounded.[16]

Later that morning, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division sent a battery of 105-mm. howitzers and two companies from the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, to set up a firebase near the southwest corner of Loc Ninh's airstrip. The battery went into action around 0950. Its first job was to soften up a landing zone some 3,500 meters to the northwest near the hamlet of Srok Silamite for Colonel Cavazos' 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. Cavazos landed his battalion unopposed a short time later. His infantrymen quickly staked out a defensive perimeter and began digging bunkers as helicopters flew in a battery of 105-mm. howitzers, the weapons and all of their ammunition slung like yo-yos on a rope beneath the aircraft.[17]

At 1200, one of the Montagnard companies from Loc Ninh radioed that it had made contact with a North Vietnamese platoon some 1,000 meters to the north of the landing zone. Cavazos immediately sent Company C to trap the enemy. Moving quickly through the evenly spaced rubber trees, his company slammed into the enemy platoon from behind, killing nine soldiers and dispersing the rest. When two more North Vietnamese platoons counterattacked, Cavazos sent Company D to turn the enemy's flank. The outnumbered Communists soon fled, leaving behind five more bodies. Captured documents indicated that the men were from the *165th PAVN Regiment*, two battalions of which General Thai had assigned to Colonel Cam, along with several hundred fillers from the *141st Regiment*, to make up for the loss of the *271st Regiment*.[18]

When Colonel Cam learned that U.S. units were searching the rubber



A soldier carrying an M72 antitank weapon

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
trees four kilometers from Loc Ninh, he dispatched more troops to engage them. The following morning, a battalion from the *165th Regiment* pounced on Company A from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, as it was reconnoitering the area around the landing zone. Cavazos immediately sent Company D and a company of Montagnards to the rescue. The relief force helped Company A push the enemy back to a low hill where the North Vietnamese soldiers took refuge in some shallow irrigation trenches. The allied soldiers gave air strikes and helicopter gunships a chance to soften up the hill before they resumed their advance (*Map 6*).

The lightly armed Montagnards rarely got the chance to overpower an entire North Vietnamese battalion, so they attacked with particular zeal. Many used up their ammunition so quickly that they began picking up AK47 and RPD light machine guns from dead enemy soldiers to continue the fight. One soldier even snatched a .45-caliber pistol from a surprised U.S. officer and then charged a North Vietnamese machine gunner who was pinned down under heavy fire. When the pistol failed to chamber a round, the Montagnard soldier pistol-whipped the man senseless.[19]

The ferocity of the charge proved too much for the North Vietnamese. They fled into a gully where many died from a rain of artillery shells, cluster bombs, and napalm canisters. The allies found eighty-three enemy dead and captured thirty-two weapons.[20]

General Hay pored over the intelligence that trickled into the 1st Division headquarters looking for signs of the enemy's next move. From captured documents and prisoner interrogation reports, Hay knew that he faced the *165th* and *273d Regiments* along with elements from the *141st Regiment*. The *88th Regiment* remained a threat to Song Be, and Hay was now learning that the headquarters of the *5th PLAF Division* and its *275th Regiment* were marching toward that area as well. There were also signs that the *5th Division* had taken operational control of the *88th Regiment*, raising the possibility that the enemy might open a new front in Phuoc Long Province while the *9th Division* continued its campaign in Binh Long. For the moment, however, Hay's greatest concern was another attack on Loc Ninh.[21]

Hay ordered the commander of the 1st Brigade, Col. George E. Newman, to move his headquarters to Quan Loi, a staging area and airstrip in central Binh Long Province, where he would take charge of the coming fight. At that point, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, was west of the district capital, while a company from the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, guarded the artillery firebase at the airfield. Colonel Newman's 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, and the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, waited at Quan Loi.[22]



Map 6

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Soldiers prepare to load a 106-mm. recoilless rifle.

Colonel Newman did not have long to wait for Cam's next move. Shortly after midnight on 31 October, a hail of rockets and mortar shells crashed into the district compound, the Special Forces camp, and the 1st Division artillery firebase at the south end of the Loc Ninh airfield. The bombardment was more accurate than it had been two nights before. At the Special Forces camp, no fewer than six 122-mm. rockets exploded inside or near the compound in the opening moments of the battle. As the barrage tapered off, a swarm of helicopter gunships and a Spooky arrived over Loc Ninh to strafe the surrounding forests. They were met by blistering fire from the heavy machine guns of the *208th Anti-Aircraft Battalion*; one forward air controller later said it was the heaviest antiaircraft fire he had ever seen in Vietnam.[23]

Two hours later, several hundred troops from the *272d Regiment* emerged from the tree line on the eastern side of the airfield. They came under interlocking fire from the two allied camps on the west side of the runway and the 1st Division outpost at the south end. The American artillerymen exploded proximity-fuse shells over the heads of the advancing soldiers, while the infantrymen at the firebase fired directly at them with three 106-mm. recoilless rifles and a pair of .50-caliber machine guns.[24]

Although the enemy took terrible losses, several dozen soldiers made it across the airfield and attacked the district headquarters compound. Using straw mats to slither over the concertina wire that surrounded the headquarters, the platoon-size force fought its way into the compound. With no more Viet Cong troops coming up behind to help them, however, the group retreated less than twenty minutes later. The fighting continued until dawn when the *272d Regiment* withdrew east, leaving behind 110 dead. Friendly losses came to nine killed and fifty-nine wounded.[25]

The defenders did not realize it at the time, but they were the recipients of some good luck that night. The *165th Regiment* had been scheduled to join the attack, but its guides had become lost in the seemingly endless rows of rubber trees. The regiment never made it to the fight.[26]

At first light, Colonel Newman organized a pursuit of the *272d Regiment* by sending the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. James F. Cochran III, into a clearing two kilometers southeast of Loc Ninh. The unit built a sturdy firebase using sandbags and wood-reinforced bunkers before going in search of the enemy. Over the next two days, patrols from the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, killed a total of eleven enemy soldiers, but the main body of the *272d* remained out of sight.[27]

On the evening of 1 November, elements from the *84A Artillery Regiment* hit Loc Ninh with mortar and rocket fire. When the barrage ended, a battalion from *272d Regiment* peppered the district compound with machine gun fire. The attacks were a ruse. Cam revealed his true hand around thirty minutes after midnight when 82-mm. mortar shells began to pummel the firebase of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. From the ambush teams that Colonel Cavazos had placed on nearby trails he learned that hundreds of Viet Cong were converging on the firebase. After making their hushed radio calls, the ambush teams detonated the claymore mines that they had hidden along the trails, shredding dozens of unwary Viet Cong troops. The scouts then slunk away as the enemy columns pressed on toward their target.[28]

When the Viet Cong reached the firebase, they raked it with small arms fire, first from one direction and then from another, to provoke the Americans into firing back and thus reveal their positions. The trick failed because Cavazos had already warned his men to hold their fire. They could see by the light of the parachute flares now drifting down that the ground attack had not yet begun. When enemy mortar crews went into action, Cavazos brought in helicopter gunships to silence them. When U.S. fighter-bombers swooped in to drop their ordnance, at least twelve Viet Cong heavy machine guns blasted back in defiance, sending streams of deadly green tracers into the sky. The fighters immediately focused on the new threat and took out the antiaircraft weapons with several well-aimed bombing runs.

At 0415, the *273d Regiment* finally launched its main assault. Several

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Robert Stryker (shown here as a private)

hundred screaming soldiers charged the perimeter. Cavazos now turned his men loose. Claymore mines and machine guns scythed into the advancing force, killing many attackers, including three Viet Cong soldiers who were armed with Soviet-made flamethrowers. The defensive fire was simply too much and the *273d Regiment* called off the attack thirty minutes later. Taking advantage of what darkness remained, the depleted regiment slipped away toward Cambodia.

The next morning, the Americans recovered 263 enemy dead from the battlefield. Numerous drag marks and blood trails hinted at even greater losses for the *273d Regiment*, now on the verge of being combat ineffective. U.S. losses were remarkably light: one killed and eight wounded. Colonel Cavazos had executed a nearly textbook example of how to defeat a numerically superior enemy force at night through a combination of timely intelligence, excellent troop discipline, a well-organized defense, and accurate supporting fire.[29]

Seeing that Cam was eager for a fight, General Hay gave Colonel Newman operational control over the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, from the 3d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. Commanded by Lt. Col. Arthur D. Stigall, the battalion made an unopposed helicopter landing four kilometers northwest of Loc Ninh on 2 November. Through General Weyand, Hay also gave Newman control over the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, from the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Led by Lt. Col. Ralph D. Tice, the unit made an uncontested landing six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh on the same day. With their arrival, four U.S. infantry battalions now formed a box around Loc Ninh. Confident that the town now had enough men to repel another attack, and with a South Vietnamese ranger battalion set to arrive there the following day, Hay's next step was to locate the three enemy regiments still lurking somewhere near the district capital.[30]

Cam lost no time going on the attack. That evening he sent the *1st Battalion* of the *272d Regiment* to assault the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, northeast of town, hoping that the firebase would be only half built. Colonel Tice and his men worked quickly, however, finishing their foxholes and bunkers by 0230 when the enemy attacked. Unable to close in on the position and punished by air and artillery strikes, the enemy withdrew from the field around 0400. He left fifty-seven dead on the field, and seven wounded Viet Cong soldiers became prisoners of war. American losses came to four killed.[31]

When the next several days passed without contact, Newman used the lull to rearrange his forces. On 6 November, he ordered the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, to dismantle its firebase northwest of Loc Ninh where there had been no enemy sightings and to establish a new base northeast of town. Newman instructed the unit's commander, Colonel Stigall, to probe eastward where he thought the *272d Regiment* was regrouping. Just south of Stigall's location, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, continued to shield the eastern approaches to Loc Ninh. With two of Newman's battalions interposed between the Viet Cong and the district capital, he felt at liberty to move the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, from Loc Ninh back to Quan Loi and to fly the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, east to Song Be just in case Cam was tempted to move in that direction. A portion of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, remained in Loc Ninh to man the artillery base at the airfield.[32]

Stigall began his search for the *272d Regiment* on the morning of 7 November. Leaving Company A to guard his new base, he marched the rest of his battalion west down a dirt road flanked on the left by a plantation and on the right by jungle. Other than an occasional sniper round whipping through the air, there was no sign of the enemy.

At 1305, three hours into the march, the colonel decided to turn his column northeast into the rubber trees. The lead company had barely entered the forest when dozens of Viet Cong soldiers from the *3d Battalion, 272d Regiment,* sprang their ambush. Enemy small arms and machine guns raked the exposed Americans crowded on the road. A salvo of rocket-propelled grenades killed Stigall and his battalion command group. Enemy fire also wounded two of his company commanders and put most of the U.S. radios out of action.

One of the few officers remaining was the commander of Company D, Capt. Raymond H. Dobbins, who happened to be at the rear of the column and thus outside the main killing zone. When enemy soldiers attempted to curl around Company D's position to roll up the left flank of the American line, Dobbins repositioned some of his men to block the maneuver. One of those men was Sgt. Robert F. Stryker of Company C, who helped foil the assault with well-aimed shots from his M79 grenade launcher. Later he threw himself on a grenade just before it exploded, sacrificing his own life to save several wounded comrades. For his actions he received the Medal of Honor.[33]

After checking the Viet Cong flanking attack, Captain Dobbins assumed temporary command of the battalion, calling in air and artillery strikes as he reorganized his men and moved them back some one hundred meters to a more defensible position on higher ground. The enemy fought for another hour before breaking contact, leaving behind sixty-six of his dead. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, had sustained eighteen killed and twenty-two wounded. After flying out those casualties, bringing in new supplies, and reorganizing the battalion,

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Colonel Newman decided that the unit was still capable of performing its mission, and so kept it in the field. When no further contact with the enemy took place around Loc Ninh over the next few days, General Hay concluded that the battle-worn units of the *9th Division* were heading back to Cambodia. The week-long battle for Loc Ninh was over.[34]

Second Wave at Song Be and Bo Duc

Even as the *9th PLAF Division* began withdrawing from Loc Ninh, elements of the *5th PLAF Division* were massing near Song Be town, some forty kilometers to the east. The *275th Regiment* arrived from War Zone D in southern Phuoc Long Province to join the *88th Regiment,* now attached to the *5th Division*. The second phase of *Military Region 10*'s campaign to improve the security of Communist lines of communications into III Corps was about to unfold.

On the morning of 6 November, elements from the *275th Regiment* ambushed a company from the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division that was stationed south of Song Be. The enemy continued the fight even when South Vietnamese reinforcements arrived. The two sides became intermingled, preventing the allies from using air and artillery strikes, but the government soldiers eventually prevailed. They claimed to have killed 265 enemy soldiers. That figure is in doubt because airpower and artillery, which together usually inflict the most casualties in a battle, played little or no role here. Whatever the truth, South Vietnamese losses were significant: fifty-four dead, fifty-five wounded, and fifteen missing in action.[35]

General Weyand thought something big might be brewing because the *275th Regiment* did not usually operate this far to the north. With General Hay's 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division fully committed to Binh Long Province, Weyand ordered two battalions from the 25th Infantry Division to sweep the area around Song Be. After two fruitless weeks of searching, he called off the effort and returned the two battalions to their parent brigades.[36]



An F–100D Super Sabre releases a napalm bomb over a rain forest canopy in South Vietnam.

Just as the two battalions left Song Be, trail watchers observed a new enemy regiment (later identified as the *271st Regiment*) moving into the area. They also detected a large number of Communist troops building fortifications near Bu Gia Map, an abandoned hamlet twenty-eight kilometers northeast of Song Be that had a small airfield formerly used by the Special Forces. The enemy, it appeared, was gearing up for a new campaign in Phuoc Long Province.[37]

More evidence supporting that view came on 25 November when part of the *275th Regiment* attacked the South Vietnamese Army camp south of Song Be. The fight lasted more than four hours, resulting in approximately one hundred enemy dead. That attack, it later turned out, was a diversion. Cam's real targets were Bo Duc, a district capital some twenty kilometers northwest of Song Be, and the neighboring Special Forces camp at Bu Dop, located two kilometers to the north of Bo Duc.[38]

Cam's plan was similar to the one he had used at Loc Ninh. The *272d Regiment* was to overrun Bo Duc and destroy the district headquarters. Following that, the *271st* and the *273d Regiments* would assault the nearby Special Forces camp at Bu Dop and fight any reinforcements that might land at its small airfield. The major shortcoming in Cam's plan was the weakened state of his division. His regiments were short on manpower, despite receiving several hundred North Vietnamese fillers in the intervening weeks. It remained to be seen whether his battered division could rise to the occasion.[39]

Cam's preparations did not go unnoticed. On 26 and 28 November, Montagnard troops from Bo Duc observed unidentified enemy forces moving through the area. General Hay believed that the *88th* and *275th Regiments* were hovering near Song Be, but the *9th Division* had dropped out of sight after the Loc Ninh battle. Hay could not discount the possibility that Cam had snuck into Phuoc Long Province in the intervening weeks. He decided to wait for the situation to develop before committing troops to either Song Be or Bo Duc.[40]

The answer came shortly after midnight on 29 November. The second phase of Cam's dry season campaign began when the *2d* and *3d Battalions* of the *272d Regiment* attacked the Bo Duc District headquarters, a fortified compound defended by a reconnaissance company from the South Vietnamese 5th Division, a company of Regional Forces soldiers, and two Popular Forces platoons. Viet Cong mortar fire prevented the Montagnard soldiers stationed at the nearby Bu Dop Special Forces camp from reinforcing the embattled district headquarters.

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The enemy attacked the compound from multiple directions to take advantage of his superior numbers. The tactic worked. A group of Viet Cong troops fought its way through the southern perimeter and forced the defenders to regroup in the northern half of the compound. The U.S. adviser attached to the reconnaissance company, Capt. Harold E. Bolin, repeatedly exposed himself to hostile fire to direct air strikes against Viet Cong machine gun positions. When the situation became critical, he called down napalm and 750-pound bombs a mere seventy-five meters from his location to prevent the enemy from overrunning the compound. The air strike landed on target, violently jarring the government soldiers in their bunkers but also killing many Viet Cong troops caught in the open.

When the defenders saw the enemy waver, they counterattacked and drove him back into the jungle. Both Communist battalions broke contact around 0630, leaving behind ninety-six dead. Friendly losses came to fifteen killed and fifty-seven wounded.[41]

Allied reinforcements arrived the next afternoon, 29 November, in several flights of helicopters. Two infantry battalions from the South Vietnamese 5th Division took up defensive positions in the town, while General Hay sent Colonel Cochran's 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, as well as Battery A from the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, equipped with 105-mm. howitzers, from Quan Loi to Bu Dop. The U.S. units established a firebase at the northwestern end of the runway.

The enemy tested the American position later that night. Shortly after 2200, a salvo of mortar rounds and 122-mm. rockets plunged into the firebase. One rocket landed squarely on a bunker, killing all four of its occupants. When the bombardment ended, hundreds of Viet Cong soldiers from the *3d Battalion, 271st Regiment*, and elements of the *80A Replacement and Training Regiment* emerged from rubber trees on the eastern side of the runway. As they crossed the open ground that separated the woods from the firebase, a distance of some 200 meters, the American artillery crews depressed their howitzer barrels and fired directly into the onrushing infantry. Small arms and machine gun fire from the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, brought down more Communist troops, but still the enemy pressed his assault.[42]

Minutes later, the besieged Americans heard the thump of rotor blades as a pair of helicopter gunships arrived overhead. A dozen or more enemy antiaircraft machine guns greeted the aircraft, but their pilots evaded the ribbons of fire that streamed skyward. Keen-eyed helicopter crews spotted a cluster of enemy mortars firing from a soccer field in a nearby hamlet. Several strafing runs disabled the weapons and decimated their operators. A flight of F-100 fighter-bombers thundered in low to tear at the enemy-held woods with bombs and cannon fire. The enemy assault faltered and soon Viet Cong soldiers were scurrying back into the forest. By 0030 almost all of the shooting had stopped. U.S. casualties were seven killed and eleven wounded. The Communists left behind thirty-one bodies. Enemy prisoners later reported that the rest of the *271st* and the entire *272d Regiment* had been lurking nearby during the engagement to exploit any breakthrough that occurred.[43]

Despite the drubbing he had administered to the *9th Division* so far, General Hay doubted Colonel Cam was ready to give up just yet. During the next week, allied patrols continued to clash with enemy forces around Bo Duc, and each night mortar shells landed in the town. Believing that a second and larger attack against the district capital might still be in the offing, Hay sent the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, and a 4.2-inch mortar platoon to fortify a second firebase at the Bu Dop airstrip on 4 December. Two days later, he sent the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, under the command of Lt. Col. Mortimer L. O'Connor, and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, to establish a firebase southeast of Bo Duc where enemy activity had been spotted.


Viet Cong soldiers were indeed in that area. An hour after midnight on 8 December, the *3d Battalion, 273d Regiment*, attacked the firebase of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, with the main assault party advancing behind a steady barrage of rocket-propelled grenades. U.S. artillery, using the minimum amount of propellant possible because the engagement range was so short, tore through the enemy with high-explosive shells and prevented him from reaching the outer wire. After taking further losses from air strikes, helicopter gunships, and 4.2-inch mortars, the enemy withdrew around 0300. The Americans counted forty-nine enemy dead the next day against their own loss of four killed. When B-52 bombers began to pound the area around Bo Duc and Bu Dop, Colonel Cam finally decided it was time to withdraw back into Cambodia for rest and refitting.[44]

The second phase of the *Military Region 10* campaign had not gone well for the enemy. Between 25 November and 8 December, the Communists had lost at least 400 men and possibly up to twice that number at Song Be, Bo Duc, and Bu Dop in unsuccessful attacks on fixed allied positions. Their only success had occurred on 5 December when a battalion from the *88th Regiment* had attacked a Montagnard refugee camp called Dak Son, located just north of Song Be. In the days preceding the attack, Viet Cong propagandists had warned the villagers to return to their original village in Cambodia so they could provide manpower and food for the Communists. The Stieng tribesmen, who had repulsed three Viet Cong attacks earlier in the year, refused to leave, but this time the enemy came in overwhelming strength. The North Vietnamese soldiers burned down the hamlet with flamethrowers, killing more than 200 women and children and abducting at least 400 villagers.[45]

Thunder Road

As the *5th* and *9th PLAF Divisions* fought their battles at Song Be and Bo Duc in late November and early

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Map 7

December, the *7th PAVN Division*, commanded by Senior Col. Nguyen Hoa, tried to cut Highway 13, the allies' main supply route in Binh Long and Phouc Long Provinces. If Hoa succeeded, he would undercut Weyand's dry season offensive by making it impossible for II Field Force to sustain operations along the border.

The *7th Division*'s main adversary was the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, which had spent the last several months reopening the road between An Loc, a district capital in southern Binh Long Province, and the brigade's headquarters at Lai Khe, a distance of some seventy kilometers. The 3d Brigade operated from a series of firebases named Caisson I through VII built at ten-kilometer intervals along that stretch of highway. Early every morning, detachments would emerge from these bases to check for mines or other damage the Communists might have done to the road the previous night. Within two hours the road would be ready for civilian and military traffic. Troops would occasionally search communities along the road for enemy agents, while other soldiers distributed propaganda and performed civic actions. As dusk approached, traffic would be stopped and curfews imposed. Hamlet gates would be locked and positions secured against the possibility of nighttime harassment by enemy mortars. Through the subsequent hours of darkness, the brigade would use tower-mounted radar to detect, and mortars to disrupt, enemy activity along the road. It would also deploy troops to temporary positions between the firebases to further discourage enemy meddling during the night. Still other artillery would launch harassment and interdiction fire against suspected enemy areas of activity. Then, when the dawn again crept over the horizon, the brigade would repeat the process all over again in what had proven to be a highly successful system.[46]

Colonel Hoa made his opening move against Highway 13 on 24 November. Shortly after midnight, the *165th Regiment* sent its *2d Battalion* to overrun a night defense position on the shoulder of Highway 13, some twelve kilometers south of An Loc. Company B of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, manned the position, assisted by a platoon from the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, consisting of three M48A3 tanks and four M113 armored personnel carriers, and two platoons from the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Mechanized), equipped with eleven M113s.[47]

When the North Vietnamese attacked, the armored vehicles that ringed the perimeter exacted a fearful toll on them. Rocket-propelled grenades hit several of the vehicles but did not put any of them out of action. Enemy sappers were unable to reach the wire in order to blow gaps for the infantry behind them. Pinned down by the tremendous volume of fire emanating from the base, the North Vietnamese became easy targets for artillery and tactical air strikes. When helicopter gunships and Spooky aircraft joined the action, the North Vietnamese commander called off the attack and withdrew his men around 0145. The enemy left behind fifty-seven dead and a large amount of equipment. American losses came to four killed. Hoa's first effort had failed.[48]

Nine days later, Hoa sent his *141st Regiment* into action against a second night defense position that was three

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kilometers south of his first target. This second outpost might have appeared to be an easier target because it contained a smaller force, Company D, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and one mechanized platoon from Company C of the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry. Shortly after midnight on 3 December, the *1st Battalion, 141st Regiment,* stormed the perimeter and got inside the wire before being driven back by defensive fire and an onslaught of artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gunships. The Americans lost seven killed while claiming at least twenty-seven North Vietnamese lives. Perhaps helping to explain the relatively modest enemy body count, the Americans discovered several hundred fighting holes approximately 200 meters from the camp that would have been fairly effective in sheltering the enemy from allied bombs and shells.[49]

A week later, Colonel Hoa gave his *165th Regiment* another chance. The target this time was CAISSON VI, situated in the Xa Cat Rubber Plantation six kilometers south of An Loc. The base contained two artillery units, Battery A of the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, equipped with 105-mm. howitzers, and Battery C of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, armed with 155-mm. howitzers. Company A from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, protected the camp along with three M48A3 tanks and four M113 armored personnel carriers from Troop A of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, which were dug into fighting positions along the outer perimeter (*Map 7*).[50]

Two hours after midnight on 10 December, a barrage of 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortars slammed into the firebase. When the bombardment lifted, a mass of North Vietnamese soldiers assaulted the perimeter. Sapper teams rushed forward with their heads bowed low to avoid being hit by the rocket-propelled grenades that whooshed through the air from their comrades behind them. When the sappers had blown several holes in the wire, Viet Cong infantry streamed through the gap. Defensive fire cut down scores of them but some made it through. The U.S. tanks fired canister rounds, shells filled with shotgun-like steel balls, to seal the gaps. The defenders soon hunted down the enemy soldiers who had gotten into the compound, although not before one sapper team managed to disable an M48 tank.

A cascade of artillery shells eventually forced the North Vietnamese to withdraw. By 0330 the fighting was over. When the sun rose, U.S. soldiers collected 143 enemy dead along with large quantities of discarded weapons and military gear. The cost to the defenders had been one killed. After the battle of CAISSON VI, the battered *165th Regiment* ceased further attempts to cut Highway 13.[51]

SCREAMING EAGLES

General Weyand received the additional reinforcements he needed to cut the enemy supply lines in Phuoc Long Province when the 101st Airborne Division's 2d and 3d Brigades arrived from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in November and December of 1967. Known as Operation EAGLE THRUST, the deployment was the largest and longest military airlift into a combat zone that the United States had ever attempted, requiring no fewer than 369 sorties by U.S. Air Force C–141 Starlifter transport aircraft. All told, the aircraft carried 9,794 passengers and 5,083 tons of equipment. An additional 4,110 tons of equipment made the journey by sea.[52]

The commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. Olinto M. Barsanti, and his advance party arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base on 18 November where they established the division headquarters. The division's 3d Brigade arrived in the first week of December and immediately moved to Phuoc Vinh in Binh Duong Province, fifty kilometers northeast of Saigon. When the division's 2d Brigade arrived in the third week of December, it moved in temporarily with the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, twenty-five kilometers northwest of Saigon. The support units of the 101st Airborne Division, the last elements of the division to leave Fort Campbell, arrived at their new stations during the last week of December. By placing the 2d and 3d Brigades of the division at long-established bases, Weyand had given the newcomers a chance to acclimate in relatively safe areas while freeing up his more experienced forces to go after the enemy regiments in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.[53]



General Barsanti

The unit that escorted the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division to its new home at Phouc Vinh, the 11th Armored Cavalry, normally operated east of Saigon in Bien Hoa Province, but Weyand shifted two of its three squadrons to northern III Corps in early December to secure Highway 13 during the dry season campaign. Those two squadrons brought with them several dozen M48A3 tanks and over a hundred M113 ACAVs (armored cavalry assault vehicles), a modified version of the M113 troop carrier equipped with a swivel-mounted M60 machine gun on either side of the rear deck behind the commander's .50-caliber machine gun. Backed by a helicopter troop with forty-eight aircraft, the famed "Blackhorse" Regiment was capable of protecting long stretches of roadway while its engineer company made improvements and cleared mines.[54]

On 4 December, the commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry, Col. Jack MacFarlane, began Operation QUICKSILVER with his 1st and 2d Squadrons. Their task was to open and secure parts

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of Highway 13 in Binh Duong Province for the movement of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Brigade, 1st Division. Mines and roadblocks had rendered some sections of the highway impassable, so it was up to MacFarlane and his men to make the way safe for the hundreds of unarmored trucks that would convey the two brigades to their new base camps.

Operating out of the 1st Division base camp at Lai Khe, the Blackhorse troopers got off to a fast start. Although there were several local force companies in the area, and two battalions of the newly formed *Dong Nai Regiment* were less than a day's march to the southeast, the enemy stayed out of sight. Engineers attached to the 1st and 2d Squadrons disarmed a number of buried mines, including a 750-pound bomb and a 155-mm. artillery round that guerrillas had rigged with a pressure detonator. The engineers also repaired road surfaces that guerrillas or the weather had damaged. Colonel MacFarlane stationed tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles at regular intervals along the highway to provide around-the-clock security. The regimental helicopter troop and U.S. Air Force observation planes equipped with Starlight night-vision scopes assisted the forces on the ground. Just developed by the Army, these Starlight scopes (optical instruments that magnified the ambient light that reflected down from the stars and the moon) turned night for the viewer into a green-hued day. Under that protective shield, the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, made its way to Phouc Vinh without loss. With the mission complete, QUICKSILVER came to an end on 21 December.[55]

The next day, the regiment turned its attention to northern Binh Long Province, initiating Operation FARGO to secure Highway 13 between An Loc and Loc Ninh. After building a base near Loc Ninh, MacFarlane had orders to open Highway 14A between Loc Ninh and Bo Duc. Weyand instructed him to patrol the Cambodian border during the holiday season. In past years, the Communists had used the cease-fire periods at Christmas, New Years, and Tet to step up infiltration.[56]

On 22 December, the 11th Armored Cavalry's 1st and 2d Squadrons began moving north from An Loc. Encountering almost no resistance, the Blackhorse troopers spent the next four days securing Highway 13, constructing three firebases to defend the road, and establishing a regimental command post and logistical center at Loc Ninh. Following the Christmas truce, engineers equipped with Rome plows, armored bulldozers named for the town in Georgia where they were built, cleared a 100-meter strip on either side of Highway 13 to make it harder for the enemy to set up ambushes.

On 28 December, the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, turned over Camp Blackhorse to the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, from the 9th Infantry Division, so it could travel north to join its sister squadrons in northern III Corps. Lt. Col. Howard R. Fuller Jr. and his 9th Division cavalrymen took over Operation KITTYHAWK to protect Highway 1 and other lines of communications in Long Khanh Province. Having only one squadron instead of three to secure his area of operations, Fuller was fortunate that the Viet Cong chose to keep a low profile during the inaugural month of his unit's deployment.

When the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, joined the 1st and 2d Squadrons at Loc Ninh on 31 December, it marked the first time that the regiment would operate with all of its subordinate elements together since it had arrived the previous December. It was also the regiment's first exposure to combat in a triple-canopy rainforest. Despite the restricted sight lines and obstacles to movement, Colonel MacFarlane was confident that his troopers could go almost anywhere in the jungle and keep the enemy on the run.[57]

ASSESSING THE CAMPAIGN NORTH OF SAIGON

During the opening phase of his dry season campaign, General Weyand had accomplished his initial objectives in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces while also turning back a major enemy offensive. General Hay's 1st Infantry Division had succeeded in opening Highway 13 as far north as Loc Ninh, a necessary precursor to future operations along the border. Hay had then positioned his 1st and 3d Brigades, reinforced by elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry, into the sector between An Loc and Loc Ninh where they could strike at the Communist bases and supply routes that ran parallel to and across the upper portion of Highway 13. At the same time, Hay's division, with only minor support from the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division and the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, had thwarted *COSVN*'s seven-regiment offensive in the battles at Loc Ninh, Song Be, Bo Duc, and Bu Dop, not to mention several clashes along Highway 13. Furthermore, Weyand had successfully moved the 2d and 3d Brigades of the 101st Airborne Division into position for the next stage of his campaign—an airmobile assault into northern Phuoc Long Province to block the Adams Trail supply channel that fed War Zone D.[58]

Weyand nevertheless recognized that the enemy had scored a few points of his own. The Communist offensive had damaged government influence in the border region. In Phuoc Long Province, the North Vietnamese assault on Dak Son had generated nearly 1,800 refugees who by year's end had still not been resettled. The fighting at neighboring Song Be had caused still more suffering. Meanwhile, in Long Binh Province, one Revolutionary Development team and three Truong Son teams (Revolutionary Development teams assigned to Montagnard communities) had abandoned their work through most of November. More serious had been the effect on Loc Ninh District town. At the outset of the battle, most of the town's residents had fled by bus and U.S. Army helicopters to temporary shelters established for them in the provincial capital. When they returned home a few weeks later, they found the town destroyed by the U.S. counterattack and looted by members of the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division. The allies provided humanitarian assistance throughout the ordeal, and 1st Division engineers rebuilt Loc Ninh's market, but the populace's faith in the ability of the government

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General Mearns

to protect them was shaken. As a II Field Force report conceded, the enemy's seizure of Loc Ninh, no matter how temporary, had represented "a significant political victory" for the enemy.[59]

Tropic Lightning Strikes War Zone C

There was, however, one more piece of Weyand's offensive—the thrust into the Communist base area known as War Zone C. Encompassing the northern half of Tay Ninh Province, War Zone C was one of the largest enemy-controlled areas in South Vietnam. The sparsely inhabited, triple-canopy rainforest offered ideal concealment for the supply dumps maintained by the *50th* and *82d Rear Service Groups*. The trees and vegetation grew so thick in many places that the forest floor remained in near darkness even on the sunniest days. Only a handful of provincial roads penetrated War Zone C and they turned to mud during the wet season. For nearly half of the year, this vast territory was an opaque and nearly impenetrable stronghold.

Hidden from the prying eyes of allied reconnaissance aircraft, Viet Cong logisticians had constructed an elaborate logistical network that ran from Cambodia through War Zone C and down the course of the Saigon River through Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and western Binh Duong Provinces to the outskirts of the capital. To counter this threat, Westmoreland had conducted extensive bombing and defoliation campaigns, backed during the past two dry seasons by large search-and-destroy operations. The most recent operation, JUNCTION CITY in February and March of 1967, had netted around 850 tons of supplies and eliminated 2,700 Communist soldiers. Nevertheless, the supply channel remained open, supporting the *9th PLAF Division*, the *84A PLAF Artillery Regiment*, and at least a dozen Viet Cong infantry battalions. As the third and final component of the dry season offensive, MACV intended to interdict the corridor as close to the Cambodian border as possible until the rainy season once again made operations in the remote areas problematic.

The organization Weyand chose for the task was the 25th Infantry Division. Nicknamed "Tropic Lightning" for the lightning-bolt patch worn by the soldiers of this Hawaii-based unit, the division headquartered at Cu Chi, a Communist-infested section of Hau Nghia Province thirty-five kilometers northwest of Saigon. The division's 3d Brigade (formerly the 3d Brigade of the 4th Division, which the 25th Division had acquired in a troop swap) resided at Dau Tieng, Tay Ninh Province, a former French villa situated on the edge of the massive Michelin Rubber Plantation some thirty-five kilometers northwest of Cu Chi. By the fall of 1967, Maj. Gen. Fillmore K. Mearns led the division. The son of an Army general, Mearns had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1938 and had fought in Sicily and Italy during World War II, receiving a Silver Star Medal in the process.[60]

Mearns' orders for Operation YELLOWSTONE were to cut the Saigon River corridor, to destroy supply caches, and to build two new Special Forces camps deep in War Zone C to monitor the border. To accomplish this mission, Mearns would have available his 1st and 3d Brigades, an armed helicopter unit—the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less one troop)—based at Tay Ninh West, and two battalions from the South Vietnamese 49th Regiment, 25th Division. General Weyand expected *COSVN* to resist the incursion with some of the main force units that used Tay Ninh Province as their rear area. The most likely opponents would be two North Vietnamese regiments, the *141st* and *165th*, believed to be in War Zone C or just to the east in Binh Long Province. The operational area likely contained several rocket or mortar battalions from the *84A Artillery Regiment*, and *COSVN* might even use the *9th Division* despite the recent beating it had taken at Loc Ninh and Song Be.[61]

General Mearns set YELLOWSTONE in motion on 8 December, directing the operation from a forward command post at Dau Tieng. Two battalions



Battery B, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery, at a firebase at Katum await a fire mission during Operation YELLOWSTONE.

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from the 3d Brigade—the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, led by Lt. Col. John M. Henchman, and the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. James V. Ladd—moved by helicopter to the small hamlet of Katum, located at the northern terminus of provincial Route 4 in the north-central part of War Zone C. They met no resistance. When the two battalions finished securing the area a few days later, General Mearns ordered several units at Tay Ninh West—the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery, equipped with towed 105-mm. howitzers, and the 588th Engineer Battalion—to proceed north along Route 4 to Katum. Arriving without incident, the engineers began building Firebase CUSTER, which would serve as the 1st Brigade's forward base for the duration of YELLOWSTONE. They also helped the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, build a second base known as BEAUREGARD some five kilometers to the southeast near the village of Bo Tuc. The engineers positioned the base on the shoulder of Route 246, a seasonal road that led from Katum into the eastern half of War Zone C.

As the 25th Division's 1st Brigade punched deep into enemy territory, Col. Leonard R. Daems sent his 3d Brigade into the southeastern edge of War Zone C, led by Lt. Col. Thomas U. Harrold's 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. Two battalions from the South Vietnamese 49th Regiment joined the search for enemy supply caches. Armed helicopters from the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, supported the 1st and 3d Brigades from the air, looking for signs of the enemy around Katum and Dau Tieng.[62]

The crews of those low-flying scout aircraft helped the infantry locate dozens of well-concealed supply dumps and bunker complexes. Some were lightly defended by Viet Cong rear service troops while others were unguarded. One of the biggest finds went to the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, which discovered 350 tons of rice stashed six kilometers northwest of Katum. Four days later in the southeastern corner of War Zone C, the 3d Brigade's 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, found 15,000 grenades buried in 55-gallon oil drums. The haul represented enough ordnance to equip ten Communist main force battalions with their normal combat load. The B-52 bombers destroyed any bases spotted by helicopter crews that infantry patrols could not reach.[63]




Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, move through heavy growth in their armored personnel carriers during Operation YELLOWSTONE.

Enemy resistance stiffened during the second week of YELLOWSTONE. Around two hours after midnight on 15 December, mortar crews from the *2d* and *3d Battalions* of the *141st PAVN Regiment* began shelling Firebase BEAUREGARD, which was home to Colonel Henchman's 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. When the barrage ended, several hundred pith-helmeted North Vietnamese soldiers scrambled across the open ground between the firebase and the forest. Most did not make it through the defensive fire, but a team of sappers found a way into the base and placed satchel charges in the ammunition dump, setting off 600 105-mm. shells before Americans forced the infiltrators to retreat. Colonel Henchman directed air and artillery strikes, which relieved some of the pressure on the base, and the battle settled into a long-distance gunfire duel that raged until 0735. The retreating North Vietnamese left behind forty bodies. The 4th Battalion lost six killed and twelve wounded. That same night, a Special Forces camp at Tien Ngon on the western edge of War Zone C withstood a similar attack that included a 300-round mortar barrage followed by infantry and sapper probes.[64]

The next day, men from the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, found a notebook on the body of a senior sergeant from the *141st Regiment* who had died during the attack on BEAUREGARD. The notebook indicated that the unit, now operating directly under *COSVN*, had orders to overrun Firebase CUSTER as well as BEAUREGARD. If left intact, those bases could severely disrupt Communist supply lines that led from the Fishhook region of Cambodia, a wedge of land that jutted into South Vietnam on the border of Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, down through the eastern half of War Zone C.[65]

In anticipation of a showdown, both sides moved extra forces into the region during the second half of December. The *9th Division*'s *271st* and *272d Regiments* joined *COSVN* in the Fishhook after wrapping up the *Military Region 10* offensive at Song Be. On the U.S. side, the 3d

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
Map 8

Brigade, 25th Division, conducted a brief blocking operation south of Dau Tieng to support Operation CAMDEN, the search for the *101st PAVN Regiment*, before heading back into War Zone C to join the 1st Brigade with Operation YELLOWSTONE. Colonel Daems decided to build his forward base camp for the 3d Brigade on Route 244, a south-running branch of Route 246, some twelve kilometers southeast of Firebase BEAUREGARD.

Colonel Daems needed only two days to get his men in place. On 28 December, he sent Lt. Col. Awbrey G. Norris and the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), up Route 4 to BEAUREGARD accompanied by two 105-mm. batteries from the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, and a battery of M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers from the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery. The following morning, Colonel Harrold's 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, boarded helicopters at Dau Tieng and flew to the spot on Route 244 that Colonel Daems had chosen for his new forward outpost, Firebase BURT. Harrold's soldiers encountered no resistance. Later that day, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and the three artillery batteries that were waiting at BEAUREGARD traveled east on Route 246 and then south on Route 244, also without incident. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Tice, and several additional artillery batteries traveled from Dau Tieng to BEAUREGARD where they assumed the defense of the base. By the evening of 29 December, the lion's share of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, was now arrayed to the east of the 1st Brigade on the general line of Route 246.[66]

The soldiers at Firebase BURT quickly built fighting positions and strung razor wire around the perimeter, knowing that the enemy might attack at any time. Bisected by Route 244, the outpost measured a kilometer from east to west and half that distance from north to south. Unable to fit all 900 men and their equipment on open ground, Colonel Daems' task force had extended the eastern tip of BURT a few dozen meters into the trees. The brigade commander located his command post and supply area at the center of the base. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, built and occupied around forty bunkers on the eastern half of the perimeter. The 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, placed their M113 armored personnel carriers in a series of hull-down positions along the western half of BURT. Batteries A and C from the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, placed their eleven 105-mm. howitzers in the southern portion of the firebase. The five 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers belonging to Battery A of the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, were arrayed in the northern half of the perimeter. A pair of M42 tracked antiaircraft vehicles, colloquially known as "Dusters," from Battery B of the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery, and a pair of M55 truck-mounted quad .50-caliber machine guns from Battery D, 71st Artillery, gave the defenders additional protection (*Map 8*).[67]

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An M42 40-mm. self-propelled antiaircraft gun, or "Duster," provides perimeter defense.

COSVN reacted quickly to the presence of Firebase BURT. Daems' 3d Brigade was now only a few kilometers west of the trail network that connected Base Area 353 in the Fishhook with the *Sub-Region 1* base camps on the Saigon River. *COSVN*'s military head, General Thai, ordered the *9th Division*, which had returned to the Fishhook following the Loc Ninh–Song Be campaign, to attack the base as soon as possible. Colonel Cam moved his *271st* and *272d Regiments* into position on the evening of 31 December, while a 24-hour truce for the New Year went into effect.[68]

At 1800 on the first of January 1968, some of those Viet Cong troops attacked a squad of U.S. soldiers at an outpost some 200 meters east of Firebase BURT. After losing two men killed, the Americans retreated to BURT. Colonel Daems put the firebase on alert and ordered the other ambush teams positioned to the north, south, and west of BURT to remain where they were.

Two hours later, the enemy fired a few mortar rounds into BURT, apparently to check the range, and then the shelling stopped. A few minutes later, U.S. ambush patrols that were hiding in the jungle several hundred meters to the north and to the south of BURT reported large numbers of enemy soldiers moving through the trees. There were so many, in fact, that the ambush teams chose not to open fire for fear of being annihilated. BURT's defenders made a final check of their weapons and ammunition as Colonel Daems' staff got on the radio to coordinate artillery support from BEAUREGARD.

At 2330, Viet Cong mortar crews opened a fifteen-minute barrage. When the final shell hit, a wave of Viet Cong soldiers from the *1st* and *3d Battalions* of the *271st Regiment* streamed out of the trees to attack the northern end of the base, while the *2d* and *3d Battalions* of the *272d Regiment* hit the perimeter from the south.

The Americans let loose with M16 rifles and M60 machine guns, detonated dozens of claymore mines, and fired canister rounds from their 90-mm. recoilless rifles. The lethal metal tore into the advancing Viet Cong, but those who survived did not falter. Firing a steady stream of rocket-propelled grenades at the firebase, which knocked out an M113 carrier and an M42 Duster, the *2d* and *3d Battalions* of the *273d Regiment* advanced toward the razor wire that protected BURT. Artillery rounds from BEAUREGARD smashed into the surrounding jungle, but still the Viet Cong infantry came on.

At 0230, a squad of sappers breached the wire along the southern face of BURT. Enemy soldiers wriggled through the holes and then ran toward the bunker line. Colonel Daems ordered every 105-mm. howitzer that could be brought to bear to lower its barrel and fire directly into the advancing Communists with beehive rounds. The metal darts posed little danger to the American soldiers inside their bunkers, but the onrushing Viet Cong had no such protection. The steel needles cut down dozens of enemy soldiers, including one man who was vaporized by an expanding cone of darts as he attempted to stuff a grenade into a company command bunker.[69]

Confronted by such murderous fire, the Communists fell back beyond the wire to regroup. Taking advantage of the lull, a flight of UH–1 helicopters from the 145th and the 188th Assault Helicopter Companies swooped in to resupply BURT with ammunition and artillery shells. When they departed, U.S. fighter-bombers streaked in to drop napalm and cluster bombs on suspected enemy staging areas.[70]

The Viet Cong resumed the battle at 0330 with a battalion-size attack aimed at the southern end of BURT. Colonel Daems shifted several infantry platoons and two M113s from less-threatened sectors to the area under attack. The enemy assault faltered and then died away at 0500, bringing to an end a twenty-hour battle that General Mearns later described as a "cliffhanger."[71]

As soon as the sun came up, helicopter gunships from the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, went in search of the enemy. They observed small groups of Viet Cong heading toward Cambodia and killed around twenty of the fleeing troops. Meanwhile, Colonel Daems' men collected numerous bodies, some 115 enemy weapons, and large quantities of ammunition and equipment scattered around BURT. General Weyand flew in by helicopter to see the results himself, while General Mearns stayed aloft in his command helicopter to direct the pursuit of the retreating *9th Division*. In all, the *271st* and *272d Regiments* had lost 379 men killed in the attack on BURT and another 8 wounded who became prisoners. Radio Hanoi claimed that the Communists had killed or wounded 600 Americans,

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but the actual tally was 23 dead and 146 wounded. Even so, the battle for Firebase BURT was the heaviest action the 25th Division had seen since Operation JUNCTION CITY back in February, March, and April of 1967. Colonel Daems gave much of the credit for his victory to the precision artillery and close air support that his forces had received.[72]

The Situation at the Beginning of the New Year

At the start of 1968, the 25th Infantry Division appeared to be on track with its dry season campaign. General Mearns' 1st and 3d Brigades were firmly entrenched in northeastern War Zone C and astride the infiltration trail that fed the enemy bases that lined the Saigon River in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. In less than a week, the two brigades had already located and destroyed a number of supply caches, and stood to uncover many more before the end of the dry season. As a bonus, their incursion into War Zone C had forced the better part of the *9th PLAF Division* and elements of the *7th PAVN Division* to engage in another costly fight only weeks after sustaining huge casualties in the Loc Ninh–Song Be campaign. Meanwhile, the 2d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division appeared to have the enemy main force threat under control in the populated districts between Tay Ninh City and Cu Chi. General Mearns later recalled feeling a sense of "supreme confidence" as 1968 began, anticipating the effect his division would have on the Saigon River infiltration network over the next four months, and by his own admission, not yet aware of the massive enemy buildup that would soon result in the general offensive–general uprising.[73]

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Illustration Note

Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are from the files of Department of Defense, U.S. Army Center of Military History, and National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Notes

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
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BOOK REVIEWS

Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk



By Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, USA (Ret.)
Naval Institute Press, 2016
Pp. xi, 234. $29.95

Review by Colin J. Williams

In *Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk*, retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Bob Scales tells of watching the documentary *Restrepo* in 2013 and realizing that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) soldiers portrayed in it fought with the "same lousy rifle (M16/4), same helicopter (CH–47), [and] same machine gun (M2)" that he and his soldiers used at the Battle of Hamburger Hill in Vietnam in June 1969 (p. 70). Few of his observations support his call for improving the recruiting, training, and resourcing of America's close-combat forces more poignantly. In alarming language, the author fashions *Scales on War* as a case against misguided predictions of future conflict and misplaced weapons development priorities. Through twenty-one chapters, he calls on the Pentagon to make changes so that the most tactical of America's combat units can dominate future battlefields.

Underlying Scales' recommendations is his argument that military dominance has made the twenty-first century an age of infantry. To neutralize American firepower, enemies of the world's only superpower have learned to fight from places where civilians, urban terrain, and proximity to U.S. forces limit their vulnerability to air and land-based indirect fire. Scales cites statistics showing that almost all casualties suffered in recent wars have come from close-combat engagements. Future conflicts may begin with a maneuver campaign but will inevitably devolve into engagements in which large-unit movement is either disadvantageous or impossible. When fighting reaches this stage, the side that can better master information operations will prevail.

Scales posits that adjusting to this new age of infantry requires changes to both the Army's personnel system and its approach to resourcing ground forces. First, close-combat soldiers need to be older, more select, better trained, and better equipped. The Army and Marine Corps can ensure mature close-combat formations by restricting war fighting billets to second-tour enlistees. Limiting membership in this way would not only curb the number of Americans having to make life-and-death decisions before they reach peak mental acuity, but also exclude from combat soldiers who never obtain the constitution necessary for engaging the enemy at close range. Second, those selected for service in the infantry need to train in virtual environments with the same quality of simulation as the Navy's Top Gun and Air Force's Red Flag programs. The military members most likely to die in combat deserve at least the same level of attention as those who fight the enemy from a distance.

For decades, the technology that has made America's Navy and Air Force the best in the world has not been applied to the nation's land forces. Scales claims that he knows how to adjust this balance: learning the enemy's location can be accomplished by blackening the sky with unmanned aerial vehicles, to include small squad-launched drones; massing dismounted infantry against enemy forces rapidly enough to be tactically decisive requires replacing the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, capable of transporting six soldiers, with a Stryker-like vehicle that can carry a full infantry squad; and issuing secure cell phones to individual infantrymen will enable these squads to talk to higher echelons and with one another, as well as provide soldiers the emotional contact needed for resolve in combat. Equally important, soldiers and marines should be armed with individual weapons more reliable than the M16. In today's global environment, such a fielding would benefit national security to a greater degree than aircraft carriers for the Navy or airplanes for the Air Force.

To develop the ideal twenty-first-century military leader, Scales would mandate graduate school for senior officers. Advising foreign militaries and interpreting events for diverse audiences—two key roles for officers in the new age of infantry—are skills best developed by those trained to think deeply and write clearly. One exemplar of such an enlightened leader is General Stanley A. McChrystal, the former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, whom Scales compares to the World War II hero General George S. Patton. To the author, McChrystal is the model of the modern general, able to exploit technology to disrupt enemy forces through unfair fighting that favors his highly trained team of teams. Similarly worthy of emulation is General David H. Petraeus, who authored the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine as commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Scales contends that the general's identification of that narrative as the new "operational tissue" connecting tactics to strategy sets the standard for the intellectual leadership needed on today's battlefield. It was Petraeus' practice of viewing events in Iraq

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through the lenses of different audiences that led the author to his conclusion about the dominance of information operations in twenty-first-century warfare.

Disappointingly, Scales does little to present either his leadership argument or his call to focus on squad-level performance in strategic context. He asserts in Chapter 8 that strategic victory will come to America by the accretion of multiple tactical victories. An unending string of successful engagements will inflict devastating losses on the enemy's will to continue fighting while preserving the resolution of the American government to see campaigns through to completion. This reasoning is as unrealistic as it is simplistic. Even if the reader believes Scales' argument that increased attention needs to be devoted to America's infantry squads—as this reviewer does—U.S. forces will need more than mastery of information operations to achieve end-state objectives. Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that the ability of religiously motivated insurgents to mobilize in opposition to American intervention is a governance problem complicated by the longstanding distrust of the multiple societies constituting the two nations. Intentionally pursuing a strategy of attrition against enemies who see themselves as engaged in a protracted war addresses one component of conflict, but not the underlying cause. While inflicting setbacks on American forces is important for stateless organizations, their political ambitions depend more on imposing their way on those they presume to rule than on fighting fairly against American infantrymen.

Despite this one serious failing, Scales' passion, evidence, and lucid writing convey his message. The reader will undoubtedly finish *Scales on War* convinced that America needs to do more to support those who serve at the forefront of its land-based forces. In today's battles, combat efficiency at the squad level may not win wars, but it will definitely generate tactical outcomes favorable to the United States. This reviewer recommends *Scales on War* to any reader interested in the future of the American military.

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American Arsenal: A Century of Waging War



By Patrick Coffey
Oxford University Press, 2014
Pp. v, 328. $29.95

Review by Ethan S. Rafuse

In light of the fact that enthusiasm for technological innovation has been one of the more compelling characteristics of the American way of war, it is not surprising that science and the pursuit of advances in weaponry have played a significant role in American national security policy since the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Nor is it a shock that a number of the men who drove and contributed to the quest for progress in arms development, such as James Bryant Conant, Billy Mitchell, Louis Fieser, Edward Teller, and Curtis LeMay, figure prominently in accounts of the United States' emergence as a global superpower. In *American Arsenal: A Century of Waging War*, Patrick Coffey offers an informative and highly readable account of the interaction between science, the people who practice it, and those who employ the results of their work to the ends of American military policy.

Coffey brings solid credentials to the task of producing this study. A professionally trained chemist and visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, the author's first book was a study of the rise of modern chemistry and central figures in the field, such as Marjorie Winch, Irving Langmuir, and Glen Seaborg, and referenced their lives and experiences as points of departure for chronicling its evolution. In his latest work, Coffey employs the same approach, selecting over a dozen specific technologies and describing and analyzing the men (and bureaucracies) who drove (or hampered) their advancement and employment. The writer begins with the most famous American inventor, Thomas A. Edison, and his efforts during World War I to produce a battery for submarines and the frustration of his efforts to convince the U.S. Navy to adopt his work. Of course, one of the more notorious contributions of science made during the Great War was poison gas. Nonetheless, despite its manifest disdain for it (both on moral grounds and because it failed to provide a decisive battlefield advantage), the American military felt compelled to establish a Chemical Warfare Service that worked with chemists to grow its own capabilities in the field both during and after the war.

For all the attention poison gas received, it was the development of the airplane into an effective tool of war that was arguably the most important innovation of the First World War. Certainly, those who worked to establish a theory for the use of airpower afterward believed this to be the case. Coffey effectively discusses the vision of airpower enthusiasts like Billy Mitchell, the

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possibilities that the Army Air Corps saw in the Norden bombsight, and the hopes that precision bombing would bolster the case for establishing an independent air force—and provide a lasting escape from the horror of the trenches—all factors that played a significant role in shaping the conduct of World War II. The author also describes how the promises of airpower fell short during the war, as demonstrated in the pursuit of area bombing against Japan. The culmination of that practice came with perhaps the twentieth century's most dramatic manifestation of the impact of science on warfare—the atomic bomb.


The end of the war, however, hardly diminished the importance of science and scientists in the conduct of war. Instead, as manifested in the pursuit of the hydrogen bomb, the maturation of missile technology, and efforts to create strategies for the use of both, the Cold War reinforced the central place of science and technology in the pursuit of national security. The war in Vietnam, of course, revealed there were limits to what science could achieve when applied to war. But that did little to diminish the enthusiasm for technology of those entrusted with the enactment of national security policy, as embodied in the effort to fulfill President Ronald Reagan's vision of a defense against missile attack and the ever-expanding employment of unmanned vehicles in the nation's efforts in the Middle East, both of which are clearly discussed here.

Although he brings a scientific background to his work on this subject, Coffey is remarkably balanced in his narrative of events and his assessments of the individuals at the center of each chapter and those who worked in support of—and in some cases against—their efforts. The author does not romanticize, offer unquestioned admiration, or engage in the demonization or idealization of them, their work, or the consequences they had for the world. To be sure, Edward Teller does not come across especially well and it is not difficult in the later chapters to get a sense that the author is vested intellectually in current debates over technology. Still, on the whole, Coffey's assessments and arguments are balanced, thoughtful, and effectively supported by his evidence.

At the same time, it must be said that for all its positive qualities, *American Arsenal* does not offer a great deal that will surprise anyone familiar with the military history of the United States since 1914. The efforts to achieve advantages in poison gas or missile technology, for example, have been fairly well documented. Nor can the research that went into this book—which draws heavily on previously published works rather than archival or primary sources—be described as especially groundbreaking.

Nonetheless, Coffey merits more praise than criticism. For someone looking for a readable, informative account of Hermann Kahn's views on nuclear strategy, the strategic bombing effort in World War II, the development of the Predator drone, or a general study of the effort of scientists to devise and servicemembers to apply new technologies over the past hundred years, this book fills both needs quite well. While by no means the final word on these subjects, *American Arsenal* offers both a fine starting point for those beginning their study of these topics and a well-constructed refresher for those already familiar with them.

Dr. Ethan S. Rafuse earned his doctorate at the University of Missouri-Kansas City and since 2004 has been a member of the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, where he is a professor of military history.



Review by Gregory J. W. Urwin

The sparks that ignited the American War of Independence at Lexington and Concord could have achieved the same result in any of several confrontations that occurred between Massachusetts colonists and British Redcoats in the months that preceded 19 April 1775. Infuriated by the Boston Tea Party of 16 December 1773, London placed Massachusetts under martial law, installing Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, the commander in chief of British forces in North America, as the colony's governor. Rather than intimidate Bay Colony Whigs, this move inflamed them, prodding them into redoubling their defiance of British rule.

J. L. Bell's *The Road to Concord: How Four Stolen Cannon Ignited the Revolutionary War* tackles a familiar subject—how Thomas Gage's attempts to prevent a revolution ended up provoking one—but makes the story feel fresh by revealing how drastically the theft of four brass guns from Boston affected the British general's judgment.

Gage decided to head off the possibility of a violent rebellion by practicing arms control. On 1 September 1774, he sent the 4th Regiment of Foot to seize 260 half-barrels of

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gunpowder from a magazine located northwest of British-occupied Boston and two small fieldpieces belonging to the nearby town of Cambridge. Local political activists depicted the powder seizure as an attempt to disarm the militia, thus leaving the people of Massachusetts exposed to the imposition of a tyrannous regime by the king's regulars. A boisterous demonstration by 4,000 angry militiamen who converged on Cambridge the next day served notice to Gage that his authority faced a potent challenge.

In the weeks following the British seizure of the colonists' gunpowder, Massachusetts and the rest of New England became the scene of an arms race. Supporters of the Whig cause attempted to carry off and conceal artillery pieces that had been distributed to various towns and cities for the purpose of local defense, while other communities with no access to such ordnance tried to purchase their own guns. Most of these cannon lay beyond the confines of Boston, which made them easy pickings, but not even artillery under the noses of five Redcoat battalions was safe. On the night of 14–15 September some daring Whigs took possession of a pair of shiny 2-pound brass guns belonging to the Boston Train of Artillery and smuggled them out of the city. On 16 September the Whigs surreptitiously removed the Boston Train's two brass 3-pounders from a gun shed opposite the 4th Foot's encampment on Boston Common, hiding them at a school for two weeks until the opportunity came to sneak them past British sentries.

Although Gage's soldiers managed to thwart Whig cannon thieves on more than one subsequent occasion, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress gained control of thirty-eight fieldpieces during the final months of peace. No loss galled Gage more than the four brass guns spirited out of Boston. Reports that filtered into Boston from Loyalist spies in the countryside soon convinced Gage that New England was preparing to rebel. His recommendation that London assemble a British army of 20,000 at Boston to pacify the region shook his political superiors and undermined their confidence in the harried general.


On 14 April 1775, Gage received instructions from England to arrest the leaders of the Massachusetts resistance. By that time, the general's intelligence sources had informed him that the missing brass guns had been hidden at a farm just outside Concord. Rather than send his troops on a wild goose chase to capture a few agitators hiding in the interior, Gage decided to dispatch a raiding force of grenadiers and light infantry to Concord to reclaim the four fieldpieces and destroy the other military materiel that the Provincial Congress had accumulated in the town. That expedition attempted to slip out of Boston late on 18 April, but Whig agents detected its departure and spread an alarm that aroused the militia and triggered the uprising that Gage had hoped to abort. Whig leaders like Samuel Adams and John Hancock assumed that the troops Gage sent to Concord were looking for them, and that error continues to surface in histories of Lexington and Concord. Bell, however, provides a detailed reconstruction of competing efforts at political and military mobilization, while enlivening his narrative with doses of intrigue and suspense.

The Road to Concord is a rare treat—a meticulously researched study unspoiled by pedantry. The book is also one of the first titles in a series sponsored by the online *Journal of the American Revolution*, an exciting experiment that benefits from the combined efforts of independent scholars and professional historians dedicated to re-examining the history of this country's founding by digging deep in previously untapped sources. Bell himself is not a professor, but the proprietor of a popular Web site about the beginning of the American Revolution, www.boston1775.net. The admirable standard that he has achieved in his first book augurs well for the other *Journal of the American Revolution*-sponsored books set to follow in its wake.

Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin is a professor of history at Temple University and author of several works on U.S. military history. He is currently working on a social history of the 1781 British invasions of Virginia.

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A Scientific Way of War: Antebellum Military Science, West Point, and the Origins of American Military Thought



By Ian C. Hope
University of Nebraska Press, 2015
Pp. x, 334. $55

Review by Andrew J. Ziebell

Ever since Russell F. Weigley published his seminal work *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York, 1973), few endeavors can lead to more controversy among American military historians and theorists than the attempt to define or redefine the way the nation approaches the business of fighting and winning its wars. Ian C. Hope, a Canadian Army officer and an associate history professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, is undeterred by the task and presents an expert examination of antebellum military science and the uniquely

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American approach to conflict. In *A Scientific Way of War: Antebellum Military Science, West Point, and the Origins of American Military Thought*, Hope demonstrates that the science of military thought and theory during this period was about much more than simply preparing for and waging continental war. From a system of defense that gave primacy to a Federalist "integrated defense policy" to the military logic of "internal improvements," this new discipline affected nearly every aspect of the emerging nation. Some might question the prime position that Hope affords West Point in this book. But when one looks at the instructors who shaped generations of practitioners of military science, and the graduates who continuously employed the lessons they learned at West Point in peace and in war, it is easy to see why Hope chose the institution as his focal point. The reader will find little else to fault in this well-organized, thoroughly researched and engaging book.


Hope sets himself the task of "revealing what constituted nineteenth-century military science, why Americans accepted it as the dominant paradigm, and how it generated an educated understanding of war" (p. 3). He breaks down the antebellum art of war into four distinct components: campaigning, artillery and ordnance, fortifications and engineering, and logistics and administration. Mastery of these staff functions required an attention to detail that only a comprehensive scientific education could instill. Purposefully missing from the calculus is the concept of "martial genius," that sort of Napoleonic feeling for the art of command. Originating in Europe and making its way across the Atlantic was the idea that adherence to strict scientific principles in the campaign could overcome the more passionate aspect of war. Without these scientific methods, decisive battle would prove elusive as nations became increasingly capable of regenerating military power. Elevation of the science over the art was pervasive at West Point, where cadets received very little instruction in history or other liberal arts throughout the antebellum period. The faculty went so far as to forbid cadets from reading popular literature, and enforced the rule by preventing the library from stocking these books well into the 1830s.

The American interpretation was not a wholesale application of European solutions to American military problems, however. Sylvanus Thayer, who served as West Point's superintendent from 1817–1833, has rightly been named the father of the United States Military Academy. But it was Dennis Hart Mahan who truly left his mark on the institution during his incredible forty-seven years on the faculty (1824–1871). Under his direction, the curriculum grew less reliant on European—primarily French—texts in the original language. Instead, the fundamental principles of these texts were adapted to more adequately address America's coastal defense, the movement of military forces across vast, mostly uninhabited spaces, and the ever-present threat of irregular warfare on the frontier. Mahan saw it as his duty to prepare each of his graduates for a varied experience that required deep analytical thinking.

While the United States possessed unique strategic challenges, it also had to contend with the self-imposed, constitutional constraint of a small standing army compared to those in Europe. It was a force with a very small core of military professionals that could expand when required, but this concept needed a "perfect" foundation on which the army could build combat power. Volunteer officers played an important role, particularly in the field, but it was the officers educated at West Point who formed this base. Hope argues that the demonstrated capacity of the Army staff to generate and support forces during the Mexican-American War made military science both "politically and socially acceptable" to the American public as it seemed to support the ideals the nation had been founded on (p. 249).

The strategic challenges facing the United States have changed dramatically since the antebellum period, and West Point is no longer the sole producer of highly educated and exceedingly competent Army officers. Yet, the reliance on the scientific application of military force by a small core of professionals remains as relevant today as ever.

Andrew J. Ziebell is a U.S. Army Reserve officer currently serving at the U.S. Army, Europe, headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany. He is a 2005 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He recently graduated from King's College London with a master's degree in war studies.



Review by Frank L. Kalesnik

While conflicts between European settlers and Native Americans lasted from 1492 to 1890, the period following the American Civil War is perhaps the best known and most romanticized. Many books, movies, and television shows glamorize the epic struggle for the American West. Famous names like Crazy Horse, Custer, and Geronimo are enshrined in popular culture, and their depictions as both heroes and villains often tell us more about the time a book was written or a film produced than the legendary events they purport to describe. General

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George Crook was one such "legend of the Old West," a seasoned Indian fighter who could be at times both ruthless and compassionate in his dealings with Native Americans. His career began in California in the years preceding the Civil War, and service in that conflict brought him the fame and advancement this seemingly reserved and unassuming soldier nevertheless craved. But his later campaigns in the West, particularly fighting the Apache and in the Great Sioux War of 1876–1877, are his most significant, and these form the subject of Paul Magid's *The Gray Fox: George Crook and the Indian Wars.*

Few books have been written about Crook. His aide John Gregory Bourke's *On the Border with Crook* (New York, 1891) and Charles King's *Campaigning with Crook* (Milwaukee, Wis., 1880) are the best known contemporary accounts. The general's own account of his exploits, edited and annotated by Martin Schmitt, was first published by the University of Oklahoma Press as *General George Crook: His Autobiography* (Norman, Okla., 1946). The same press released Charles M. Robinson III's one-volume *General Crook on the Western Frontier* in 2001.

Magid's *The Gray Fox* is the second book in a three-part series. The first is *George Crook: From the Redwoods to Appomattox* (Norman, Okla., 2011); the third, which covers events following the Sioux War, is forthcoming. An attorney by profession, Magid's work is a labor of love, the result of years of thoughtful research. Does a subject so thinly covered previously deserve such extensive attention? Having now read the first two parts of this trilogy, this reviewer says "Yes!"

Crook was notoriously reticent, often keeping his own counsel. A teetotaler and avid outdoorsman, he was a determined campaigner, pursuing his enemies ruthlessly through heat, rain, and snow from Idaho to Arizona. He relied extensively on Native American scouts, believing their employment provided the most effective means of wearing his opponents down. His mobile columns remained in the field in pursuit of his foes, relying on pack mules to supply his hard marching but light traveling forces. Contemptuous of military pomp, he normally wore civilian attire, eating the same meager rations as his men, though these were often supplemented by game meat this avid hunter brought to the community pot.

Crook could also be vain and petty. He grew contemptuous of his old West Point friend Philip Sheridan, under whom he served in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, believing Sheridan had taken credit for Crook's own achievements. The rift grew in the Western Indian campaigns, where Crook's outstanding reputation, earned largely in operations against the Apache, dimmed with his awkward performance in operations against the Sioux. Given command of the Department of the Platte with headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, forces under his command mistakenly attacked a Cheyenne village in March of 1876, causing that tribe to fight alongside the Sioux in subsequent hostilities.

Leading one of the three columns converging on the Native Americans' assumed location in southeastern Montana, then-Brig. Gen. George Crook was surprised by his foes on the morning of 17 June 1876 while camped on the banks of the Rosebud. His force of about 1,400 men, to include packers and Indian (Crow and Shoshone) scouts allied with the army against the Sioux and Cheyenne, who were estimated to be about 1,000 strong. Both sides claimed a victory, the army holding the field when the Sioux and Cheyenne left at the end of the day. Crook subsequently withdrew to encamp in Wyoming, while the Indians went on to their triumph at the Little Big Horn a week later. He later linked up with Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry's column, but their combined force proved too cumbersome and soon split. Crook's subsequent "mud march" through the Dakotas was a nightmare for all concerned, despite a minor victory against the Lakota at Slim Buttes on 9–10 September 1876.

Magid's analysis of these events is thorough, engaging, and incisive. He is particularly adept at unraveling the enigma created by Crook's aloof demeanor.


> Speculation regarding the psychological state of the long dead is an exercise fraught with uncertainty, particularly with respect to a figure as fantastically devoted to concealing his inner self as George Crook. Yet it would be safe to hazard that, caught unawares by an enemy he had seriously underestimated and, for the first time in his career denied a victory against an Indian foe, the engagement at the Rosebud had dealt a violent blow to the general's considerable ego (p. 264).

Despite his lackluster performance in the Great Sioux War, Crook's career continued, and he proved as determined to secure a lasting peace by treating his former enemies fairly as he had been in hunting them down to force them to surrender. This will be the subject of the author's next book, and this reviewer looks forward to it. For readers interested in the Indian Wars, especially those who want to know more about George Crook, Paul Magid's work comes highly recommended.

Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik earned his bachelor's degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and his master's degree and doctorate in American history at Florida State University. He taught at VMI and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and was a command historian for both the Air Force and Marine Corps. He also served twenty-two years as an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. He is currently the command historian for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

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The Generals: Patton, MacArthur, Marshall, and the Winning of World War II



By Winston Groom
National Geographic, 2015
Pp. 510. $30

Review by Francis P. Sempa

The Second World War continues to fascinate and inform students of history and military strategy, and the larger-than-life personalities who organized and led this country to victory must become known to a new generation of Americans for whom World War II is "ancient" history. Winston Groom, a popular military historian best known as the author of *Forrest Gump*, has written an engaging and informative biography of three of America's most important generals—Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, and George Patton—whose careers intersected throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

All three men were born in the late-nineteenth century, before the United States emerged as a world power. MacArthur's first memories were of troops fighting hostile Indians on the frontier; his father, Arthur MacArthur, a Union Civil War hero, was assigned to Army posts in the far West. Marshall's boyhood was spent hunting and fishing in Uniontown, a small coal town in southwestern Pennsylvania. His ancestry reached back to Jamestown, Virginia, and his uncle served as an aid de camp to Confederate General Robert E. Lee. Patton grew up in Pasadena, California, on his family's 1300-acre estate. He dreamed of becoming a soldier like his grandfather, George Patton, a Confederate colonel who fought in the Shenandoah Valley and was killed in the Third Battle of Winchester.

MacArthur graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point where, in Groom's words, he "arced . . . like a shooting star, setting records some of which remain unmatched today." (p. 108). Marshall attended the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), where he thrived in military studies and on both the drill and football fields. Patton attended both VMI and West Point, struggled academically because of dyslexia, but "seemed to thrive on the starkness, austerity, and hazing" of military life (p. 69). From an early age, MacArthur and Patton believed they were men of destiny. Marshall shared their ambition but not their brashness, flamboyance, and recklessness. MacArthur and Patton would win their glory on the battlefields of two world wars, while Marshall would become first an indispensable staffer and later the "organizer of victory."

Prior to U.S. involvement in World War I, Marshall was stationed in the Philippines at Fort William McKinley with the 13th Infantry Regiment. This was his first opportunity to lead large bodies of troops in military maneuvers, and he performed so well that Maj. Gen. Franklin Bell called him "the greatest potential wartime leader in the Army" (p. 48). MacArthur and Patton, meanwhile, received their baptism by fire during America's incursions into Mexico. Patton was proclaimed a hero for his daring cavalry raid at the San Miguel Ranch in search of one of Pancho Villa's top lieutenants. MacArthur was promoted and recommended for the Medal of Honor for his brave actions on a mission to locate missing railroad engines on the line from Vera Cruz to Alvarado.

The talents and character of these three men were even more evident during the First World War. MacArthur, as deputy commander and commander of the 42d Division, commonly called the Rainbow Division, earned seven Silver Stars and two Distinguished Service Crosses in battles in the St. Mihiel salient and during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Groom even implies that MacArthur probably deserved the Medal of Honor. Secretary of War Newton Baker called him "the greatest American field commander produced by the war" (p. 185). One American general cited MacArthur for promotion, explaining that "[o]n a field where courage was the rule, his courage was the dominant factor" (p. 185).

Patton, meanwhile, was assigned to the infant U.S. Tank Corps. During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive his tanks supported two infantry divisions. The author notes that Patton's battle plan "emphasized the offensive and presciently anticipated Germany's armored *Blitzkrieg* two decades into the future" (p. 172). Like MacArthur, he repeatedly and courageously exposed himself to hostile fire—Patton was wounded by machine gun fire during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Marshall, though itching for battle, performed so well at planning, organizing, and staff work that General John J. Pershing would not risk losing him on the battlefield. Marshall drafted the battle plans for the offensive at St. Mihiel and "was one of the chief planners" of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, which involved logistics and transport for more than 400,000 troops. (p. 170). He was also willing to tell uncomfortable truths to superior officers—a trait also exhibited, albeit less diplomatically, by MacArthur and Patton. "[N]o matter the pressure," writes Groom, "[Marshall] knew the right thing to do and did it" (p. 137).

After the "war to end all wars," the U.S. Army dramatically downsized, and funding was cut further during the New Deal years. On the eve of World War II, Groom notes, "the army was woefully undermanned—perhaps equal only to that of a third-world nation" (p. 255). As Army chief of staff in the early 1930s, MacArthur battled with the New Dealers, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, to secure more funds for the Army, but the nation's political leaders in the midst of a great depression chose butter over guns. Patton, between the wars, continued to extol the virtues of the tank, and developed a friendship with another of the Army's rising stars, Dwight D.

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Eisenhower, who shared Patton's views on tank warfare. Interestingly, Patton also wrote a paper predicting a future war with Japan and envisioned a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. When the United States finally began to prepare for the impending war in the late 1930s, it would be Marshall who organized the nation's armed forces for victory.

All three generals played pivotal roles in the U.S. and Allied victory in the Second World War. Marshall, as Army chief of staff, oversaw the huge growth of the service and selected the generals who would lead it in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, northwestern Europe, and the southwest Pacific. He was President Roosevelt's top military adviser throughout the war. Patton and MacArthur were, in Groom's words, "the shrewdest, most aggressive, battle-wise, and successful generals in the field" (p. 17). Patton and his troops won victory after victory in North Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany, while MacArthur and his soldiers waged a brilliant combined-arms offensive in New Guinea and the Philippines.


Patton died in a motor vehicle accident shortly after the war. In President Harry Truman's administration, Marshall served as an envoy to China, secretary of state and secretary of defense, and spearheaded the European Economic Recovery Program that bears his name. MacArthur served as military administrator of Japan, overseeing the transformation of that country from an aggressive, imperial, militaristic empire to a peaceful democratic state. He later led U.S. and UN forces after the outbreak of the Korean War, during which he planned and executed one more strategic masterpiece—the landing at Inchon. MacArthur's subsequent public disagreements with Truman's conduct of the war resulted in him being relieved of command. After that, the old soldier gradually faded away.

Winston Groom has done a great service by reminding us about the qualities and character of these three men. "They were exceptionally good soldiers, and great captains," he concludes, "brave as lions, bold as bulls, audacious, and inventive, marshaling huge victorious armies. With all their quirks and foibles and mistakes they were still fine men who served their country with distinction, and . . . their memory enrich[es] the national trust" (p. 473).

Francis P. Sempa is the author of *Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat Soldier's Journey through the Second World War* (Lanham, Md., 2011), which tells the story of his father's experiences with the 29th Infantry Division in World War II. He has written on historical and foreign policy topics for *Joint Force Quarterly*, the *University Bookman*, the *Claremont Review of Books*, the *Washington Times*, *Strategic Review*, *Orbis*, and other publications. He is an attorney and an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University.

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My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness



By Howard Jones
Oxford University Press, 2017
Pp. xxvi, 475. $34.95

Review by Edward D. Jennings

Although the Vietnam War continues to fade from the memory of the American public, the events that took place in and around the hamlet of My Lai in South Vietnam fifty years ago still reverberate through the political and military institutions of America today. *My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness*, part of Oxford University Press' Pivotal Moments in American History series, is both useful and timely given the daily news reports and images of the horrors of war that continue in ongoing conflicts throughout the world.

Offering more than just a new interpretation of this horrific event, Howard Jones, a research professor of history emeritus at the University of Alabama, combines his skills as a historian and researcher to provide a deeper understanding of My Lai and the Vietnam War to answer the question of why the massacre took place. Jones uses diverse primary and secondary sources, many previously unavailable, to balance and combine many perspectives—ranging from those of American troops, enemy soldiers, and civilians in the combat zone to that of the president of the United States—to produce a detailed account of the tragedy at My Lai that is graphic, disturbing, and infuriating at times.

The book is organized into three major sections with multiple chapters sequenced chronologically, enabling the reader to switch perspectives with relative ease. The first section, "Pinkville," provides an overview of the combat environment and context of the Vietnam War in 1968; introduces the organization, training, and select leaders of the U.S Army's 23d Americal Division and subordinate units; and details the planning, preparation, and execution of Task Force BARKER's search-and-destroy mission in the vicinity of My Lai that resulted in the murder of over 500 noncombatant civilians. The second section, "Aftermath and Cover-Up," describes the various reports and interpretations of the events at My Lai, the investigations and legal implications for the military chain of command, and the introduction of "evidence" by numerous individuals and organizations with competing agendas. The third section, "My Lai on Trial," chronicles the actions of journalists, investigators, lawyers, and military and political leaders before, during, and after the trials of U.S servicemembers accused of committing war crimes in My Lai. Jones complements his narrative with two reference maps and thirty-two photographs that not only aid in the visualization of the battlefield and the aftermath of operations in My Lai, but also enable the reader to associate the


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faces and names of the primary actors involved in the My Lai trials.

A seasoned historian, Jones skillfully exposes the many layers of this story, revealing how a lack of meaningful training on the law of land warfare was a disservice to soldiers fighting a war of attrition against an unconventional enemy. The combined elements of racism and retribution fueled by youth and fear, poor leadership, careerism, and deceit within the chain of command led to American soldiers murdering Vietnamese civilians in My Lai. One of the most intriguing aspects of this book goes beyond the battlefield, linking My Lai to other events occurring on the American home front that continued to erode the American public's support for the war. Jones clearly shows that the My Lai trials were not just about accountability and justice, but were also used to bolster the agendas of businessmen, politicians, and activists. The epilogue, arguably the most important part of the book, provides an update on select individuals (victims, perpetrators, and bystanders) associated with My Lai; discusses the various reforms in military education, training, policies, and laws; and examines the relevance of My Lai to contemporary warfare.

Extensively researched, well-written, and thoughtful, *My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness* is the definitive work on this tragic event. It should be mandatory reading for military professionals and policymakers because what happened at My Lai and during the subsequent investigations and trials needs to be recounted to every generation—and never forgotten.

Edward D. Jennings earned his bachelor's degree in history from the Citadel and his master's degree in international relations from Troy University. He served as an officer in the U.S. Army for over twenty years with duty assignments in the United States and throughout the world. He is currently an assistant professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



By Conrad C. Crane
Naval Institute Press, 2016
Pp. xv, 307. $39.95

Review by Wm. Shane Story

When Conrad Crane retired from the Army in 2000 after teaching history at the United States Military Academy, he was best known as an airpower theorist and for his book *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (Lawrence, Kans., 1993) and, among West Point alumni, for his detailed analyses of Black Knights' football. Time changes things. Just eight years later, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bing West noted Crane's "world-class reputation as a counterinsurgency analyst."[1] *Cassandra in Oz* is Crane's memoir of how this transformation happened; how a strategic whirlwind swept him up in efforts to guide the U.S. Army toward a revitalized counterinsurgency doctrine intended to help the military find its bearings in Iraq and Afghanistan. He wanted Army leaders to better understand challenges that were at once intellectual, doctrinal, institutional, strategic, and political. Crane often felt, however, that they either did not hear what he had to say or outright ignored it. It is hard to tell which experience was worse.

In the first two chapters, which cover the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, Crane sees himself as a Cassandra whose warnings go unheeded. In early 2002, he could not get past Pentagon gatekeepers to caution senior officials that quick success in Afghanistan was not a model for operations in Iraq. His frustration grew in early 2003 when senior leaders disregarded his book *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 2003). It was maddening to Crane that his best efforts fell on deaf ears, but his prescriptions could be contradictory. For example, if a situation demanded military intervention, he favored using overwhelming force to achieve decisive effects followed months later by a swift drawdown. On the other hand, if stability was impossible and a situation was irredeemable, then the best thing to do was to leave immediately, which would only perpetuate the crisis (pp. 36, 40). Missing is guidance for knowing what advice pertained to which strategic conundrum.

Chapters 3 through 7, the heart of the book, explain the production of Field Manual (FM) 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, which was a doctrinal response to political and strategic failures in Iraq. These began with the collapse of the Iraqi regime in April 2003, when the Bush administration was so paralyzed by policy contradictions that it surrendered the initiative in post-Saddam Iraq to radical clerics and insurgent groups. Although the administration wanted to use military victory to transform Iraq and the region, it undercut this objective by initiating a rapid drawdown of American forces in Iraq. The troop reduction had multiple purposes, including the avoidance of unnecessary burdens and expense, to prevent a postinvasion backlash, and to shift resources to higher priorities, such as transforming the Department of Defense. Soon enough, however, Iraq's postinvasion chaos scuttled the Pentagon's plans for a hasty withdrawal, and an anti-American insurgency took root amidst Iraq's ongoing internecine conflicts.

By late 2005, with Iraq in turmoil, Crane's reputation as the prescient author of *Reconstructing Iraq* made his appearances a hot ticket on the

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D.C. lecture circuit. That is when an old West Point classmate, Combined Arms Center Commander Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, asked Crane to review a draft of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. Petraeus, who had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003 and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq in 2004, was now attempting to revolutionize Army doctrine to guide operations in Iraq. For Crane, joining Patraeus' team led to months of travel, writing and editing, and leading conferences of subject matter experts arguing over precepts. Revisions countered and accommodated criticisms about the efficacy and wisdom of counterinsurgency operations. Crane recounts this frenetic time and adds a valuable reader's guide to the resulting manual. Chapter 7 gives full vent to the doctrine's harshest critics, and engaging those critics leads Crane to his best insight: "Counterinsurgency is an operational approach, not a national strategy, but in the strategic vacuum that existed, the manual came to fulfill that role. The fact that a nation can execute COIN does not mean that it should" (p. 133).

The final section, chapters 8 through 12, offers mixed assessments of the doctrine's utility in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the fall of 2007, after General Petraeus testified that the surge and the mission to protect the population had begun to reduce levels of violence in Iraq, Crane took one of those whirlwind battlefield tours wherein outside experts fly in for brief, exhilarating visits to see what is happening and assess whether it amounts to progress. Generals in charge and young sergeants leading troops left Crane in awe. He was impressed to see that many units were implementing the doctrine, but dismayed when other units did not. He was also humbled where it seemed the manual was unequal to the situation.

If the surge reflected the successful application of the new counterinsurgency doctrine, it did not resolve the larger problems of an Iraqi political settlement and American troop commitments: how many, for how long, and to what end? The aftermath of the surge, coupled with the fact that it did not lead to an enduring commitment to complete the mission and secure its gains, gave Crane the sense of opportunities missed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where counterinsurgency "was never either fully resourced nor allowed sufficient time." At the same time, however, Crane questions whether counterinsurgency could ever have worked in Afghanistan, because "without the possibility of establishing a legitimate indigenous governing authority, such a campaign is doomed to fail" (p. 219). Because his book focuses on doctrinal development and not on Iraq, Afghanistan, or other geostrategic hornets' nests, Crane does not explain how one knows whether such a possibility exists. Instead, he concludes with postsurge echoes of the doctrinal debates that had been all the rage at the height of the Iraq war and by offering a few final lessons.

Some of those lessons invalidate themselves. For example, Crane laments the fact that headquarters often have to "play the Super Bowl with pickup teams," but then argues that "it no longer makes sense to train every officer to be prepared to take on new responsibilities in an expanded force" (pp. 253–54). In fact, officers and soldiers in recent wars have been called upon time and again to step up to challenges far beyond all their education and training. Some have exceeded expectations and some have not, but there will continue to be a premium on the flexibility and resilience needed to learn from and surmount unforeseen trials. Any who deem themselves warriors must be prepared to assume greater responsibilities in a force that expands, contracts, and adapts to evolving conflicts.

It is worth noting that *Cassandra in Oz* is not about Iraq; there is not a single mention of Ayatollah Sistani, Najaf, Iran or Syria—factors that cannot be ignored by anyone intending to influence Iraqi politics—and Moqtada al-Sadr is named once. The ubiquitous John Nagl, however, appears some thirty-four times, and even the satirist Jon Stewart gets a nod. The point is not that Crane should have explored Iraqi sectarianism, but that doctrinal arguments about counterinsurgency proceeded many thousands of miles away from the drivers of Iraq's sectarian conflicts. Put another way, the center of gravity for FM 3–24 and *Cassandra in Oz* lay somewhere between Washington, D.C.; Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, not between the Tigris and the Euphrates. In effect, the manual and the memoir are more relevant to American concerns than to the future of Iraq or how to resolve that country's conflicts.

If these criticisms seem harsh, my regard for *Cassandra in Oz* is not. Crane's investment in his subject is personal because he taught many who fought in these wars, some of whom never made it home. It is worth reading, and reading over again, because those who served in these conflicts will understand better the doctrinal debates through which the Army sought to define missions and shape outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fill the margins with scribbles about your own ideas and disagreements as Crane explains what he experienced and wrote along the way. In the end, he was left to ponder what difference it had made, whether the costs were worth it, and what he might yet teach anyone willing to listen.

NOTE

1. Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2008), p. 122.

Dr. Wm. Shane Story, a retired Army Reserve colonel, is the chief of the Contemporary Studies Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has a Ph.D. in history from Rice University and deployed to Iraq as a historian with the Coalition Land Forces Component Command in 2003 and with Multi-National Forces–Iraq in 2007–2008.

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Chief Historian's Footnote



Book Process Standard Operating Procedure, Part II

Before delving into the main topic of this Footnote, I want to recognize Mr. Ed Clarke, who has moved on from the Center of Military History (CMH) to a new position within the Army. Ed came to CMH in 2014 to be the first program manager for Career Program (CP) 61, and as such, he did all the hard work of creating CP61 from scratch. But more importantly, Ed demonstrated a high level of initiative and dedication, continually improving the program in ways both large and small. Each year he obtained a bigger pool of money to spend on training, education, and conferences for the Army's historians, archivists, and museum professionals. In one of his last efforts, he successfully gained approval for CP61 to participate in a pilot program that will allow the CP to directly spend its budget rather than going through the lengthy and difficult G–3/5/7 approval process for each and every expenditure. He will be truly missed, and his successor will be challenged meeting the standard that Ed set.

In my last Footnote, I described some of CMH's efforts to improve how it researches, writes, and produces its official history volumes. In addition to reducing the scope of books and providing graduate research assistants to help authors, one of the key aspects of the new standard operating procedure (SOP) is ensuring that projects receive high-level attention throughout their development. To that end, the chief historian, the director of Histories Directorate, the writing division chief, and the master authors (more on them later) serve as an editorial board to monitor each book from the prospectus stage through final production.

More emphasis on the prospectus will help the author and the editorial board determine what needs to be covered in the book, how much time should be spent on research, and how long the project should take. As with any task, devoting more resources to it could result in a better outcome. The Army, as an example, could always increase readiness to a higher level if it had more ammunition, more fuel, and more training time. But the nation provides a limited budget, and the Army does the best it can with what it has. For a book, the primary resource is the author's time, and the prospectus guides the amount of effort that should be applied. The detailed prospectus also helps ensure that an author will not omit desired topics or go off on tangents.

In a reversion to a practice employed in the heyday of the World War II "Green Books," the editorial board will review each chapter as it is completed and provide guidance to the author as needed. This process of ongoing group review by the board also provides feedback that will serve as the basis for personnel evaluations and help ensure that all authors are treated similarly. Tying evaluations to the deadlines established in the prospectus, and to the results of editorial board reviews, allows the system to reward those authors who meet or exceed desired benchmarks of quality and timeliness.

Some aspects of the SOP are organizational. One key objective is to minimize the distractions to authors and supervisors. To that end, we established a program manager billet in Histories Directorate to take over many of the administrative duties previously handled by historians, such as serving as the designated federal official for our advisory committee. We also are consolidating all authors under a single writing division, down from three just a few years ago. Disbanding the Vietnam group in 2016 freed up one GS–14 historian to become a master author, and we are in the process of establishing a second such position. This track permits the best writers to pursue promotion up through GS–14 without having to become a supervisor, thus allowing CMH to keep that hard-earned expertise and wealth of knowledge focused on producing books (and minimizing the risk that writers will seek a promotion outside CMH).

There are no silver bullets in the SOP, but we think that all the changes working together will have a positive impact.

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
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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

MAKING, GATHERING, WRITING, AND TELLING ARMY HISTORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

It bears repeating that our directorates at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) all play unique but interrelated roles as custodians of the Army's history. We are executing this important mission even as the events we chronicle happen before our eyes in the twenty-first century.

Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley has made it a priority to establish new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), a force structure decision with roots in the types of conflicts that have confronted the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia since the attacks of 11 September 2001. CMH is an important player in the creation of SFABs in two ways. Our Field Programs Directorate (FP) has advised leadership on the best lineages and battle honors to apply to these new units, showing FP's extensive expertise in these areas. The Institute of Heraldry moved mountains to advise on, design, and bring to production the insignia, flags, and heraldry, and all in time for the activation and deployment of these units. This team effort did not go unnoticed across the Department of the Army.

Our FP team is also helping units and command history offices across the Army to better assemble the operational record for our total force, while optimizing the command and control of our Military History Detachments (MHDs) in all three components to produce more effective enablers for this process. The HQDA Studies and Support Division, part of FP, continues to produce the annual Department of the Army Historical Summary, and responds to a myriad of requests for short studies and historical expertise across the Army.

The CMH team of research and writing historians in our Histories Directorate is about to embark on our first new official history series in almost fifteen years. This series of more than twenty volumes will eventually comprise three subseries covering Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and the Institutional Army since 11 September 2001. It will take a team effort across the Army to gather the documentary record for these volumes, develop manuscripts, and declassify them for timely publication.


Finally, our team of museum professionals in the Army Museum Enterprise is engaged daily in using our materiel culture to tell the Army's history to audiences in innovative ways. In doing so, we educate the force and foster greater connections between the Army and society. We are dependent on our field historians, MHDs, and unit and branch museums to work to keep our collection updated with equipment from current operations. The National Museum of the United States Army will feature a gallery called "Changing World," a space that will tell the story of post–11 September 2001 operations around the world, right up to Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. As an example of the synergy that can happen between field historians and our museum community, a command historian in Iraq was able to obtain a captured Islamic State in Iraq and Syria flag from the battlefield and arranged for its accession into the Army Historical Collection. That flag will be on display in the "Changing World" gallery when the museum opens in two years. Let's continue to educate, inspire, and preserve!

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NOTES

New Publication from CMH

The Center of Military History recently published *Into the Fight, April–June 1918*, by Mark E. Grotelueschen. This pamphlet is the fourth installment of the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series and covers the American Expeditionary Forces' role in countering the German Spring Offensives of March–June 1918. The arrival of the American forces on the Western Front in early 1918 coincided with a series of major German pushes intended to break through the Allied lines. The crisis of the German offensives provided an opening for multiple American divisions to enter the lines. They worked with British and French units to resist the German advances, took command of their own sectors of the front, and increasingly engaged in their own offensive operations. The narrative of this volume spans the brutal fighting at Cantigny, Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, and Vaux, where the inexperienced and untried American soldiers and marines received their first exposure to the grim realities of combat. Yet as the actions of these early campaigns show, both allies and enemies soon learned that the Americans who reached the front in the spring of 1918 were willing and able to fight with the grit and determination needed to achieve victory. This booklet is seventy-nine pages and contains numerous maps, illustrations, and a list of recommended further readings. It has been issued as CMH Pub 77–4 (paper) and is available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.



In Memoriam: Morris J. MacGregor Jr. (1931–2018)

Morris J. MacGregor Jr. was born in 1931, grew up in Silver Spring, Maryland, and was a lifelong resident of the Washington, D.C., area. He attended the Catholic University of America and completed graduate studies at Catholic University, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Paris, where he was a Fulbright scholar.

MacGregor was a career historian, first with the Joint Chiefs of Staff History Office from 1960 to 1966 and with the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) from 1966 to 1991. While at CMH, he served as Director of Special Collections and Contracts and as Acting Chief Historian. His book *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965* was published by CMH in 1981, and he received a commendation from then-Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. He later coauthored *Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution,* published in 1987, and *United States Army in World War II: Reader's Guide,* published in 1992.

MacGregor also authored several works outside CMH, including *Blacks in the U.S. Armed Forces* (1977); *A Parish for the Federal City: St. Patrick's in Washington* (1994); *The Emergence of a Black Catholic Community* (1999); and *Steadfast in the Faith: The Life of Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle* (2006).

A lifelong Catholic, MacGregor was the coeditor of the quarterly publication of the Catholic Historical Society of Washington. He passed away on 14 April 2018 of complications from a stroke. He is survived by a sister, brother, and numerous relatives and friends.



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher Rein is a historian with the Combat Studies Institute, Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas, where his dissertation and first book, *The North African Air Campaign* (Lawrence, Kans., 2012), argued for an operational use of airpower rather than strategic pursuits that have dominated the U.S. Air Force for most of its history. His second book, *Alabamians in Blue*, scheduled for release in 2019, examines the linkages between environmental history and southern dissenters in northern Alabama during the Civil War. He has served as an associate professor of history and the Deputy for Military History at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and as an associate professor at the Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama, where he directed the Modern Airpower course and instructed courses on leadership.




Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall while commanding the II Corps in North Africa, c. 1942–1943

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Fredendall's FAILURE

A Reexamination of the II Corps at the Battle of Kasserine Pass



BY CHRISTOPHER REIN

The Battle of Kasserine Pass has become legendary in American military circles, especially among proponents of peacetime preparedness in the post–World War II Army. In its first test against the Germans, the Army endured a significant setback, suffering hundreds of casualties and losing thousands of men captured in a German counterattack engineered by the vaunted Desert Fox himself, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The episode serves both progressive narratives, of an Army that picked itself up off the mat and went on to vanquish its opponent, as well as advocates of greater peacetime preparedness and training, to avoid repeats in future wars, where the first battle might be the only battle.[1] It also serves to reinforce the Army's emphasis on leadership, as one man, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, has suffered the lion's share of the blame for the reverses, fitting neatly within a service narrative that prizes heroic combat leadership as an arbiter of battle. Focusing on American failure at Kasserine also helps the star of Fredendall's replacement, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., shine brighter by comparison, Patton's principal biographer, Martin Blumenson, has become Kasserine's preeminent chronicler. But Kasserine defies easy explanation. Extenuating factors degraded the II Corps' performance in the battle and deserve detailed analysis to examine how organizations function in successful operations and how leaders handle the many challenges faced—not least among them personnel management—when things do not go according to plan.

Background: The II Corps

The U.S. Army II Corps' history dates back to the First World War when the corps was part of the British Third Army in the "Hundred Days" offensive that culminated in the breach of the German Hindenburg Line. This joint service is represented on the corps' insignia, an American eagle and a British lion flanking a roman numeral "II."

The II Corps, after serving as a National Guard headquarters during the interwar years, was reactivated by the

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Dwight D. Eisenhower, shown here as a four-star general, stops for a noontime mess during an inspection tour in Tunisia in 1943.

U.S. Army






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Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, c. 1942

War Department at Fort Jay in New York Harbor in August 1940. The corps' mission was commanding the divisions being mobilized to raise the Army's level of preparedness in light of the conflict then raging in Europe. The unit participated in the Carolina maneuvers in the fall of 1941, "during which the Corps, by now under command of [Maj. Gen.] Lloyd R. Fredendall, gained a reputation for able staff planning."[2] During the maneuvers, Fredendall faced an almost identical scenario as the one the Allies would later see in Tunisia: a large, infantry-heavy army (of which Fredendall was a part) advancing against a smaller but more heavily mechanized and therefore more agile foe, with his notional opposition then provided by the same 1st Armored Division later assigned to his command.

By virtue of its proximity to ports of embarkation, planners selected the II Corps, now under the command of Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, to be the first corps headquarters shipped overseas to command the American divisions slated for the buildup in the United Kingdom in preparation for the eventual cross-channel attack onto the European continent. Fredendall, disappointed not to be going overseas, took command of the newly formed XI Corps in Chicago. Realizing how disappointed Fredendall was, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, wrote to him explaining that the II Corps was destined for a special project which Clark had been instrumental in planning.[3] Clark ascended to become the deputy to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the North African Theater of Operations; Marshall objected to Clark's projected replacement, Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, because the II Corps commander would lead the invasion forces destined for Oran, Morocco. Marshall offered Eisenhower the services of "practically anyone you name" from among the corps commanders currently in the states: Maj. Gens. William H. Simpson, Courtney H. Hodges, John P. Lucas, and Fredendall. From that list, Eisenhower selected Fredendall. It has been suggested that Marshall and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, then commanding the

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Army Ground Forces, pushed Fredendall on Eisenhower. But Fredendall's reputation, largely gained in training the 4th Infantry Division and in corps command in the Carolina maneuvers, likely tipped the scales.[4]

In the Second World War, the strength of the bond that formed between the British and their II Corps allies would be sorely tested when General Fredendall suffered a humiliating defeat that, after the war, he blamed on the commander of the British First Army, Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. N. Anderson. According to Fredendall, Anderson had micromanaged II Corps and repeatedly divided it into so many parts and dispersed it so widely that it was incapable of action, especially when facing the strong German counterattack at Kasserine.[5] After the war, even the British official history agreed, admitting that Fredendall's "freedom to act was in many ways restricted by 1st Army [*sic*]."[6]

Indeed, if there is anything to be learned about corps command and leadership from the II Corps, it is in managing relationships with senior and subordinate commanders. In addition to the tension between the corps and army commanders, serious rifts also developed between division and corps commanders, most notably between Fredendall and Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, who commanded the 1st Armored Division. The dispute was mostly over the way Fredendall, at Anderson's direction, had dispersed and detached Ward's command, leaving him little more to command than a division headquarters with support units. This friction was exacerbated by supposedly neutral observers sent by Eisenhower, third parties who were themselves ambitious and anxious for a combat command. This led to an almost complete breakdown within II Corps and the eventual relief of both Fredendall and Ward.

Operation Torch

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved the Operation Torch landings in North Africa for November 1942, the II Corps, as the only corps headquarters then in the United Kingdom, became the planning organization for one of the three landings, designated the Center Task Force and destined for Oran. General Patton's Western Task Force sailed directly from the states for Morocco, while a British headquarters led the Eastern Task Force at Algiers.

At the same time, the II Corps underwent a series of levies on its personnel, with staff officers siphoned off to man Eisenhower's Allied Force headquarters, including General Clark. As one historian of early mobilization efforts put it, "Expansion on such a scale entailed the cannibalization of the field-ready armies, corps, and divisions so laboriously built up in the course of the 1941 training and maneuvers program."[7]

As a result, the II Corps staff had to be rebuilt under the new commander, General Fredendall, who reported less than a month before the landings. Most of the staff replacements were new and all were inexperienced. The chief of staff, Col. John A. Dabney, was a 1926 graduate of the University of Kentucky Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and the G–3, Col. Robert A. Hewitt, was a 1932 graduate of West Point. The G–2, Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, also a West Point graduate, spent most of the interwar period as a reservist, and Fredendall's aide, Capt. James R. Webb, was a civilian the summer before. The staff became known as "Fredendall's kindergarten," and the corps commander himself remarked, "By God, I am going to war surrounded by children!"[8] Despite this, Fredendall took over an advanced planning effort, and successfully directed the corps headquarters in the landings, functioning as an embarked Task Force headquarters aboard the command ship HMS *Largs*.

Center Task Force's objective was the city of Oran, which was defended by the Vichy French garrison. Two airfields just beyond the city, La Senia and Tafraoui, were scheduled for assault by an airborne battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 509th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, flying directly from the United Kingdom under the command of Lt. Col. Edson O. Raff. The airborne landings largely miscarried, due to the aircraft being scattered enroute and confusion over whether a "peace plan" (no French resistance, air-landed on the airfield) or "war plan" (active resistance, combat drop over the airfield)

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General Montgomery watches his tanks on the move during Operation TORCH in North Africa, November 1942.



U.S. Army

Field Marshal Rommel (*third from left*) and members of his staff, c. 1943

was in force. The amphibious landings, a classic double envelopment, featured deployments by a portion of Combat Command Bravo (CCB) of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division's 26th Infantry Regiment at Cape Figalo and Les Andalouses, respectively, west of Oran, and the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments of the 1st Infantry Division, backed by the remainder of CCB at Arzew, east of Oran. After establishing themselves ashore, both elements marched inland and assaulted the city from the rear. Despite some early setbacks, the landings achieved their objectives by the third day, enabling Fredendall and his staff to land and enter the city, with Fredendall riding in one of the first tanks. For the next two months the II Corps would command a rear area, feeding corps units into the fighting farther east in Tunisia and administering the Allied-controlled territory on behalf of the French.

Initially, American forces, especially those under General Patton in Morocco, were to watch Spanish Morocco and prepare to respond to any attempts to close the Strait of Gibraltar by Spain's ostensibly neutral, but in reality pro-Fascist, leader Francisco Franco, which would cripple the Allied logistic situation. But by early January, as more American units joined the fighting farther east in Tunisia, Eisenhower elected to send a corps headquarters forward to direct the growing number of American units assigned there. In Eisenhower's memoirs, he suggested that Patton would have been his first choice but, because most of the units had initially belonged to the II Corps and because Fredendall's staff was then over a thousand miles closer to the front than Patton's, the II Corps won the job. Patton was busy training U.S. units and planning for what would become the Operation HUSKY landings in Sicily—undertaken less than two months after the end of combat operations in Tunisia—but was bitter at being passed over for the combat command.[9]

TUNISIA

Fredendall established his corps headquarters in a narrow canyon near the Algeria-Tunisia border, in what became known as "Speedy Valley" after the corps' radio call sign. In an effort to protect against frequent air attacks, Fredendall ordered two companies of engineers to blast tunnels deep into the canyon walls, which later led to charges that Fredendall lacked courage. Fredendall's aide, Captain Webb, offered a different interpretation, suggesting that Fredendall ordered the tunneling primarily to keep idle engineers busy, but that the new quarters would provide additional protection against the elements. The corps staff suffered terribly in poorly heated tents while

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
blasting was underway, with several, including Webb, contracting serious and debilitating illnesses during the coldest months of the year. American forces were operating at the end of a logistical shoestring, and quartermasters had shipped few winter supplies to counter the chilly days and snowy nights high in the Atlas Mountains, to what they assumed was a warm desert in Africa. Fredendall began rotating staff members through an advanced headquarters further south in Gafsa, in a broad valley reaching to the edge of the Sahara, in part to give his staff an opportunity to "thaw out" from the chill encountered in Speedy Valley.

The II Corps mission was to protect the right flank of the British First Army's line, facing the German and Italian forces defending Tunisia. At the same time as the TORCH landings, General Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army had defeated Field Marshal Rommel's forces at the Battle of El Alamein, beginning a three-month-long pursuit that culminated in the capture of Tripoli in January 1943. The II Corps was to link up with the Eighth Army when it arrived on the Libya-Tunisia frontier and provide flank protection, but Fredendall hoped for a more active role, planning a series of probes in preparation for what he hoped would be a larger-scale offensive that would drive through to the coast, preventing Rommel from uniting with the Axis forces farther north in Tunisia. Eisenhower presented the plan, named Operation SATIN, at the Casablanca conference in January, but the combined chiefs of staff felt it was too ambitious and that the II Corps lacked the strength to hold what would be an exposed salient jutting into Axis lines.

As a result, the corps assumed a defensive mission with units widely scattered across a broad front. The Germans, demonstrating the advantages of an active defense, counterattacked at the weakest sector of the Allied lines, where a poorly equipped French corps linked the main British forces in the north with the II Corps in the south. As a result of Allied advances at both Faid and Fondouk Pass in late January, General Anderson detached elements of the II Corps, including CCB of the 1st Armored Division to support the French and placed a second unit, Combat Command Romeo, in reserve to clear up any penetrations. By early February the II Corps controlled only two battalions of the 168th Infantry of the 34th Infantry Division as Anderson placed the other two regiments and the division headquarters in the French sector, along with Combat Command Alpha (CCA) of the 1st Armored Division and a French Division. All along the Allied line General Anderson had mixed units by type and nationality, complicating logistics and preventing the concentration of either a powerful striking force or, as Eisenhower particularly desired, a mobile reserve.

General Ward, in particular, resented having two-thirds of his division taken from him and having the defensive positions for the remainder dictated to him by corps headquarters. In a similar manner, General Anderson directed that two battalions of the 168th Infantry, of Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder's 34th Infantry Division, be posted on isolated hills in the rear of Faid Pass where they would be able to defend against weak German patrols. However, they were also at risk of being cut off and surrounded in the event of a strong thrust through the pass.[10] Both Ward and Ryder later blamed Fredendall for the dismemberment of their divisions, as the order came down bearing his name. At the very least, they felt he was guilty of insufficiently protesting the action to Anderson and, if necessary, the American theater commander. However, for Fredendall, the first choice risked precipitating another British-American row, about which Eisenhower had already counseled him. The latter required jumping the chain of command, which was also unlikely to bring about harmonious relations between the British and American commanders.

British First Army commander General Anderson (*left*) and Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley in Tunisia, c. 1943



U.S. Army

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The Battle of Kasserine Pass

Unfortunately for the men of the 34th Infantry Division, their worst fears were confirmed when a German armored thrust broke through the Faid Pass on the morning of 14 February, surrounding the isolated positions that were too far apart for mutual support and brushing aside the armored units intended to link them together. Fredendall immediately ordered a counterattack to clear up the situation but, with only a tank battalion under his direct control, General Ward could do little against elements of two battle-experienced German armored divisions that outnumbered him two-to-one. Fredendall also asked for the release of Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinette's experienced CCB from the British First Army but received only one battalion of tanks from General Anderson, who remained convinced that the German attack through the Faid Pass was only a diversion and that the main attack would come farther north in the French or British sectors.

Fredendall's staff had correctly divined the Germans' intentions—combining intelligence gleaned from aerial reconnaissance and radio intercepts—to place the bulk of the enemy armor opposite the II Corps. Unfortunately, Colonel Dickson, the II Corps G–2, had been unable to convince Anderson of the likelihood of this scenario during a lengthy meeting at the II Corps headquarters on 13 February.[11] Dickson's forceful arguments had no effect on Anderson, who emerged from their meeting saying, "Well, young man, at least I can't shake you," but later told Fredendall, "You have an alarmist and a pessimist for a G–2."[12] Anderson and Eisenhower both tended to rely excessively on Ultra intercepts, which had revealed an earlier plan for an attack in the north but had been superseded by events.[13] After the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower asked for a replacement for his British intelligence chief, Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, belatedly realizing that he should have placed greater trust in estimates from Fredendall's young but capable staff.

After meeting with Anderson and Eisenhower at the II Corps headquarters on the evening of 13 February, Fredendall left for Gafsa arriving around 0100 on 14 February. Rommel's twin thrust was set to jump off in just a few hours; the first through the more distant Faid Pass, blocked by elements of the 34th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division sufficient to delay the Axis in that sector, and the second on Gafsa, the more critical area. As reports came in, including one confirming the German order of battle opposing him, Fredendall ordered the remainder of CCA, which had been blocking the road at Gafsa, to rejoin its parent command farther north. Without sufficient forces, Gafsa and the vital airfields at Thelepte would have to be abandoned, initiating a long overdue contraction of the II Corps' overextended front.

Having apprised Anderson of his estimate of the situation, Fredendall had no choice but to continue to defend his exposed position with the limited troops available. Rather than brood in his headquarters throughout the battle, as some historians have implied, Fredendall made several trips to the front. His first visit was on the night of 14 February to Gafsa in the south, the site of the main German attack, and to the defensive line in front of vital Allied airfields at Thelepte. The loss of Gafsa would open a shortcut to the Allied supply dumps at Tebessa through Bou Chebka, then held only by a French division and a few American Rangers. While the penetrations at Faid and Kasserine would attract the most attention, due to the heavy American losses there, the back door to Tebessa remained a critical vulnerability in the Allied defenses, and—largely as a result of his personal reconnaissance in that sector—Fredendall wisely gambled on leaving it only lightly defended in order to funnel reinforcements into the battles further east. After the loss of Gafsa and Thelepte, Fredendall actually shifted his headquarters forward, from Speedy Valley to an old school at Le Kouif, centrally located to the fighting along the contracting front. This relocation facilitated another visit to the threatened area behind Kasserine, where Fredendall personally placed General Robinette's CCB in the positions from which it finally halted the German drive.[14]


Upon arriving back at Speedy Valley and hearing of the 1st Armored Division's repulse at Faid, Fredendall lobbied Anderson for the return of CCB to the 1st Armored so that Ward could make a stronger counterattack the next day and relieve the now isolated battalions of the 34th Infantry Division. Anderson refused, but did release one tank battalion, which would only be enough to replace Ward's losses thus far and was unlikely to rescue the situation. In fact, the piecemealing of units was a significant factor in the mismanagement of the entire Kasserine battle defeat and one of the principal lessons learned. The preeminent historian of Kasserine, Blumenson, pointed out that, in subsequent battles, "commanders decided to employ units as units instead of parceling them out in small segments," and future corps commanders, including Patton and Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, with the theater commander's support, established that "the policy of [the] II Corps was to keep the division concentrated."[15]

Fredendall's aide, Captain Webb later related, "There was no sleep in Speedy Valley that night. Staff officers were going and coming in jeeps, checking personally on troop movements and visiting the command posts of the troops in position." With two widely dispersed threatened sectors, Fredendall remained in his central position to direct the withdrawal in the south. General Anderson ordered the withdrawal to take place over two nights, but Fredendall wisely amended it to just one given the speed of the German force's advance and the need to counter the attacks to the east. Webb continued, "Their chiefs, under the CG's direction, were planning a counterattack for the relief of the surrounded battalions. It was

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a forlorn hope, but along with the battalion of tanks from CCB had come an Army directive to restore the situation, so Corps was going to make the attempt."[16]

Unfortunately, the second attack by the 1st Armored Division was equally disastrous, resulting in the wrecking of the division and the loss of Sbeïtla, the main town between Faid and Kasserine Passes. The defeat also opened the road west to Tebessa and north to Sbiba, the right flank of the French sector, then held by elements of the 1st Infantry Division and new British reinforcements belatedly rushed south. As the Army's official history noted, "With the loss of Sbeïtla, the II Corps had experienced the consequences of an overextended defense and a successful concentration of enemy force."[17] The II Corps began hastily organizing a defense of Kasserine Pass but had only the shattered remnants of 1st Armored Division, plus one battalion of the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of engineers. Fredendall rushed this stopgap force into the breach. Anderson also swung into action, pushing reinforcements to both Sbiba and Thala in the north. Fredendall's request for reinforcements also shook loose the divisional artillery of the 9th Infantry Division, then far to the rear in Algeria, which would have a decisive impact on the defense of Thala. However, at Kasserine there were simply too few Americans to hold the pass. The engineers and 1st Infantry Division troops, named "Stark Force," successfully delayed the Germans for two days at the pass, inflicting casualties and slowing the enemy's timetable. Though Rommel's forces would eventually push through the pass on the morning of 20 February, almost a full week had elapsed since the beginning of the offensive. The II Corps had covered the vital approaches into the Army's rear and bought time for reinforcements to reach the threatened area.



Halting the Breakthrough

By 19 February, "General Fredendall's corps was split into three forces along the Western Dorsal with a fourth in a supporting position on the south flank and a fifth being brought into position during the following night."[18] As the Germans broke through, the II Corps organized another defensive line at Djebel Hamra, with the remnants of the force from the pass stiffened by General Robinette's CCB. British forces backed by American artillery met the brunt of the thrust outside Thala and, despite heavy losses and being pushed back almost to the town itself, held the line there. Rommel was beginning to reach his culminating point and lacked the combat power to continue the offensive. In addition, Montgomery's lead elements were closing up to Rommel's blocking position in southern Tunisia, requiring the return of his mobile elements there. Believing he had achieved his objective of a spoiling attack that bought space and time in his rear area but frustrated that he was unable to inflict a larger defeat on the Allies, Rommel pulled back through the pass. The II Corps had rolled with the punch, suffering heavy casualties in the opening phases due to the piecemeal commitment of its assigned units and the overwhelming enemy force thrown against it. But, the corps had also prevented a larger disaster, protecting the more important airfields and supply base at Tebessa and preventing Rommel from rolling up the Allied lines to the north.

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Most of the lost territory had been recovered by the end of the month, and the Allied strategic situation was none the worse for wear.

AFTERMATH

Unfortunately for Fredendall, his corps had lost substantial numbers of men and materiel and temporarily given up important jumping-off positions. Before the battle was over the Allied command began searching for a place to lay the blame and for someone to accept accountability. General Anderson, the overall commander, had left the corps in an exposed position and ignored accurate intelligence that might have allowed it to pull back to more defensible positions with fewer losses. But Eisenhower was straining to establish positive relations between the coalition partners, and an American theater commander sacking a British army commander was unlikely to further those goals. Eisenhower did bring, in a prearranged move, General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander from Egypt and put him in command of the 18th Army Group, containing Anderson's First Army and Montgomery's Eighth Army. This removed the campaign from Anderson's direct control and, although he was allowed to finish out the battle in Tunisia, he never again received an important field command.

Within the II Corps, Fredendall's poor working relationships with his subordinates had consequences. General Ward, commanding the 1st Armored Division, had watched the Germans destroy his division piece by piece. Replacement M4 Sherman tanks arrived daily, but the veteran crews were gone. The losses undoubtedly had an effect on Ward, and Fredendall considered relieving him. Cabling Eisenhower on the evening of 19 February, he wrote, "Ward appears tired out and worried and has informed me that to bring new tanks in would be the same as turning them over to the Germans."[19] While Ward's assessment may have been accurate, especially if the corps and army continued to commit his division piecemeal, his defeatism did not sit well with Fredendall. The message continued, "Under these circumstances do not think he should continue in command although he has done the best he could. Need someone with two fists immediately. Suggest Truscott."[20] Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., who had commanded one of the task forces under Patton in Morocco, was then serving as commander of Eisenhower's forward command post at Constantine, Algeria. He was fully informed of the course of the battle and seemed disposed to commanding the 1st Armored Division.



A column of captured U.S. soldiers in Tunisia in early 1943

Eisenhower had other ideas. Maj. Gen. Ernest M. Harmon, who graduated two years behind Eisenhower at West Point and commanded the 2d Armored Division in Morocco, was widely recognized as an expert on armored warfare. Eisenhower summoned him and, according to Harmon, told him to report to the II Corps headquarters where, based on his assessment of the situation, he was to relieve either Ward or Fredendall. Harmon responded, "Well, make up your mind, Ike. I can't do both!"[21] Despite chiding his subordinates for "spending too much time in their headquarters and not having sufficient situational awareness of what was transpiring at the front," Eisenhower, in this case, was apparently guilty of the same offense. Although reluctant to interfere in his British Army commander's force dispositions (he did later tell General Marshall that they "were not completely in accord with my instructions"), he was about to send a replacement officer to relieve either a division or corps commander, only he was unsure which.[22] Harmon arrived after Fredendall had already positioned the units that would halt the enemy offensive, but the corps commander did hand him control of one of the two widely dispersed blocking forces the corps controlled, freeing Fredendall to monitor events on the opposite flank. Harmon eventually recommended Fredendall's relief, but when Eisenhower offered

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General Patton watches American tanks advancing against Axis forces in Tunisia, 1943.

General Bradley, shown here shortly before arriving in North Africa, c. 1942



Harmon the job he demurred, realizing that it would be unethical to take the job of a man whose firing he had just recommended. On 6 March 1943, newly promoted Lt. Gen. George Patton succeeded Fredendall as the commander of the II Corps. When Patton finally decided to relieve Ward a month later, Harmon received command of the 1st Armored Division, then the only American armored division in action against the Germans.

During the pursuit phase of the battle, Eisenhower also sent General Bradley to visit the II Corps. Bradley had flown directly from northwest Florida—where his 28th Infantry Division had been undergoing amphibious training on the Gulf of Mexico's shores at Camp Gordon Johnston—with only a brief stopover in Washington, D.C., to get Marshall's appraisal of the situation. Bradley's assessment of Fredendall's leadership was disparaging. In *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (New York, 1983), Bradley relayed General Truscott's description of Fredendall as,

> Small in stature, loud and rough in speech, he was outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. He was inclined to jump at conclusions which were not always well founded. He rarely left his command post for personal reconnaissances and visits yet he was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he was. General Fredendall had no confidence in the French, no liking for the British in general and General Anderson in particular, and little more for some of his own subordinate commanders.[23]


Bradley added to Truscott's estimate, "His 'command post' was an embarrassment to every American soldier: a deep underground shelter dug or blasted by two hundred engineers in an almost inaccessible canyon far to the rear, near Tebessa. It gave the impression that, for all his bombast and bravado, Fredendall was lacking in personal courage."[24]

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Truscott's assessment, due to his success during the war and long influence after, has been repeated almost verbatim by successive historians of Kasserine. Yet each of these charges, when viewed from Fredendall's perspective, has a logical explanation. Commanders frequently have to make decisions based on incomplete information. Given the dispersed nature of his units, he could not always wait for perfect information before acting. In the balance, his management of the battle was sound, as he correctly redeployed units to keep Rommel away from his biggest prize. His front stretched thin, limited personal reconnaissance, abysmal road network and undependable transportation, coupled with a strained communications network over unreliable radios, meant that trips to the extreme ends of his lines could put him out of touch with other parts of the battle for hours. Yet, he did make two personal reconnaissance missions to the front during the most critical phases of the battle, once at the opening to Gafsa and again at the conclusion to Djebel Hamra and Thala. He was correct to place no confidence in the demoralized and underequipped French, and Anderson's mismanagement, both in refusing to permit a tactical withdrawal and in withholding the units Fredendall needed to defend the overstretched front, was a contributing factor in the battle. Fredendall's row with Ward has acquired legendary status, but Patton himself fired Ward a month after taking command, suggesting that the disagreements between the two during the battle were not entirely Fredendall's fault. And, once his lines shifted, Fredendall abandoned his "underground bunker," just a few days into the battle and advanced his command post forward to a more central location.

Why would Bradley feel it necessary to engage in character assassination decades after the battle? Further evidence comes from Bradley's own memoir, where he reports that,

> From Constantine, [Maj. Gen. Walter] Bedell Smith, my aides and I jeeped to Fredendall's new II Corps headquarters at Djebel Kouif, about fifteen miles north of Tebessa. It was freezing cold in Tunisia, [the original justification for the underground headquarters] but Fredendall's reception was colder than the weather. He lived in a comfortable home and, by military custom, should have invited me to share it. Instead, I was banished to a shabby windowless "hotel" with no amenities, quarters unsuitable even for a second lieutenant."[25]



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A view of Bizerte Harbor, c. 1942–1943

Bradley would have been wise to consider the "quarters" most second lieutenants then involved in the battle were inhabiting—a shallow, mud-filled hole, if they had time to scrape one out. Fredendall probably would not want a "spy," which Bradley freely admitted he was, snooping around his headquarters and certainly not sharing his quarters, denying him any sort of privacy. Before even leaving for Tunisia, Bradley was aware that "my mission did not endear me to the Commander of [the] II Corps," as Bradley would be "regarded as an odious spy for Ike, carrying tales outside the chain of command. Any suggested corrections from a rank newcomer from an exalted rear-echelon headquarters would be bitterly resented and probably ignored or laughed at behind my back."[26]

While in Tunisia, Bradley also visited the 1st Armored Division, commanded by "Orlando Ward, my friend from West Point and my former boss on Marshall's secretariat," and shared notes with "my War College classmate" General Harmon, and "an old friend, [Maj. Gen.] Terry de la Mesa Allen [also a West Point graduate]," whom Bradley also found it necessary to relieve months later in Sicily while Allen was still commanding the 1st Infantry Division. On 5 March, when Eisenhower came to visit the II Corps to relieve Fredendall, Bradley was absent, visiting Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy's 9th Infantry Division and alleged that Fredendall, "discourteously had not informed me" of Eisenhower's visit. As a result, "after my useless two-hour jeep ride, I arrived back

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at II Corps frozen to the marrow."[27] Whether Fredendall's slight was real or perceived, it did not further endear him to Bradley. In a private conversation with Eisenhower, during which Bradley recommended Fredendall's relief, Bradley learned that he was to become the II Corps' deputy commander under Patton but would be promoted to corps command after a short time to free Patton up to resume his planning for Sicily. In essence, Bradley had just done what Harmon refused to do—recommend the relief of an officer so that he could move up and assume that position.

Fredendall's Relief

After ultimately deciding not to relieve Ward, Fredendall next found his head on the chopping block. Immediately after the battle, Eisenhower wired Fredendall, "This afternoon I sent you a telegram expressing my complete confidence in your leadership. I meant every word of it but we must not blind ourselves to the serious defects that exist in our training, and perhaps in certain instances, in our organization," though Eisenhower did admit that "I realize that no American division has yet had an opportunity to fight as a complete unit." A week later, Eisenhower reiterated, "There is no question at all in my mind of you having proved your right to command a separate and fairly large American force on the battlefield."[28] This could have just been an example of Eisenhower trying to remain positive and offer encouragement to a subordinate, but it masked an underlying movement to engineer Fredendall's relief. Reports began trickling in, primarily from "ministers without portfolios," including Truscott and Harmon, of affairs at the II Corps headquarters. Truscott, for his part, reported discord between Fredendall and Anderson and between Fredendall and Ward, saying, "Between General Fredendall and General Ward there developed an antipathy most unusual in my experience. General Ward came to believe that General Fredendall knew nothing about the employment of armor and was motivated by personal animus in disregarding the division commander and his recommendations. General Fredendall, on the other hand, thought General Ward was incompetent and personally disloyal to him."[29] In the end, the inability to manage this personality conflict would cost both men their jobs.

On 4 March, Truscott spent the day with Eisenhower and his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, discussing the II Corps and the upcoming campaign. Truscott later recalled that, "Asked for an opinion, I replied that General Fredendall had lost the confidence of his subordinates and that I did not believe the Corps would ever fight well under his command. I also believed that General Fredendall disliked and distrusted the British and would never get on well under British command. I recommended that General Eisenhower assign General Patton to the command."[30] That day, Eisenhower wired Marshall, "In the past two days I have developed grave doubts about Fredendall in his future role . . . Fredendall is a good fighter, energetic and self-confident and I have encouraged him to the limit by the fullest expressions of confidence in his work. His difficulty is in handling personnel in which field he is in constant trouble."[31] Upon hearing further doubts from both Generals Alexander and Harmon, Eisenhower decided to make the change, not due to Fredendall's performance in the last battle, but more from the way the battle had fractured relationships up and down the chain of command, destroying trust within the corps and threatening its utility in the important battles to come. The next day, 5 March, Patton replaced Fredendall in command of the II Corps and the following month, when Patton took charge of the Seventh Army for the invasion of Sicily, he rewarded Truscott by assigning him command of 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to lead that assault.

Patton marked his assumption of command with a series of orders that the troops described as "chickenshit"—wearing ties with combat uniforms and $25 fines for not wearing a helmet—a direct shot at Fredendall, who had been photographed during the battle wearing a knit "jeep cap" at his frosty headquarters. Patton also cleaned house on the II Corps staff. Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, who would later command the 4th Armored Division under Patton in the Battle of the Bulge, replaced Colonel Dabney as chief of staff while Col. Kent C. Lambert temporarily took the G–3 job from Colonel Hewitt. Hewitt got his old job back a month later when Lambert took command of CCA in the 2d Armored Division. Colonel Dickson, saved by his astute judgment in forecasting the Axis attack, kept his G–2 post after several weeks of close supervision.

Not all of the changes were positive, though. After a period of good cooperation between the II Corps and the XII Air Support Command, which processed timely aerial reconnaissance requests for Dickson and thus enabling more accurate intelligence assessments, the air-ground relationship soured under Patton's leadership. According to Dickson, under Fredendall, the XII Air Support Command commander "[Brigadier] General Paul L. Williams and his staff lived with us and the most cordial relations had been maintained," but under Patton, the relationship deteriorated to the point that the two headquarters separated, which ran counter to the best practices at the time. Dickson reported, "it was more difficult for me to request our aerial photography and reconnaissance by telephone rather than to run next door with an overlay of the situation map. G–3, too, was getting even less results with his air support requests."[32] The relationship declined to the point that Patton and Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, commanding the Northwest African Tactical Air Force, eventually had an ugly exchange in their public situation reports, where Patton claimed he had not received any air support and Coningham replied by suggesting that the II Corps was not "battleworthy," resulting in embarrassment to both commands and frustrating Eisenhower's efforts at seamless Allied cooperation.

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The II Corps and the Victory in Tunisia

The biggest changes to the II Corps came in the way it was organized and how it fought. Gone were the days of piecemeal deployments along the front. With the threat of Spanish intervention now firmly in the rearview, units in Morocco and Algeria became available. The 9th Infantry Division's three infantry regiments followed its divisional artillery into the line, as did the remainder of 34th Infantry Division. The 34th now had the unenviable task of rebuilding its only combat-experienced infantry regiment, reduced in the battle to a single battalion, while "preparing the other two regiments for battle, a liability that would show in the coming campaign. The corps finally assembled with full divisions—both the 1st Infantry and the 1st Armored Divisions, the units credited with successfully repelling Rommel's final assault—now rebuilt with new equipment and intensive training of raw replacements by the experienced troops. With three full infantry divisions and one armored, the II Corps was now stronger than most U.S. corps would be for the duration of the war. In addition to its full complement, the corps also received a defensive front reduced in size with secure flanks and an offensive mission—driving forward toward the sea to threaten the Germans' vulnerable supply lines in their rear—at the same time Montgomery's Eighth Army opened an attack on the enemy's front. Despite a poor showing by the 34th Infantry Division at El Guettar, the corps performed well in March, rehabilitating itself sufficiently to free Patton to return to the Seventh Army and resume the planning for Operation Husky. This allowed his deputy corps commander, General Bradley, to take his turn at the wheel.

The attack in southern Tunisia saw the II Corps "elbowed out" of the Allied line. In order to be in on the final assault, Bradley successfully lobbied for a change of front, shifting the corps north to the extreme left of the Allied line. This put the corps up against difficult terrain and formidable defenses guarding the port of Bizerte, Tunisia's second-largest city after Tunis, but with a secure flank on the Mediterranean side. The II Corps again had four full divisions and Bradley, an infantry specialist, charged his three infantry divisions with opening the Axis defenses so that he could commit his armor in a breakthrough. Initially, German defenders stymied all three infantry divisions, resulting in Bradley calling a conference of his division commanders. Here, according to Colonel Dickson, Bradley's deft touch in managing his subordinates was on full display:

> Bradley opened the conclave with a statement that we were behind schedule, losing our drive and sitting down. He asked what the division commanders proposed to do about it. He called on Generals Harmon (1st AD), Allen (1st ID), Ryder (34th ID) and Eddy (9th ID) in turn to state their plans. The natural rivalry between units took hold and each speaker tried to be bolder and more aggressive than his predecessor. Bradley dismissed them saying, "Gentlemen, I expect each of you to do exactly what you have said here."[33]



National Archives

German prisoners of war shown after their surrender to American troops at the close of the Tunisian campaign, May 1943

Within two weeks, American forces had broken through and captured Bizerte, surprising the British, who took the main prize of Tunis. Over 200,000 Axis prisoners went into massive Allied prisoner-of-war staging areas, depriving the enemy of much needed manpower and inflicting a serious psychological blow to the Axis cause. Two months later, the II Corps, still under Bradley's command, fought its way across Sicily, eventually jumping to the Italian mainland and closing the war at the foot of the Alps in the Po Valley.

General Marshall recalled Fredendall home to command the Second Army, a stateside training billet that would benefit from the general's reputation as a skilled instructor and the combat experience he had acquired in North Africa; he would never again hold a combat command. In the interest of promoting positive Allied relations and winning the war, Fredendall held his tongue until after his retirement in 1946. But two years later, unhappy with how he had become as-

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sociated with the debacle at Kasserine, he wrote an article for the *Chicago Tribune* hoping to clear his name by pinning most of the blame on General Kenneth Anderson. "Gen. Anderson scattered my command from hell to breakfast over my 150-mile front. By direct orders he placed every one of my units, even down to the battalions and companies. He never permitted me to collect my armor into a powerful mobile striking force."[34]

The newspaper wrote Eisenhower asking him for his thoughts but he declined to comment, aware of the futility of refighting old battles. The episode perhaps speaks to Fredendall's character and his noted inability to establish positive working relationships. Despite retiring as a lieutenant general and having contributed to the ultimate Allied victory by training numerous combat divisions rotated through Second Army, he insisted on clearing his name and fighting the "mem-wars." Ward and Allen, his principal subordinates, recovered from their reliefs to command units late in the war—Ward with the 20th Armored Division and Allen with the "Timberwolves" of the 104th Infantry Division. Truscott and Harmon went on to successful corps command, while Patton, Bradley, and Clark all led armies in combat.

ANALYSIS

Of the four men who commanded the II Corps in the ten months between July 1942, when serious planning for Operation TORCH began, and May 1943, when the Axis surrender formally concluded the North African campaign, Fredendall led the corps the longest. He assumed command just over a month before the TORCH landings in October 1942 and relinquished command to Patton after the Kasserine battle in March 1943. While Clark, Patton, and Bradley were all forceful personalities who enjoyed significant battlefield success throughout the war, Fredendall, despite effectively directing the landings at Oran, became tied to the failures at Kasserine, and his career along with the II Corps' reputation suffered accordingly.

Could one man alone be responsible for the failures of an organization that performed well in the early stages of, as well as after, his tenure in command? Certainly the U.S. Army, with its institutional focus on leadership as the arbiter of success and failure in battle, was inclined to think so. Certain internal Army biases might have been at play as well. Eisenhower, Bradley, Clark, and Patton all graduated from West Point; Fredendall failed out after his freshman year because of academic issues, yet he was later admitted to Massachusetts Institute of Technology, although he never graduated. Pinning the defeat at Kasserine solely on Fredendall, while highlighting the critical importance of combat leadership, also made it easy to gloss over other service failings, such as inadequate doctrine, inferior equipment, and insufficient training. Organizationally, purging Fredendall and some of his staff also made it easier to rehabilitate the vitally important corps, the only one in action against the European Axis at that time. While Fredendall's shortcomings as a commander—from poor working relationships with superiors and subordinates, to charges of a lack of personal courage—are apparently well-documented, there were other factors that contributed to the II Corps losses at Kasserine. Certainly Fredendall's punishment, being "kicked upstairs" and given a third star, suggests that Eisenhower and Marshall thought so, especially when compared with their ruthless cashiering of failed division and corps commanders later in the war. It is worth examining exactly how the II Corps functioned in their first test against the Germans, as the conditions they experienced, in a novel theater with limited intelligence and a lack of experienced troops, are certain to be duplicated for future corps commanders and staff officers as they face an uncertain foe in an unknown place.

The II Corps' performance at Kasserine in February 1943 contrasts sharply with the TORCH landings the previous November—also under Fredendall's command, albeit against a static and much less-capable French foe—and the final campaigns in Tunisia. These three periods offer a constructive lens for assessing corps performance in combat: the planning and successful amphibious assault against a defended shore, one of the most difficult exercises in land warfare, the defensive position in what was supposed to be a quiet and certainly the secondary area of the front, and an aggressive drive against a weakened but still dangerous opponent resulting in the enemy's capitulation. Why was the II Corps successful in the bookend operations, but arguably a failure (though, it must be noted, Rommel's effort to seriously disrupt or delay the endgame in Tunisia did not succeed) in the middle one? Four factors stand out.

First, at both Oran and in the latter stages of the Tunisian campaign, the II Corps had an aggressive, offensive mission, attacking enemy positions which afforded it the element of surprise in choosing where and how to fight. At Kasserine, the II Corps ceded the initiative to one of the better tactical commanders of World War II, Rommel, who successfully rolled up the dispersed and isolated positions the II Corps had been charged with defending, but lacked adequate troops to do so successfully.[35] According to one historian this proved a serious handicap. "For Americans who had been imbued with an aggressive and offensive notion during training, the defensive Battle of Kasserine Pass imposed a role for which they were psychologically ill equipped."[36]

Second, the enemy troops facing the Oran landings and the final battles in Tunisia were not the same as those faced at Kasserine in February. Weak Vichy French garrison troops did not conduct a proactive defense and likely saw their opponents as potential liberators. Likewise, the German garrison in April and May had begun to suffer from serious logistic shortages, brought about by a sustained naval and air campaign against vulnerable lines of communications across the Mediterranean. In contrast, the German force that hit the II Corps at Kasserine had been rebuilt behind the Mareth Line after a disastrous retreat across Libya, and

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reinforced by additional units and equipment, including the new Tiger tank, rushed across the straits to Tunisia after TORCH. These enemy forces were probably near their peak in terms of strength, morale, and effectiveness.

Third, geography favored the II Corps in its first and third operations. The objectives were proximate and the battlespace easily contained with few opportunities for enemy flanking attacks. At Kasserine, the chessboard sprawled across hundreds of miles isolated by steep mountain ranges and connected by often impassible roads during the worst of the North African rainy season, making it difficult to shift meager forces to the many threatened points.

Finally, the II Corps controlled nearly full divisions with clear unity of command in the Oran and Bizerte operations, fighting with one infantry and most of an armored division (1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions) at Oran and with three full infantry and one armored divisions (1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions) in March and April. In contrast, in February, Fredendall only commanded portions of the 1st (two regiments) and 34th (barely one regiment) Infantry and 1st Armored (two combat commands) Divisions, as his army commander, British General Anderson, detached significant elements of all three divisions to support French units occupying the seam between the American and British corps on the line in Tunisia. One American officer argued, "the generals of three nations had borrowed, divided, and commanded one another's troops until the troops were never quite certain who was commanding them."[37] Historian Orr Kelly agreed, noting that much of the blame lay with "Anderson, who, in the opinion of many American officers, had botched things by micromanaging Fredendall and his American corps."[38] Fredendall, not wishing to cede the initiative to the Germans, had squandered some of his strength in aggressive but counterproductive attacks, further weakening and dispersing his force.[39] While in no way excusing the II Corps' many failings in the Kasserine battle, these four factors—mission, enemy, terrain, and troops—as well as the corps commander's and staff's collective inability to effectively address them up the chain, must be considered in any appraisal of American combat effectiveness in the first battles of World War II.

CONCLUSION

Given the weight of evidence marshaled against him by both his peers and posterity, it would seem that Fredendall's leadership deficiencies were a key component of the II Corps' performance at Kasserine Pass. Assigning primary importance to leadership masks other deficiencies, in corps dispositions, equipment, and training that Fredendall could do little to remedy in the short time before the battle. Ultimately, all he could do was to respond to the situation as best he could. As Blumenson observed, "the underlying cause of the American failure was discrepancy in numbers between the Allies and the Axis."[40] Rick Atkinson, author of an award-winning study of the Army in North Africa, wrote, "For years, Fredendall would be castigated for the poor American showing; like several of his subordinate commanders, he was overmatched."[41] While the military response, given the resources available to him, was likely more than adequate, the way Fredendall managed the personal relationships, both with subordinates who had been left out to dry and superiors who were largely responsible for it, proved to be his, and the II Corps' undoing. In the end, he was unable to control much of what was happening around

Generals Eisenhower (*right*) and Patton confer at the beginning of the II Corps offensive in Tunisia, 16 March 1943.



National Archives

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him. The only thing he could control was how he reacted to it, and how he let that affect those who worked for him. And in that, history has found him wanting.

At the same time, an examination of the II Corps in the Tunisian battle reveals a larger degree of patronage and nepotism than is generally acknowledged in the senior ranks of the World War II officer corps. In an organization that was supposed to be a pure meritocracy, it is surprising how often connections, mentor-subordinate relationships, and "old school" ties played a role in hiring and firing decisions. While these relationships might be fairly easy to manage at lower levels, at echelons above brigade, officers have acquired both a wide reputation, as well as substantial networks both within and across branches, and hiring and firing decisions are likely to affect those well beyond the individual involved. As a result, well-placed mentors or subordinates can have an undue influence on personnel decisions, and this pernicious influence should be guarded against. While officers always have, and always will favor proven "known quantities" over the unknown in personnel decisions, the appearance of favoritism or fraternization can quickly erode trust within any organization, crippling its ability to accomplish the mission. While Eisenhower never reflected on it publically, personnel management was likely the most valuable lesson he learned in the North African campaign.

NOTES

1. Indeed, this is the justification given by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles: 1776–1965* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), which includes a chapter on Kasserine by Martin Blumenson, one of the preeminent historians of the Army in World War II.

2. U.S. Army II Corps, *II Corps: A Brief History* (Milan, Italy: Editoriale Domus, 1945), p. 7.

3. George Catlett Marshall, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: "The Right Man for the Job," December 7, 1941–May 31, 1943*, Vol. 3, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 264.

4. Ibid., p. 367.

5. John H. Thompson, "Kasserine Fiasco Laid to British," *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, 15 Feb 1948.

6. I. S. O. Playfair and C. J. C. Molony, *The Mediterranean and Middle East*, Vol. IV, *The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 298.

7. Christopher Richard Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 186.

8. Benjamin A. Dickson, "G-2 Journal, Algiers to the Elbe." Unpublished manuscript, Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

9. Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 274.

10. Thompson, "Kasserine Fiasco Laid to British." The story reports, "Two untried battalions of the 34th Infantry Division (a former National Guard Division of Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin men), and an artillery battalion were on isolated mountain peaks on the plain in front of Faid Pass. This [*sic*] was Anderson's direct orders."

11. Dickson would also correctly predict the German counterattack at El Guettar on 22 March 1943, giving Patton ample time to react. George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), p. 53.

12. Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), p. 332.

13. Ibid., p. 336.

14. James R. Webb, "Diary Covering the Activities of General Fredendall and Supporting Players, December '42–March '43," p. 6, James R. Webb Papers, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans. (hereafter cited as Webb Diary).

15. Heller and Stofft, *America's First Battles*, p. 262; Howe, *Northwest Africa*, p. 627.

16. Webb Diary.

17. Howe, *Northwest Africa*, p. 435.

18. Ibid., p. 443.

19. Alfred D. Chandler, ed. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years*, Vol. II, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 966.

20. Ibid.

21. E. N. Harmon, *Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 112; Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, p. 388.

22. Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 970.

23. Lucian Truscott, *Command Missions* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), pp. 144–45.

24. Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 128.

25. Ibid., p. 135.

26. Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), p. 32; idem, *A General's Life*, p. 133.

27. Bradley, *A General's Life*, pp. 135–37.

28. Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, pp. 1002–03.

29. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 145.

30. Ibid., p. 173.

31. Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 1007.

32. Dickson, "G-2 Journal, Algiers to the Elbe." p. 54.

33. Ibid., p. 63.

34. Thompson, "Kasserine Fiasco Laid to British."

35. Heller and Stofft, *America's First Battles*, p. 247.

36. Ibid., 264.

37. Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, p. 324.

38. Orr Kelly, *Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), p. 254.

39. Heller and Stofft, *America's First Battles*, pp. 244–46.

40. Ibid., p. 264. (This citation refers to Blumenson's chapter on Kasserine.)

41. Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, p. 390.

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U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

A Forlorn Hope

The Sword Commemorating the Army Flag Raising at the Halls of Montezuma

By Dieter Stenger

The U.S. Army Center of Military History is the proud steward of the State of Iowa's presentation sword to Capt. Benjamin Stone Roberts for his gallantry as the commander of a "forlorn hope"—a sacrificial raiding party or a group of combatants taking part in an assault where casualties are expected to be high—during the Mexican War in 1847. The presentation of the sword commemorated merely one of seven acts of bravery in battle, as well as the service of a soldier who, by 1865, would ascend to the rank of brevet major general, U.S. Volunteers.

Benjamin Roberts, born on 18 November 1810, in Manchester, Vermont, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1835 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. After serving four years and resigning his commission in 1839 to become a civil engineer, he returned to the Army at the outbreak of the Mexican War in 1846.[1] Appointed by President James K. Polk as the ranking first lieutenant of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, Roberts commanded the advance guard of the Marines under Marine Corps Maj. Levi Twiggs and captured the city of Vera Cruz in March 1847. He later led the company that stormed the works at the Battle of Punte del Medio. Promoted to the rank of captain in February 1847, he then commanded a squadron of his regiment and stormed the main heights of Cerro Gordo in April. Roberts led the charge against San Juan de los Llanos and commanded the advanced guard in the Battle of Contreras, both in August. He led his company at the Battle of Churubusco, and then commanded a hand picked forlorn hope of marines from the brigade of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Persifor F. Smith and the men succeeded in capturing Chapultepec on 13 September 1847. With 100 men from his regiment and 400 volunteers, Roberts routed the forces of Mexican Army General Antonio López de Santa Anna. During the capture of the Gareta of Belin, one of two gates to Mexico City, he led the advance of Brig. Gen. John A. Quitman's 4th Division that broke into the city on the morning of 14 September 1847. As the first officer to enter the city, General Quitman gave Roberts the honor of raising the American flag over the ancient Mexican palace of Montezuma, while Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott led the U.S. forces into the city. In November 1847, Roberts surprised and then defeated Generals Anastasio Torrejón and Joaquín Rea and 700 guerrillas at Tlascala, capturing their main supplies and weapons. In consideration of his services in General Scott's campaign, President Polk brevetted Roberts a major and a lieutenant colonel in the Regular Army. In 1849, the legislature of Iowa presented to Roberts the "thanks of the State, expressive of its appreciation of his services in the capture of the City of Mexico, and afterwards, by another resolution, bestowed upon him a sword of honor, presented by its Representatives in Congress at the Capitol in Washington.

The Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee, Massachusetts, fabricated the sword, including the sterling silver grip of the hilt that is completely engraved. The cross-guard and knuckle bow of heavily gilt brass and gold plating is composed of three branches, completely covered on the outside surfaces in a wreath with an eagle above and curtains to either side. In the center of the escutcheon is the inscription, "PRESENTED BY the State of Iowa TO CAPT. B. S. ROBERTS for meritorious GALLANT service in Mexico." The scabbard is adorned with a large solid gold presentation plaque engraved with the special orders giving Roberts the honor of raising the American flag over the U.S. Capitol dome.

The presentation sword to Captain Roberts is stored in the climate-controlled Museum Support Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Dieter Stenger is the chief curator of arms and ordnance at the Museum Support Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Notes

1. "Documents Regarding Cpt. Benjamin S. Roberts," Army Historical Collection Accountability System, Central Control No. 905844, CMH 2017.004.014 A, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

2. S. S. Howe, ed., "Biographical Sketch of Brigadier General Benjamin Stone Roberts," *The Annals of Iowa 1864*, Vol. 1, no. 5 (Iowa City: Iowa State Historical Society, 1864), pp. 200–206

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U.S. Army Art Collection

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NMUSA Feature

Within the Walls

The "Army Theater" Construction

By Patrick R. Jennings

In 1888, long after the fighting of the American Civil War came to an end, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, the hero of Gettysburg and former governor of Maine, spoke to members of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States (MOLLUS) as he nominated former U.S. President Rutherford B. Hayes to be the group's commander in chief. Chamberlain, an educated man and a proponent of history, noted to his audience that, "Noble records that have been made are to be nobly kept," but more importantly, he added, "The power of noble deeds is to be preserved and passed on to the future."[1] Chamberlain urged the MOLLUS members, most of them Civil War veterans, that their duty was not simply to record and collect their past, but to remember it and to teach it to future generations.

As work on the National Museum of the United States Army progresses, *Army History* will continue to provide status updates in future issues. Periodically during construction, the journal will focus on a special section or exhibit in the facility or part of the collection that will be on display.

One of the more remarkable features of the museum will be the state-of-the-art "Army Theater." It will offer an immersive cinematic experience that unfolds across a 300-degree screen, supplemented by rumbling seats, helicopter rotor wash, and full surround sound.[2] The theater, extending almost three stories high, seats 122 people and also is capable of showing first-run movies and the latest documentaries. It is equipped for public presentations that display a single large-screen or multiple smaller screens that can surround the audience.

The Army Theater will present museum visitors with an orientation film, *Of Noble Deeds.* The title is taken from Chamberlain's words and reflects his desire to preserve the Army's history and teach it to future generations. The movie highlights the meaning of service to one's country and sets the stage for the "Fighting for the Nation" galleries, six sub-galleries that make up the museum's primary exhibit space. As the film navigates the Army's history using quotes, video clips, and historical photographs, it syncs historic and contemporary events with the core values of the American soldier: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. From the Battle of Bunker Hill to the war in Afghanistan, the movie will remind audiences that soldiers are the heart of the Army and will connect these soldiers' stories with the artifacts and art on display in the museum.

Dr. Patrick R. Jennings is the chief of Programs and Education at the National Museum of the United States Army.

Notes

1. Joshua Chamberlain, Enclosure to a Letter to Rutherford B. Hayes, 2 Nov. 1888.
2. The film will be screened throughout the day during the museum's regular hours and selected showings that are less intense with far fewer immersive special effects—for viewers who are sensitive to loud noises, flashing lights, and sudden movements—will be offered each hour.

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


A view from the museum lobby of the theater's curved exterior wall with the black supports of the Soldiers' Stories pylons in view



A construction worker welding at the entrance to the Army Theater

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At almost three stories high, the theater walls support a massive 300-degree screen.



Rendering of media playing in completed Army Theater

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Capt. Jonathan D. Bratten is the command historian of the Maine Army National Guard. He enlisted in 2008, received his commission in 2011, and holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history. He has held leadership and staff positions from platoon through battalion level and served one deployment to Afghanistan. In 2016 Bratten served as a historical adviser for the Smithsonian Channel documentary *Americans Underground: Secret Cities of World War One* and also appeared in the piece. He has written for the Army Press, [illegible] historical [illegible]nuation, the *Wa[illegible]ost* [illegible]e *Ba[illegible]*

[illegible] *[illegible]kes* *E[illegible]* [illegible] (Lin[illegible], 2[illegible]8). He lives [illegible]ortland, Maine.



U.S. soldiers with Company H, 103d Infantry, pause in a trench in the Toul sector in France, c. 1918.

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"Your Men Don't Know How to Fight"

The American Expeditionary Forces Incorporating Lessons Learned

BY JONATHAN D. BRATTEN

In the early morning hours of 20 April 1918, select troops from *German Army Group Gallwitz*, under the overall command of General Max von Gallwitz, conducted final inspections of their equipment before setting off in dense fog for their jumping-off positions. They picked up pre-staged explosives, grenades, and rolls of white tape to mark the spots where they planned to blow holes in the enemy wire barricades. At precisely 4:45 A.M., German batteries of all calibers unleashed a punishing barrage on the American lines in the Toul sector in northeastern France. Their objective was the village of Seicheprey, and its occupants into a stupor, time for the infantry to scoop up the remaining Allied troops. The defenders, American soldiers with the 102d Infantry Regiment of the 26th Division, were indeed stunned—but only momentarily. Seicheprey erupted into a hellish nightmare, with hand-to-hand fighting all around. It took two days for the 26th to retake Seicheprey, at the cost of hundreds of casualties—including about one hundred men who were taken prisoner and paraded by the Germans as part of a propaganda campaign.[1] For the Americans, it was a rude awakening to a brutal new type of warfare, and it would be their baptism by fire.[2]

The spring of 1918 was a heady time for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France. Four U.S. combat divisions were completing various stages of their training: the 1st and 2d Divisions, both Regular Army units, and the National Guard's 26th and 42d Divisions. There were milestones aplenty in the early days: first shots, first raids, and first casualties. April saw the 26th Division tangle with the best of the German Army's assault forces at Seicheprey. The 1st Division was fully engaged on the first American offensive, taking and holding Cantigny in May. In June the 2d Division halted the Germans at Belleau Wood, and in July all divisions were on the offensive until the end of the war.

But absent from those "firsts" is one engagement that demonstrated not only how well the Americans could fight, but how quickly they learned—both from their French allies and from



...with the 2d Division fire a 37-mm. machine gun at German troops in northeastern France, 1918. /U.S. Army


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their German adversaries. On 16 June, the Germans attempted another assault like the one at Seicheprey—but this time against the 103d U.S. Infantry in the town of Xivray. However, in this instance they met with absolute disaster because the U.S. troops had learned how to fight in a modern war. A close study of the engagement demonstrates that many of the principles the Army uses today—mission command, defense in depth, standard operating procedures—all contributed to defeating a superior force of veteran German troops.

Xivray is a small town in the Lorraine region of France, just down the road from Seicheprey, and both villages were pounded into rubble during the war. In 1914, the German advance in this sector had driven French forces so far west that the German lines protruded like a spearhead into France. The front later stabilized, and this area became known as the St. Mihiel salient. The Toul sector was on the southeastern edge of the salient, where the Germans maintained a strong presence along the heights of the Meuse, threatening Verdun and Soissons. On 3 April 1918 the 26th Division moved into the sector, relieving the 1st Division and one French division. Under the overall command of Maj. Gen. Fénelon F. G. Passaga's 32d French Army Corps, the 26th Division would take over the defense of the entire sector.[3]

The 26th, nicknamed the "Yankee Division," was composed of National Guard units from the New England states. Of the division's four infantry regiments, two—the 101st and 104th—were from Massachusetts, the 102d came from Connecticut, and the 103d hailed from Maine and New Hampshire. The division had spent February and March on the front at Chemin des Dames. The Toul sector was their next test before they were ready for offensive combat.

The 103d Infantry, commanded by Col. Frank M. Hume, a postmaster before the war, took up its first position with the wood of Bois Brule—literally, "the burnt woods"—on its left and the village of Seicheprey on the right.[4] The American front lines ran along a





U.S. Army

French residents fleeing German troops during the Axis advance, May 1918

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ridge that dipped down into swampy areas near Xivray and its twin town of Marvoisin, where small ponds had developed. The main front was entered through numerous shallow ravines, which offered cover and concealment to potential attacking enemy forces. The trenches had degraded into muddy quagmires because of the low ground and the incessant rain, and the sides had collapsed from continuous artillery bombardment. Dugouts were in poor shape as well, meaning that the men stationed in forward positions could get little in the way of rest.[5] Xivray was connected to Marvoisin, far forward of the main lines, by one trench, with a communication trench running toward the rear. From Xivray, the trench line ran parallel to the small stream Rupt de Mad, angling back toward the town of Bouconville. Halfway from Xivray to Bouconville were two small rises, both filled with dugouts to make them strong points.[6] Commanding the 1st Battalion, 103d Infantry, Capt. James Hanson noted in a letter to his wife, "Somehow this sector worries me."[7]

Opposite the 103d's new position lay the German main line of trenches—some only one hundred meters away. Above these lines rose the dominating height of Montsec. The Germans had turned this hill into a fortress and from its top, they had a clear line of sight all the way across the 26th Division's lines. Soldiers felt as if Montsec was always there looking down on them no matter where they were.[8] Behind Montsec were wooded areas where the Germans could move their troops and hide artillery batteries from the French and Americans.[9] German observation balloons and aircraft routinely went up around Montsec, so Allied movements in the daytime quickly drew a deadly barrage from German batteries.[10] The 26th's intelligence estimated that the unit received an average of 1,300 German artillery rounds every day they occupied the Toul sector.[11] Consequently, the Americans conducted resupply operations, defensive position construction, and patrolling missions during the hours of darkness.

Across the murky expanse of no-man's-land, the Germans of the *5th Landwehr Division* were intensely interested in these newcomers to the war. The *5th Landwehr,* used primarily as a defensive unit, had occupied this position since the initial invasion in 1914–1915. By the time the Americans arrived in the sector, the *5th Landwehr* had taken only light casualties and was well accustomed to defensive warfare. Rated by AEF intelligence as a fourth-class division with "no initiative or capacity for offensive operation," the *5th Landwehr* would nevertheless show that they were skilled adversaries in positional warfare.[12] Moreover, it was not just the *5th Landwehr* with which the Americans had to contend, but select German assault battalions that specialized in raids as well.

At the time, the best way to gain intelligence on opposing units was to conduct raids and capture prisoners. In April, the Germans probed the 104th Infantry at Apremont and the 102d Infantry at Seicheprey, gaining prisoners from both units.[13] On 27 May they raided the 101st Infantry's position at Flirey. They were forced back, but still took a few captives.[14] All that remained was to test the 103d Infantry around Xivray, and the *5th Landwehr* would have gained valuable intelligence on all the infantry regiments in the 26th Division.


The 103d Infantry was not idle. They participated—albeit in a minor way—in the action at Apremont and Bois Brule in April and had been active in patrolling their front lines. Enemy artillery fire, sniping, and the weather proved to be the most trying for the men. Pvt. Charles Dubuque of

Pvt. Samuel J. Dana, assigned to Company I, 103d Infantry, shown here after being wounded in action at Xivray, France, on 16 June 1918. Dana was one of nine Passamaquoddy Indians who served with the 103d in World War I.



State Library of Massachusetts

Irvin E. Doane, shown here as a captain, c. 1919



Maine National Guard Archives

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Col. Frank M. Hume, commander of the 103d Infantry



Wartime view from the top of Montsec with arrows pointing to barbed-wire barriers, 1918

Company I wrote home to his family in April describing life in the trenches: "It rained for five days and five nights steady, and of all the water in France, we had the majority in our trenches. We were covered with mud from the top of our helmet to the bottom of our shoes, and it would run off our overcoats or slickers just like water."[15]

On 13 June the 103d changed its troop disposition around Xivray-et-Marvoisin. They evacuated their frontline trenches in position 1, about 100 yards to the front of the town in an exposed position. The platoons pulled back to the 1 Bis position, halfway between the Rupt de Mad and Xivray, where they would be less vulnerable to being cut off and captured.[16] Only Companies E, I, and L were represented on the front lines around Xivray-et-Marvoisin, with the balance of these units kept in support in the towns of Bouconville and Rambucourt—both a few kilometers behind Xivray. As was the regiment's standard operating procedure, each company held two platoons forward and two platoons in support. This permitted an elastic defense in depth with squads arrayed similarly.

The 103d Infantry maintained small outposts in Marvoisin because the town was too far forward to risk exposing a larger force, but it could not be left completely undefended.[17] Hotchkiss machine guns from Company D, 103d Machine Gun Battalion, bolstered the infantry positions along the line, built into strong points.[18] All told, approximately 225 U.S. soldiers occupied the 1 Bis positions and outposts around the two towns.[19] Field guns of the 51st Field Artillery Brigade, which could deliver 75-mm. and 155-mm. shells on enemy targets with one call from a forward observer, supported the infantry. The men in the trenches badly needed this firepower; it took a minimum of thirty minutes for reinforcements to arrive if they were attacked.

From Montsec, the Germans had ample opportunity to observe the movement of American troops around Xivray. German patrols checking the American trenches in front of Xivray found them vacant. It was here that they would strike the 103d. The main body of the strike force was com-



A U.S. Army major rides in the basket of an observation balloon near the front lines in northeastern France, June 1918.

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posed of 300 shock troops from the *36th Landwehr Regiment* of the *5th Landwehr Division*. The assault force was composed of eighty storm troopers from *Sturmbataillon 14* who were moved into the area prior to the attack. These select veteran troops traveled around the Western Front conducting raids. They were noted for their excellent infiltration tactics and the ferocity of their attacks. Most preferred to carry light machine guns rather than rifles, and also carried bags of hand grenades. Rounding out the strike force were thirty to forty troops from *Pionier Kompany 16*, approximately 100 from the *22d Bavarian Reserve Regiment*, and twenty *flammenwerfer* (flame throwers).[20] The operation, with a total strength of 500–600 men, was named *Brotausgabe* (Bread Ration).[21] The troops rehearsed for the assault for three days, utilizing *flammenwerfer*, MP18 light machine guns, and MG08 heavy machine guns. Rehearsals were conducted at full scale, out of sight of U.S. lines. On the final day they held one last full dress rehearsal, complete with smoke to provide a realistic depiction of the imminent battle.[22]

For artillery support, the Germans counted on the fire of approximately fifteen batteries in the vicinity, as well as two long-range railroad guns firing massive 210-mm. shells.[23] Observation of artillery fire was obtained through positions on Montsec and aerial flyovers. Lt. Frank Burbank, commander of Company C, 103d Infantry, wrote in frustration, "Enemy planes do about as they wish over this sector."[24]

On the night of 15 June, the German assault force, augmented by stretcher bearers and other support personnel, moved into the area opposite Xivray on trucks and then advanced on foot to their various points of departure, picking up explosive charges, wire cutters, and marking tape along the way. The assault force split into three elements at the jumping-off point. The first, containing the storm battalion, most of the pioneers, and two groups of infantry, was to attack Xivray from the west; the second, consisting mostly of *36th Landwehr* soldiers, was to bypass the village from the west, circle around, and attack from the south; the third, also primarily *36th Landwehr* troops, would assault from the east, catching the 103d Infantry in a pincer movement.[25]

At 0315 on 16 June, U.S. field artillery observers on night watch with the 101st Field Artillery reported what appeared to be a working party northwest of Xivray-et-Marvoisin. The battery called down to the 103d Infantry's headquarters, which reported that there were no working parties out. The commander of the 101st Field Artillery, Col. John H. Sherburne, had made it clear to his commanders that they were to exercise disciplined initiative in the absence of direct orders. With German movement visible, the battery opened up with preregistered fire from their 75-mm. guns.[26] They caught the first concentrations of German troops assembling for the assault.

At 0320, the German batteries opened up—early, because of the American shelling—focusing on the forward U.S. positions, striking lines of communications, and hitting both Bouconville and Rambucourt. From the placement of German fire, it was evident that they knew where all the U.S. troops were positioned. High explosives, shrapnel, and gas targeted the American front lines, as well as battery positions, which noted that their positions were "shelled very heavily." But this did little to cause the U.S. artillery fire to slacken.[27]

For the infantry, however, the barrage was another story. The outposts in Marvoisin and the communications trench near Xivray fared poorly. In fact, of the twenty-eight fatalities that the 103d Infantry's regimental history lists from 16 June, all but seven were from shell fire. Several sources from both within the division and without attest that this was the most severe bombardment received by U.S. troops to that date.[28] Whether true or not, this assertion lends credence to the ferocity of the attack. "It can be stated with authority that it was the heaviest barrage the Germans put over while the Americans occupied the Toul sector," wrote a soldier from the 29th Engineers after the war. The German 210-mm. howitzers targeted Rambucourt, the massive shells caving in dugouts and destroying buildings.[29] Enemy fire was most destructive around Marvoisin, causing the outposts and machine gun positions which had no dugouts to shelter in to suffer greatly.[30]

Almost immediately the barrage cut the communication lines from the 2d and 3d Battalions' headquarters to their forward companies, necessitating all communication to be carried by runners.[31] In addition to the artillery fire, at 0330 German planes bombed Boucq, where the 26th Division headquarters was located, as well as Roy-au-Meix and Jouy-sous-les-Côtes, where both infantry brigades had their headquarters.[32] The fire raged along the whole front line; several artillery rounds struck the field kitchen of Company E, destroying it completely.[33] At the beginning of the bombardment, Cpl. Clarence Dunlap of Company E sent one man from his squad out to an advanced listening post to keep an eye on routes the Germans might use to infiltrate. As the barrage increased in intensity, Dunlap left cover and crawled out to join his man in the listening post so that he would not be alone and fearful. Both men were wounded, and Dunlap died of his wounds the following day.[34] In the same company, Cpl. Ralph Merrow was struck by shrapnel and lost consciousness as he was tending to the wounds of a comrade. Sgt. Harold McElhiney's ammunition belt was struck by a fragment of hot shrapnel, causing his hand grenades and ammunition clips to explode—killing him instantly. Shell splinters also struck Sgt. Elwood Allen in the head, killing him as well.[35]

The preliminary enemy barrage lasted from twenty to thirty minutes, which was longer than the ten minutes initially allotted by German planners, undoubtedly because of the swift response of American gunners. At 0355, gas rockets were spotted coming from the German lines, sent up by the German infantry.[36] This was supposed to be the signal for the German artillery to open fire, prisoners later stated, but the alertness of U.S. observers had caused the Germans to open fire early. At 0430, U.S. infantry in Xivray called for an artillery barrage to their

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Soldiers with the 101st Field Artillery fire an antiaircraft machine gun at a German observation plane in Plateau Chemin des Dames, France, 5 March 1918.

front, an order possibly called in by Lt. William B. George, a forward observer with the 102d Field Artillery. His Distinguished Service Cross citation states that, "During a violent bombardment, when the roads were being swept by heavy shell fire, Lieutenant George exposed himself to enemy fire for the purpose of obtaining the desired information."[37] Regardless of who called it in, the American barrage caught the attacking German infantry in the open, disrupting and checking their advance at the outset. At the same time, the twelve Hotchkiss machine guns from Company D of the 103d Machine Gun Battalion began laying down suppressive fire on their fronts.[38]

The three German columns pressed forward to their attacks. Coming out of the early morning mist, the Germans struck American outposts in Xivray and Marvoisin and the communication trench between the towns. They were surprised by the American machine gunners who had stuck to their positions through the barrage and now cut into the attacking columns.[39] In the northwest corner of Marvoisin, a machine gun emplacement from Company D, 103d Machine Gun Battalion, was manned by Cpl. Donald F. Peck and Pvts. John Flynn, Ben Parker, Alex Robertson, and Newport Wycoff. The attacking Germans from the *36th Landwehr Regiment* placed a machine gun on a nearby knoll and fired on this position. Eventually only Flynn and Wycoff remained unhurt.[40] Wycoff suddenly dropped, shot through the thighs, and Flynn was left working the gun until it jammed. Wycoff urged Flynn to leave and get help. Flynn ran back through Marvoisin and found Lt. Roger Williams, the commander of Company I, 103d Infantry, in the communications trench. Flynn informed Williams that the Germans were on the edge of the town.[41]

Lieutenant Williams assessed the situation with the commander of Company L, Lt. Irvin E. Doane. The two had no time to wait for orders from their battalion commanders and agreed to carry out an automatic counterattack, a tactic that had been devised by the French and implemented by American forces. This maneuver required that the reserve be brought forward from Bouconville. However, shells were still falling all around their position and all the communication lines had been cut during the German barrage. With no other options, Doane ran back through the curtain of German shells to get the reserve platoon.[42]

At 0555, runners from Company I reported to the regimental command post that Germans were spotted entering Xivray. This was the first enemy column, made up of the deadly *Sturmtruppen*. Opposite them were two platoons of infantry from Company I that had hunkered down in the communications trench between Xivray and Marvoison during the bombardment, but remained in place to stop any attackers. As the barrage shifted to the right, the infantrymen spotted the Germans coming through a break in the wire and moving to the left. The infantrymen opened fire with their rifles at any targets they could see.[43] A German machine gun placed nearby

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began spraying the trench and pinning down the men.[44] Pvt. Charles Lola defended his advance post with tenacity before being killed by machine gun fire, the first Passamaquoddy Indian to be killed in World War I. He would be posthumously awarded the French Croix de Guerre. Pvt. Samuel J. Dana, also a Passamaquoddy, was seriously wounded.[45]

Also in Company I was Pvt. Amedee Deschaines, who carried the much-maligned Chauchat automatic rifle. From his position within the trench he could not see the enemy, nor could he support his weapon on the slippery mud of the trench lip. Frustrated, Deschaines climbed up on top of the edge of the trench, fully exposing himself to the enemy. Manhandling the Chauchat to his shoulder, he proceeded to engage the column of *Sturmtruppen* with accurate and deadly fire while his comrades tossed him fresh magazines of ammunition every time he ran out. In total he fired forty-two magazines, each one holding twenty rounds.[46] Emboldened by his bravery, his fellow soldiers crawled out of the trench and began engaging the Germans with rifles and grenades. This sustained volume of fire broke the German assault and they retreated back into Xivray. Deschaines received the Croix de Guerre on 9 November 1918, a month after he had been killed in a gas attack.[47]

The third enemy column, composed of men from the *36th Landwehr Regiment*, moved around Xivray to the left attempting to get to Bouconville to cut off the U.S. troops in Xivray. They were confronted by Pvt. George F. Foster of Company D, 103d Machine Gun Battalion, the only unwounded man of his machine gun team after the German bombardment. He opened on the enemy when they were within range, cutting down dozens of German soldiers and blunting their attack. Additional soldiers rallied around his position and formed a new machine gun crew. His actions single-handedly stopped the envelopment of U.S. lines around Bouconville.[48]

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Williams detached a squad of men to return with Private Flynn to retake his gun on the right flank. The squad followed the trench back to the town to try to flank the Germans, only to discover that the Germans had moved to a position directly adjacent to the trench. The surprised doughboys emerged to find themselves right on top of the unsuspecting Germans, who took to their heels. The Americans shot several, retook Flynn's gun, and captured the German gun that had originally targeted him.[49]

By this time Lieutenant Doane was returning from Bouconville with the reserves accompanied by Lt. Clinton V. Pickering from Company E. As they were staging the reserve for the counterattack, Doane spotted a small party of Germans in the open, approximately 250–300 meters away. The lieutenants, with six volunteers, charged the enemy party and scattered it, shooting several of them. The Germans had been carrying a litter with a wounded German officer on it and they abandoned him to the Americans. They also left Pvt. Hamlin from Company L, who was wounded, and would have been the only prisoner taken from the 103d in this action. The German prisoner, a lieutenant, was irate, "Your men don't know how to fight," he protested to Doane. "They had no business to be where I was; they had come through a German barrage to get there and they might have been wiped out."[50]

Having checked the advance of the three German assault columns, the Americans counterattacked and pushed into Xivray. The fighting in some cases was hand-to-hand. Sgt. Vern C. Boutilier of Company L caught a team of enemy soldiers in the intersection of the communication trench and the 1 Bis position and attempted to engage them with his Chauchat, which jammed. Undeterred, he dropped his weapon, drew his bayonet, and charged the enemy, scattering the group and capturing their machine gun. With this he held his position until the rest of his platoon caught up to him. Lieutenant Williams spotted three German soldiers in the ruined streets, one of whom was carrying a *flammenwerfer*. Firing on them with his pistol, his rounds ignited the flamethrower's propellant, which exploded, killing the trio.[51] The Americans cleared each building with grenades, bayonets, and pistols until they had regained the forward edge of Xivray.

At 0723, artillery observers reported to Headquarters, 103d Infantry, that "the Boche [German troops] were leaving Xivray, carrying stretchers." The artillery immediately laid down a barrage to catch them encumbered and in the open.[52] It was this barrage that an American soldier commented to a reporter after the fight, "We would have driven them clear to the Rhine if it hadn't been for our own barrage. But," he added retrospectively, "it got them."[53] Thirty minutes later, the observers reported the last of the Germans withdrawing from Xivray. At the same time, the regimental headquarters began receiving reports from the line battalions and companies. Because the first German barrage had knocked out telephone communications, updates to regimental headquarters had been slow.[54]

Headquarters listed their first direct report from Xivray at 0830, "Trenches and posts knocked in—several dugouts stoven in—will put men in good ones—have breakfasted them—will maintain daytime observation posts—Boche Red Cross men are carrying back the wounded now—they are pretty busy." It took until 1230 to receive a message from the company commander in Xivray, Lieutenant Williams.

> Have not at any time been out of Xivray except in front—we had not information of box barrage in time to use it [i.e., to use it to pursue the enemy with more than a few soldiers] —we got many Boche as they tried to come in but none entered our line—a big group came up Bouconville road and set up their machine gun, but we handled them and have captured two of their guns—my men are now searching for wounded . . . Boche Red Cross have carried back many wounded to Maison Blanche.[55]

Two hours after the attack ended, the Germans unleashed a furious bom-

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bardment on the frontline positions, Boucq, and the surrounding towns. Apparently frustrated at having come away empty-handed, the Germans were intent on punishing the Americans. Xivray was hit with more high explosive and gas. While Pvt. Howard Crosby and a lieutenant from the 103d's Machine Gun Company were "making a reconnoiter of our new positions . . . a high explosive landed near us, knocking me out and covering us both with dirt. While unconscious, several gas shells exploded nearby and I inhaled considerable gas. The next thing that I remember was coming to in the 101st Field Hospital in Toul, on the morning of the 17th."[56] Boucq was shelled so hard that the 26th Division headquarters was forced to displace to Trondes some four kilometers away.[57] As the artillery rounds were dropping in Boucq, a doughboy was standing near a mule that took a direct hit from a shell, blowing it to bits. A YMCA man rushed to help the soldier up, asking if he was hurt. "Hell no," replied the shaken soldier, "but you ought to see that mule."[58]

As was customary at the time, Allied newspapers exaggerated German losses. The supplemental regimental report filed on 23 June stated that the 103d had buried forty-seven dead German soldiers to that point, and could see six bodies in their immediate front, with many more in the tall grass in no-man's-land, but added, "We have made no effort to bury these as it would unduly expose our men."[59] Estimates of German losses run from the fifty-three killed reported above to a possible seventy. Hundreds were wounded by American artillery and machine gun fire. The 103d also reported taking eleven prisoners—some reports state ten, and others thirteen—including one officer, some of whom were wounded. The regiment captured five MG08 machine guns, recaptured one Hotchkiss machine gun (Private Flynn's), three flamethrowers, one smoke producer, one pair of wire cutters, and "a quantity of small arms, small arm [*sic*] ammunition and pioneer equipment."[60]

Losses within the 103d Infantry from this action were twenty-eight killed, thirty-six seriously wounded, sixty slightly wounded, and forty-seven gassed. The 103d Machine Gun Battalion suffered two killed and eleven seriously wounded. The majority of the wounds and deaths were from the artillery fire.[61] Casualties continued for three days after the engagement due to the sustained artillery fire.

The Allied press took hold of the engagement at Xivray and soon headlines proclaiming a new U.S. victory raced around the world. Publicly, the Germans did not have much to say about the affair. The *Army Group Gallwitz* report of 16 June 1918 noted that, "Between the Meuse and the Moselle we inflicted losses on the American by an attack on both sides of Xivray and destroyed parts of their positions."[62] However, their internal after action review was vastly different. Filed on 22 June, the report openly stated, "It was again proven that the American Infantry employed on the Western Theater is an adversary that battles well in close fighting and must not be undervalued. The Americans are masters in employing machine guns." The report went on to say that two full *Sturmabteilung* (assault detachments) were annihilated from the American machine guns. In a worried tone, the report lays out that American defensive tactics have come to resemble those of the Germans themselves.[63] It was a sign that the AEF was learning. Yet there was no mention of prisoners;

U.S. soldiers don their masks during a gas alarm in the St. Mihiel Salient, 30 April 1918.



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Soldiers with the 2d Division drive to a rest camp during a relief from the front line in northeastern France, 17 June 1918.

taking prisoners was something that the German shock troops expected. But at Xivray, the 103d Infantry denied them their prize, and is known for "never having had a man captured while holding a defensive sector."[64]

Commendations were quick to come down for the 103d Infantry and its supporting units at Xivray. Letters from the French Corps and Army commanders arrived, followed by a short missive from General John J. Pershing, "I am directed by the commander-in-chief to inform you that he has noted with sincere appreciation the excellent work of the 103d Regiment of your division, which inflicted severe losses in killed, wounded and prisoners in repelling the strong raid attempted by the enemy on the morning of 16 June 1918, on the Xivray sector."[65] Probably the best summary of the action, though, came from Sgt. Samuel E. Avery of Headquarters Company, 103d Infantry, who wrote home, "You have probably read (by this time) of the little affair we got into, and let me tell you Em they sure did get the worst of the argument, and then some [*sic*]."[66]

While Xivray does not rank with the better known battles of World War I, it highlights several important developments in how the AEF learned to fight the Germans. First, positional warfare had to be fought at the lowest level. Company grade officers were empowered to make tactical decisions without waiting for orders, using disciplined initiative and prudent judgment. Second, U.S. troops learned the importance of having standard operating procedures in place so that units could simply act without having to wait for orders. In essence, Xivray was the example of mission command in action. A third point was the crucial importance of liaison between infantry and artillery. Communication between combined arms prevented Xivray from being another Seicheprey. Defense in depth was another lesson learned from the battle. Rather than forming a static line, U.S. troops were deployed in echelons stretching more than a mile back from the front. Had the German attack been the prelude to a full offensive rather than a raid, they would have met successive lines of defense meant to wear them down until they became overextended. Lastly, the AEF showed it could rapidly incorporate lessons learned. It had been two months since Seicheprey, but already the units of the division had implemented controls to ensure that they were not caught off guard again. A unit of National Guard soldiers, outnumbered by the enemy, demonstrated that they could go toe-to-toe with the Kaiser's best and secure a victory.

Notes

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3. Frank M. Hume, *History of the 103rd Infantry* (Boston: H. I. Hymans, 1919), p. 13; Benwell, *History of the Yankee Division*, p. 65.
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5. Emerson G. Taylor, *New England in France, 1917–1919* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), pp. 101–02.
6. Frank P. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division in France* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1919), p. 184.
7. Ltr, James W. Hanson to Zara Hanson, 30 Apr 1918, Maine State Museum, Augusta, Maine.
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26. Finnegan, *A Delicate Affair*, p. 280.

27. Ibid., p. 595; Author unknown, *Being a Narrative of Battery A of the 101st Field Artillery* (Cambridge, Mass.: Brattle Press, 1919), p. 108.

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41. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division in France*, p. 188.

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43. A. E. Brownrigg, "Amedee Deschaines, the Hero of Xivray." *Nashua Telegraph*, 16 Jun 1926.

44. Hinman, *Ranging in France*, p. 72.

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51. Nelson, *Report for Liberty Loan Speakers*, p. 3.

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53. United Press International. "Kaiser's Best Troops Facing Americans." *Daily Transcript* (Norman, Okla.), 18 Jun 1918.

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
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BOOK REVIEWS

Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It



By Larrie D. Ferreiro
Knopf, 2016
Pp. xxv, 429. $30

Review by John R. Maass

A plethora of history books over the last several years have fallen prey—most likely at the insistence of publishers' marketing departments—to making outlandish claims in their subtitles. "The Month that Saved America," or a general who "Saved the Revolution," and the politician who "Saved the American Dream" are just a few of these hyperbolic phrases on book covers that exaggerate for effect. Larrie Ferreiro's new book, a 2017 Pulitzer Prize finalist in history, carries a subtitle as well, a claim that France and Spain saved America's bid for independence in the Revolutionary War. In this tightly written, well-argued book, the author thoroughly proves his case.

As Ferreiro outlines in detail, the newly united American colonies desperately needed supplies, powder, and weapons at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775. Patriot leaders quickly realized that in order to procure "warlike stores" and shore up their finances, they would need to secure European loans and alliances in their fight against Great Britain. In the effort to obtain this materiel, the author argues that an official political stance by the Continental Congress had to be announced by 1776—hence the Declaration of Independence. France and Spain "would openly take sides" only if America "demonstrate[d] that it was an independent nation fighting against a common British enemy," Ferreiro writes, and concludes that "the Declaration was not meant for King George III . . . [n]or was it primarily intended to rally the American colonies to the cause of independence . . . [i]nstead, the Declaration was written as a call for help from France and Spain" (p. xvii). Thomas Paine's widely read pamphlet, *Common Sense* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1776), was also a call for alliances, in that it made clear the direct link between a declaration of independence and the securing of aid from France and Spain (p. xix). While Ferreiro's argument about America's founding document being primarily a call for military aid and diplomatic ties may be somewhat overstated, he certainly has made an intriguing case for this purpose of the Declaration.

One of the many myths told in books and stories about the Revolutionary War is that only after the 1777 American victory over the British at Saratoga, New York, did France enter the war on the side of the rebellious colonies. In fact, as Ferreiro shows in detail, the French began conspiring with the Americans from the conflict's early stages, and had laid the groundwork for intervention long before the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775. French agents toured North America in the prewar years to gauge the colonists' disaffection from Great Britain, while in France military and political leaders longed for opportunities to get back at the British after the humiliating French defeat in the Seven Years' War. A strategy of revenge (*revanche*) became the new focus in Paris and Versailles, Ferreiro writes, which informed the support in France (and to a lesser extent, Spain) for the American insurgents.

Much of Ferreiro's well-written narrative includes fascinating details about the efforts of France and Spain to crush their enemy across the channel. French plans to invade the British Isles began as far back as the late 1750s, and continued into the Revolutionary War years, particularly in 1774 when newly crowned King Louis XVI made the Comte de Vergennes his foreign minister. By 1775, French and Dutch merchants were used as cover to ship muskets, powder, and ammunition to America, spurred on by French playwright and merchant Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais. The Spanish, who were "joined at the hip with France" (p. 319), were always reluctant partners of the French, feared the British Navy, and never officially recognized the United States diplomatically during the war. Nevertheless, they too made extraordinary contributions of money, troops, and supplies.

The French also provided invaluable service to the American cause of independence in the form of officers that General George Washington's Continental Army had few of: engineers and artillerists, the best of which "had been trained in France" (p. 121). Washington needed them for construction of defenses, positioning his guns, and to conduct or defend sieges. While it is true that Washington and Congress grew frustrated with the number of French volunteer officers who sailed to America to offer their services in the war in return for commissions and the chance for glory, many of these officers rendered valuable service to the rebels, including the Marquis de Lafayette, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the Comte de Rochambeau, and Louis Lebègue Duportail. The latter may have been

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the most useful to Washington, as he rose to become chief engineer to the Continental Army, a brevet major general, and one of the American commander's trusted aides.

Perhaps the Spanish and French provided their most beneficial service to the new United States with their navies, for as Ferreiro concludes, the combined fleets could not be ignored by Britain's Royal Navy after 1778. This was especially true in the Caribbean Sea and around the Florida coast, where prized sugar islands remained a British concern, as did invasion threats to the home islands. "For the first time in the war," the author writes, the British navy "would be on the defensive" (p. 171).

French and Spanish armies also fought on the American side, notably at Pensacola, Florida, and at the siege of Yorktown, Virginia, where most of the combined Franco-American force consisted of French soldiers, sailors, and vessels.

Larrie Ferreiro has provided readers of American and military history with a flowing narrative of dramatic events, one that shines a much-needed spotlight onto the indispensable role that foreign assistance played in supplying American forces, reinforcing them with troops and ships, and ultimately enabling them to win their independence.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the National Museum of the United States Army. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from Ohio State University. He is the author of the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, titled *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811* (Washington, D.C., 2013), *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2015), and *George Washington's Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2017).

Black Tommies: British Soldiers of African Descent in the First World War



By Ray Costello
Liverpool University Press, 2015
Pp. xiv, 215. $29.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

During World War I, British soldiers were popularly known as "Tommies," a nickname with origins in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When images of those soldiers and their service are recalled today, they tend to be thought of primarily as white men. But in *Black Tommies: British Soldiers of African Descent in the First World War*, author Ray Costello, an independent British historian, documents the fact that more than a few were of African descent.

Costello faced a significant problem in conducting his research for this book. In the U.S. Army, African American soldiers (except those whose skin color was light enough to enable them to "pass" as white men) were confined to segregated units until 1948, when President Harry S. Truman desegregated the U.S. armed forces. Additionally, enlistment papers indicated the race of the enlistee. In the British Army, however, the search for black Tommies was greatly complicated by the facts that race was not noted in enlistment documents and that small numbers of black soldiers were allowed to serve in otherwise white regiments. There were large black communities in several British port cities, such as Liverpool and Cardiff, and their men "presented themselves to the recruiting authorities with varying results in terms of acceptance, depending to [*sic*] the inclinations of the officer in charge" (p. 50). As but one example, Norman Manley, a Jamaican studying in England and destined to become independent Jamaica's first prime minister, served in the Royal Field Artillery from 1915 until 1919.

Black units raised outside the United Kingdom helped fight in the campaigns that were conducted against German colonial and Turkish forces in Africa and the Middle East. One of these units was the West India Regiment, which had, since the last decade of the eighteenth century, largely been recruited in Jamaica. During the war, all of its troops were West Indian volunteers with white officers and some black noncommissioned officers.

Most black units, however, did not serve in combat roles. In 1915, the British Army began raising the British West Indies Regiment (BWIR). When the regiment was later transported to the Western Front, its soldiers were not used to fight Germans but were restricted to performing labor and guard duties. This was because of British concerns about showing black troops that they could successfully fight a white European foe, a lesson that might spell problems throughout the British Empire after the war was over. The Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps served in France, primarily loading ammunition. The South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC) also served in France, mostly in ports, unloading supply ships and loading trains with war materiel for the front. In 1917, the SANLC suffered a great tragedy when its last contingent heading from South Africa to France on the troopship SS *Mendi* was accidentally rammed by the SS *Darro* in thick fog in the English Channel, killing roughly 650 personnel.

Meanwhile, a black unit, the Royal Engineers Coloured Section, had been raised in the United Kingdom. The men in that outfit worked as crane operators, clerks, motorboat drivers, and crewman aboard ships, and were stationed in Mesopotamia during 1917 and the first few months of 1918.


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Although the *Manual of Military Law* (1914) clearly forbade black or mixed-race officers from leading white men in the British Army, Costello documents the service of a handful of black British officers. These men included 2d Lt. Walter Tull, who, for many years, was incorrectly credited as being the only black British officer to serve during the war. Tull was killed in France in 1917 while serving with the Middlesex Regiment. Second Lt. George Edward Kingsley Bemand served in the Royal Field Artillery and was killed in France in 1916. Several black physicians also saw service in the Royal Army Medical Corps, including Dr. Risien Russell, who was commissioned as a captain and served from 1908 until 1918.

Many black British troops were greatly dissatisfied with the manner in which they were treated during their time in uniform, and sometimes this provoked a violent response. In December 1918, a BWIR battalion stationed in Taranto, Italy, mutinied after being assigned to duties they thought should be performed by a labor unit. This resulted in the battalion being disbanded and its members distributed among other units. All the other BWIR battalions in Taranto were disarmed.

The author has made a good start in researching a topic that has been largely ignored over the past century. He admits, "There is tremendous scope for further research into the world of the Black Tommy which will add significantly to the military history of the Great War" (p. 166). Readers interested in black military history, specifically in World War I, will find much to appreciate in this book.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.



Review by Mark Klobas

Pity the poor doughboys, for theirs is a tale of historical neglect. Sandwiched as they are between the Billy Yanks of the American Civil War and the G.I.s of World War II, the troops of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) have not enjoyed the benefits of the attention given to those other soldiers by many esteemed historians, whose books sought to encapsulate the experience of service in their respective wars. Even their contemporary counterparts in Europe have received scholarly attention from Denis Winter and others, who explained what life was like for the British Tommy and the French poilu as they trained and served on the Western Front in World War I.

In that respect Richard S. Faulkner's book is sized to fill the gap in the literature on the subject. It is a comprehensive work in the best sense of the term, a weighty tome in which there is hardly a superfluous page. The author provides an extensive examination of what the war was like for the millions of men who enlisted or were drafted to serve in the AEF, covering everything from their induction to their training, from their uniforms to their weapons, from their voyage overseas to their housing in France, and from their relationships with civilians to their response to trench warfare. Nothing is neglected, with chapters on the soldiers' discipline and morale, the differences created by race and ethnicity, and even their sex lives and alcohol consumption. Doing so required Faulkner to undertake a wide-ranging survey of all of the available material, and the one hundred-plus pages of endnotes and bibliographic listings at the end of the book serve as a testament to the labors it required.

As daunting as the vast number of sources must have been, synthesizing it so as to draw conclusions from such a wide range of material poses an even greater challenge. To his credit, Faulkner acknowledges this by providing no single overarching explanation for why men joined up in 1917 or how they responded to their training or life in the trenches. Instead he conveys their diversity by describing the span of motivations and experiences, showing how very different service could be for the men. The war for a soldier who went over in the summer of 1917 proved to be very different from the one who followed a year later, and even two men on the same ship destined for France could face disparate circumstances based on their race, their rank, or their role.

Yet, for all of the variety of experience, certain commonalities emerge over the course of Faulkner's book. Foremost among them is the lack of preparedness for what the troops faced. Though the U.S. Army had made plans prior to the war for the rapid training of a large number of inductees, many of these arrangements quickly proved inadequate to cope with the hundreds of thousands of men who stuffed the new camps established to train them. Without a sufficient quantity of seasoned personnel, junior officers often found themselves doing the work that was normally the responsibility of their noncommissioned officers, while they all rushed to train for a war unlike any other in American history. In this they received assistance from their new allies, as the British and French both provided veterans well versed in the ways of trench warfare. However, the benefits of their

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
advice were often blunted by the views of American officers, whose unjustified beliefs in the superior doctrine and abilities of Americans as soldiers led them to disdain the hard-won lessons learned by the Allied armies on the Western Front.

Many of these prejudices were perpetuated once the doughboys reached France. For most of the Americans traveling "over there," their ideas of France as an enlightened nation filled with friendly people soon confronted the reality of a nation weary from three years of debilitating warfare. Though numerous soldiers took affectionately to the French people they encountered, their interactions with French and British soldiers reinforced the perception that their comrades had lost their fighting spirit, and that the reintroduction of this element by the American forces would win the war. Moreover, the advanced training which was planned for American units arriving in France was increasingly rushed in order to get the desperately needed troops to the front as quickly as possible. The result, as Faulkner sadly notes, was a casualty rate far higher than necessary, as underprepared American soldiers with an exaggerated sense of their capabilities experienced an unnecessarily bloody education at the hands of the Germans. Despite their losses, though, the doughboys persevered through these miserable conditions right up to the Armistice, with the survivors expressing a lasting pride in their life-changing ordeals.

Faulkner details the experiences of these soldiers with a degree of assuredness borne of his command of the information. Yet, what distinguishes his writing is the sympathy with which he recounts the lives of the young men who served in the AEF. While he renders criticism where it is due, his admiration for their service provides a respectful and dignified account of their time while in uniform. When coupled with the thoroughness of his work, it makes for a book that serves both as an indispensable starting point for anyone who wants to learn about the American soldier in World War I and a valuable, well-organized reference work to which readers can return to learn more about any aspect of the doughboys' service. In this respect the book can take its place next to other classic works about the conflict. It is a volume that no student of the Great War can afford not to have on their shelves.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Scottsdale, Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is a podcaster with the New Books Network and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.

The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939–1941



By Roger Moorhouse
Basic Books, 2014
Pp. xxxiv, 382. $29.99

Review by Matthew E. S. Butler

Roger Moorhouse laments the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 as "simply not part of our collective narrative of World War II. It is my conviction that it should be" (p. xxiii). In *The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939–1941*, Moorhouse builds a strong case on behalf of its salience. The plural possessive punctuation in the title is intentional: the pact was the creation of the twentieth century's most despicable villains. Both sought to take advantage of the crumbling international situation and, in time, each other. Moorhouse explores all the important implications—diplomatic, ideological, economic, military, and humanitarian—of the alliance on Germany, the Soviet Union, and the various peoples unfortunate enough to live between them.

Given the mutual and vocal antipathy between the Nazi Party and Soviet regime for decades, the agreement was an unexpected thunderclap heard around the world. Nonetheless, the leadership of both Germany and the Soviet Union shared a desire to upend the global status quo. Toward that end, both the German and Soviet foreign ministers, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, thought they had achieved a masterstroke on 23 August 1939. The nonaggression pact's Secret Protocols hid the most important and sinister aspects: the wholesale division of Eastern Europe. Those details were finalized shortly after both powers invaded Poland in staggered succession, Germany on 1 September 1939 and the Soviets sixteen days later.

Poland was divided along the River Bug. The Soviets were also promised Bessarabia (Moldova), Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. At first, the Baltic States were subjected to unequal treaties, but by early August 1940 all three were annexed by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, with a secure Eastern Front, Germany could turn its might toward the successful springtime invasion of Western Europe. Totaling the extent of their 1940 conquests, Hitler's empire had grown by 500,000 square miles while Stalin's was 260,000 square miles larger. Ultimately, they came to share a 620-mile common border.

Between August 1939 and June 1941 the two countries concluded at least six formal treaties and trade agreements. These triggered a cascade of smaller negotiations haggling over the details such as commodity prices and delivery schedules, and Moorhouse provides vivid vignettes of these tense parleys. Until 1941, the Soviets drove "a very hard bargain" (p. 172) and the Germans grew

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increasingly dissatisfied. Contrary to any popular notions, Soviet fuels and minerals were not crucial to Germany's victories over France and the Low Countries.

In return for their foodstuffs and raw materials, the Soviets had a shopping list of German technologies and industrial machinery. The author provides us only a glimpse of what they wanted and ultimately received. There are big-ticket items intended for reverse engineering, like the incomplete heavy cruiser Lützow and fighter aircraft, such as five Bf-109Es. As Moorhouse explains, "the Soviets were demanding from Germany nothing less than the shortcut to an advanced military-industrial economy" (p. 174). Regarding tanks, many brand new Soviet models, like the T-34 and KV, were assembled in factories recently kitted out with German machinery, while for the Germans, "one out of every eight" of their tanks that would eventually invade Russia "was indeed running on Soviet fuel" (p. 263). However, economic and military historians will be disappointed by the absence of any tables. A chronology of deliveries arriving in each respective country, if available, could have provided a balance sheet of sorts. Did one materially get the better of the other before all-out war?

The Devils' Alliance is provocative regarding Hitler's decision to betray Stalin. Reminiscent of A. J. P. Taylor's arguments, Hitler is depicted as "the supreme opportunist" following a reactive "multitrack policy" (pp. 210–11).[1] In the autumn of 1940, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was "strained but not yet moribund," Moorhouse explains, but in mid-December "Hitler's decision would be made for him by events at an obscure regional conference in Galati, Romania" (pp. 213–14). A discussion of riverine navigation became a platform for yet more Soviet hard bargaining; the conference ended with literal fist fights between the Italians and Russians. "This nexus is made abundantly clear by the timing of events," Moorhouse concludes. "The very next morning Hitler issues his Directive No. 21 . . . the death knell of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was sounded, and Operation Barbarossa was born" (pp. 215–16). The book offers little documentation to rule out this exact sequence as simply coincidence.

Sir Ian Kershaw, the 2001 Wolfson History Prize recipient, has argued that Hitler's motivations in attacking the Soviet Union were many, ranging from deep-rooted anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism to a decades-long desire for material self-sufficiency and Lebensraum. The most important reason, however, was geopolitical: to eliminate, in Hitler's own words, "Britain's last hope." With the Soviet Union quickly removed, he was certain the stubborn British would sue for peace. By mid-1940, it was thought in Berlin that "conquering London via Moscow" was less risky and more certain; Hitler never veered away from this conclusion.[2]

Moorhouse's description of a play-it-by-ear approach until mid-December 1940 is less convincing. In November, Hitler tasked his generals to find an ideal location for a field headquarters close to the future front—the eventual "Wolf's Lair" near Rastenburg, East Prussia—and on 5 December he told his top generals to prepare an invasion for May 1941.[3] The formalized War Directive No. 21, which came thirteen days later, specified the same timeframe. The Danubian Conference was probably not the watershed that finally swayed Hitler to issue his most important decision of the war; the eventual invasion was delayed multiple times due to unforeseen difficulties, the demands of practical preparations, and the desire to avoid a winter campaign.

Events in the Balkans shifted Stalin's thinking too. By late March 1941, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia were all within Hitler's Axis. "[T]he fall of Belgrade marked the moment at which the active appeasement of Hitler began in earnest," (p. 230) argues Moorhouse. Whereas Stalin had used the pact for over a year to leverage territory and technology, by the spring of 1941 he was on borrowed time, hurriedly reorganizing and arming a military sapped by his own purges and the disastrous Winter War with Finland. On 22 June 1941, time ran out.

The grisly human cost of this "peacetime" diplomacy rarely slips out of view in *The Devils' Alliance*. The mass deportations, executions, and other atrocities up and down the newly shared borderlands of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are described in agonizing detail. The barbarity of both regimes in Eastern Europe is laid bare. In this regard, the author has an obvious axe to grind with decades of postwar Soviet handwringing that asserted the 1939 pact was simply defensive. Nonetheless, Nazi Germany proved itself more murderous; Soviet victory in the east and Allied victory in the west was the best conceivable outcome, even for the Eastern Europeans who would not realize independence until the 1990s. In this regard, Moorhouse situates the Nazi-Soviet pact front and center in explicating the European origins of both the Second World War and its long overhang, the Cold War.

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
1. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish, 1961).

2. Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940–1941* (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 54, 70, 75, 86–87.

3. Ibid., p. 84.

Dr. Matthew E. S. Butler resides in Indianapolis where he serves on the staff of the Indiana House of Representatives. He has a bachelor's degree in history from Purdue University and received a master's degree in British history from the College of William & Mary in Virginia. He holds a doctorate degree in modern history from the University of Cambridge. Both his thesis and dissertation examined economic ties between the British Empire and South America.

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Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler's Invasion of Stalin's Soviet Empire

By Frank Ellis
University Press of Kansas, 2016
Pp. xxviii, 568. $39.95

Review by Reagan Fancher

In recent decades, a multitude of titles have analyzed Operation Barbarossa, Adolf Hitler's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. This massive attack surprised foreign observers and began the bloodiest chapter of the most destructive war in history. In his meticulously researched book, *Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler's Invasion of Stalin's Soviet Empire*, Frank Ellis offers a refreshing look at the campaign from the perspectives of the two major belligerents.

The author could not have selected a more suitable subtitle for his work. The book goes to great lengths to provide a crucial reassessment of Barbarossa, drawing from a wealth of sources that included the diary of a German Panzer Division soldier and Soviet secret police (NKVD) operations in the wake of Hitler's invasion. Critically, the volume will be appreciated most by those with background knowledge of the vast offensive and the Eastern Front of World War II in general. It is not intended as a book for beginners, as those who have not studied this theater of the war may feel lost among Ellis's in-depth details and dissection of other works on the topic.

The writer begins with an informative view of Hitler and the Nazi Party's racial ideology and their motives for planning and carrying out horrendous atrocities during the campaign. Rather than focusing on the military episodes of Barbarossa's initial phases, however, Ellis homes in on the rear actions of the Nazi *Einsatzgruppen*. These mobile killing squads followed the German Army into Soviet territory and massacred over a million Jews.

The author also explores the development of armored warfare doctrine during the interwar period by such theorists as Heinz Guderian and Vladimir Triandafillov. The incorporation of political ideology into German and Soviet military training is described at great length. Another strength of the book is the focus on the indoctrination of Soviet military commissars, referred to by Ellis as "a new type of combatant" (p. 98).

The author meticulously describes the introduction of political commissars into the Red Army and their ruthless efficiency in enforcing the ideological norms dictated by Stalin. Commissars were known as tenacious combatants and had the unquestioned authority to contradict the orders of Soviet military commanders. Ellis argues that these ruthless men, whom he compares to the Nazi *Einsatzgruppen*, could arguably pose a threat from a military perspective, and that the view of them as innocent targets of the Nazi's own murder machine is thus not entirely justified.

Ellis also compares and contrasts Hitler's "Commissar Order" with Stalin's own "Katyn Memorandum," a document issued by NKVD Chief Lavrenti Beria recommending the mass execution of thousands of Polish prisoners of war. While in no way attempting to excuse the horrendous crimes carried out by Nazi forces on the Eastern Front, the writer persists in trying to set the record straight regarding what he feels to be a self-righteous, undeserved victim status afforded to Soviet military commissars.

Another key point explored in the book is the controversial theory put forward by Soviet defector and author Viktor Suvorov, to which the author refers as the "Stalin Attack Thesis," or SAT (p. 401). In his book, *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (London, 1990), Suvorov argued that Stalin was actually planning to attack Hitler prior to the start of Operation Barbarossa. Ellis delves into Suvorov's various claims regarding Soviet military planning and statements by Stalin and other Soviet leaders. He then counters them with his own findings, ultimately rejecting Suvorov's overall argument regarding Stalin's intentions.

Ellis argues, in direct contradiction of Suvorov, that Stalin's mass purges of the Red Army leadership weakened the Soviet military to the point of ineptitude in defending against attack, not only in terms of experienced military leadership but in creating a system of terror in which Red Army commanders were fearful of showing initiative in warfare. Citing other problems with the SAT, the author ultimately rejects the notion that Stalin was in any way preparing to attack Hitler in 1941. In this reviewer's opinion, Ellis makes a good case for his position but does not fully succeed in rebutting Suvorov's thesis. He does not take into consideration the findings of Suvorov's book, *The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II* (Annapolis, Md., 2008), in which Suvorov expands his earlier argument and addresses many of the key issues that Ellis alleges he neglects. Nevertheless, Ellis' book contains another major revelation largely overlooked by many scholars of the Eastern Front. He points out that one of the most decisive reasons for the failure of Hitler's forces in the Soviet Union was due to the Nazi refusal to abolish the hated collective farm system. This is a pivotal issue, because as German forces advanced in the wake of Barbarossa, they were initially welcomed as liberators by much of the Soviet civilian population, especially in Ukraine.

As Ellis points out, Ukraine was among the regions hardest hit by Stalin's ruthless collectivization policies of the 1930s. The so called "kulaks," or skilled peasants, had been forced onto collective farms, and had to turn over all their property to the regime in Moscow. When the Ukrainian and Russian civilian populations realized that not only did Hitler have no intention of abolishing this policy, but planned to adopt it himself, they fought the invaders with the same fervor with which they continued to resist Stalin's troops.

Overall, Ellis' use of primary sources —including NKVD documents, Red


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Army propaganda literature, and a German soldier's war diary—makes for an impressive and highly informative read. His emphasis on several key areas of importance regarding the Eastern Front provides a fresh, realistic, and objective new look at the war and adds significantly to the topic's growing historiography. In the years to come, *Barbarossa 1941* will no doubt further the ongoing research into this crucial period in world history.

Reagan Fancher received his bachelor's and master's degrees in history from the University of Louisiana at Monroe. His current research focuses on the Islamist mujahideen insurgency during the Soviet-Afghan War and the Soviet Red Army during World War II.

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Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1969–1971



By Kevin M. Boylan
University of Press of Kansas, 2016
Pp. x, 366. $34.95

Review by Andrew J. Birtle

For the past fifteen years, historians have been debunking the myth that the Allies had essentially won the Vietnam War, only to lose it at the Paris peace talks in 1973 and by bad decisions that came afterward. In *Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1969–1971,* Kevin M. Boylan joins the attack on this notion and its chief propagator, Lewis Sorley, by taking an in-depth look at a single South Vietnamese province, Binh Dinh. The book is a valuable contribution, for to date historians have focused primarily on the big picture from the vantage points of Washington and Saigon. Few have descended into the weeds to test how President Richard M. Nixon's policy triad of Vietnamization, pacification, and American troop withdrawals unfolded in the field. Through extensive research and lucid prose, Boylan demonstrates that, in Binh Dinh at least, the Allies never won the war.

Binh Dinh was a key province during the Vietnam War. Situated in northern Military Region II, it was South Vietnam's second largest province in terms of acreage and contained 5 percent of the country's population. It was also mired in poverty because of overpopulation and a shortage of arable land—intractable problems that no government could easily resolve. Complete control of Binh Dinh would allow the Communists to cut South Vietnam in two. For this reason both sides had targeted the province since the beginning of the insurgency in 1959. Unfortunately for the Allies, Binh Dinh had been an enemy stronghold since the Indochina War of the 1940s and early 1950s. The renowned scholar Douglas Pike dubbed it the heart of the insurgency, first against the French, and later against the South Vietnamese government.

Binh Dinh had revolutionary fervor, but that alone does not explain why it was such a trouble spot. In a country where family ties often trumped other considerations, the enemy's deep roots in the community posed a significant obstacle to the Saigon regime. Families were loath to renounce their sons, brothers, and husbands who had first fought against the French before later taking up arms against the Allies. Moreover, after the Indochina War many Communist soldiers had married Binh Dinh girls before relocating to North Vietnam as part of the Geneva Accords. These marriages further cemented Communist ties to the population in preparation for the day when the guerrillas would return. Thus, from the start the challenge for the Allies was less to protect the province than to wrest control of it from the enemy, an unenviable task.

As daunting as the challenges were in Binh Dinh, the Allies felt they had no choice but to tackle them. After briefly reviewing the history of the province during the early and middle years of the Vietnam War, Boylan focuses on the period after U.S. Army General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. took command of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from General William C. Westmoreland in mid-1968. These were the years in which Sorley says the Allies defeated the insurgency. They were also the years when MACV experimented with inserting U.S. soldiers at the local level in Binh Dinh. In Operation Washington Green, the 173d Airborne Brigade dispersed squads across northern Binh Dinh to live and work with paramilitary soldiers (Regional and Popular Forces). For two years the brigade assisted pacification by attacking the enemy's clandestine government, by protecting hamlets from Viet Cong intimidation and violence, and by conducting civic actions as part of the Allies' larger nation building program. Brigade training and mentoring activities likewise furthered Vietnamization, preparing the South Vietnamese armed forces for the day when they would stand alone, a day that was fast approaching due to President Nixon's progressive withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. In short, the campaign in Binh Dinh was a microcosm of the Nixon-Abrams era in Vietnam, and U.S. officials at the time touted Washington Green as the very model of a successful, modern counterinsurgency campaign. A careful study of this province thus seems worthwhile, not only for understanding the war in one locale, but as a test for just how successful Nixon and Abrams were in defeating the insur-

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gency in the final years of American participation in the war.

What Boylan found was that "population centric" counterinsurgency did not succeed in Binh Dinh. Mistaken policies and undesirable behavior by U.S. troops contributed to the negative outcome, but fundamentally the author believes that WASHINGTON GREEN "foundered on the twin shoals of the enemy's great strength and effectiveness and the government of [South] Vietnam's all-encompassing weakness and ineffectiveness" (p. 269). Not only did the enemy enjoy sociopolitical advantages, but he posed a military challenge the Allies were never able to overcome. Although the Americans were relatively successful in protecting the population from guerrillas, they were ineffective at the two extremes of the violence spectrum: terrorism, which had a devastating impact on Allied attempts to govern, and the enemy's conventional military capabilities. The Phoenix Program's attempt to root out the Communist politico-terror apparatus paled in effectiveness compared to Viet Cong assassinations, while the Allies failed to bring the enemy's large, conventional forces to heel. Instead, security waxed and waned with the presence of North Vietnam's *3d Division*. When the division removed itself from the area, pacification moved forward. When it returned, pacification regressed. And nothing the Americans tried—from small patrols made by troops living close to the population to large-scale search and destroy operations—succeeded in providing permanent protection from this conventional military threat.

Alongside the enemy's strength and endurance were systemic weaknesses in South Vietnamese society. These included widespread apathy and war weariness, socioeconomic maladjustment, corruption, and perhaps most importantly, inept leadership at virtually every level. Boylan credits nearly all progress that did occur in Binh Dinh to the Americans, not the South Vietnamese. But there were limits to what the United States could do or was willing to do. Moreover, the policies of Vietnamization, pacification, and withdrawal, while theoretically in harmony, often worked against one another. When the 173d Airborne Brigade withdrew from South Vietnam in 1971, the situation in Binh Dinh rapidly deteriorated.

Critics may argue that failure in one province does not mean the program failed overall. Boylan concedes this point, noting that every province in Vietnam was different, but he is equally correct in noting that all counterinsurgency, like politics, is local. Moreover, Binh Dinh was not just any province, it was the Nixon administration's poster child for the alleged success of General Abrams' "one war" strategy. Boylan also uses data to show that his findings in Binh Dinh mirrored nationwide trends. He calls on historians to do more province-based studies to test hypotheses about the war, a worthy aspiration indeed. For now, however, he and others have shot enough holes in the Sorleyan victory thesis to bring it crashing to the ground.

The book contains some factual errors. The author misstates the weight of a Rome Plow and misattributes authorship of the strategic hamlet program to the United States. He also asserts that the Viet Cong first started burning hamlets in Binh Dinh in 1969, when in fact they had been burning hamlets in the province for years.


Errors such as these are minor and do not undermine the integrity of Boylan's work. More questionable are the author's acceptance of some commonly held, but debatable, beliefs. For example, the book accepts the notion that Abrams adopted a significantly different strategy than Westmoreland, one that eschewed "body counts," when the evidence clearly indicates that Abrams emphasized attritional warfare. The book portrays Operation WASHINGTON GREEN as being unprecedented, yet many operations shared its practices to one degree or another, starting with Operation FAIRFAX, initiated by Westmoreland in 1966. The author speculates that the enemy's program of land redistribution made it popular in Binh Dinh, yet the problem in the province was not the ownership of land but the lack of arable land to begin with. For this the Communists had no solution. Finally, the author relates without comment a regimental adviser's statement in 1969 that "we have never put pressure on higher ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] echelons to commit their maneuver units to pacification" (p. 115). In fact, by 1969, U.S. military and civilian officials had been harping on this subject for many years, using virtually all the tools at their disposal. Mediocre results do not equate either to a lack of understanding or to a lack of effort at every link of the civil–military advisory chain.

One of the more unfortunate misperceptions concerns the extent of South Vietnamese participation in the fighting. Boylan paints the South Vietnamese military as an organization that sat back and let the Americans carry the burden. He is correct that South Vietnamese performance left much to be desired, but the idea that the Vietnamese left the fighting to the United States is a gross mischaracterization. During the three years that are the focus of this book, the United States lost 14,853 combat dead while the South Vietnamese suffered 67,917 combat deaths. So who was carrying whom? Perhaps the high rate of Vietnamese casualties, a number the U.S. public would never have tolerated had they been Americans, played a role in influencing South Vietnamese behavior. That so many died indicates both the incredible impact the war had on a country that was much smaller than the United States, and the depth of support for a regime that would not fall until North Vietnamese tanks rolled over it in 1975. It is long past time to recognize the sacrifices of the South Vietnamese people in their struggle against communism.

Dr. Andrew J. Birtle is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has written two books about the evolution of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. He is currently working on a book about U.S. Army activities in Vietnam between 1961 and 1965.

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Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War



By William Burr
and Jeffrey P. Kimball
University Press of Kansas, 2015
Pp. xvi, 455. $39.95

Review by Shannon Granville

In the second half of October 1969, the United States launched a series of military exercises that effectively constituted a worldwide test of the U.S. military's readiness and capability to engage in nuclear warfare. These exercises, officially called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, used strategic air and naval forces to present an aggressive posture of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as it might have appeared in active combat. The real purpose of these exercises was known to only a handful of people in the U.S. government, including President Richard Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and their respective chief aides. To an outside observer, such a coordinated readiness test might seem an understandable if excessive show of force, considering the U.S. government's desire to maintain a strong front in its ongoing involvement in the war in Vietnam. Yet in their book *Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War*, William Burr and Jeffrey A. Kimball present a more disconcerting line of reasoning behind the overarching military strategy: an approach that Nixon and Kissinger thought of as "Madman Diplomacy." Their goal was to emphasize not only that Nixon was willing to consider the use of nuclear weapons in order to force a settlement to the Vietnam War, but also that he was an irrational, unpredictable actor—and, unlike his predecessors, might be reckless enough to give the order to strike with disproportionate nuclear force and risk a larger conflict that would jeopardize his own security. Through this case study, Burr and Kimball provide a history of America's nuclear threat diplomacy and an analysis of the inherent tensions between nuclear deterrence and compellence to achieve diplomatic ends.

The authors are well placed to analyze the potential role of nuclear weapons in the Nixon-Kissinger playbook for Vietnam. Burr is a senior analyst with the National Security Archive at George Washington University, and has written extensively on U.S. diplomatic history with a focus on nuclear history and nonproliferation. Kimball, professor emeritus of history at Miami University in Ohio, is the author of *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), which examines the administration's strategic approach to the stalemate it had inherited. The authors' interest in the 1969 nuclear readiness alert originated in the 1990s, and stemmed from their disagreement with a then-prevalent thesis about the reasoning behind it—namely, that it had been intended to deter a threatened Soviet attack on China in late 1969, in the wake of the Sino-Soviet border conflict that had been simmering since March of that year. In the mid-2000s, they published initial findings from their research through the National Security Archive and the journals *Cold War History* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and sought to resolve their questions on the meaning and repercussions of the readiness test through additional Freedom of Information Act requests; extensive research in U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military records; and interviews with many of the participants involved.

Burr and Kimball's account begins with a political, military, and cultural survey of nuclear diplomacy and brinksmanship from 1945 to 1968, evaluating how different presidential administrations in the first two decades of the Cold War viewed the potential role of nuclear weapons in crisis decision making. It examines how the "nuclear taboo" surrounding the use of such weapons informed many choices made during different moments of Cold War tension, such as the 1954–1955 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The second chapter focuses on how Nixon's and Kissinger's own strategic views on nuclear weapons developed, particularly with relation to the influence that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had on Nixon's early conception of his Madman Theory. The next six chapters cover the more practical applications of Nixon's and Kissinger's strategic diplomacy and military escalation against the Soviet Union and North Vietnam throughout 1969, including the bombing of Cambodia; efforts to link planned harbor mining operations against Haiphong with diplomatic overtures to Moscow; and the development of DUCK HOOK (also known as PRUNING KNIFE), a collection of military operations that contemplated the use of tactical nuclear weapons against targets in North Vietnam but was abandoned when first Kissinger and then Nixon reevaluated its potential effectiveness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test itself forms the center of the penultimate chapter, and an epilogue evaluates why the test failed to compel concessions out of the Soviets or the North Vietnamese at the negotiating table and how Nixon and Kissinger consequently shifted their approach to seeking a long-term exit strategy for U.S. forces in Indochina.

Nixon's Nuclear Specter is a solid, well-researched book, with clear prose that helps propel the narrative through the murkier aspects of the motives and reasonings of Cold War strategic decision making. Most of the sources are from U.S. archival materials and English-language publications, but the authors have provided some counterpart perspectives through translated primary source documents from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union and interviews with individuals such as Luu Van Loi, a member of

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the North Vietnamese delegation who has published translations of materials from the Paris peace negotiations. The only notable omission in the book is one over which the authors themselves had no control: the Henry Kissinger papers, which are held at the Library of Congress, and are currently sealed from the public and will remain so until five years after his death. Burr and Kimball refer to this unusual arrangement as "possibly the last standing abuse of power of the Nixon era . . . [and] most likely in violation of federal records laws" (p. x), which speaks volumes for the frustration of researchers everywhere in dealing with materials from the Nixon administration.


One of the strongest messages of *Nixon's Nuclear Specter* is a warning about the dangerous game that politicians and military leaders play when relying on nuclear weapons in coercive diplomacy. The mixed messages surrounding the October 1969 nuclear feint helped undermine its credibility with its intended Soviet and North Vietnamese audiences. Combined with the toxic internal obsession with secrecy that was a hallmark of the Nixon administration, the historical perspective is sobering:

> Even though policymakers before Nixon and since have believed that military force is a necessary adjunct of diplomacy, he and Kissinger may have been unique in their conviction that secret threats and stealthy military operations could actually produce desired diplomatic results. Moreover, their desire for strictly compartmentalized security was so absolute and their distrust of the State Department and the military leadership so great that they put themselves into what amounted to an echo chamber that was nearly impervious to advice from experts in the national security bureaucracy. Their furtive mind-set and methods would create dysfunction in government as civilian officials and top commanders puzzled over the meaning of the policies and actions that they had taken before and during October 1969 (p. 8).

The threatened use of nuclear weapons for diplomatic signaling, as Nixon and Kissinger found, raised unnecessary risks of accidental consequences and simultaneously undermined their own credibility as political and military decision makers. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, this assessment remains as topical as ever.

Shannon Granville is an editor with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War International History Project series copublished with Stanford University Press. She has a master's degree in international history from the London School of Economics and a bachelor's in history from the College of William & Mary. Her research interests include Cold War nuclear history, postwar British and Japanese politics, and political satire in popular culture.

Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory



By James M. Dubik
University Press of Kentucky, 2016
Pp. viii, 225. $50

Review by Alan M. Anderson

Just war theory has been studied and discussed by philosophers, military strategists, and policymakers for centuries. It is intended to ensure that from a moral standpoint, war is ethical—both the decision to commence war (*jus ad bellum*) and the way in which war is conducted (*jus in bello*). Retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, now a professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, focuses his recent monograph, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*, on the *jus in bello* branch of just war theory. In a thought-provoking and well-reasoned analysis, Dubik argues that the traditional, exclusive focus of *jus in bello* on the tactical level of warfare—the actions on the battlefield—is inadequate and wrongly ignores the equally significant strategic level of warfare: "the level at which senior political and military leaders set war aims, identify strategies and policies, approve the military and nonmilitary campaigns necessary to achieve those war aims, and establish the coordinative bodies necessary to translate plans into actions and adapt as the vagaries of war unfold" (p. 3).

Dubik argues that Michael Walzer's preeminent work, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), presents too much of a bright-line rule between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Dubik contends that Walzer's approach leaves a gap in just war theory: the strategic or war-waging dimension. He illustrates his point using the decisions senior political and military leaders made regarding the North Africa campaign in World War II as examples of correctly setting, adapting, and revising strategic aims as the conflict unfolded. Having established the strategic-level gap in just war theory, Dubik identifies the tripartite "central tension inherent in the strategic, war-waging dimension of war's conduct" as:

> (1) achieving coherence by setting war aims and making strategy, policy, and campaign decisions that increase the probability of achieving those aims; (2) generating organizational capacity

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> by translating those aims and decisions into action that achieves those aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, and the least risk to the innocent and to one's political community, then adapting decisions and actions as the vagaries of war unfold; and (3) maintaining legitimacy by doing all the foregoing while observing that war convention, sustaining public support of the war effort, and ensuring proper subordination of the military to civilian leadership (p. 27).

Dubik uses the American Civil War and U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan to further establish that the conduct of war includes both tactical and strategic dimensions that have a moral aspect. Waging war, Dubik maintains, includes the responsibility of senior military and political leaders not to "squander the lives of the citizens-who-become soldiers without accruing moral blame" (p. 56).

Dubik next analyzes alternative approaches to how senior political and military leaders should interact at the strategic level. He first considers the objective control theory of Samuel P. Huntington and the principal-agent theory of Peter Feaver, followed by the unequal dialogue approach described by Eliot A. Cohen in *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003). Using examples from the Vietnam War and of the conduct during the Iraq War in the Rumsfeld era, Dubik concludes that all of these theories are inadequate in some way. The principal-agent theory fails to adequately value soldiers' lives—a necessary element for the war-waging dimension of *jus in bello*. The unequal dialogue approach "leaves unattended the important role that senior political leaders play in setting the right climate for a proper dialogue" (p. 112).

Considering the various deficiencies in these theories, Dubik describes what he believes is the proper framework for the war-waging dimension: a near continuous, performance-oriented, dialogue implementation regime. To work, such a regime must promote candor, open minds, and include repetitive dialogues among senior leaders. In addition, the results of such dialogues must be translated into action, not just initially, but also adapted as political and military events unfold—adjusting to the dynamic nature of war. Dubik in effect argues for a type of observe, orient, decide, and act loop at the strategic level. Such a regime is not infallible, but increases "the probability of prudent action and of using well the lives of citizens-who-become soldiers, protecting the political community, and limiting risk to the innocent" (p. 130).

Dubik identifies five principles that should guide senior political and military leaders who are engaging in the regime he describes. These five principles—continuous dialogue, final decision authority with civilian leaders, managerial competence, war legitimacy, and the right of resignation under certain circumstances—provide a structure that, if followed, should result in war-waging decisions and actions that will use the lives of citizen soldiers appropriately. This plan would also reduce the chances that innocent lives or the existence of the political community are needlessly risked. "Senior political and military leaders who follow the principles . . . are acting justly with respect to the exercise of their *jus in bello* strategic, war-waging responsibilities" (p. 138). Dubik concludes, "The five war-waging principles—plus the tripartite tension inherent in waging war—more completely circumscribe the moral dimensions of war's conduct at the strategic level" (p. 172).

There is much to be said for Dubik's identification of the "gap" in traditional just war theory to address the strategic, war-waging level of the conduct of war. His recognition and description of the benefits and framework for operation of a continuous, performance-oriented, dialogue-effecting regime at the strategic level merits strong consideration among senior political and military leaders. As might be expected, Dubik's book also raises a number of thought-provoking questions. Has he truly identified a gap in the *jus in bello* theory? Or has he more simply described a method and policy for conducting warfare at the strategic level that senior political and military leaders should follow in order to more successfully prosecute war? Just war theory is intended to apply to, and guide the conduct of, all parties to a conflict. Does one side really want its enemy to follow Dubik's approach to ensure that they better execute their war-waging responsibilities and therefore, presumably, conduct the war more effectively? And how does Dubik's theory apply in the context of modern warfare, which often involves failed-state or nonstate actors who have no citizenry to which they are politically responsible or who could not care less about taking innocent citizens' lives or wasting the lives of their "soldiers" on the battlefield?

Regardless of the responses to such questions, *Just War Reconsidered* is a timely study that should be required reading for all military and political leaders who are responsible for the conduct of warfare at the strategic level.

Dr. Alan M. Anderson received a bachelor's degree from Coe College and a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. He earned a law degree from Cornell University and a doctorate in War Studies from King's College, London. His research focuses on the laws of war and military strategy in the first decade of the twentieth century. He currently is working on several book-length projects relating to his doctoral research and a World War II unit operational history.

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CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE



JON T. HOFFMAN

EVALUATING COMMERCIAL PUBLISHING PRACTICES FOR CMH

In previous Footnotes, I have reviewed initiatives the Center of Military History (CMH) has undertaken to improve support to the Army. But sometimes events, rather than plans, dictate what happens. One of those circumstances arose in 2017, when the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army began a review of the Army Publishing Directorate (APD), which handles the printing, distribution, and warehousing of nearly all the Army's publications, including CMH's official histories. Mr. Mark F. Averill, the deputy administrative assistant, was focused on APD's warehouse in St. Louis, ensuring that its operations were as efficient and cost effective as possible.

As it turned out, one of the largest "customers" of the warehouse was CMH, which had nearly 1,400 pallets of books in stock, comprising some 626 distinct items from our catalog. That led Mr. Averill to pull CMH into the review, with the goal of determining if we were printing, distributing, and storing the appropriate quantities of our publications. As part of that analysis, he tasked us with investigating the wisdom of shifting to e-publication (digital-only books optimized for electronic reading devices), as well as the possibility of a commercial print-on-demand option to meet any remaining need for actual paper copies.


CMH began with a look at the current state of e-books in commercial publishing. Contrary to the perception that digital is the wave of the future, it turned out that the Association of American Publishers had documented that e-books as a percentage of sales had begun a steady decline. Actual sales data over the past decade for one particular commercial military history publication (authored by a CMH historian) vividly demonstrated that decrease in the military history field (most germane to CMH). A Pew study also showed—somewhat surprisingly—that the shift away from digital was greatest among the younger generation. Although CMH will continue to experiment with e-books—we have recently re-issued *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe* (Washington, D.C., 1938) as a digital publication—for the time being we will still focus primarily on paper copies, because that is what most of our readers want.

The examination of print-on-demand started with considering who would pay to acquire the books and how they would do so. It turned out that regulations prohibit the use of a government purchase card for printed material, thus cutting off that potential simple avenue for official requestors to directly order books. One alternative would be individual offices or units going through the APD printing process, which would have put an intolerable burden on that organization. Instead of ordering a large quantity on behalf of CMH (as currently happens), APD would have been doing largely the same amount of work repeatedly to fill each customer's print order, even for a single book. A slightly more efficient method would have been CMH/APD periodically ordering small quantities of a title to keep a few in stock to meet requests. To evaluate this option, CMH and APD ordered five copies each of a campaign pamphlet, a paperback book, and a hardcover book. The pamphlets cost $33.50 apiece, compared to the more typical cost of just under a dollar when printed in large quantities. The paperback books came in at $169 each. We canceled the order for hardcovers when the winning bid was over $1,400 per copy! In addition, the response time to publish was about three weeks—much longer than simply fulfilling an order from warehouse stock. Equally important, the pamphlets and paperbacks we received were of a much lower quality than usual. That was partly due to the type of press used for a shorter turnaround, but also due to the lack of a press inspection, which is only available (and practical) when printing much larger quantities. With that actual data in hand. Mr. Averill canceled further consideration of print-on-demand as a solution.

The main change to come out of this review was the development of business rules to govern future publications. CMH will base its print orders on initial distribution, plus the likely quantity needed to meet demand for about five years. The actual number acquired will be based on expected usage data, the cost of warehousing a pallet, and the cost of printing per book, with a balance between the three to achieve the most efficient use of Army dollars.

This long overdue review provided a good opportunity for CMH to evaluate its practices and optimize, so that we operate more like a commercial publisher and keep one eye constantly focused on the cost of doing business.

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
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
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AMERICA'S ARMY OF DEMOCRACY
THE NATIONAL ARMY, 1917–1919

BY JOHN A. BOYD

OCT 18 2018
University of California Berkeley





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KESTERNICH
THE BATTLE THAT SAVED THE BULGE

BY DOUGLAS E. NASH SR.

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMY HISTORY AND WORLD WAR I CENTENNIAL COMMEMORATIONS

I recently had the pleasure of attending the Army Birthday Ball here in Washington, D.C. The event is an annual celebration of the establishment of the Continental Army on 14 June 1775, and usually includes a strong historical component. For the past two years, the Center of Military History has been honored to be entrusted with the development of much of the ball's World War I Centennial theme. This year's 243d birthday celebration expanded on last year's "Over There!" theme to highlight Army heroes in various eras. It was a poignant reminder of the centrality of history and historians to the institutional memory of our Army.

During his formal remarks, Secretary of the Army Dr. Mark Esper presented an extended reflection on the value of historical awareness in building future readiness. "As we honor that history—our heritage," he began, "I also want to talk about how the lessons of the past one hundred years can help shape the Army of 2028." He noted the costs, in lives and treasure, of a force being unprepared for war, and that this lack of preparedness can often be traced directly to a failure to remember our past. Secretary Esper challenged us not to "forget what has made us the world's preeminent fighting force" and to "ensure we remember the lessons from the past one hundred years."

No Army historian could fail to note, while listening to our service's senior leader, that the Army's Command and General Staff College is preparing to make deep cuts to military history instruction for midgrade officers. All of us must strive to make Army History relevant and impactful to current operations, in all places all the time. With that imperative in mind, we have two upcoming forums to foster collaboration and an exchange of ideas. From 14 to 17 August, we will hold the Military History Coordinating Committee and Department of the Army Historical Advisory Subcommittee at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for command and professional military education historians and subcommittee members. From 10 to 14 December, we will hold the second iteration of our Continuing Museum Training Course at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for Army Museum Enterprise museum directors and senior staff. If you are invited to one or both of these events, please attend, make your voice heard, and be a part of our ongoing response to a resource-constrained environment.

Finally, I'm proud to report that the passion and skills of Army historians were on full display in late May in France as we conducted the first iteration of our World War I Centennial commemorations. We had a week packed with staff rides, unit heritage events, and commemoration ceremonies at American memorials and cemeteries, all focused on the Regular Army divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces. We hosted more than sixty leaders and soldiers from the 1st, 2d, and 3d Infantry Divisions. Later this year I will write an article and include photos to capture the high points of all the commemorations, but I leave you today with two quotes from participants that speak to how meaningful the events were:

"To come here in person is just an awe-inspiring experience to see what happened and learn the history firsthand . . . it is humbling. I wouldn't trade this experience for the world." (Staff Sergeant, 1st Infantry Division)

"I initially wondered how much value the lessons of World War I would have to my unit today. Once we got out here I saw the immense value and how applicable and valuable the lessons learned are to today's Army." (Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division)

Let's continue to educate, inspire, and preserve!


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NOTES

New Publications from CMH

The Center of Military History is proud to announce the publication of two new additions to its U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series. The first, *The Marne: 15 July–6 August 1918,* by Stephen C. McGeorge and Mason W. Watson, covers the American Expeditionary Forces' (AEF) participation in the Second Battle of the Marne. Between March and July 1918, a series of four major German offensives had sought to break through the Allied lines. By mid-July, German troops had advanced to the edge of the Marne River, but fierce resistance from the Allies halted their forward momentum. Between 15 and 17 July, American divisions along the Marne and in Champagne played a decisive role in stopping the German advance, most notably alongside the French forces defending the strategically vital city of Reims. From 18 July to 6 August, American units took part in the Allied counteroffensives that pushed the Germans back from the Marne to the Vesle River. The narrative of this volume focuses on the American efforts on the critical Marne salient, where AEF divisions fought side by side for the first time.

The second pamphlet, *St. Mihiel: 12–16 September 1918*, by Donald A. Carter, explores the AEF's participation in the St. Mihiel Offensive in September 1918. The St. Mihiel salient, created during the initial German invasion in 1914, had withstood multiple French efforts to regain the territory. Yet, even though the Germans had established strong defensive positions around St. Mihiel, the salient was highly vulnerable to attack and was an optimal target for a potential American operation. Until this point in the war, members of the AEF had not fought in a formation larger than a corps, and then only under French or British leadership. Now, as part of the American First Army under General John J. Pershing, they prepared to launch an offensive that would demonstrate to the Allies and the Germans alike that the Americans were capable of operating independently. The AEF's successful efforts in the St. Mihiel Offensive, and the lessons it learned during the battle, helped set the stage for the grand Allied offensive to come that would seize the initiative on the Western Front.



These booklets have been issued as CMH Pub 77–5 and CMH Pub 77–7, respectively. Both pamphlets will be available for requisition by Army units through their normal channels and for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Call for Submissions: D-Day at Seventy-Five

As we approach the seventy-fifth anniversary of the D-Day landings during World War II, *Army History* is requesting submissions that focus specifically on aspects of this seminal event. In addition to the standing invitation for articles, the details of which appear in every issue of *Army History* in the Call for Submissions box, we are now looking for contributions that touch on the wide range of topics related to Operation Overlord. Our intention is to publish a few quality pieces in the Summer 2019 issue. Articles should be between 4,000 and 8,000 words with endnotes, and the use of primary sources is highly encouraged. It is also suggested that authors adhere to the CMH Style Guide (https://history.army.mil/howto.html). Submissions should be in Microsoft Word format, double spaced, in Times New Roman 12-point font, and should be sent before February 2019 to the following email address as an attachment, usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. John A. Boyd, an Army Reserve officer, received his bachelor's degree in history from Vanderbilt University, two master's degrees in history and education at the University of Cincinnati, and a Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky. In 2003 he was appointed the historian for the 81st Regional Support Command and later became the director of Army Reserve History from 2014 to 2016. He is currently the command historian for the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. He deployed to Iraq with a Military History Detachment in 2005–2006 as a theater historian. In 2010 he was attached as a command historian to Joint Task Force HAITI as part of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. He devotes much of his time to performing research with his wife Rachel—also a military historian. He is currently writing a book on the U.S. National Army.




Two unidentified soldiers of the 77th Division

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AMERICA'S ARMY of DEMOCRACY

THE NATIONAL ARMY, 1917–1919



By John A. Boyd

Baccarat Sector, France, 12 July 1918: Unlimbering their gun, Capt. Anderson Dana's Battery A, 305th Field Artillery, 77th Division, National Army, feverishly worked their French 75-mm. artillery piece while Cpl. Andrew Ancelewitz aimed the weapon based on the latest scouting report. Seconds later, Sgt. Fred Wallace relayed Lt. Col. Henry Stimson's order to fire to Pvt. George Elsmek, who "pulled the lanyard sending the first National Army shell whistling across the Boche trenches."[1] For Colonel Stimson, a former and future Secretary of War and Captain Dana's battalion commander, his dream of an army of trained citizen-soldiers had become reality.[2]

From August 1914 to April 1917, Americans watched in horror as hundreds of thousands of British, French, Germans, Austria-Hungarians, Russians, and others slaughtered each other on the battlefields of Europe, and yet, the United States had failed to prepare itself for the possibility that it too might go to war. When the nation finally did declare war on Germany on 6 April 1917, the Regular Army and National Guard combined only numbered 213,557 soldiers—an army the Germans rated as somewhere between those of Portugal and Belgium.[3] To make up for this lack of manpower, the United States built a draftee "Emergency Army" of combat divisions that ultimately became known as the National Army.


This article focuses primarily on the National Army from 1917 to 1919, a unique part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). To date, no publication or literature has been discovered that discusses the contributions of the National Army as a distinct entity, and this narrative is intended to address that oversight. During its brief but significant existence, the National Army (NA) evolved from an untrained "Emergency Army" of conscripts into a distinct military component comparable to the Regular Army (RA) and National Guard (NG). It became an organization that proved itself worthy of consideration as a reserve force—the strategic reserve America had failed to build before the war. With this in mind, NA divisions became the

Composite Image: Soldiers of the National Army marching with the nation's colors, c. 1918 /Library of Congress

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Henry L. Stimson, c. 1912



John McAuley Palmer, shown here as a brigadier general, c. 1945.



Captain Moseley

foundation of a new reserve component in 1920: the Organized Reserve.[4]

Birth of the National Army

Alarmed at the prospect of war and the failure of earlier defense legislation to pass in Congress, U.S. Army planners Capt. John McAuley Palmer and Capt. George V. H. Moseley developed a manpower measure called the National Army plan in February 1917. Their plan divided the U.S. into sixteen training areas determined by population and advocated compulsory military training for eligible males of military age. Still a prewar peacetime proposal, it stipulated nine years to build a reserve force of two million to three million men; additionally, it was intended for continental defense only, or so the Senate was told.[5]

The declaration of war in April 1917 changed this. A revised Palmer-Moseley plan—ready "just in time"—was approved by Congress and the War Department. What followed was an eleventh-hour attempt to stand up the reserve force the nation had failed to build.[6] "Hereafter we must always have a sufficiently large reserve of trained citizen soldiers to insure our safety," the *New York Times* scolded. "If we had possessed such an army, the course of this war would have been different."[7]

Using relevant sections of the National Defense Act of 1916, which established a Regular Army, Volunteer Army, National Guard, and an Officer Reserve and Enlisted Reserve Corps, Congress and the War Department used the "volunteer army" reference to create the "National Army."[8] President Woodrow Wilson also authorized the War Department to reorganize the entire U.S. Army.[9] The Army General Staff assigned numbers 1 through 25 to Regular Army divisions, 26 through 50 to the National Guard, and 76 through 100 to the National Army divisions.[10] Based on the Palmer-Moseley plan, sixteen NA divisions would be built, starting with the 76th Division.[11] With Wilson's signing of a Selective Service Act on 18 May 1917, the first 500,000 conscripts would report to training camps throughout August and September 1917. To house and train the National Army, sixteen Army cantonments—one per division—were selected throughout the United States and hastily built. Camps Upton, Jackson, Dix, Sherman, and Lewis were but a few examples.

As the first draftees reported to the camps, they were met in most cases by U.S. Reserve (USR) officers commissioned through Officer Training Camp programs or Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) schools. At Camp Dix, a soldier recalled he was met "by a young officer who wore 'U.S.R.' on his collar and who had a steady, appraising eye."[12] In fact, the building of NA divisions was primarily a USR officer concern: "I believe the influence of the Reserve officers has been a most potent factor in the rapid molding of the drafted men," observed a visitor, the Rev. Joseph H. Odell.[13]

Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were few and far between, averaging less than 1.5 percent of an NA division. They could only be found in upper level

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A panoramic view of Camp Lewis, 28 September 1917



A panoramic view of Camp Sherman, c. 1918



A panoramic view of Camp Upton, c. 1919



Governor Manning, c. 1917


division and regimental staff headquarters or, in the case of NCOs, in battalion and company level senior NCO assignments.[14] In his examination of the National Army's 81st Division, historian Allen Skinner determined that 92 percent of all second lieutenants and 63 percent of captains were USR.[15]

Meanwhile, public interest in the war effort intensified with the draft. By design, states and communities had a vested stake in their National Army. In a deliberate effort, the draftees were regionally organized into multi-state divisions. The 81st Division, for example, was made up of men from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. The governor of South Carolina, Richard I. Manning III, had six sons in the Army, two of whom were with the 81st Field Artillery training at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, and one as an officer in the 79th Division. The 80th Division consisted of men from Virginia, West Virginia, and parts of Pennsylvania. The 77th Division was primarily from New York, whereas the 313th Infantry of the 79th Division was nicknamed "Baltimore's Own" for obvious reasons.

Creating a National Army Identity: "Drafted Man as Good as Volunteer"[16]

There were a number of things all Americans needed to know: militarily, they had to understand that a draftee army was as good as a volunteer force—whether true or not—and the draftee needed to believe that he was. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Bailey, commander of the 81st Division training at Camp Jackson, submitted a one-page newspaper commentary to this effect. "So much for the system," began Bailey, complaining how voluntary enlistments had fallen

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war might rid the United States of racial bigotry and class distinction."[18]

There was still the color line, however, where "radical Southerners profess[ed] to be afraid of conscription because of the possibility of an encroachment on white supremacy in the South."[19] Responding to outcries from African-American leaders, political objections were overcome, and two African-American NA divisions were authorized, the 92d and 93d Divisions. One white officer with the 92d commented, "Shoes spick and span, uniforms neat and clean, slick and natty—that's the Negro soldier. He's there. He'll write his reputation big in France. He's working like a fiend. He has a big pride in his Division—the Ninety-second, composed entirely of Negro soldiers."[20] This all-black draftee combat division, the "Buffalo" Division, would be the sixth NA division to deploy to France, arriving 19 June 1918.[21]

The ideals of democracy and egalitarianism were well and good; but more important to mothers, fathers, spouses, and others was the reassurance that their loved ones were safe and doing well—that they were with the right sort of men, moral men, who wanted to "make good." For that matter, the unity of the war effort demanded that the draftee NA divisions be nothing but patriotic Americans dedicated to the war effort, or so it was written. Dozens of articles and stories were published informing the public that their draftee soldiers were well taken care of, healthy, training enthusiastically, living in a morally uplifting environment, and accommodating to Army life well with other "Great Americans." These were not "conscripts" but men who had been honorably inducted, men who had patiently waited for their number to be called so they could answer the colors. Books like *Blown in by the Draft* and *The New Spirit of the New Army* addressed the perceived concerns of the nation. "If you feel after reading the book [*The New Spirit of the New Army*] that your son has joined the Y.M.C.A. rather than the army . . . you are not so far wrong after all," mentioned a *New York Times* book review. Another declared, "Strange and wonderful is the great Army of Freedom!"[22] Within these books and articles, such as *Our New National Army*, *The National Army*, or *The Man in the National Army*, were fairy-tale stories about the occasional German immigrant who chose to serve his new country and fight "Kaiser Bill," the pacifist leaning man with doubts, or the antiwar Socialist who suddenly realized the error of his ways and became a first class fighting man.

Of these "patriot reassurance" books, *Our First Half Million*, by Edward Lyell Fox is a shining example of National Army patriotism. Fox joined the National Army in 1917, was commissioned a captain of field artillery after attending Officer Training School in Madison, New York, and was assigned to the 349th Field Artillery of the African American 92d Division. Few writers were as enthusiastic about the NA or the future of the "Buffalo" Division as Fox. A self-made adventurer and author of two books about his 1915 experiences in wartime Germany, he was reassigned to the Army Military Intelligence Division in Washington, D.C., just in time to discover that his books were banned for being pro-German. Undaunted, Fox would publish *Our First Half Million* under the pseudonym "Captain X" and the book would be his last.[23]

For Fox, the National Army was serious business, and its soldiers were a world away from being naïve flag wavers singing "Over There." National Army draftees understood what was at stake:

> They entered this war after reading of it for three years. They know its horrors. In this they are unlike the men of any nation whom circumstances rushed into war, as into an Unknown Adventure. Our men know this war; they followed it in the press since its outbreak. They are going in, dogged and grim; theirs is a *cold courage*.[24]

For today's reader, an examination of such wartime literature seems entirely over the top—propaganda or patriotic gore—easily dismissed, but the fact is there was simply too much of it. The average NA soldier-in-training was being told through multiple sources—his officers, trainers, books, journals, manuals, newspapers, politicians, ministers, and visiting camp dignitaries—that he was a unique and exceptional soldier serving in an egalitarian army fighting a war for democracy. His indoctrination started at home with *The Home-Reading Course for Citizen-Soldiers*, designed and issued by the War Department for general use. This series of thirty daily lessons, intended for "the men selected for service in the National Army," appeared as a pamphlet or in hometown newspapers. It offered "practical help in getting started in the right way," and featured such lessons as "Making Good as a Soldier," team building, camp life, guard duty, foot care, and "Playing the Game." Lesson No. 27, "The Spirit of the Service," reminded draftees that "the National Army has been picked to represent all parts of the country and all groups of the people. Never has America sent forth an army so truly representative of the nation."[25]

"The very air," declared Capt. X [Fox], "breathes with the deep purpose of the new army and its deep conviction in the justice of our cause. *We will not lose*."[26] When so indoctrinated, it was inevitable that over time a majority of NA soldiers came to believe they were "Soldiers of Democracy." This was fine with the Regular Army, for initially an NA identity was encouraged.[27] Unlike the NG, this was a force the RA could directly control. The moment had arrived, and they intended to build a model army in their own image using Regular and Reserve officers.

As mentioned, NA divisions contained more USR officers commissioned through ROTC or Officer Training Camp programs than any of the three components; RA and NG officers tended to stay with their divisions.[28] Also different, due to their draftee origins, National Army units contained a higher percentage of foreign-born soldiers. As noted earlier, the 77th "Metropolitan" Division, also known as the "Statue of Liberty" Division or "Melting Pot" Division, was built with large numbers of New

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York draftees of all ethnicities and faiths. The 77th bragged that forty-six different languages were spoken, but similar situations existed in the 78th, 79th, and 82d Divisions, among others. This, too, made NA divisions decidedly different from the rest of the Army at the start of the war.[29]

Leaders of the new National Army purposely inculcated their soldiers with an esprit de corps. The officers of the RA well understood that men performed better in battle as a team fighting for the ideals embodied in their units. All NA soldiers wore a unique identifying collar disk with the letters N and A superimposed over the "U.S." or some variation thereof. Like the RA and NG divisions, men of the NA chose colorful and descriptive nicknames for their divisions. Men fought in the 78th "Lightning," 82d "All-American," 86th "Black Hawk," or 91st "Wild West" Divisions. In fact, by March 1918, all divisions were instructed to select a symbol with which to mark their equipment for easier identification while overseas. The 81st "Wild Cat" Division went a step further, creating a distinctive unit shoulder patch—a three-legged wildcat on an olive drab circle. At the time, shoulder patches were nonregulation, but General John J. Pershing, the commander of the AEF, could not help but acquiesce and permit an NA division to tout its identity; after all, a unit shoulder patch was yet another way of telling the Allies that the United States intended to fight as an independent army with its own units, not as individual soldier replacements for the French and British. Once Pershing approved the "Wild Cat" patch, all divisions were authorized to wear a shoulder sleeve insignia.

General Pershing, c. 1917



The National Army as a Progressive Era Social Experiment

Truly the National Army was a new model army, a great experiment born during the Progressive era. Liberal reformers of all types flocked to help mold and shape the soldiers of the new divisions. Convinced that engaging men in positive activities built moral men, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker selected Progressive reformer Raymond Fosdick to head the new Commission of Training Camp Activities (CTCA). Soon all NA cantonments offered soldiers sports activities, libraries, movies, musical shows, and YMCA huts (for a feel of family and home). Fosdick appointed Joseph Lee to run the new War Camp Community Service (WCCS), which mimicked the Playground and Recreation Association of America, of which Lee was a founder. The subtitle of one *New York Times* article informed readers, that these efforts were designed to keep the "Good Behavior of the National Army's Young Soldiers . . . Under the Influence of Rational Safeguards and Systematized Recreation." In other words, "the army is neither a reformatory nor a Sunday school. It has quite enough to do," declared Col. John Howard of the Camp Upton Military Police.[30]

For the many foreigners in the ranks—18 percent of all U.S. soldiers were born outside of the country—the Army created the Foreign-speaking Soldier Subsection (FSS), which sponsored English classes and civic lessons to make the troops "better Americans." But surprisingly, there were few efforts to forcefully Americanize foreign-born soldiers. Instead, they were often organized into small units based on their language or ethnicity using native speaking officers. To instill patriotism, well-known ethnic or religious leaders toured the training camps inspiring them to do their part and "make good."[31]

The largest ethnic groups to immigrate to the United States between

Secretary Baker, 1916



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
Raymond Fosdick, c. 1917



General Wood, c. 1919



A War Camp Community Service poster, 1918



Joseph Lee, c. 1918

1885 and 1914 had been Italians and Russians. These numbers were reflected in the national draft; for example, the 77th Division was also known as the "Yiddish Division" due to the large number of Russian Jews in the ranks. In 1917, while the 77th trained at Camp Upton, the commanding general requisitioned a train to transport 3,000 Jewish soldiers to Passover services in New York.

While Progressives conducted their social experiments, the Regular Army was, again, not displeased with the direction and goals of its new model army. Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, an advocate of compulsory military training before the war, believed "a man's economic efficiency and citizenship value [was] enhanced by military training." In fact, a soldier "has learned the habits of promptness, personal neatness, respect for authority, respect for law, respect for the rights of other people, . . . to value men at their true worth, one in whom the narrow prejudices of locality, religion, environment have been largely ironed out."[32]

The intended end state was an army of physically fit, well-disciplined, highly trained soldiers with superior habits of health and morality. Yes, give the draftee to the National Army, and, according to Wood, "You have made him a better American"—provided the soldier could survive the trauma of artillery and machine gun barrages, rifle and hand-to-hand combat, the death and maiming of comrades, and the possible shell shock that goes with time in hell.[33]

The National Army as an Emerging Component

Gradually, if not fitfully, the NA acquired the characteristics of a military subculture similar to, but also different from, the RA and NG. Military correspondence of the day seldom used the term "component" when referring to the NA, but often used "branch," just as the RA and NG were branches of the Army. In any organization, a critical ingredient when creating a subculture is time, and here NA soldiers inadvertently stayed in cantonments longer than RA or NG troops—long enough to undergo an ideological incubation period. The deployment of NA divisions was often delayed, in some cases for as long as nine months. It was during their extended stay in the camps that draftees were inculcated with a loyalty to their comrades, regiment, division, and the National Army. These delays were not intentional, but rather, a byproduct of American unpreparedness. Pershing explained,

> [T]here was little equipment left even for the additional men required to fill up the National Guard. Unfortunately, this made it necessary to delay calling out more drafts for units of the National Army. However, considerable numbers were called into service and proceeded with preliminary instruction, but the lack of equipment seriously delayed their progress.[34]

The Army General Staff's overall scheme was to deploy the RA divisions first, then the NG divisions followed by NA divisions once they were validated for combat and deployment. This is more or less what happened: "Our little Regular Army, our National Guard, is speeding overseas," Fox told his readers. "In that vast battle line of Europe, they will be swallowed up. But they will hold the line until the National Army comes, until we come."[35] By the end of May 1918, nine NG divisions were in France, compared to three NA divisions.[36]

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Undoubtedly, the NA divisions were in the camps longer, some too long, and as is true for most military organizations, unit pride and self-identity often expressed itself competitively—with the nearest rival being the National Guard. "The Reserve officers . . . want their units to overtake the National Guard and stand abreast of the Regular Army as quickly as possible," observed Reverend Odell.[37] Often, RA and NA leaders targeted the NG as undemocratic and elitist. In General Bailey's view, the social underpinnings of the NG "handicaps [them] at the start, and . . . valuable time is needed to eliminate it." An additional problem, as Bailey saw it, was volunteers had "much to unlearn."

> In any volunteer organization I have ever known both rank and file had much to unlearn before they could start on the rough and thorny path to efficiency, and this severance of old time relations and the adoptions of new ones is an unfortunate necessity among volunteers as we have always organized them.[38]

This "time to unlearn" theme applied to officers and enlisted men: the "National Guard officer undergoes no test of ability in many States," declared Bailey, in words worthy of a hardheaded Regular Army officer.[39] Others simply implied the NG was "handicapped by the fact that a large percentage of its men had only a smattering of military knowledge . . . which had to be unlearned before the training in the newer ideas of warfare could begin."[40]

In an article titled "Claim Drafted Men Outdistanced Guards," it was revealed that the War Department's initial plan had been to deploy the bulk of NG troops to France prior to moving the NA divisions, but due to an inspection of the NA, authorities seemed convinced "that many of the national army divisions are in better shape than the national guard." Adding insult to injury, NG officers blamed their delay on their allotment of draftees, calling them men of "the poorest sort of soldier material."[41]

Such thinking was not confined to the officer class. A few enlisted soldiers of both components developed mutual dislikes for each other while training in the camps. This low-level noise morphed into an irritating intraservice rivalry in which each gave as good as they got.

When a secondary headline in *The State* (Columbia, S.C.) proclaimed, "National Guard Sings Better Than National Army," the average reader might have expected an amusing anecdote. If so they were quickly disappointed. Singing in this era was serious business, and cantonment song leaders concluded that "a difference is readily noticed in the National Guard and National Army camps." National Guard singers were regarded as "further advanced" because they had sung together for years when compared to the NA draftees.[42] This musical assessment may well have been the equivalent of lyrical "fighting words."

Pfc. Kendrick Parks, Medical Detachment, 116th Field Artillery NG, Camp Jackson, had heard enough. National Army officers evidently ridiculed several of his comrades, telling them they were substandard, and used the derogatory comment "National Guard, eh?" when making corrections. Sergeants of the NA were doing the same things, sizing up NG troops, deriding their habits, discipline, appearance, and criticizing their work.

In a fiery letter, Parks defended the NG saying, "whatever be said antagonistic to the National Guard, there is vastly more to be said in their favor." Parks acknowledged that the Guard had initially made mistakes, exposing itself to "unjust slander from some of those who came into service after them," but the Guard's hard learned lessons helped the entire Army. Senior leaders had shaped "their plans and moulded [*sic*] them through experiments with the National Guard." Of the NA he remarked, "some of that little cheap element should be instructed in common sense, policy and courtesy . . . lately old National Guard men have suffered abuse and humiliation." Ending his letter in a flurry of NG indignation, Parks concluded saying, "All this antagonism will perish with the other little things of the war . . . when records are reviewed in the light of peace."[43] History would prove Parks right, but meanwhile for good, bad, or ugly, NA officers and enlisted men had developed a self-identity, sometimes at NG expense. The National Army had come of age.

Did component differences influence deployment and organization? When examined, the Army General Staff and AEF appeared sensitive to the types of combat divisions it put onto the line. At one point they evidently organized corps based on RA, NG, and NA components. In late March 1918, the *New York Tribune* reported, "Draft Troops not to be last at Front," commenting on the Army's 2–2–2 Corps organizational plan. The intent was for each AEF Corps to consist of two RA, two NG, and two NA divisions.

Secretary Baker drawing a lottery number for the draft



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Not surprisingly, this plan eventually crashed and burned as corps were adjusted and reorganized in France. By May, a new corps organization plan called for one RA, one NG, and one NA division each.[44] This was tacit recognition of the NA as a unique component. Senior leaders likely believed that NA divisions needed to be mixed evenly with their RA and NG counterparts.[45] For those keeping score, NA divisions outnumbered RA and NG divisions in France for the first time on 25 August 1918.[46]

7 August 1918, General Order No. 73: "This country has but one army—The United States Army."[47]

At the highest levels, Secretary Baker, Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March, General Pershing, and others had endured enough "component" quibbling. "[T]here had grown a feeling of irritation and friction . . . between the different elements comprising the army," complained March, and he intended to stop it.[48] Indeed, it was irritating low-level noise—there was a war to be won. When such bickering filtered down from officers to privates, it was time to call a halt. For pragmatic reasons as well as economies of scale, the time had come to roll all components into one unified "United States Army." In truth, the RA, NA, and NG designations had provided a wartime expedient for building and fielding divisions. However, over time, as RA and NG divisions received their share of draftees and replacements, the initial differences between the components had started to blur. This was a reasonable yet questionable claim.



General March, c. 1918

Frankly, the elimination of "branches" (components) seemed pragmatic, part of a larger plan to uncomplicate staff work. It was also timely, for the RA was creating component neutral divisions. In the belief that more divisions were needed to end the war in 1919, the Army was building divisions 9 through 14, and on 1 August 1918, six additional RA divisions, 15 through 20, were announced. These twelve RA divisions were built on a new organizational and training model; each would consist of two RA and two draftee regiments.[49] With the end of component differences, regiments, officers, and men could be efficiently moved throughout the total army structure. The NG, and for that matter the NA, had bought the RA much needed time, but there would be no new NG divisions fielded, and once the 100th or 101st NA Divisions were manned and deployed, the likelihood of new NA divisions was questionable.[50] Therefore, it was with much self-satisfaction that March discussed at length the creation of a unified United States Army with the *New York Times* on 11 August 1918:

> Unification will undoubtedly remove the cause of, or rather the opportunity for, much dissatisfaction among the three different branches [components]. Each has been likely to think that it was discriminated against with reference to the other two, whether the question concerned an officer's promotion or retirement, or sending regiments belonging to one of the other branches to France.[51]

With the issuance of General Order (GO) No. 73, all three components were officially made one army on 7 August 1918.[52] The National Army was no more, and any "reference," warned March, "to the United States Army as divided into separate and component forces of distinct origin, or assuming or contemplating such a division," was at an end. The identification collar disks of soldiers were to be changed from NA or NG to the RA "U.S." March was especially proud of this achievement, for he believed the bickering would stop, but in reality, component self-identity would not change overnight.[53]

Protesting that "the morale of our men will be hurt by this," New York Governor Charles S. Whitman circulated a petition among governors advocating new insignias for National Guardsmen to preserve their identity. Among his suggestions were red stars on uniform sleeves, state coat-of-arms on campaign hats, piping, or different colored collars. Whitman asked March to delay implementing GO No. 73, but not all governors agreed with him. South Carolina Governor Richard I. Manning III pushed back saying, "my conviction is strong that during the war there should be no distinction . . . that there should be one unified United States Army."[54] A son of the post-Civil War South had opted for the "Union" of one Federal Army.

In Europe, there were few stockpiles of new collar disks—an expensive proposition at best—and the divisional numbering system remained well-known. Soldiers knew who was who. Furthermore, newspapers and military reporting systems still used NA, RA, and NG distingtions, and the differences between officer commissions would never truly die. Then again, allegiance to the National Army was perhaps strongest in the training camps and with those stationed stateside. Only the heat of battle would determine the true nature of the three components.

"The Eyes of the World Were Upon Them:" The National Army in Battle[55]

After training with the British, the first NA division to arrive in France, the 77th "Statue of Liberty Division," was posted in the Baccarat sector in Loraine, south of Strasburg on 26 June 1918. The first draftee division was in combat:

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Charles Whitman being sworn in as governor of New York, 1 January 1915

> The 77th was to be the first National Army Division to take over a part of the front line. It was the first real test of a great experiment. It was to determine whether an army recruited from the motley ranks of civilian life could, within a few brief months, be trained into an effective fighting force. It was to forecast whether the natural assets of initiative, alertness, courage and determination could be matched against the iron discipline of a great war machine.[56]

Cpl. Isaac N. Freedman of the 307th Infantry provided firsthand combat news of the "great experiment." The Germans "used everything on us that they ever had attempted, including gas shells and liquid fire," he wrote after an attack, "but they were sent back with losses—and they outnumbered us two to one." Proudly mentioning a handshake from his company commander that "was worth all kinds of money to me," Freedman concluded his letter saying, "You can tell your friends . . . that the National Army is a success."[57]

How was the National Army used and how did it fight? Whether by accident or design, NA divisions appear to have fulfilled the role of a strategic reserve. With the creation of the American First Army and the transition to large-scale military offensive operations similar to the Allies, NA divisions became an indispensable part of AEF operations. Put another way, the St. Mihiel attack and the larger Meuse-Argonne Offensive could not have been accomplished without NA divisions.

This begs the question raised by Gen. March as to whether the NA divisions could have been used in combat earlier. After the war, March claimed that both he and the War Department believed,

> that these men from the United States obtained by the draft and trained in our camps, who were eager to get on the firing line, could have been utilized in the fighting very much sooner than they were with marked advantage both to the United States and our Allies.[58]

March blamed Pershing's training plan saying, "I believed that entirely too much time was spent on the training considered necessary by General Pershing before he permitted a man to be sent to the firing line in France."[59]

"The practical effect of the Pershing policy," opined March,

> was that large bodies of American troops, divisions whose morale was at the highest point, who had had from four to six months in camps in America, and who expected on arrival in France to be thrown into battle immediately, found the keen edge of their enthusiasm dulled by having to go over again and again drills and training they had already undergone in America.[60]

It was more complicated than that. The performance of each American combat division hinged upon how they were trained, led, and how much they learned in combat. The American army used questionable doctrine and training in 1917 and 1918. While

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
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General Pershing insisted on a doctrine of "Open Warfare"—breaking the German trench lines through fire and maneuver and then advancing campaign-style to victory—most NA soldiers had been trained in trench warfare, yet there was precious little of that. Prior to deployment, most NA divisions were repeatedly stripped of troops for use as replacements before finally deploying themselves, meaning that a good number of their soldiers lacked training. This error was compounded when green NA divisions were committed to combat in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns that ended the war.[61]

Still, National Army divisions began making a name for themselves during the St. Mihiel Offensive of 12 September 1918. It was here that the 89th, 90th, and 82d Divisions, deployed with four veteran divisions, experienced their first combat, while the 78th, 80th, and 91st Divisions were initially placed in reserve to help.[62] The unexpected American attack was a stunning victory and secured the 200-square mile St. Mihiel salient: "It may have represented the high point of the AEF."[63]

However victorious, many believed that Pershing had overcommitted himself. Concluding the St. Mihiel campaign on 16 September, he had promised the Allies he would then conduct the large-scale Meuse-Argonne Offensive, some fifty miles away, on 26 September. This left his most experienced combat divisions—the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d—unable to disengage and out of sector for the impending attack.

According to General March, this compelled Pershing to discard his training program and "shove men into the fighting just as fast as he could get them."[64] Instead of veteran divisions, the Meuse-Argonne campaign used new divisions. In fact, seven of nine attacking divisions had barely completed their training in France, and of these, five lacked combat experience.[65] Of the nine attacking divisions, four were National Army. Among them was the hapless 79th Division, which was ordered to attack the most difficult and defended position on the entire



42d Division soldiers man their trenches near Baccarat, c. 1918



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American troops pass through Montfaucon, c. 1918

front—Montfaucon, nicknamed "Little Gibraltar." General Pershing believed that "green troops were bursting with enthusiasm and bored by their long stay in the training camps," and the 79th was therefore assigned to "fix" the enemy to the front of Montfaucon, while the veteran 4th Division on the 79th's right flank would advance beyond the objective and execute a left turn, capturing Montfaucon from behind.[66] It never happened. The III Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Bullard, creatively reinterpreted the 4th Division's orders, commanding it to ignore its flanks and move forward. This failure, interpreted by some as betrayal, eventually resulted in over 3,500 casualties during two days of combat for the 79th. Stalled in front of Montfaucon, the concept of "One Army" was torpedoed by Pershing and his staff, who believed a National Army division was holding up the entire First Army, and with it the entire Meuse-Argonne Offensive. However, this was far from the truth. The misuse of the 79th in the attack and General Bullard's disregard of the battle plan remained contentious throughout the interwar period.

Eventually, the 79th did capture Montfaucon, and the 80th Division of Bullard's III Corps made respectable gains. The 80th participated in all three phases of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the only NA division to do so, earning the sobriquet "Only Moves Forward." The 77th, 91st, and 89th Divisions would also fight well. Unfortunately, Pershing, who had achieved a strategic surprise on 26 September, now had to contend with German reinforcements who shattered his dream of a breakthrough and open warfare.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive would be a grinding battle of attrition for forty-seven straight days. It would be the NA's trial by fire as well as its major contribution to American victory. The NA would incur 37 percent of the battle's casualties, more than any other component.[67] Its use as a strategic reserve made victory possible.

In a war of attrition, battle metrics meant little. Nevertheless, the Army of 1918 attempted to measure success based on numbers: the number of miles advanced, the number prisoners and equipment captured, and tragically, the number of casualties a division endured—which for some signified fighting prowess. By any measure, National Army divisions fared about as well as most divisions in the AEF. Historian Mark Groteleuschen assessed the combat ability of all AEF divisions, saying:

> Often they did so sloppily, recklessly, occasionally even ineptly; but nevertheless, when American units fought on the defensive, they were rarely thrown back; and when they attacked, they usually moved forward. Though they often suffered more casualties than they should have, ultimately they pushed the Germans back and meted out much punishment along the way.[68]

The first NA division to arrive in France, the 77th, endured 25 percent more casualties than any National Army division, likely because it was on the ground longer. It advanced a total of forty-four miles during the war, followed by the 89th Division with thirty miles. In fact, the NA divisions won the component race, advancing 178 miles compared to the NG's 175 and the RA's 128. Days on the front line, however, tell a different story. National Guard divisions totaled 1,095 days, the Regular Army 678 days and the National Army 675—but these statistics are next to meaningless. Time, leaders, terrain, training, and most certainly

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General LeJeune, c. 1920

ceived over 80,000 men during its time in cantonment. Men reported, were trained, and suddenly were reassigned elsewhere, much to the frustration of cadre who then had to start training new troops all over again.[70]

Once in Europe, five NA divisions were skeletonized or converted into depot divisions. The 83d Division was the first to experience this practice when it functioned as the 2d Depot Division on 27 June 1918. At the time, it was one of only two depot divisions intended to manage replacements for nine divisions on the line, seven in training, and six arriving in France.[71] In August, the 76th Division arrived and served as the 3d Depot Division, followed by the 85th Division, which performed as the 4th Depot Division. The 84th and 86th Divisions fared differently: the 84th was broken up, sending its men to the 1st and 2d Depot Divisions, while the 86th was skeletonized, transferring men to the 2d Depot Division and some units to the Service of Supply.[72]

The 83d and 85th Divisions each detached an infantry regiment to entirely different theaters of war. The 332d Infantry of the 83d Division was detached and deployed to Italy to boost Italian morale. It kept the Germans and Austro-Hungarians guessing about where the AEF would strike next. In October 1918, it participated in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.[73] The 85th Division provided the 339th Infantry and support units for the Northern Russian Expedition. Calling themselves the "Polar Bears," the regiment's troops supported a complex mission that resulted from confusion caused by Russia's exit from the war in 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War.[74]

For reasons not fully explained, the 91st Division received orders on 15 October 1918 to move to Belgium under the command of the French VII Corps. Most American officers, especially Maj. Gen. John LeJeune of the 2d Division, were not impressed with French *élan* or leadership in late 1918. LeJeune's beloved 2d had paid a stiff price in a joint attack on Blanc Mont when slow-moving French divisions exposed the 2d's left and right flanks to German counterattack. Incensed, LeJeune threatened to resign if his division had to fight alongside the French in any future offensives.[75] This may explain why the 91st found itself the lone NA division under French command so late in the war. Arriving at the end of October, the 91st took part in the Ypres-Lys Offensive until the armistice. No other NA division would again serve under foreign command.

The Strategic Contribution of 1919

Significantly, the NA played a strategic role in the outcome of the war. While the RA built additional divisions (9 through 20) for deployment, eight NA divisions, numbers 94 through 101 were equally in some state of organization and/or training when the war ended.[76] These twenty additional combat divisions, of which eight NA were a part, were intended for the Summer-Fall offensives of 1919 that would end the war. The Germans most certainly knew about them. A casual reading of the military's *Army Navy Register* reveals assignment orders for key officers



General Cochran, 1918

and staff to the divisions. For example, Brig. Gen. William B. Cochran was no doubt eager to leave Camp Gordon to assume command of a brigade of Nebraska and Missouri infantry—soon to become part of the 100th Division organizing at Camp Bowie, Texas.[77] Pershing and the Allies had begun 1918 with the expectation that the war could not be won until 1919; had this been the case, the fielding of these divisions signaled the end of the war for Germany. The existence of this strategic force-in-embryo was yet another reason for German capitulation.

The Creation of the Organized Reserve, 1920: From Individual to Unit

On 11 November 1918 the Great War ended. The soldiers of the National Army were transported home, most discharged without parades, and left to resume their lives. While in France, the men created division-level associations to host reunions and assist soldiers making the transition back to civilian life. Unfortunately, this is as far as they went; with the exception of the American Legion—a mix of RA, NG, and NA members—no NA lobbying organization was

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formed.[78] Meanwhile, Congressional committees gathered in 1919 to revise and update the 1916 National Defense Act, at first considering a plan known as the "Baker-March Bill."[79] Military leaders and others testified before Congress, among them Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan of the National Guard Association. O'Ryan and the National Security League proposed a new component—"a great citizen army, to be known as the national guard corps." They suggested thirty divisions, functioning as a separate component of the United States Army under the direction of the Secretary of War.[80] Such an entity eliminated any requirement for a federally controlled Reserve Corps or National Army as had occurred in 1917.

Into the fray stepped Col. John McAuley Palmer. Testifying before Congress, Palmer sought to "perpetuate the citizen army of the World War."[81] He considered the National Guard an "organized citizen army" which, if placed under federal control, could simultaneously serve both state and nation. He well understood the Regular Army's desire to have a federal component it could directly control. He also sympathized with veterans who admitted that "if we go back to a vague reserve status like our present reserve corps . . . we are through." Palmer also believed that "the designation of previously existing local units having records in former wars . . . [like the one just concluded]," could be used as a basis of organization.[82] General Pershing sided with Palmer:

> We have a very great asset in our trained units that have had experience in the war. I am referring to the units of the National Guard and so-called National Army. They have returned with traditions, with a history, with pride of service, all of which makes a very valuable asset in any organization that is to be used as a basis for training. I think those divisions should be continued in existence with the officers that served with them, retaining them in the rank they had as far as their efficiency proved that they were capable of performing the duties of their respective ranks; and **I would hold those divisions and designate them as reserve divisions** [author's emphasis] into which could be put the young men as they left the training camps. I would try to get together the officers and men who formerly composed these divisions; by so doing the traditions and the esprit of those organizations would be kept alive for the rest of time.[83]

While the proposal was pragmatic in thought, the devil was in the details. The plan Palmer championed advocated a system of Universal Military Training (UMT) that would assign newly trained soldiers directly into the World War I-era divisions—National Guard and National Army—on an equal basis. Upon completion of training, the recruit "would be enrolled for four years in one of the local units of the National Guard or the Organized Reserve [NA divisions] formed in the vicinity of his home."[84] Palmer, and likely Pershing, well understood that the "whole of the new citizen army would have been strictly a Federal force entirely free from the complicated dual system status of the militia clause of the Constitution."[85]

Palmer's concept did not survive scrutiny; Congress would torpedo the plan as too expensive, and the National Guard would rally to defend their prewar status. The newly elected president of the National Guard Association of the United States, Lt. Col. Bennett C. Clark, son of the Democratic Speaker of the House, Champ Clark, was especially vocal, telling adherents in St. Louis, "It is the aim of all of us to build up the national guard and smash the regular army."[86] Other allies boldly asserted that the Guard did most of the fighting during the war and that the conscription requirement in the proposed "National Defense Act" would force many four-month recruits into the Regular Army for a year to make up for a lack of volunteers. The National Guard "is alive to the efforts of the regular army to foist legislation thru congress which

General O'Ryan, 1918



Bennett Clark during training at Fort Myer in 1917



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Courtesy of the College Archives and Special Collections, Williams College

Colonel Whittlesey, c. 1918

will place all control of military affairs with the regular army and eventually kill off the guard," warned the *Evening Times-Republican* (Marshalltown, Iowa) deep from within the American heartland.[87]

The Guard would gradually tone down its rhetoric, but in the face of Guard distrust and fiscal constraint, Palmer reluctantly threw out UMT and replaced it with a volunteer system. Congress, he parsed, "therefore decided that the new citizen army should be formed in two separate lines, a first line to include the wartime divisions of the National Guard; and a second line, the Organized Reserves, to include the wartime divisions of the National Army."[88]

On 4 June 1920, the 1916 National Defense Act was amended. It created an Organized Reserve (OR), which incorporated the divisions of the National Army and the prewar Officer Reserve and Enlisted Reserve Corps.[89] *The Army Navy Register* was quick to explain the 1920 Act, saying "each component will have a fixed mission and an equally important role. . . . The Organized Reserve is distinctly a war force. In time of peace it will be maintained [as a] skeletonized organization or cadre, capable in an emergency of broad expansion."[90]

To man the former NA divisions, General Pershing issued a call to his 203,786 officers of the Great War to rejoin their old divisions as reserve officers. Over 87,000 officers enthusiastically responded with an additional 12,000 applications kept on file—an extraordinary response. Men like Lt. Col. Charles W. Whittlesey, commander of the famous "Lost Battalion," wasted no time soliciting his wartime comrades to rejoin the 77th Division.

While far from perfect, the Army's intent was to man OR divisions with their full complement of officers, plus one-third of their senior enlisted soldiers, all in a nonpay status except when doing two weeks of annual training. In the event of a war, each division would fill the lower ranks with trained draftees and deploy. Meanwhile, OR divisions were established in nine Army Corps areas throughout the country, close to where the original NA divisions had received draftees in 1917.[91] "As the Organized Reserves [*sic*] are distinctly a war force and will attract a class of citizens who do not feel inclined or are unable to undertake the obligations assumed by members of the National Guard," explained the *Army Navy Register*, "it will be maintained as a cadre of a skeletonized force." And, perhaps recalling the NA and NG differences of 1918, the *Register* optimistically predicted, "there will be no competition between it and the National Guard."[92]

Standing up the new OR took time, but eventually the old NA divisions were manned and quasi-functional. For example, the 81st "Wild Cats" headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee, quickly filled 100 percent of their officer slots by 1922, while other divisions did the same or came close.

The National Army had become the new Organized Reserve. A memorandum for the adjutant general of the Army, dated 8 July 1922, stated:

> National Army regimental colors which are available will be re-issued to the proper regiments of the Organized Reserves. Pending the adoption of regimental arms and mottos regimental colors will be issued from the stock now on hand with the old crest by the Minute Man crest.[93]

The Legacy of the National Army

Without the National Army of 1917–1919, today's Army Reserve might not exist. Prior to the First World War, a small Officer and Enlisted Reserve Corps provided technical specialists to RA and NG units as individual soldier augmentees. Some sources incorrectly reported "The Army Reserve Corps numbered 4,000 enlisted men and no officers" at the start of the war.[94] Right or wrong, the Reserve Corps remained insignificant to many prior to 1917.

In fact, depending upon which prewar plans are examined, congressional leadership usually leaned toward expanding the National Guard while adding more federal control. It took a war emergency demanding millions of men in 1917 to change this, and even here, there were some who promoted the idea of simply expanding NG divisions and putting draftees directly into them. Only a series of mishaps, poor interactions, and misunderstandings between the NG and RA dating back to 1898 prevented this—the RA convinced itself it had to have a federal component it could directly control. For the Organized Reserve, this was a window of opportunity.


Equally fortunate for the Army Reserve was the fact that NA divisions assumed the characteristics of a component during the Great War. The divisions developed unit esprit de corps and a special pride in being NA officers and soldiers. They had been trained and led by a small cadre of RA officers and large numbers of USR officers who had made them in their own image. They knew little about the training camp experiences of the RA and NG components and were repeatedly told they were a uniquely democratic and egalitarian force—exceptional in all respects. Considering the fact that the National Army was the reserve the United States failed to build before the war, moving the NA divisions and their structure to the Organized Reserve seemed logical and pragmatic. In 1920, it could have ended differently; Maj. Gen. O'Ryan's proposal to create a NG corps of thirty divisions

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was only one of several plans that might have relegated the Army Reserve to a minor or nonexistent role.

With the movement of NA divisions to the OR, the Army Reserve had officially moved from individual reserve soldiers to reserve soldiers in units. This institutional change moved the Army Reserve in a direction from which there was no going back. One hundred years later, the lineage of the National Army continues to permeate today's Army Reserve. Many of today's USAR units use the same regimental numbering system and wear the same unit patches that were designed in 1917 and 1918. Every OR division, plus additional divisions, were reactivated in World War II, and like those of 1917–1919, were filled with draftees who went on to win a war. It is their lineage and heritage we celebrate today, and the National Army lineage undoubtedly gave us heroes: Lt. Col. Charles Whittlesey of the 77th's "Lost Battalion," Sgt. Alvin York of the 82d "All American" Division, and Medal of Honor recipients such as Cpl. Freddie Stowers of the 371st Infantry, National Army.[95] It is indeed a heritage worth commemorating.

AH



Courtesy of the American Battle Monuments Commission

The gravestone of Medal of Honor recipient Freddie Stowers at the Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery



Library of Congress

In the Wire, by Eyre Powell. Powell, chief of Union Pacific Press Bureau, was attached to the 89th Division in France in 1918.

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NOTES

1. Julius Ochs Adler, *History of the Seventy-Seventh Division, August 25th, 1917–November 11th, 1918* (New York: W. H. Crawford Company, 1919), p. 209.

2. Stimson served as Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913 and again from 1940 to 1945.

3. The U.S. Army consisted of 9,693 officers and 203,864 enlisted men. "The U.S. Army in World War I Fact Sheet," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History [hereafter cited as CMH], accessed 6 June 2017, http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/wwi/_documents/WWI_Fact_Sheet.pdf); A. Scott Berg, *Wilson* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2013), p. 440.

4. This author discovered no publication which specifically discusses the National Army as a distinct entity within the United States Army of 1917–1919, nor are there any articles that examine the NA as a functional component similar or equal to the RA and NG.

5. *Harrisburg Telegraph* (Harrisburg, Pa.), 10 Feb 1917. Two significant plans were the Stimson plan and Continental Army plan.

6. John McAuley Palmer, *America in Arms* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 161.

7. "The National Army," *New York Times*, 4 Aug 1917.

8. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War, Vol. I* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), p. 130.

9. The 1916 Act authorized the president to draft NG soldiers as individuals. No units of the prewar NG were mobilized. Instead, NG soldiers were put into newly organized divisions numbering 26 through 42.

10. The Regular Army initially stood up eight divisions numbered 1 through 8. The National Army fielded sixteen divisions plus two African-American divisions, the 92d and 93d. Organization, planning, and limited numbers of troops filled National Army divisions 94–101, but none deployed due to the war's end.

11. *The State* (Columbia, S.C.), 1 Feb 1918. National Army brigade numbering began at 151, infantry regimental numbers began at 301 and up. Each 27,000-man division consisted of two brigades and four regiments (two per brigade), making it what they called a square division. The Army also launched a short-lived scheme to field fifteen NA cavalry regiments, publishing the names of the first seven commanders. These regiments—the 301st–315th CAV. NA—were eventually converted to artillery units.

12. Captain X [Edward Lyle Fox], *Our First Half Million: The Story of Our National Army* (New York: The H. K. Fly Company Publishers, 1918), p. 25.

13. Joseph H. Odell, "The New Spirit of the New Army," *The Outlook*, 23 Jan 1918.

14. The Army originally planned for 961 RA NCOs to serve with each NA division, but the number kept being reduced.

15. Skinner used 81st Division personnel lists from May and June 1918. Other commissions in the 81st were labeled National Army commissions, a mix of internal promotion, NG, and RA soldier promotions.

16. *The State* (Columbia, S.C.), 29 Apr 1918.

17. Ibid.

18. "War May Rid U.S. of Race Hatred," *Washington Times*, 12 Jan 1918.

19. *New York Times*, 7 Apr 1917. For more on George Creel see Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Mobilization* (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1955), Chapter X, "Influence of Propaganda and Censorship on Mobilization in World War I."

20. Captain X [Fox], *Our First Half Million*, pp. 75–76.

21. The 93d Division consisted of drafted African-American National Guardsman organized into three regiments. The 93d is officially listed as a National Army division. Its division headquarters was never organized and all its regiments were assigned to the French Army during the war.

22. *New York Sun*, 31 Mar 1918, (Section 6, Book Reviews), pp. 10, 12.

23. Fox was discovered to be the author by cross-referencing other books and articles. He always dedicated his work to his wife, Eleanor Ward Fox or "EWF." Fox was later dismissed from the Army and became the subject of Senate testimony during December 1918 investigations of pro-German activity in America. Although Capt. George Lester of the Military Intelligence Division testified that Fox was a loyal soldier, Fox's life as a writer was over. He died 20 January 1920, and his obituary requested that no flowers be sent.

24. Captain X [Fox], *Our First Half Million*, p. 84.

25. "Home-Reading Course for Citizen-Soldiers," *Public Ledger* (Maysville, Ky.), 12 Sep 1917.

26. Captain X [Fox], *Our First Half Million*, p. ix.

27. As with most organizations, not every soldier would enthusiastically embrace the cause, the draft, or the National Army. See Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2005), which discusses anti-conscription, opposition to the war, and more.

28. Captain X [Fox], *Our First Half Million*, p. 124.

29. Les' Andrii Melnyk, "A True National Guard: The Development of The National Guard and its Influence on Defense Legislation, 1915–1933" (Ph.D. diss., The City University of New York, 2004). Melnyk states that on average, draftees composed 25 percent each NG division.

30. "Making Vice Unpopular in Camp," *New York Times*, 16 Dec 1917.

31. For an excellent overview of Progressive efforts in the cantonments see, Nancy Gentile Ford, *Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2009), pp. 88–111.

32. John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration, and Opinion in the United States, 1915–1920* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), p. 337.

33. Ibid.

34. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, pp.130–31.

35. Captain X [Fox], *Our First Half Million*, p. 17.

36. The African-American 93d Division is not included in this count. While officially designated an NA division, three-quarters of the division were black National Guardsmen.

37. Odell, "The New Spirit of the New Army."

38. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Bailey, "Democratic Fighting Force is National Army," *The State* (Columbia, S.C.), 29 Apr 1918.

39. Ibid. A great number of RA officers did not respect the NG, before, during, or after the war. After the war, Pershing would apologize on behalf of the RA saying, "The National Guard never received the wholehearted support of the Regular Army during the World War. There was always more or less a prejudice against them." Quoted in Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000*, (Department of the Army Pamphlet 130–1, November 2001), p. 187.

40. *Topeka State Journal*, 12 Mar 1918.

41. "Claim Drafted Men Outdistanced Guards," *The Topeka State Journal*, 12 Mar 1918.

42. "The Importance of Music in Military Training," *The State*, 8 Jan 1918.

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43. "Asks for Just Judgement of the National Guard," *The State*, 25 Aug 1918.

44. *New York Tribune*, 23 Mar 1918; "Original Plan Abandoned," *New York Tribune*, 22 May 1918.

45. There are several reasons for this; the most likely is the uncertainty as to how NA and NG divisions would perform in combat.

46. *New York Times*, 25 Aug 1918.

47. War Department, GO 73, 7 Aug 1918, RG 165 (War Department and Special Staff), Chief of Staff General Correspondence 1918–1921, Box No. 10, National Archives Record Administration, Washington, D.C.

48. Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1932), p. 3.

49. *New York Times*, 1 Aug 1918.

50. The AEF was working the thirty-division plan to bring one million men to France by 31 December 1918. An eighty-division plan was in the planning stages when the war ended. See Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Mobilization*, pp. 298–306.

51. "Only One U.S. Army," *New York Times*, 11 Aug 1918. Boldface inserted by author.

52. The Army would implement a total draftee army, prohibiting voluntary enlistments the next day, 8 August 1918.

53. Melnyk, *A True National Guard*, p. 99. Melnyk comments that March and Baker considered General Order No. 73 "among the greatest achievements of their wartime tenure." See also March, *The Nation at War*, p. 5. March mentions that Army unification had come up before; Secretary Baker had discussed it with then-Army Chief of Staff General Hugh L. Scott, who had opposed it. March reports that Baker commented of GO No. 73, "there is no order . . . [that] gives me more pleasure to sign than this."

54. "Whitman's Request Denied by Governor," *The State*, 20 Oct 1918.

55. Edwin L. James, "Upton Division Gallant in Action," *New York Times*, 24 Aug 1918.

56. Adler, *History of the Seventy-Seventh Division*, p. 32.

57. "Upton Men Like Veterans," *New York Times*, 8 Aug 1918.

58. March, *The Nation At War*, pp. 260–61.

59. Ibid., p. 256.

60. Ibid., p. 258.

61. In many instances NA divisions did not receive the "mandatory" three months training in France that had been ordered by Pershing.

62. The three divisions account for more time in a sector defense than any other NA divisions except the 92d, which was poorly utilized in battle. The veteran divisions were the 1st, 2d, 5th, and 42d.

63. Mark E. Groteleuschen, "The Doughboys Make Good: American Victories at St. Mihiel and Blanc Mont Ridge," *Army History* 87 (Spring 2013): 13.

64. Ibid.

65. William T. Walker Jr., *Betrayal at Little Gibraltar* (New York: Scribner, 2016), pp. 62, 99. Four divisions would get newly assigned artillery regiments with which they had never trained.

66. Ibid., p. 63. The 79th was assessed as having less training time than any division in the AEF. General March's belief that "a short polishing in training" was all that a NA division required was disproved.

67. Meuse-Argonne casualties by component: NA 37 percent, NG 34 percent, RA 29 percent.

68. Groteleuschen, "The Doughboys Make Good," p. 8.

69. *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe: A History, Guide, and Reference Book* (American Battle Monuments Commission, U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter cited as GPO], 1938), p. 515

70. Richard S. Faulkner, "'There is a limit to human endurance': The Challenges to Morale in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign," Edward G. Lengel, ed., *A Companion to the Meuse Argonne Campaign* (West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 2014), p. 291.

71. Leonard L. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, (U.S. Army CMH Pub. 104–9, U.S. GPO, Facsimile Edition, 1982, 1988), pp. 212–13.

72. Ibid., pp. 221–24.

73. *Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces* (Washington D.C., U.S. GPO, 1920), pp. 54–55.

74. Ibid.

75. Maj. Bryan L. Woodcock, "The 91st Infantry in World War I–Analysis of an AEF Division's Efforts to Achieve Battlefield Success" (Student thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013).

76. The 94th Division, aka the "Neuf-Cats" or "Neuf-Quarte" (French for "Nine-Four"), was to be a segregated Puerto Rican division modeled after the 93d Division in which only the regiments were organized. The organization of the 373d through 375th regiments was underway, but was slowed due to a lack of Spanish-speaking officers.

77. "Fort Gordon Notes," *Army Navy Register*, 2 Nov 1918, p. 498.

78. The Reserve Officer Association would be formed in 1923, too late to influence National Defense Act amendments of 1920.

79. The bill proposed by Secretary of War Baker and Chief of Staff March advocated a 500,000-man Regular Army as well as universal military training. The bill was ill-conceived and poorly presented, likely to fail on its own merit with the opposition of the National Guard.

80. "Bases New Army on Militia." *Washington Post*, 31 Aug 1919.

81. Palmer, *America In Arms*, p. 168.

82. Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, pp. 353, 345.

83. Ibid., p. 354. Bold emphasis added by author.

84. Palmer, *America in Arms*, p. 174.

85. Ibid., p. 170.

86. *The Logan Republican* (Logan, Utah), 8 May 1919. For a detailed discussion of the 1920 National Defense Act and how the RA and NG ultimately compromised, consult Melnyk, *A True National Guard*.

87. *Evening Times-Republican* (Marshalltown, Iowa), 1 Sep 1919.

88. Palmer, *America in Arms*, p. 171.

89. OR strength would hover around 100,000 (mostly officers) during the interwar period. Lt. Col. (Ret.) Steven E. Clay would remark in *U.S. Army Order of Battle 1919–1941, Vol. 1; The Arms: Major Commands and Infantry Organizations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2010), p. 4, "Due to political maneuvers by N.G. lobbyists, the authorized strength of O.R. units was set at 100 percent wartime strength for officers, but only 33 percent wartime strength for enlisted personnel."

90. *Army Navy Register*, 11 Sep 1920, p. 564.

91. One useful feature of the OR was that every college ROTC program assigned its newly commissioned officers directly into a nearby OR division.

92. *Army Navy Register*, 11 Sep 1920, p. 564.

93. Memo in possession of the U.S. Army Reserve Command History Office.

94. *The Sun* (New York), 2 Jun 1918. This report was not correct; the Medical Reserve Corps alone boasted several hundred doctors beginning with its establishment in 1908.

95. Nine Medal of Honor recipients can be found in the ranks of the 89th Division—a two-way tie for the second-highest number.

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U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT

NEW IN PRINT

THE GREAT WAR: U.S. ARMY ART

BY DEBORAH A. STULTZ

The U.S. Army Center of Military History is marking the World War I Centennial in many ways, and the publication of *The Great War: U.S. Army Art* is one of them. The book showcases pieces from the Army Art Program, which is also observing its own one hundredth anniversary.



World War I was the first time the Army recruited artists and sent them into combat. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers as captains, the Army instructed eight artists to record the American Expeditionary Forces' activities during the Great War. Eyewitness artists outside the program soon followed them to Europe. Their works give us a sense of poignancy and emotion that cannot be captured by photography.

Through the book's pages, we can step into the atmosphere of the war: from the embarkation of troops, to the factories producing armaments, to the frontline trenches, to evacuation hospitals, to the home front. The reader feels the despondency of war refugees, and aches alongside a suffering soldier.

The book also presents propaganda posters that the Division of Pictorial Publicity commissioned to support the war effort. The division recruited the top artists and illustrators of the time to quickly and effectively convey the government's message: enlist, buy bonds, and conserve food.

General editor Sarah G. Forgey, Chief of Art, Army Museum Enterprise, guides us through the artwork. She shares insights into the artists and their artworks as only a curator can. Photographer Pablo Jimenez-Reyes took great care to accurately record the artworks for the book. Former Army Staff Artist Gene Snyder designed the beautiful volume.

Shown here are some pages from this important book. The volume will be available in November 2018 and can be purchased by itself or as part of a handsome boxed set with its companion, *The Great War: U.S. Army Artifacts*.

Deborah A. Stultz is an editor at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

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Storming Machine Gun
Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France
1918
Charcoal and pastel on paper, 18⅛" × 27¼"

Harding followed the tanks into battle during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive from their launching point at Avocourt and he continued to document their activities until he could no longer keep up. His notes from the period are disjointed impressions, meant to recall feelings and images when he later revisited them: "the dead Boche near dugout, the long stream of blood, the shells arriving as we sat there."[6]

[6] Krass, *Portrait of War*, p. 229.



Smith sketched this view of Cantigny from the vantage point of the Americans. He later reflected that "at the end of this dispute over which of us should have Cantigny, there was very little of Cantigny to have. The drawing will verify this statement. The sketch was made in the direction in which our troops made their attack, and it shows to some extent the advantage that the possession of this town had, situated, as it was, on a hill, over troops that were dug-in below it. And that is exactly why we took it."[10]


[10] Ibid., p. 45.

Cantigny
Cantigny, France
1918
Gouache and pencil on paper, 8¼" × 11¼"


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This impressionistic rendering of a medic carrying a wounded soldier to safety is one of Woolf's most moving World War I pieces. He spoke very highly of the spirit of the American soldiers: "Everyone conveys the impression that he is there for the business of helping to win the war, and, after the American fashion, nothing is permitted to interfere. The boys are fine specimens of manhood, physically and mentally."[9]

[9] Ibid.



A Trench Ambulance on the Firing Line
France
1918
Oil on canvas, 30" × 22"



The Observer
France
1918
Etching on paper, 9⅛" × 12⅛"

This etching depicting a concealed observer could almost be viewed as a self-portrait. As the holder of a pass allowing him to travel where American troops were located and to record their activities, Hornby's primary role was as an observer. The artist took this task to heart, recording such details as the camouflage concealing this soldier, while creating works of art.

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Scott again removes all traces of individuality from the soldiers he depicts in this drawing, outfitting them in full gear and gas masks. Their enlarged eyes appear to glow, adding to the alien-like mood of this scene.

Machine Gunners
France
1918
Pencil and crayon on paper, 12" × 18"

This colorful image of a diving American biplane presents a romantic view of the Air Service, which began the war with only 131 officers and 1,087 enlisted men. Expanding and training troops quickly, despite slow production of aircraft, the Air Service had grown to over 78,000 by the signing of the armistice.[4]

[4] The total strength of the Air Service as of 11 November 1918 was 7,726 officers and 70,769 men. Of these, 6,861 officers and 51,229 men were then in France; Shipley Thomas, *The History of the A.E.F.* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), p. 385.



Join the Air Service and Serve in France
J. Paul Verrees, 1917
Color lithograph on paper, 37" × 25"

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FRENCH INFANTRY MUSKET

M1728 (CHARLEVILLE)

BY PAUL MORANDO

During the Revolutionary War, the French provided substantial military and logistical support to help secure an American victory over the British. The import of weapons and other materiel, including thousands of "Charleville" muskets, proved crucial in winning the war and solidified France's commitment to American independence. The early years of the revolution saw a shortage of arms in the colonies, partially due to Britain's 1774 ban on firearms imports and later its seizure of firearms and gunpowder. Along with the Intolerable Acts, the confiscation of arms from American colonists greatly contributed to the outbreak of war in April 1775. The following year, the Continental Congress formed a secret committee to purchase weapons from France. By 1778, when France openly entered the war, they were shipping muskets directly to America.


The example featured here is a French .69-caliber M1728 Infantry Musket popularly referred to as a Charleville musket. It will be on exhibit in the "Founding the Nation" gallery of the National Museum of the United States Army. The display consists of eighteenth-century weapons and artifacts that highlight the "Beginnings of the Army" during the American Revolution.

What makes this particular musket unique is that it is the only known example related to the state of Delaware. The barrel is marked on the face with "DEL. State N.C. no 94" and the wood stock is branded "DEL. STATE N.C." These markings refer to the State Arsenal in New Castle, Delaware, which still stands today. This weapon would have been manufactured in one of three French arsenals: Charleville, Mauberge, or St. Etienne. This model was the second version of the musket, which was first adopted in 1717. The main difference between the two was that the barrel of the M1728 was attached to the stock by three bands rather than just one. This modification became the standard for all versions that followed. Later, the M1763 Charleville musket served as a model for the first American Springfield musket made in 1795.

Approximately 375,000 M1728s were produced in France, but it is unknown how many came to North America. What is known is that the Charleville musket was a key weapon for American soldiers and a fitting symbol of France's unwavering support of America's fight against British colonial rule.

Paul Morando is the chief of exhibits at the National Museum of the United States Army.

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KESTERNICH





The Battle that Saved the Bulge

By Douglas E. Nash Sr.

he Battle of Bulge, the epic confrontation between American forces and the armies of the Third Reich ook place from 16 December until 28 January 1945, was the st land battle ever fought by the Army. In terms of the number of anks, and cannon committed to ttle, as well as the number of ca- s on both sides, nothing before can compare. Of the 610,000 o took part in the campaign, 395 Americans were killed, d, or missing.[1] It was the last Adolf Hitler's once-vaunted *cht*, making its final attempt e Germany's dwindling for- th a daring offensive designed to split the U.S.-British coalition with a strike by two panzer armies through the Ardennes toward the strategic port of Antwerp.

Hitler himself envisaged the attack in September 1944 as the answer to Nazi Germany's seemingly unsolvable strategic dilemma. The Führer believed that if only he could deal a devastating blow to the Allies, he could knock them out of the war and then turn once more to the East where his troops could then administer a crushing defeat upon the steadily approaching Red Army. The forces for such an operation, which the *Wehrmacht* planning staff estimated would require thirty divisions, ten of which would be armored, would have to be carefully gathered and concealed to achieve strategic surprise when they launched the attack in November 1944.[2] For a variety of reasons, including tank production and delivery schedules, delays in fuel procurement, and last but not least, the Allies' insistence on attacking toward Aachen in the north and Colmar in the south, Hitler's grandiose *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine) offensive was finally rescheduled for 16 December.[3]

The various accounts of the American triumph in the Ardennes usually recognize the valiant stand at Bastogne by the 101st Airborne Division and the equally gallant delaying action of the 7th Armored

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National Archives

General Middleton, c. December 1944



U.S. Army

Bruce C. Clarke, shown here as a lieutenant general, c. 1955



National Archives

General McAuliffe, c. February 1945

Division at St. Vith. Historians also acknowledge lesser-known encounters at Elsenborn, Lutzkampen, and Diekirch and other desperate holding actions by the 2d, 99th, 106th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. All these engagements, large and small, combined to slow and finally stall the German offensive, robbing it of its momentum and, most of all, the precious time upon which the operation relied for success. The stories of sacrifice by thousands of American soldiers during the Battle of the Bulge are legion, as are the commanders who led them, such as Generals Troy H. Middleton, Bruce C. Clarke, Anthony C. McAuliffe and George S. Patton, to name a few. But if one were to mention the Battles of Kesternich and Monschau and the names Parker and Dolph, most historians, or the few remaining veterans of the Battle of the Bulge for that matter, would likely scratch their heads and wonder why these places and names are even relevant today and what connection they have with the better-known battle—their battle—that raged to the south. But the fighting that occurred in

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Field Marshal Model, c. 1944



General Dietrich, c. 1944



General Manteuffel, c. 1944

these two locations, particularly Kesternich, which at the time many considered an American defeat, constituted nothing less than the battle that saved the Bulge.

To understand the vital role that the Battle of Kesternich played in the overall context of the Battle of the Bulge, an understanding of the German concept of the operation is essential. Hitler's plan, to be executed by Field Marshal Walter Model's *Army Group B*, envisioned that the main effort, consisting of *Schutzstaffel* (SS) General Sepp Dietrich's *Sixth Panzer Army* with nine divisions—including four panzer divisions—would punch through thin American defenses in the Schnee-Eifel region. The Germans would then begin a right-wheeling movement that would quickly reach the Meuse River, taking Liege in stride and quickly push on toward Antwerp, capturing that city and isolating British Army Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group in only seven days. On the left, Lt. Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, with four panzer and three infantry divisions, would command the supporting effort, *Fifth Panzer Army*, which would protect Dietrich's left flank as it advanced, reaching the Meuse at Namur before terminating its advance at Brussels. The other supporting effort, consisting of Lt. Gen. Erich Brandenberger's *Seventh Army* with six infantry divisions, would push out toward the southwest and seize defensible terrain facing south to block any attempt by General Patton's Third Army to attack the German flank. Six to seven divisions would be in *Army Group B* reserve, and the entire offensive would be supported by a massive amount of artillery and rocket batteries—the largest concentration of German firepower ever seen in the West.[4]

During the early stages of the plan's development, the German chain of command recognized the crucial importance of protecting *Sixth Panzer Army's* right flank, which would be vulnerable to any American counterattack originating from the Aachen area through the road networks converging at the towns of Monschau, Eupen, and Limbourg. Consequently, the mission of protecting this vulnerable asset was assigned to Maj. Gen. Otto von Hitzfeld's *LXVII Corps*, consisting of the *272d Volks-Grenadier Division (VGD)* on the far right (northern) flank and the *326th VGD* on the left. Both would advance simultaneously at dawn on 16 December and seize the area between Monschau in the south and Lammersdorf in the north within five hours.

Both divisions would immediately push on through the Hohes Venn forest toward the Vesdre River at Eupen in another five hours, reaching their objective and going on the defensive between Eupen and the town of Limbourg by the end of the first day.[5] Here, Hitzfeld's corps, codenamed *"Korps Monschau,"* would then dig in, hold firm, and block any attempt by U.S. forces to move through Eupen and attack into the exposed flank of the *I SS Panzer Corps*, which constituted *Sixth Panzer Army's* main effort that would attack through the Losheim Gap. A *Fallschirmjäger* (parachute) battle group led by Col. Friedrich von der Heydte would jump into the Hohes Venn forest the night before the attack to seize key highway intersections to prevent American reinforcements from being brought into play and assist Hitzfeld's attack as necessary, a plan known as Operation *Stösser* (Thruster).[6] Hitzfeld's right flank in the Hürtgen Forest would be covered by the neighboring *LXXIV Corps*, with its *85. Infantrie-division* charged with carrying out limited attacks designed to tie down American forces and prevent them from interfering with the operations of the *272d VGD* to its south.

The overall operations plan for Model's *Army Group B* stressed flank

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Generals Brandenberger and Erich von Manstein confer during Operation BARBAROSSA, June 1941.



General Hitzfeld, c. 1944

protection as a necessary condition for success, as did Hitzfeld's, whose own order emphasized the importance of covering the advance of the armored units on his corps' left. Hitzfeld's order stated, "In fulfillment of this assignment, the corps will defend the Vesdre sector with absolute resoluteness. It will become our new front line!" After providing guidance and zones of attack for each division, the corps' order concluded with the exhortation, "The guiding principle for every action we take: Eyes focused on the right! Onward to Eupen! Onwards [*sic*] to the Vesdre at Eupen and Limburg!"[7]

This emphasis was not lost on his two division commanders, who echoed Hitzfeld's sentiments in their own orders just as forcefully. Should Hitzfeld's two divisions achieve their objectives on time as planned, his corps would then turn right to block any American attempt to shift reinforcements intended to stop the German advance. Corps artillery, engineers, and antitank units would then reinforce the defenses to prevent any American troops from getting through. By sealing off the routes through Monschau, Eupen, and Limbourg from the north, where the bulk of the U.S. First and Ninth Armies were arrayed, any American troop movements intended as reinforcements would then be forced to make a wide, circuitous detour to the west through Namur and Marche.

The road movement distances involved, should the Americans be blocked from moving reinforcements through this area, were significant. Instead of a thirty-mile, one-hour ride in a two-and-a-half-ton truck from Aachen to Malmedy or Elsenborn via Eupen traveling at twenty-five miles per hour, any U.S. reinforcements would have to be diverted westward around the Hohes Venn through Hasselt, Namur, and Marche using other main supply routes before they could arrive in Malmedy. This would necessitate a 180-mile detour requiring at least seven hours in perfect weather conditions with no competing traffic, no refueling or rest stops, and no mechanical breakdowns—conditions that simply did not exist in December 1944.

In reality, a move of such proportions involving an infantry division of 16,000 men would likely require at least ten hours, and that would only apply to the lead regiment. Follow-on elements of the division would need additional time.[8] Units would then need to be unloaded, marshalled, and marched on foot to the desired defensive positions in the Schnee Eifel region, which, given the fluid combat situation that existed during the first several days of the offensive, may take at least ten hours more. Such a move would not only take nearly a day longer than moving through Eupen, but would also place them at some point during their movement in open country, squarely in the path of the oncoming *I SS Panzer Corps*.[9]

Intelligence reports indicated that the fought-out 8th Infantry Division lightly held the ten-mile-wide stretch of the front lines through which the corps would attack between Lammersdorf and Höfen. The 8th had exhausted itself during costly fighting for the towns along the Brandenberg–Bergstein Ridge and Hill 400 during the previous two weeks. The Germans expected this division to limit its activities to local patrolling and absorbing thousands of infantry replacements. To its south lay Col. Cyrus A. Dolph's 102d Mechanized Cavalry Group, a unit that was rich in light armored vehicles but lacking in ground troops to hold its wide defensive sector. To the south near Höfen, Hitzfeld's corps faced a regiment from the untested 99th Infantry Division, which had recently arrived in Europe and tasked


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with occupying a quiet defensive sector stretching from the area south of Monschau to the Losheim Gap. German intelligence analysts believed that it had been sent there to gain combat experience before being committed to battle.[10] Altogether, German military intelligence believed that *LXVII Corps* faced no more than two infantry regiments and a thinly spaced mechanized cavalry group with only two squadrons. They expected little action from the Americans on 16 December, except for occasional combat patrols and harassing artillery fire.[11]

To carry out his attack, Hitzfeld's two infantry divisions would have six infantry regiments with a total of twelve infantry battalions, two division artillery regiments, a *"Volks"* artillery corps with two artillery regiments and two rocket-launcher brigades, as well as combat engineers, antiaircraft, antitank, and assault gun battalions. In all, Hitzfeld's plan as written would hurl over 30,000 men against the American forces in his assigned zone of attack, backed up by over fifty assault guns and tank destroyers, 228 artillery tubes of all calibers, and 108 rocket launchers.[12]


German Federal Archives


Colonel von der Heydte, c. 1944




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The 46-year old Hitzfeld was up to the challenge; an experienced and highly competent leader, he had proven himself as a division commander during the invasion of the Soviet Union where he had earned the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. His two division commanders, Maj. Gen. Eugen König of the *272d VGD* and Brig. Gen. Dr. Erwin Kaschner of the *326th VGD,* were just as experienced and were highly regarded by their contemporaries as combat leaders and tacticians with a wealth of experience fighting both the Red Army and Western Allies. To the south, the *Sixth Panzer Army's* main effort, *I SS Panzer Corps*, would attack between Elsenborn and the Losheim Gap with two infantry divisions making the initial penetration, followed by the main attack by the *1st* and *12th SS Panzer Divisions.*[13] In addition to enjoying a three-to-one advantage on the ground and an enormous advantage in artillery, Hitzfeld's corps also would have the benefit of complete surprise, or so he and his subordinate commanders thought.

Portrait of Colonel Dolph



While the German offensive preparations continued apace, Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, commander of the U.S. First Army, prepared to resume the offensive to capture the Roer River dams, a goal that had eluded him since September, when a series of costly attacks through the Hürtgen Forest had left him nothing to show for his efforts, save a few dozen square miles of cratered terrain, several ruined towns, and over 30,000 casualties. No fewer than three major division-level attacks had been launched from the northern and northwestern approaches to the dams between 14 September and 8 December, leading to the capture of the towns of Lammersdorf, Hürtgen, Vossenack, Gey, and Bergstein. However, each offensive culminated before achieving decisive results,



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and the attack against the town of Schmidt by the 28th Infantry Division ended in disaster. This time, Hodges would try the southwestern approach through Lammersdorf and Wahlerscheid.[14]

Completely unaware of the impending German attack, Hodges directed Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow, commander of V Corps, to use two of his infantry divisions, the 78th in the north and 2d in the south, to conduct their own attack on 13 December and punch through German lines near Lammersdorf and Wahlerscheid, respectively. The 78th Infantry Division, which had only arrived in Europe in mid-November, would seize Simmerath and Kesternich before pushing on to seize the Urft and Paulushof Dams, a mere five miles away. The center would continue to be held by Dolph's 102d Mechanized Cavalry Group, which would conduct aggressive patrolling designed to distract the enemy from the attack's true objective.

The veteran 2d Infantry Division would move up to a position just behind the front lines of the 99th Infantry Division near Elsenborn and conduct a supporting attack through Wahlerscheid toward the town of Dreiborn before linking up with the approaching 78th Division. If all went well, not only would the long sought-after dams finally be in American hands, but the bulk of both the *272d* and *277th VGDs* would be trapped and destroyed. As yet, the Americans were unaware of the presence of Kaschner's *326th VGD*. Remarkably, the concept of operations for both the German and American plans featured attacks through the same villages. The key advantage, then, would lie with whomever attacked first.[15]

Records indicate that neither side had any inkling of what was about to unfold. The Americans completed their preparations for the attack by 12 December; the movement of the 2d Division into its attack position north of Elsenborn had gone completely undetected, though the Germans had detected an increase in American vehicular activity. German preparations were much more elaborate, involving the movement of two regiments from the *272d VGD*



General König, c. 1944



General Kaschner, c. 1944

from positions near Gey and Bergstein beginning on the night of 12–13 December via a circuitous route that would skirt the west bank Roer River to avoid detection. While en route, both regiments would absorb over 1,000 infantry replacements to fill their ranks, which had been depleted in heavy fighting during the past three weeks.[16] A series of forced foot marches brought up the *326th VGD* from its assembly area near Bonn. They would arrive in its frontline positions during the night of 14–15 December, relieving the *277th VGD*, which would then slip to the south that same evening to join the *I SS Panzer Corps*.[17] The timing of all of these events would be crucial to the overall success of Hitzfeld's mission.

7th Armored Division tanks near St. Vith, c. December 1944



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
Both of Hitzfeld's divisions were to be in place and ready to commence their attack in the early morning hours of 16 December. A predawn artillery barrage would rain over the American frontline divisions, designed to pin the G.I.s in their foxholes while German infantry swarmed over them. Several batteries of searchlights would illuminate the direction of the intended attack to help guide the infantry. It was a complex scenario made all the more challenging by the fact that neither of Hitzfeld's subordinate commanders knew the exact details of the overall plan until 14 December, when Hitzfeld and his staff at *LXVII Corps* headquarters briefed them in the village of Dalbenden, ten kilometers southeast of Gemünd. Hitzfeld himself, who was aware of the general outline of the offensive, did not receive his own copy of the *Sixth Panzer Army's* plan until 8 December, giving him only four days for him and his staff to draft and issue the *LXVII Corps* order.[18]

Generals König and Kaschner, therefore, had less than two days to draft their own division's plan, leaving precious little time for regimental, battalion, and company commanders to draft theirs, conduct assault rehearsals, and carry out reconnaissance of the routes to their assembly areas. In fact, Hitler himself forbade any kind of frontline reconnaissance from being carried out, except on a case-by-case basis, approved personally by him.[19] He did not want to run the risk of compromising *Wacht am Rhein* should anyone be captured while conducting a reconnaissance, but this overly cautious approach made it nearly impossible for subordinate commanders to adequately prepare their units for the attack. This decision would have fatal consequences in the days to follow.


While Hitzfeld's men and thousands of other German soldiers arrayed along the front lines in the Schnee-Eifel and the Ardennes feverishly completed their last-minute preparations for the attack, the U.S. Army V Corps initiated its own offensive at dawn on 13 December. Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker's untried 78th Division burst forth from its positions around Lammersdorf and stormed Simmerath after a short but powerful artillery preparation, catching the men of *Grenadier Regiment 982* of the *272d VGD* completely by surprise. By noon most of the village was in American hands. To its north, Parker's 311th Infantry Regiment, temporarily attached to the 8th Infantry Division, began its diversionary attack through Raffelsbrand to tie down the defenders in their bunkers.[20] To the south, Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson's veteran 2d Division attacked out of the Elsenborn area, grinding its way through the surprised but well dug-in troops of the *277th VGD*. Supported on their right by a regiment from Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer's green 99th Division, Robertson's troops, after navigating German minefields and barbed wire obstacles, fought their way into the clear and were well on their way to Wahlerscheid by the end of the day.[21]

After a brief pause to reorganize its attacking columns, the 78th Division's 309th and 310th Infantry Regiments continued pushing on, seizing the town of Rollesbroich and the western outskirts of Kesternich by late afternoon on 13 December. After crossing the wide open fields west of the town, a single antitank gun emplaced in a concrete bunker kept the Americans from entering Kesternich. The 309th Infantry, rein-


General Hodges, c. 1944



General Gerow, c. 1944



General Parker, c. 1944



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General Robertson making an address from a radio station in Salzburg, 6 June 1945



General Lauer, c. 1944



Colonel Burian, c. 1944

forced by a battalion from the 310th, halted while it waited for an artillery barrage to soften up the German defenses. When the accompanying tank company from the 709th Tank Battalion refused to lead the attack out of fear of German *Panzerfausts* (one-shot antitank rockets), the lead infantry company of the 309th continued the attack without them and managed to take several houses on the west edge of Kesternich by nightfall after heavy fighting.[22]

Unbeknownst to General Parker and the commanders of the 309th and 310th Infantry Regiments, German troop movements tied to the *Wacht am Rhein* timetable already were coming into play. The leading elements of *Grenadier Regiment 980* of König's division began arriving in their forward attack positions near Kesternich at the same time that Simmerath fell to Parker's troops. Though intended to play a key role in the division's impending attack, this regiment, led by Col. Ewald Burian, appeared at the right place and the right time to challenge the American attack. Still, the German high command was unaware of American intentions as late as the midafternoon of 13 December, believing that the attacks by both the 2d and 78th Divisions were mere probing attacks.[23] It was not until the U.S. assault continued the following morning when Hitzfeld, his army commander Sepp Dietrich, and *Army Group B* headquarters grew truly alarmed after they received word that all but the eastern portion of Kesternich had fallen.

Over the next two days, as the 78th enjoyed success, the attack by the 2d would stall near Wahlerscheid at a place nicknamed "Heartbreak Crossroads." Here, its 9th Infantry Regiment would suffer heavy casualties as it attempted to overcome the stubborn defenses erected by the *277th VGD*, as it attempted to extricate itself in time to get into its own attack positions by midnight on 15 December. In contrast, the 78th basked in its initial accomplishment, pleased that the attack by two of its unproven regiments had progressed so well. Although its 311th Infantry had suffered heavy losses fighting on the division's left flank at Jägerhaus and Raffelsbrand while achieving little of note, the rest of the division's attack had gone very well indeed.[24] General Parker and his staff were confident that all of Kesternich would be in American hands by midday on 15 December and that the division would be well on its way to the Roer River Dams by the following morning.

The American optimism of 14 December would prove to be misplaced. Shocked by the 78th Division's successful surprise attack, *Army Group B's* commander realized that if the American advance continued, it would jeopardize last-minute preparations for the Ardennes Offensive. For on that very day, the SS panzer divisions of the *Sixth Panzer Army*, Model's spearhead, moved from their assembly areas west of Cologne to forward attack positions in the Schnee Eifel region. Control of Kesternich and the Roer River Dams would place U.S. forces on the high ground overlooking the Cologne plain where they would have an unobstructed view of the German movement and imperil the

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

National Archives

German prisoners of war under guard in Kesternich, c. December 1944

launch his attack early that evening so as to release the battalions from the *326th VGD* that same night, allowing them to join the rest of the division for its own attack on the morning of 16 December—the start date for the offensive. Thus a series of cascading events was set in motion that would ruin Hitzfeld's carefully choreographed attack.[27]

Preceded by a short but accurate artillery barrage by one hundred guns, the two and a half German battalions surged into Kesternich in the early evening of 15 December, catching the troops from Parker's division unawares. After overcoming initial resistance, the German attack, spearheaded by three tank destroyers and an armored 37-mm. *Flak* (antiaircraft) halftrack, quickly pushed through to the western outskirts of the town, capturing 300 men from 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry Regiment, in the process. By midnight it was all over and the Germans had regained control of Kesternich.[28] The threat posed by the 78th Division's attack had been erased, but the damage was done. Hitzfeld's corps had been thrown into disarray not only by the American's surprise attack, but by the extraordinary effort it took to get sufficient forces into place to carry out the counterattack.

When 16 December dawned, instead of having twelve infantry battalions supported by two assault gun battalions and over a dozen artillery battalions, Hitzfeld only had three and a half battalions and no assault guns. Instead of bringing all three of its regiments to bear against U.S. troops holding the line between Konzen and Lammersdorf, the *272d VGD* would have to defend itself against continued American efforts to retake Kesternich. By 15 December, it was obvious that the *272d* would not be able to participate in the offensive at all. To König's south, Kaschner's *326th VGD* desperately tried to get its troops into position by dawn on 16 December, but it



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
was an impossible task. The delays in relieving the two battalions that participated in the Kesternich counterattack meant that they could not move quickly enough to reach their assault positions between Höfen and Konzen.[29]

To make matters worse, an enormous traffic jam occurred behind the front lines just as elements of the *326th VGD* moved into their assault positions and those of the *277th VGD* moved out. This delay meant that a large portion of the German artillery could not get into position during the night of 15–16 December to register their guns and begin firing their preparatory barrages in support of Kaschner's attack. One of Kaschner's grenadier battalions became lost in the woods while moving up to the front and did not show up again until the following morning, while another battalion had been stalled by traffic jams. But Hitzfeld's attack still had to go forward on schedule, regardless of the difficulties his corps faced. Only three battalions and two companies of another were able to cross the line of departure at dawn on 16 December, attacking north and south of Monschau and west of the village of Münzenich.[30]

Instead of overpowering the defending U.S. troops by a three-to-one ratio, Hitzfeld's assault barely achieved a one-to-one ratio, without any assault guns and with insufficient artillery fire. Despite the plan's exhortations to attack simultaneously, none of the *Volksgrenadiers'* assaults were coordinated, allowing the American artillery to engage each of them sequentially.




German troops advancing past abandoned American equipment, c. December 1944



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The remaining battalions of the *326th VGD* would have to attack as soon as they arrived, without any time to prepare. Von der Heydte's nighttime airborne operation was a costly flop, with most of his men scattered throughout the woods north and south of the Hohes Venn, adding little of consequence to the German endeavor, least of all impacting the movement of American reserves through Eupen as had been hoped.[31] The few men of von der Heydte's *Kampfgruppe* who did land in the right place in the Hohes Venn watched helplessly as column after column of American trucks and tanks roared past them toward the site of the German penetration in the Losheim Gap.

The results were predictable. While the troops from the *326th VGD* attacked bravely, a hail of machine gun and artillery fire by troops from the 38th Cavalry Squadron of the 102d Cavalry Group easily repulsed their uncoordinated assaults north and south of Monschau.[32] On 17 December, German efforts to bypass Monschau came to grief when troops from the 38th Cavalry and an attached infantry company from the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion mowed them down in the open terrain surrounding Monschau.[33] After several hours of this senseless slaughter, Kaschner called off his attacks after losing over 20 percent of the troops who had taken part. Another attempt the following day fared no better, leaving the *326th VGD* nothing at all to show for its sacrifice. Monschau and Eupen would not fall that day, or ever.[34]



It soon became evident that Hitzfeld's attack was going nowhere. To replace the *272d*, at the time decisively engaged at Kesternich, Hitzfeld was assigned the *277th VGD*, then attacking Elsenborn, and ordered to continue the attack. However, the consequences of the failure to seize Eupen and push on through the Hohes Venn to the Vesdre and take Limbourg soon began to bear bitter fruit. On the evening of the first day of the German attack, the 1st Infantry Division, then in First Army reserve near Liege, was alerted for movement to reinforce what appeared to be the start of a major offensive rather than the harassing attack that Twelfth Army Group had initially assessed. By midnight 16 December, the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division had passed through Eupen and the Hohes Venn, arriving unmolested in their assembly area near the Elsenborn Ridge.[35] The following day, the veteran 30th Infantry Division from XIX Corps of the Ninth Army was alerted for movement, as was the 7th Armored Division.

The lead elements of both divisions began passing through Eupen unimpeded throughout the day on 17 December, arriving near the front lines by the evening of 18 December, where they immediately went into action.[36] Using the First and Ninth Armies' network of paved highways that had been previously designated as main supply routes (MSRs) ensured that the rapid movement of these divisions could

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American troops passing through Monschau, c. December 1944

occur without German interference. Traffic regulation control points vectored the long columns of tanks, jeeps, and trucks carrying troops and towed artillery day and night, undisturbed by any German attempts to block traffic. American troops were unaware of just how close the Germans had come to doing just this; a review of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps maps of the period clearly depicts how these MSRs converged in the transportation nodes of Eupen, Spa, Liege, and Malmedy, most of which lay in *LXVII Corps'* zone of attack.[37]

The inability of Hitzfeld's troops to take Monschau and penetrate as far as Eupen to block this movement meant that his corps could not provide any flank protection at all for Dietrich's *Sixth Panzer Army*. The *Schwerpunkt* (main effort) of Model's offensive soon found itself under attack on its northern flank by a number of American divisions moving down from the Aachen area and points north. By 20 December, no fewer than six U.S. divisions—three armored and three infantry—had either begun counterattacks against Dietrich's spearheads in the Schnee Eifel or were preparing to, and all of them had passed through Eupen, Spa, or Liege over the past five days.[38] Several more divisions were to follow by the end of the first week of the offensive, bringing the total coming down from the north to nine by 25 December. Effectively blunted and with his attack running out of steam, Dietrich was forced to commit his reserve, *II SS Panzer Corps*, but that effort went nowhere as well, despite the Americans' abandonment of the "fortified goose egg" at St. Vith by 23 December.

When Dietrich's leading unit, *Kampfgruppe Peiper*, was trapped on 22 December at La Gleize and forced to walk out after abandoning all of its vehicles, it was obvious that his *Sixth Panzer Army*'s attack had completely stalled, a development that forced Model to shift his army group's main effort to Manteuffel's *Fifth Panzer Army* in order for the offensive to maintain momentum.[39] This change of focus enjoyed considerably more success until the attack by its leading *2d Panzer Division* finally was brought to a standstill on Christmas Eve within sight of the Meuse near Dinant at Foy-Nôtre-Dame. This effectively ended Hitler's vaunted game-changing offensive.[40]

Patton's relief of Bastogne on 26 December boosted Allied morale, but in reality, the Germans had already lost the battle a week earlier. Though it would take another month of hard fighting to force Model's armies back to their starting line, the first five days of the offensive decided the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge. While it is clear that well-led and hard fighting soldiers of the U.S. First and Third Armies had stopped and ultimately defeated Model's troops, it is still not entirely clear, even more than seven decades after the war, why the battle turned out the way it did.

Eclipsed by the bitter fighting that took place in the Schnee Eifel and Ardennes, the struggle for Kesternich 13–16 December 1944 did more than anything else to shape the German offensive before it began and force Model's troops to take the direction they eventually took. Had the 78th Infantry Division not attacked Kesternich when it did and in effect carried out a spoiling attack without actually knowing it was doing so, a superior German force most likely would have overwhelmed the 102d Cavalry Group, taken Monschau and Eupen, and trapped the 78th east of the Hohes Venn. This move would have effectively denied the Americans the use of the critical road network they desperately needed and forced them to take a lengthy detour around the "Bulge" using MSRs farther to the west. Had this occurred, such a diversion would have taken U.S. troops an additional day to carry out their attack and denied them the ability to rapidly reinforce their ranks to stop the German offensive in the Ardennes before it could fully develop. Long overlooked, it takes no stretch of the imagination to say that it was the Battle of Kesternich that saved the Bulge.

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Notes

1. Roger Cirillo, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History [hereafter cited as CMH], 1984), p. 53.

2. Percy Schramm, Foreign Military Study MS A–862, *The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes, September–16 December 1944* (Heidelberg, Germany: His-

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torical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, 1948), p. 63. Maj. Schramm, who maintained the war diary of the *Wehrmachtführungsstab* or Operations Staff of the German Armed Forces at the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW, or German Armed Forces High Command) in Berlin, kept meticulous notes, which he was able to save, and thus has written an invaluable account of the extensive planning that preceded the Ardennes Offensive.

3. Ibid., pp. 139–40.

4. Ibid., pp. 74–75.

5. Generalkommando LXVII. Armee-Korps, *Korpsbefehl Nr. 1 für den Angriff Beiderseits Monschau* (Corps Order for the Attack Astride Monschau), 12 December 1944, 1–2 (hereafter cited as LXVII. Armee-Korps) (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration (NADC).

6. Friedrich von der Heydte, Foreign Military Study MS B-823, *Kampfgruppe von der Heydte, 25 Oct–22 Dec 1944* (Heidelberg: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe), p. 3; Schramm, *The Preparations for the German Offensive,* p. 184.

7. LXVII. Armee-Korps, *Korpsbefehl Nr. 1*, p. 2.

8. Distances were calculated using a 1944 U.S. Army Topographical Engineer map of northeast Belgium with the known MSRs as of December 1944 overlaid. Movement times were computed from Chapter 4 of the U.S. Army Field Manual 25–10, *Motor Transport*, dated 12 March 1942, using the standard motorized movement rate of 25 mph for an infantry division.

9. In fact, this is exactly what happened to one American unit, the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, which was on its way to join the 7th Armored Division when the Germans slaughtered one of its march columns near the Baugnez Crossroads two miles southeast of Malmedy on 17 December by *Kampfgruppe Peiper* of the *1st SS Panzer Division*, an event that became known as the Malmedy Massacre.

10. Schramm, *The Preparations for the German Offensive*, p. 221; *Feindnachrichtenblatt* (Intelligence Bulletin) Nr. 2, 326, Volks-Grenadier Division, 13 December 1944, pp. 1–2 (hereafter cited as Feindnachrichtenblatt).

11. Feindnachrichtenblatt, p. 3. German intelligence completely missed the arrival at the front lines of the green 78th Infantry Division, which took over the southern half of the defensive sector of the 8th Infantry Division beginning 11 December 1944.

12. Generalkommando LXVII. Armee-Korps, *Hinweise für die Artilleristische Kampfführung* (Arillery Fire Support Planning Instructions), 14 December 1944. This document provided the overall corps fire support plan, including how artillery fires would be integrated with the overall corps plan of attack, the fire support plan of its higher headquarters (*Sixth Panzer Army*), and the order of battle of the artillery and rocket-firing units. The total number of available artillery tubes and rocket launchers was derived from an analysis of the pertinent tables of organization for the units that would be directly supporting Hitzfeld's corps, including divisional artillery of the corps' two Volks-Grenadier Divisions and the supporting *Volks-Artillerie Korps* (corps artillery command).

13. Cirillo, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II,* pp. 11–12.

14. A superb background to the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest, with detailed descriptions of the previous offensives leading up to the one that began on 13 December 1944 can be found in Charles B. MacDonald's *The Siegfried Line Campaign* (CMH Pub 7-7-1), (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1961). An excellent official account of the Battle of the Bulge is Hugh M. Cole's *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (CMH Pub 7-8) (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1965). Both are part of the "Green Book Series" written by CMH that covers the European Theater of Operations in World War II.

15. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,* pp. 79–80.

16. Douglas E. Nash, *Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp: With the 272d Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich* (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2015), p. 120. The numbers of German replacement troops being brought up to restore the strength of the division's infantry component was gleaned from actual movement orders for two separate *Marsch* (reinforcement draft) battalions issued by the *272d Volks-Grenadier Division* (copies in the author's possession), as well as by the personal account of former corporal Gerd Hörner, *"Life and Death in the Hürtgen Forest with the 272d Volks-Grenadier Division,"* Hannover, Germany, January 2003.

17. LXVII. Armee-Korps, Anlage (Annex) I, *Bereitstellung der Infanterie-Verbände* (assembly areas of infantry units) (Washington, D.C.: NADC), p. 2.

18. Otto von Hitzfeld, Foreign Military Study MS A-935, *LXVII Corps in the Ardennes* (Koenigstein: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, 1945), p. 3.

19. Schramm, *The Preparations for the German Offensive,* pp. 224–25.

20. 78th Infantry Division Historical Association, *Lightning: The History of the 78th Infantry Division* (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 33–34.

21. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,* pp. 79–80.

22. Edward G. Miller, *A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hürtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944–1945* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995), p. 186.

23. Ia Kriegstagebuch, Oberbefehlshaber West (ObWest), *Meldungen und Befehle*, Zwischenmeldung 13 December 1944 (Supreme Commander, Armed Forces Command West, Operations Officer War Diary for Ob-West, midday report), hereafter cited as Ob West KTB. (Note: This was von Rundstedt's headquarters, which tracked events leading up to and during the Ardennes Offensive very closely.)

24. AAR, 78th Infantry Division, 1–31 December 1944, p. 15.

25. Ob West KTB, *Tagesmeldung* (evening report), 14 December 1944. German concerns about the advance of the 78th Infantry Division were also highlighted in Edward G. Miller's "Desperate Hours at Kesternich." *World War II* (November 1996): 34.

26. Ob West KTB, entry dated 14 December 1944, Para. 4, 12 (footnote).

27. Nash, *Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp,* pp. 133–34. An irony of the American attack at Kesternich is that the 78th Infantry Division attacked three days before the *272d VGD* was scheduled to begin its own attack as part of the Ardennes Offensive. It is worth pondering what would have occurred had both attacks taken place on the same day. As it was, the collision of these two divisions would have fateful consequences for the fighting that would follow over the next several days.

28. Miller, *A Dark and Bloody Ground,* p. 188.

29. Erwin Kashner, Foreign Military Study (MS) B-031, *The Right Flank of the*

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Ardennes Offensive (*326th Volks-Grenadier Division*) (Steinlager Allendorf: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, 1946), pp. 1–2.

30. Ibid., p. 2.

31. Von der Heydte, *Kampfgruppe von der Heydte,* p. 38.

32. Rpt, Headquarters, 102d Cavalry Group (Mechanized), *Defense of the Monschau Sector by the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 16–18 December 1944,* Annex 1 to Historical Report, 20 February 1945, pp. 1–2.

33. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

34. Erwin Kashner, Foreign Military Study (MS) B-092, *326th Volks-Grenadier Division in the Ardennes 16–25 December 1944,* (Steinlager Allendorf: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, 1946), p. 5. This MS, a follow-up to MS B-031, offers a more detailed explanation for the failure of the division's attack toward Monschau. The author dwells at length on the unfavorable correlation of forces, yet being a good leader, he tried to do his best to accomplish his mission. At the end of this MS, Kaschner laments that by 25 December, his division had been reduced to two understrength battalions, a weak combat engineer company, and two weak artillery battalions. Much of the credit for this decimation can be given to Colonel Dolph's 102d Cavalry Group.

35. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,* p. 86; Headquarters Twelfth Army Group Situation Map of the Engineer Section (hereafter cited as Twelfth Army Group Situation Map), 16 December 1944, Control Number 2001628569 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress). Twelfth Army Group's situation maps, updated daily, clearly reflected the locations of division-sized units and above, including locations of army and corps headquarters. These maps also accurately portrayed the road and rail network throughout the army group's area of operations, which encompassed Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and northwest Germany. Using these maps in a sequential fashion, the historian can observe the movement of divisions from one location to the next, as well as the roads being taken. The locations of enemy units are also portrayed. This little-used resource is a boon to anyone who wishes to study the fighting in northwest Europe in greater detail.

36. Twelfth Army Group Situation Map, 18 December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress).

37. Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1991), pp. 272–73. This volume contains a map (Map 8) that portrays First Army Ammunition Installations and Main Supply Routes, 6 June–16 December 1944.

38. Twelfth Army Group Situation Maps, 16–20 December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress). To attain this number, the writer compared the initial locations of these units on 15 December with their locations on the evening of 20 December. The maps also show the routes these divisions used to conduct their movement. The continuously expanding order of battle of the U.S. First Army as it incorporates these divisions along the northern shoulder of the German penetration is also ably described in Cole.

39. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,* pp. 134–35.

40. Ibid., pp. 567–68.



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
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BOOK REVIEWS

Hitler's Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest



By Edward B. Westermann
University of Oklahoma Press, 2016
Pp. xiii, 322. $34.95

Review by Eugene M. Harding

Walk into any bookstore and you will find a section of works on the study and preservation of the atrocities committed during the Holocaust. Title after title will yield quite similar results with stories all touching on the same points. As the survivors, their persecutors, and the brave soldiers who liberated the victims continue to pass away, the ability of historians and researchers to find new angles from which to study this tragic period will also begin to fade. However, *Hitler's Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest* by Edward Westermann breaks this trend.

Anyone who has studied the Holocaust or attended Holocaust workshops can attest that one of the fundamental rules is never to compare suffering. The writer should simply present the history and leave the reader to make his or her own conclusions. Westermann takes a different approach to the study of the Holocaust by not only showing the suffering endured by its victims, but by discussing its similarities to the atrocities committed in the western campaigns against Native Americans. What makes his work unique, however, is that he draws connections between the two eras that many historians—for one reason or another—have left out. Consequently, the author does not write about a comparison of suffering, but rather examines how the two were more than coincidentally linked.

The book begins with a discussion of the concepts of manifest destiny and lebensraum and their origins. In the introduction, the reader learns that Hitler repeatedly referred to the U.S. pursuit of manifest destiny and likened its path to the one he intended for Germany. As he reportedly said, "Our Mississippi must be the Volga, not the Niger" (p. 3), and it becomes immediately evident that the American government's plan for conquering the Native Americans was a direct inspiration to the Führer. Both pursuits had an end goal of removing a people seen as inferior and not worthy of living on the land they possessed. These efforts concluded with the invaders taking up residence in the conquered land and turning it into something productive.

A key difference between the two groups of intruders comes to light in Chapter 3, when Westermann shows that even though the intent was similar, the mindset of the commanders conducting the operations was fundamentally different. He explains that American military commanders such as Brig. Gen. George Crook and Col. Nelson Miles "proved ready to use force to punish or coerce the Indians, but still displayed a deep respect and admiration for their adversaries and their culture" (p. 156). As such, the ultimate plan was to assimilate the Native Americans into the United States following the completion of the westward expansion. Even though the two sides were enemies, there was a future for the Native Americans in the nation.

In direct contrast, the German soldiers and the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) shared no such viewpoint of the Jewish and Slavic peoples. Indoctrinated by Nazi ideology, the soldiers and the SS saw these two peoples as subhuman and incapable of assimilation into the postwar German world. In short, there was no place or future for Jews or Slavs in Nazi Germany.

Even though the U.S. government wanted to assimilate the Native Americans, the Indians—much like the people persecuted by the Nazis—suffered massacre after massacre. The author goes to great lengths to show how both groups were hunted down and murdered if they resisted, and this leads to his discussion of the creation of guerrilla warfare.

As a direct result of their persecution, the Native Americans, as well as the Jewish and Slavic peoples, had small groups splinter away from the main population and begin to resist their tormentors. Well-kept documents on the operations of the Native Americans do not exist. As a result, we are left with the verbal histories created largely by their conquerors. Westermann includes a map that shows the locations of the partisan camps and operations during World War II (p. 234), suggesting that the people persecuted by the Nazis were anything but submissive.

The book concludes with Westermann's supposition that although both historical occurrences were clearly atrocities, the intended end results were not similar. The American government wished to remove the Native Americans from land deemed valuable. The Nazis, however, wished to eliminate an entire group of people based on religious and alleged genetic differences.

The American drive for westward expansion (manifest destiny) and the quest for living space (lebensraum) of Nazi Germany are two topics that have been around for a long time. The amount of information that exists as a result is monumental in scope and will continue


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to be so for some time. *Hitler's Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars* effortlessly tackles the history of these tragedies and creates a fresh and modern view of two histories. This reviewer highly recommends this book for these and other reasons. History does repeat itself to varying degrees, and Westermann proves this in his work. The book brings to light a wealth of new information rarely seen before, and this is a large part of what makes the author's argument unique and worth reading.

Capt. Eugene M. Harding is an armor officer and is currently the commander of Delta Company, 2d Battalion, 152d Infantry Regiment, in Bluffton, Indiana. He has been in the Army eight years, is a qualified 5X military historian, and holds two history master's degrees, one in ancient and classical studies and the other in genocidal studies with focus on the Holocaust.

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The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor



By William T. Johnsen
University Press of Kentucky, 2016
Pp. xx, 406. $50

Review by A. R. B. Linderman

Upon entering Arlington National Cemetery, one encounters an equestrian statue, not of any American hero, but of British Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington during World War II. Dill repeatedly smoothed out difficulties in the Anglo-American relationship and, when he died in 1944, was buried among America's honored dead. In *The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor*, William T. Johnsen, a professor of military history and strategy at the U.S. Army War College, observes that "the importance of the relationship between Dill and [U.S. Army General George] Marshall cannot be overstated" (p. 210). It was one piece of an intimate relationship between the British and American militaries, adeptly chronicled by Johnsen in his latest work.

Johnsen's thesis is that the Grand Alliance, "the most successful military coalition in history," succeeded as the result of "an evolutionary process that took place between the military staffs before the entrance of the United States into the war" (pp. 253–54). At increasingly regular meetings over several years, leaders of the two militaries developed a common strategy, created operational procedures, and coordinated their industries. "Battles and campaigns alone," Johnsen notes, "although vitally important, are never enough to secure victory" (p. xx); this unglamorous staff work laid the foundation for allied victory.

Anglo-American cooperation during the interwar period was inhibited by a variety of factors; Johnsen cites the American refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the role of the Irish bloc in American politics, the reluctance by American policymakers to use military power, and the disdain of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain for American fecklessness in general and President Franklin Roosevelt specifically. Nevertheless, both sides gradually realized that they lacked the resources to compete with one another.

Meetings between the two militaries began, tentatively, in early 1938. Talks in 1939 and 1940 not only allowed Britain to contract for much-needed war material, but also jumpstarted American industrial capacity, cultivated habits of compromise, and, "because the talks on supplies took place openly, [accustomed] the American public and Congress . . . to the idea of Anglo-American cooperation" (p. 79). Extensive "tactical and technical information" provided by the British in 1940 "was priceless and undoubtedly saved hundreds, if not thousands, of American lives in the initial period after American intervention" (p. 128).

In November 1940, more than a year before Pearl Harbor, the military staffs agreed to fight a defensive war in the Pacific while concentrating on Germany first. In the spring of 1941, both nations agreed on further details of such matters as areas of responsibility, command procedures, and military missions in each country. In July 1941 U.S. forces arrived in Iceland to relieve the British garrison. Two months later U.S. naval vessels began escorting convoys between Iceland and the Eastern seaboard, even though not formally at war.

Johnsen does not sugarcoat the many squabbles between the two powers, but is also cautious about their significance. "In a global war, where strategic requirements always exceed available resources, there had to be mechanisms for ensuring the appropriate allocation of material and resources necessary to support strategy" (p. xx). That the two militaries hammered out such mechanisms is proof of their unity, in spite of the limited resources.

This study underscores the importance of human actors. For those making decisions in the years before Pearl Harbor, the significance of those decisions was not always clear: "Most [trends] remained shrouded in secrecy, doubt, risk, miscalculation, and an opponent's decisions. . . . Thus, if today it appears that they took small, halting steps or missed opportunities, such outcomes are more apparent in retrospect" (p. 5). One of the gems of this work are the biographical sketches throughout, which add depth and orient readers who may not be familiar with some key individuals.

Johnsen is careful to avoid a sense of inevitability. He notes, for example, that "although in hindsight the situa-

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tion in Latin America may not look serious, it was a significant concern for U.S. political and military leaders" (p. 85). In May 1940 Roosevelt ordered 10,000 soldiers airlifted to Brazil to prevent the Germans from seizing territory there. As late as May 1941, American planners feared German forces might advance from Vichy territory in northwest Africa into Brazil.

Many studies of the Grand Alliance place considerable emphasis on Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Although they played pivotal roles in establishing Anglo-American cooperation, the difficult work of setting priorities and procedures was done by others. Johnsen argues, for example, that Churchill's visit to Placentia Bay aboard HMS *Prince of Wales* in August 1941 was most important not for the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting it produced, but because the chiefs of staff on both sides were afforded the opportunity to meet, plan, and build rapport.

The picture of Roosevelt that emerges is not a flattering one. Johnsen is careful to be evenhanded, but repeatedly describes situations where Roosevelt's refusal to provide clear guidance to his subordinates—likely in an effort to keep his options open—imposed hardships on the men trying to resolve practical measures for fighting the Axis Powers. Churchill comes off better than Roosevelt, but Johnsen notes occasions where Churchill was not the Atlanticist of mythology, when, for example, in the summer of 1940 he nearly turned down naval talks with the United States.


Throughout prewar planning, commitments were a problem. Understandably, the British wanted the Americans to make them; just as understandably, the state of American politics before Pearl Harbor made concrete, public commitments extremely unlikely. What is surprising in all of this was that the British repeatedly asked anyway, demonstrating "just how tone-deaf they were on this issue" (p. 95).

When full staff talks began in early 1941, lack of meaningful joint mechanisms placed the U.S. at a disadvantage. The British services generally presented a unified organization, but the U.S. military consisted of two very distinct services. Indeed, it was in order to mirror the British Chiefs of Staff Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established in the first place. The British came well prepared to meetings; American efforts were often ad hoc and last-minute.

Another recurring irritation was the question of the Far East. Both sides underestimated their Japanese opponent. Moreover, Johnsen faults Britain's approach to the matter. "Although continually stressing the importance of Singapore, they did not appear interested in actually defending the supposed keystone of the empire," even to the point of expecting the United States to denude the West Coast in order to guard Singapore (p. 123). Churchill scolded the Admiralty that "anyone could have seen that the United States would not base a battle-fleet on Singapore and divide their naval Forces" (p. 142). The Americans made their decision about how to prioritize limited resources; the British had trouble admitting they did not have adequate resources to defend Singapore, and subsequently paid the price for attempting to do so.

This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Grand Alliance, a well-researched and clearly written argument that success in war often begins long before the battlefield.

A. R. B. Linderman holds a Ph.D. in history from Texas A&M University and is the author of *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain's Special Operations Executive* (Norman, Okla., 2016).



By Mark T. Calhoun
University Press of Kansas, 2015
Pp. xvii, 412. $39.95

Review by Eric R. Price

If the relentless challenge facing historians is to find something new to say about a subject, first-time book author Mark Calhoun has well exceeded that mandate. Calhoun's volume, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army*, provides a wealth of new information about a largely marginalized, when not maligned, figure in the historical accounts of World War II. More importantly, the author uses the story of McNair as a vehicle to better understand the U.S. Army's performance during World War II.

It is hardly surprising that McNair remains mainly forgotten in American history. Soft-spoken and intensely private, the enigmatic general died in Normandy early in World War II, the unfortunate victim of an errant American air strike. Yet, his near absence from the historical narrative has less to do with his early death and more to do with his relegation to staff assignments for most of his military career. Ironically, Calhoun demonstrates throughout that it was these noncommand assignments that made McNair a central figure in the Army's preparations for the war and provided the skills that led to General George C. Marshall calling McNair the "brains of the Army" (p. 311).

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Throughout his career, McNair demonstrated wide-ranging interests in military training, modernization, officer education, and the development of the experiments needed to make progress in these areas. Featured heavily throughout the book is his interest in testing. For instance, McNair oversaw several studies related to changes in equipment, doctrine, and organizations over the course of his career. This included tests on new mountain artillery systems in 1911–1912, operations between the coastal artillery and air service in the defense of Oahu in 1923, and efforts to redesign division structures in 1937. More indirectly, as the deputy commandant of the Field Artillery School, McNair supported experiments designed to improve the integration and control of artillery fires in support of ground maneuvers in 1929. In each case, McNair applied rigorous standards to processes designed to modernize equipment and doctrine. He applied this same rigor to the analysis of doctrine, training, and weapons systems on the eve of World War II.

Calhoun demonstrates the care with which McNair approached his responsibilities in conducting such tests and deconstructs the logic behind the recommendations the general made to the War Department. He shows that McNair's approach to studying problems and formulating recommendations was sound, even if his conclusions proved not to be correct after the fact. This suggests that McNair was far more qualified for some of his key assignments than previous historians gave him credit. For instance, some have criticized McNair's central role in the 1941 General headquarters Maneuvers, suggesting that his direct involvement in planning for the event and the authorship of the umpire manual indicate an effort to exert influence on the outcome. However, Calhoun argues that McNair's experience in the development of combined arms doctrine, in the design of divisions, and in umpiring of the 1939 maneuvers and observing the 1940 maneuvers show that McNair's qualifications to prepare the Army for war were "probably unmatched by any other officer in the army" (p. 229).

Interestingly, even as the author shows that McNair was more qualified for some of his assignments than previous historians believed, he also rebuffs suggestions that McNair was wholly to blame for controversial decisions he made during the war. The most prominent criticism is that McNair was directly responsible for the Army's adoption of antitank guns in lieu of an effective tank to match against enemy armored formations. It is true that McNair had long advocated for guns as the primary means for defending against tanks. However, Calhoun argues that the adoption of the 37-mm. antitank gun had more to do with the inability of the War Department to produce and quickly transport heavy tanks to the European theater than with what constituted the best defense against enemy armor (p. 234). More broadly, the writer asserts, "McNair enjoyed less decision-making authority and autonomy during World War II than some accounts assert," suggesting that Marshall acted as final arbiter in the department's decision making (p. 329).

Advocating for McNair's influence on World War II preparations while simultaneously suggesting that the general lacked authority in decision making is perhaps the weakest part of Calhoun's argument. How could McNair be the architect of the World War II Army and at the same time not be held accountable as the decision maker? What Calhoun shows is that McNair developed many of the systems for assessing doctrine, equipment, training, and personnel selection even while he was rarely in the position to approve the recommendations that resulted from those assessments.


Thus, while *General Lesley J. McNair* tells an important story about this lesser-known general, Calhoun also uses McNair's career to illuminate the processes by which the Army developed and tested doctrine and equipment, made decisions on organizational design, and selected soldiers for service within the Army. Each of these examples shows that the War Department was far from being complacent about a conflict that appeared to be just over the horizon, as many historians have suggested. Instead, Army leaders carefully considered the lessons of the First World War: the potentialities associated with a renewed global conflict, the opportunities presented by emerging technologies, the development of new weapons systems, and the doctrine needed to incorporate these new systems into an effective fighting force. Thus, writer contributes to the recent revisionist trend in World War II history that credits the outcome of the war, in part, on American successes rather than just German failures. Unlike other revisionists, he does not base his case on the belief that American success was driven by an indomitable spirit to overcome shortcomings in doctrine, training, and equipment. Instead, Calhoun argues that the Army prepared for war against the Axis by developing sound doctrine, streamlining organizational structures and acceptable equipment, and conducting realistic training, so that American success was a function of learning how to fight effectively with the tools at hand. McNair's role in this, argues Calhoun, stands as "one of the most remarkable achievements of the war" (p. 308).

From its title or table of contents, a potential reader might be tempted to think that this book is merely a biography of a tangential character in the history of World War II. Fortunately, it is not. Instead, perhaps due to the limited availability of McNair's personal papers, the author uses the general as a lens through which to correct prevailing narratives about the inadequacy of the U.S. Army, both in its preparation for the war and its performance throughout it. This makes the book an excellent reference on American preparations for World War II and U.S. Army professional military education. Equally important, Calhoun's well-written book provides the best look to date at McNair and illustrates the value of organizational leadership in an institution that often places a premium on direct leadership at the expense of those who lead the systems and processes that create institutional-level success.

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The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964–March 1965



Edited by Nicholas J. Schlosser
Marine Corps University Press, 2016
pp. xxxviii, 366. $59

Review by Greg McCarthy

The Greene Papers is a collection of writings from the original documents of U.S. Marine Corps General Wallace Greene, the twenty-third Commandant of the Marine Corps. The one hundred items cover a fourteen-month period ending in early 1965 and were declassified in 2011. The work unfolds in strictly chronological fashion and the editor's notes are minimal, usually identifying some principal or offering a slight correction. This provides the reader with an original source, real-time assessment of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) discussions in the critical run-up to the major deployment of ground forces to Southeast Asia. The records are interspersed with several 1972 summaries of Greene's oral history recollections on specific documents or events. Those comments were made before the peace agreement and fall of Saigon, so Greene was speaking of a still-ongoing war.

The basic contours of America's involvement in Vietnam have been established at least since the publication of the *Pentagon Papers* (New York, 1971) and David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest* (New York, 1972). Former National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York, 1997) added detail (and blame) to deliberations of the JCS. *The Greene Papers* confirms in dry detail the many unchallenged assumptions and rosy scenarios that led to the commitment of substantial ground combat troops. The collection also provides contemporaneous evidence that as early as January 1964, Greene's first month of a four-year term, the situation was deteriorating and needed greater U.S. commitment or outright abandonment.

The specifics remain troubling. Vietnam was a textbook case of mission creep, ends-means misalignment, a limited war yielding limited results, and ad hoc decision making that regularly omitted key players and options. General Maxwell Taylor, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), often misrepresented the JCS views to President Richard M. Nixon, but ingratiated himself to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, much to the detriment of his role as principal military adviser to South Vietnam, and later, its U.S. ambassador.

In Greene's writings, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara are noted for their indecisiveness and micromanagement, respectively. Johnson follows Kennedy's lead in *not* relying on the National Security Council for policymaking and discussion. Greene paints a picture of at least half the Joint Chiefs regularly being kept in the dark about various White House decisions, learning about directives through the media or word from the theater. McNamara's dismissive overconfidence is on display throughout. In what sounds like modern controversies, Johnson's frustrations with policy leaks led to his vow to fire any leakers, and he later ordered the FBI to investigate his own staff (p. 340).

The basic outlines of the policy challenge appear in early 1964. Greene's initial trip to South Vietnam in January found U.S. advisers with minimal enthusiasm for a job they estimated would take two to three years. He assesses colonels there as only "average." It is almost eerie how prescient some the JCS concerns are: is General William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, tough enough to face down politicians? In May 1964, Greene foresees that "we are about to become deeply involved" in Vietnam, maybe bigger than in Korea. The Secretary of Defense may be discredited, he notes. Even McNamara in March 1964 is increasingly nervous. In late 1964, Greene believes that a major war will not be popular.

The Joint Chiefs face a series of escalating exchanges, including the still-controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 resulting in nearly unanimous approval of a congressional resolution to respond. The reader may note an unusual alliance forming between Greene and Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay. The two are the resident "hawks," seeking decisive engagement and strong commitment (although Greene leaves open the possibility of walking away altogether). Further, Greene and LeMay are both outspoken at times within the JCS that the chiefs' views must be presented to the president. Although he is not above describing LeMay as belligerent and fumbling in one exchange with McNamara, LeMay's retirement in early 1965 deprives Greene of his closest ally.

Johnson makes only minimal appearances in the book. There is a cameo by Daniel Ellsberg, in pre-*Pentagon Papers* notoriety. Cyrus Vance, a future Secretary of State, regularly appears as Deputy Secretary of Defense but leaves little impression. A *New York Times* editor tells senior Johnson officials his reporters have a

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better read on the country than the administration.

McNamara discussed, unprompted and on multiple occasions, preemptive strikes on embryonic Chinese nuclear facilities, predicting it would otherwise be an enormous problem in coming decades. The domino theory (the idea that the loss of Vietnam would inevitably lead to the Communist takeover of the remainder of Southeast Asia) and Communist Chinese dominance over Vietnam are both taken as axiomatic (but have been widely disputed since).

Greene's documents make clear that the American leaders never forged the kind of partnership with South Vietnam that would succeed when tested. Successive U.S. ambassadors expressed regular frustration with the mediocre leadership of South Vietnam. At the same time, on at least two occasions, leaders (the U.S. ambassador and the intelligence community, respectively) overestimated their survivability.


Congress has a slightly larger role than expected in Greene's writings, given its virtual rubber stamp in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Johnson urges the intelligence community to share its findings with Sen. Barry Goldwater, his opponent in the 1964 general election. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Russell, viewed generally as a hawk, tells Greene in October 1964 that he told Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to install a South Vietnam puppet demanding U.S. withdrawal. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, assesses the early 1965 Congress as indifferent or opposed to Vietnam (p. 278). Sen. Albert Gore Sr., a Democrat from Tennessee and the father of the future vice president, gives one official "hell" in February 1965 for why the United States is in Vietnam at all. The chiefs discuss how much to tell Congress in open hearings.

McNamara's guidance to the JCS in early 1965 is to ask for more force than needed and to avoid Korean War-style failure. The story ends abruptly (and without even a coda of an editorial comment) in March 1965 as the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade takes its position in Da Nang.

As a narrator, Greene, who died in 2003, seems reliable and mostly avoids score-settling, although his animus toward McNamara is not disguised, decrying his "whiz kid management techniques" at one point. Greene's 1972 oral history summaries are not as illuminating as the original documents.

Perhaps the only thing worse than a decision by committee is one made by part of a committee. Lamenting the piecemeal approach, Greene concludes that "nothing has been learned from history on the proper application of military power" (p. 253). He seemed to have grasped in its early stages that our Vietnam effort was doomed, but did not voice the subsequent regret of his contemporary, Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson, that he should have resigned in protest. It is worth noting that Greene was the first Commandant of the Marine Corps to serve as a full member of the JCS, and Marine observers may appreciate the intimate thoughts of a wartime commandant. The book will also be of great interest to Vietnam War scholars seeking primary sources and of general use to the larger body of works addressing the decision-making processes of the war. *The Greene Papers*, though a snapshot in time from only one-fifth of the Joint Chiefs, revisits Vietnam in all its awful complexity.

Col. Greg McCarthy, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, earned his Ph.D. at the Catholic University of America and has deployed to Afghanistan as a Marine historian. He is currently an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies in Washington, D.C.



By Bruce M. Venter
University of Oklahoma Press, 2016
Pp. xxi, 356. $29.95

Review by Garrett A. Close

Union Army Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's ill-fated 1864 raid on Richmond, Virginia, with its supposed aims of killing Confederate President Jefferson Davis, setting the rebels' capital ablaze, and freeing 13,000 Union prisoners of war from Libby Prison, makes for a compelling story. However, despite the intriguing nature of the raid, few historians have explored it in depth. Bruce Venter remedies this lapse in Civil War historiography with the excellent *Kill Jeff Davis*, a well-researched and interesting account of the people and events involved in one attempt to strike at the heart of the Confederacy. In the book, Venter examines the raid at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, then discusses why it ended in failure.

Venter's work focuses on Kilpatrick and his subordinate commander, Col. Ulric Dahlgren, as they led the Union raid. The author describes the actions taken by each commander on their way to Richmond, along with the stiff resistance they encountered as they approached the city. He tells of their attempts to leave Confederate territory, and how Dahlgren, unable to communicate with Kilpatrick, was ultimately killed in the process. Venter concludes by describing the aftermath of the raid, including the Confederate

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response to documents they discovered on Dahlgren's body that stated his objective: to kill Jefferson Davis. The writer argues that these documents were likely genuine, but that it was probably Dahlgren, not his superiors, who made the decision to kill the Confederate president.

Venter's exploration of the strategic level of war is chiefly concerned with how President Abraham Lincoln chose to exercise national power in shaping Kilpatrick's mission. Lincoln met with Kilpatrick before personally approving his mission to attack Richmond and free Union prisoners of war, the raid's original objectives. The author argues, though, that the decision to kill Davis was not made by Lincoln. He says that while the president likely "had no problem taking Davis prisoner . . . no evidence exists that Lincoln wanted him dead" (p. 248). He also reveals that Lincoln was a close confidant of the father of Dahlgren, and that this relationship may have led to Dahlgren's selection to serve under Kilpatrick on the raid. Venter makes a credible case that this had a negative impact on the raid's outcome, as Dahlgren had not yet fully recovered from his foot being amputated mere months before the start of Kilpatrick's mission.

Venter later delves into the operational level of war. He discusses Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler's failed raid on Richmond, which preceded Kilpatrick's mission but shared similar objectives. The author adds the story of Brig. Gen. George Custer's diversion toward Charlottesville and discusses its effects on Kilpatrick's raid. Throughout the narrative, he includes detailed information on Confederate forces, including the decision by the Confederates to destroy Libby Prison and kill the Union prisoners of war inside if any attempt was made to free them.


While *Kill Jeff Davis* recounts the politics and campaigns leading to Kilpatrick's mission, the book is at its best while examining the raid at the tactical level. Venter provides vivid descriptions of terrain, environmental conditions, and units' actions and offers sound exposition on the potential thought processes of commanders and analyses on why combat actions succeeded or failed. The author's assertions are well supported; his book is heavily footnoted and relies on sources such as official records, regimental histories, newspaper accounts, unpublished diaries, reminiscences, and Army archival sources previously unused by historians.

Not content simply to describe the circumstances surrounding Kilpatrick's raid on Richmond, *Kill Jeff Davis* also provides a comprehensive explanation for why the cavalry expedition failed to accomplish its objectives. Venter argues that multiple factors, including issues with weather, knowledge of terrain, command and control, logistics, and a lack of secrecy each played a role in the outcome of the raid. He paints a picture of the cold, rainy weather that followed the cavalry, muddying fields, filling rivers, and slowing the raiders' movement at times when speed was critical. The author shows how Dahlgren failed to effectively use scouts and how his resulting navigational errors delayed his command, preventing them from effectively supporting Kilpatrick in Richmond. Venter also aptly depicts the command and control issues that hindered the mission. At one point, Dahlgren attempted to contact Kilpatrick for guidance, so he sent scouts to ask Kilpatrick to signal him with rockets. He was apparently undeterred by the fact that the same rockets had been absolutely ineffective at keeping the two cavalrymen in contact throughout the mission thus far. Logistics also proved challenging, as evidenced by the fact that Dahlgren's element, when it was ambushed near King and Queen Courthouse, was almost out of ammunition. Finally, Venter argues that the raid required secrecy to succeed, but that "from the outset that rarest of military commodities was compromised" as knowledge that the raid was to occur was fairly widespread (p. 260).

If the writer stumbles at all in *Kill Jeff Davis*, it is in finding a balance between telling the overall story and exploring its details. He typically does a good job of both, but occasionally his enthusiasm to explain an event in depth interrupts the forward momentum of the narrative. In one example, he devotes an entire chapter to Martin Robinson, a guide who lost his way and was later brutally killed by Dahlgren. Historians will undoubtedly appreciate Venter's efforts here, but more casual readers may find such lengthy asides somewhat dry. This is, however, a very minor quibble. Venter deserves great credit for contributing to the historical record in such a fascinating way, and anyone interested in the Civil War would be well served in reading *Kill Jeff Davis*. His book will likely appeal to casual readers, military professionals, and historians alike.

Maj. Garrett A. Close received his master's in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University. He served with the 3d Cavalry Regiment in Iraq and currently works as an intelligence officer in the 1st Cavalry Division.





By Chad R. Fulwider
University of Missouri Press, 2016
Pp. xi, 274. $60

Review by Nicholas M. Sambaluk

In *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I*, author Chad R. Fulwider makes sure from

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the outset to lay out the importance of his topic, asserting that "the battle for American public opinion" was "the most decisive battle of World War I" (p. 3). German propaganda efforts were intended to reinforce U.S. neutrality during the conflict, but Fulwider explores these endeavors and the reasons they ultimately failed.

Perhaps the principle German failing was that officials in Berlin concocted a selective and largely inaccurate understanding of German Americans. The German government assumed that these immigrants and their descendants, making up about a quarter of the U.S. population at the time, constituted a pool of latent support for the Fatherland. This view ignored the fact that the fealty of turn-of-the-century German Americans to their heritage, customs, food, and faith did not necessarily translate into loyalty to the Second Reich. In fact, many had emigrated precisely because they saw economic or political opportunities in the New World that had been lacking in Germany. Furthermore, the biggest organization for the immigrant and descendant population was the National German American Association, a consciously nonpartisan entity sympathetic to American noninvolvement in the war and disinterested in serving simply as a mouthpiece for Berlin's messaging.

Complementing Berlin's misconception of German American society was its misunderstanding of how best to address American audiences. Fulwider repeatedly demonstrates that the German government favored the use of overt propaganda documents on the assumption that the stamp of government authorization would lend further credibility to the message. Contemporary German American scholars noted that this might be effective in Germany but was counterproductive in the United States. While Berlin utterly failed to learn this lesson, London seized on the opportunity from the outset to establish subtle, unattributed, and vastly more effective propaganda modes in the neutral United States, contouring the national debate about the war.

The author notes that German efforts were confused, ineffective, and frequently contradictory. Repeated shifts in U-boat policy came without warning to the people charged with running propaganda efforts in the United States, and propagandists were frequently sent scrambling to react to events. Funding for covert sabotage efforts by agents of the Army and Navy were questionably routed along diplomatic and business channels. Discovery of these efforts tainted the German government's propaganda message. Other more passive German methods included the creation of the Bridgeport Projective Company as a dummy business that "tied up construction firms, specialized technical equipment, and resources that could not be exploited by American capitalists" to sell munitions to Britain and France (p. 130). This, too, was uncovered and deepened suspicion of German spokesmen and diplomats.

One area in which Fulwider finds the German effort notably botched was in its failure to more energetically support the creation of war propaganda films for foreign consumption. Although a film company was created for the purpose and was "the most promising vehicle for redirecting the American perception of Germany," it "foundered due to a shortage of funding and a lack of faith and insight on the part of officials in Germany" (p. 143). The problem was due less to a lack of resources than to Berlin's poor choices, as Fulwider explains in a footnote "the Germans wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars attempting to funnel arms to [rebels in] India, money that could have been spent through the American Correspondent Film Company to produce better German film propaganda" (p. 221).

Fulwider does an effective job showing how early and how completely the United States' economic dealings with the Entente powers made it a less-than-neutral country. Despite the nation not officially entering the war until April 1917 and conducting a hectic mobilization that prevented large-scale participation in European combat until the following summer, U.S. businesses from arms manufacturers to horse breeders were doing a lively business with Germany's enemies within weeks of war's outbreak, and by September 1915, U.S. policy had shifted to allow economic credits to London and Paris as well as the extension of half a billion dollars of loans to the Allied powers. Thus, "the United States was an integral participant in the 'European war' by mid-1915, in economic terms, if not overtly as a declared belligerent" (p. 50).


German propaganda efforts were a failure. From the start of the war, the cutting of Germany's trans-Atlantic cables had put the country at a messaging disadvantage. Britain's naval dominance, its trade with the United States, its blockade of Germany, and its broad definition of contraband posed monumental problems for Germany. Crucial mistakes by the German policymakers themselves compounded their difficulties. As a result, by the time the United States entered the war, "German-Americans quickly closed ranks with their fellow citizens by contributing heavily to liberty-bond drives" (p. 115) and by serving in the armed forces. This did not prevent a deep and nasty cultural campaign against things and people associated with Germany during the war period. In terms of social history, "the experience of German-Americans reveals that even those groups who seemed to have successfully integrated and assimilated into society could also be easily marked out yet again and discriminated against on the basis of perceived disloyalty" (p. 9).

In conclusion, the reader is presented with a deeper understanding of one aspect of World War I history that reinforces some important points, including the lessons that errors in strategy and perception can deal the heaviest blows and that mindsets can be dynamic, malleable, and manipulated. *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I* is a worthwhile and important read for anyone interested in World War I or the impact of strategic messaging.

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Dr. Nicholas M. Sambaluk is an associate professor of strategy at the Air University eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He is the author of *The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security* (Annapolis, Md., 2015), which was named "Air Power History Book of the Year" in 2016 by the Air Force Historical Foundation. His forthcoming book *21st Century Warfare: The Impact of Cyber Warfare, Social Media, and Technology* will be published by ABC-Clio in 2019.

Unwanted Warriors: The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force



By Nic Clarke
University of British Columbia Press, 2016
Pp. xi, 239. $32.95

Review by Peter L. Belmonte

In *Unwanted Warriors: The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force*, author Nic Clarke, a historian with the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, writes that somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 men were declared medically unfit to serve in the Canadian armed forces between 1914 and 1918 (p. 3). These men, rejected at recruiting stations or in staging camps, suffered a stigma that, in some cases, the author equates to wounds suffered on the battlefield. In considering and evaluating contemporary records, Clarke seeks to answer a series of questions: "[H]ow did the military authorities come to define what constituted the minimum physical standards for service? How did medical examination work? In what ways, and why, did concepts of military fitness differ between Canadian military authorities, Canadian medical professionals, and laypeople? How did such differing constructions impact recruiting, recruits, and those rejected for service? How did civilian societies view, and treat, those deemed unfit to serve? How did those turned away as unfit navigate their rejection for service?" (p. 9).

Before proceeding into his narrative, Clarke reminds us about the use of the term "lowered standards" when discussing physical requirements: "[W]e should be careful not to attribute an overly negative connotation to the world 'lowered' when discussing the changes to the Canadian Expeditionary Force's minimum physical standards. Although these standards were lowered in the sense that less was required of some recruits, the changes implemented did not impact negatively on the ability of individual recruits to successfully carry out their mission or that of the force as a whole" (pp. 8–9).

In the first chapter, the author covers the evolution of Canadian military medical standards for recruits and the regulations governing medical and physical exams. These standards changed over time. From the black-and-white "fit" and "unfit" designations in effect in 1914, the categories became much more nuanced and broadened. Recognition that modern warfare required different types of service and duties prompted a reevaluation of standards. Men unfit for combat in the trenches could still be fit and useful for duties behind the lines or even garrison and administrative work in Canada. Such a realization resulted in a categorization scheme that placed men in one of several categories, from A to D, with subcategories within each group. A similar scheme was in effect for the United States Army at the time.

In the next chapter, Clarke shows how Canada's increasing demands for men resulted in a general lowering of standards as the war progressed. Even before the manpower crunch was felt, the Canadian Army lowered its standards regarding dental health, height, chest girth, and vision, among other things. Furthermore, the different branches of service had differing standards; height requirements for heavy artillery were different than those of the infantry, for example. Even among support units there were differences in standards between railroad construction battalions, forestry battalions, and Dental Corps units, for instance.

Clarke examines some failures in the system in Chapter 3. As early as 1914, with the "fit/unfit" rating system basically still in effect, some Canadian soldiers were arriving in England with obvious impairments. These included amputated limbs and noticeable severe limps; indeed, some of the examples cited by the writer are astounding. The number of unfit men arriving in Europe was enough to cause civilian and military leaders a great deal of concern, and in turn, they issued further instructions and cautions. This chapter also recounts the efforts by recruits, medical officers, and unit commanders to subvert the medical inspection process in order to fill their ranks, which added to the problem of unfit men arriving in Europe.

Chapter 4, as the title states, explores the "Clashing Concepts of Fitness." Civilian and military notions of fitness did not always agree, and the civilian concept often had some influence on doctors' decisions. Many civilians simply could not understand why a healthy, hearty logger, for example, should be rejected for military service because he had bad teeth. Other ailments and conditions didn't hinder a man from civilian employment, and both prospective recruits and civilians questioned the military's wisdom in rejecting some applicants.

Visibly, most of the men rejected for service appeared to be physically "fit" enough for service. Consequently, they were frequently the targets of overzeal-

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ous ladies pressuring men to enlist, or even aggressive recruiters seeking men to fill the Army's ranks. The Army and some communities developed various badges and pins that these men could wear to indicate to observers that they had tried to enlist but had been rejected. This, of course, cut both ways: it showed that a man had willingly tried to enlist, but it also was a beacon telling the world that he was, in some way, substandard. Chapter 5 gives a statistical review of large samples of these substandard men, looking at such factors as religion, occupation, age, etc.

In Chapter 6, Clarke looks at the cost of rejection. For those men eager and willing to volunteer, being declared unfit had a devastating impact. The results ranged from suicide to self-exile. According to the author, "many rejected volunteers, whether they chose death at their own hands or carried the scars of their rejection, became uncounted casualties of the Great War" (p. 113).

Of course, not all the men rejected for service were trying to get to the front. Some men eagerly sought rejection as a way of avoiding the front. Such men went out of their way to point out disqualifying medical conditions to doctors conducting their examination. Likewise, wives, parents, and siblings of men in the ranks wrote letters to civilian officials and military commanders seeking to get their loved ones discharged. The letters invoked age, infirmities, and family obligations in order to sway official decisions.

In his final chapter, Clarke summarizes the preceding sections and reviews the changes in Canadian Army medical examinations and classifications promulgated during World War II. Several appendices summarize the changes in regulations and categories in the Canadian military throughout the war years. Clarke's endnotes are helpful and detailed, and his bibliography will give researchers plenty of opportunities for further study.

This book is an interesting and very worthy addition to World War I historiography. Such a work could be written from any combatant nation's perspective; let's hope that others will take up the mantle and more carefully examine these "unwanted warriors."

Peter L. Belmonte is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and freelance historian. He holds a master's degree in history from California State University, Stanislaus, and is the author of several books including, *Italian Americans in World War II* (Dixon, S.C., 2001), *Days of Perfect Hell: The U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, October–November, 1918* (Atglen, Pa., 2015), and (with Alexander F. Barnes) *Forgotten Soldiers of World War I: America's Immigrant Doughboys* (Atglen, Pa., 2018).

The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew



By Michael M. Walker
University Press of Kansas, 2017
Pp. xiii, 400. $39.95

Review by Eric Setzekorn

The clash of empires in northeast Asia is a subject that continues to resonate in history and contemporary politics. Michael M. Walker's *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew* details the brief but pivotal conflict between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China, concluding that the Soviet victory paved the way for a much stronger Japanese interest in Manchuria. While Walker presents a compelling argument for the importance of the 1929 conflict, the confused nature of the fighting and numerous actors, each with distinct goals and motivations, makes the historical narrative difficult for a casual reader to easily comprehend despite the author's valiant efforts. Although successful in achieving Walker's goal of creating a "drum and trumpet operational history," *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War* is more appealing to the military history specialist rather than a broad audience.

The heart of the author's analysis is the vital role of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which connected Soviet territory in Siberia and the Far East by cutting across Manchuria. Built by the Russian government in the 1890s and early 1900s, the CER linked Chita and Vladivostok by transiting the northeastern province of what was then the Qing Empire, cutting travel time but involving Russia in complicated local politics. The 1905 Russo-Japanese War, 1911 Chinese Revolution, and 1917 Russian Revolution fractured the political system of the region, leading to the rise of local military forces and frequent skirmishing. Booming economic growth fueled by World War I, the rise of soybeans as a commercial crop, and the surging population of the city of Harbin further complicated the situation, leading to Manchuria becoming the "Wild West" of northeast Asia. In the 1920s, the combination of uncertainty and opportunity continued as local warlords, military proxies of great powers, and rapid economic development resulted in a vibrant and dangerous borderlands region.

Into this maelstrom, the Zhang family, the most powerful of local warlords, and the Kuomintang Party under Chiang Kai-shek sought to gain control of the CER for reasons of prestige and economic benefit. Driven by nationalism and a desire to solidify public support by opposing "imperialism," these two leaders maneuvered their military forces to extract concessions from the Soviets. Walker expertly describes the confusing Chinese political atmosphere of the 1920s, often dubbed the "Warlord

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era," but at times the number of names and dates becomes overwhelming. The Soviet motivations are more straightforward, as Joseph Stalin attempted to reclaim and solidify pre-1917 Russian prerogatives, while at the same time presenting the Soviet Union as a revolutionary ally of the Chinese. Curiously, the individual motivations and decision making of both the Chinese and Soviet leadership is given little examination. For example, the military training and political background of Chang Hsueh-liang, the most important local Chinese leader, is skimmed through in one paragraph. Several key issues, such as the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's son was a de facto hostage in the Soviet Union during this period, are not mentioned.

The book's best moments are in the later chapters in which Walker examines the decisive Soviet offensive in the fall of 1929 that destroyed Chinese aspirations of gaining control of the CER. Directed by General Vasily Blyuker, large-scale and skillful Soviet preparations for the conflict gave them a crucial advantage in fighting on both the western and eastern borders of Manchuria and along the Sungari River that flowed through the center of the region. Although the size of the theater of operations was enormous, the scale of the fighting was small, with only 1,000 Soviet and 9,000 Chinese casualties. The sharp, sudden victory of the Soviets was noted by Chinese and Japanese observers as heralding a return of Russian involvement in the Far East after a decade of civil war and isolation. The author argues that the Soviet ascendance led to a shift in Japanese thinking to focus on a potential Manchuria threat, an intriguing but weakly supported assertion.

Although a lengthy book, with 297 pages of text and over 100 additional pages containing notes, a bibliography, and an index, there is limited space devoted to the general military history of the era and interwar developments. Walker highlights the role of airpower and the increasingly heavy weight of artillery used by the Chinese and Soviets, but there is no attempt to link the fighting in Manchuria to other interwar conflicts such as the Chaco War in South America or the Spanish Civil War. This is a missed opportunity to engage with the high level of interest in interwar military developments.

A more serious issue is a heavy reliance on extremely dated sources and English language material. While there is a smattering of Chinese and Russian language material utilized, the overwhelming majority of sources are English language, which is problematic for a topic that had few American or British observers, and where none of the primary participants released large numbers of documents for translation. In addition, Walker's insights into the Chinese domestic political scene are hindered by the use of scholarship that is decades old. For example, his lengthy discussion of the Chinese "warlord era" uses material written by Ch'i (1966), Ch'en (1968), Sheridan (1966), Wu (1968), and Gillin (1960). While their scholarship was sound and remains useful, newer works on the period, such as Ed McCord's *The Power of the Gun* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), are inexplicably not used.

Overall, *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War* has great value for a specialist, and specific chapters will be of great utility to students of the 1920s Soviet and Chinese military forces. Casual readers of military history will struggle with many of the chapters that focus on the intricate Chinese politics of the period. For those looking for a "David Glantz-style" approach to 1920s Chinese military affairs, Walker has presented a professional and competent work on the volatile and fascinating history of northeast Asia.

Eric Setzekorn is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History and an adjunct professor at George Washington University. He is the author of *The Rise and Fall of an Officer Corps: The Republic of China Army, 1942–1955* (Norman, Okla., 2018).

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CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

JON T. HOFFMAN



PERSONNEL MATTERS

A number of personnel changes have taken place at the Center of Military History (CMH) in recent months. First among them, Mike DeYoung took over as the new program manager for Career Program (CP) 61, replacing Ed Clarke. Many of you already know Mike as the term employee who has been spearheading our World War I commemorative efforts. His extensive knowledge of the Army historical community and his well-known facility for developing personal relationships with colleagues contributed heavily to his selection. In addition, Mike spent many years in the Army managing significant programs, including the expansion and improvement of the service's Congressional Fellowship effort, so he has the demonstrated experience to build upon the already strong foundation of CP61. In the coming months we hope to get him out to the field to personally introduce himself to as much of the CP61 workforce as possible.

In an earlier Footnote I noted that we planned to establish a second master author position by converting one of our two existing writing division chief billets. That process has been completed, and after an open hiring action that evaluated candidates both internal and external, we selected Dr. Thomas Boghardt. Thomas has worked at CMH for a decade and has been a writing historian for the past several years. He is in the process of revising the completed first draft of a major book on Army intelligence in Germany from 1944 to 1949, part of our Cold War series. Before coming to CMH, Thomas was the historian for the International Spy Museum and has two commercially published books to his credit, both covering aspects of World War I intelligence, along with a monograph and dozens of articles.

Our initial crop of graduate research assistants (GRAs) completed their year at CMH on 31 July. They more than amply validated the GRA concept by their many valuable contributions to the work of the Center. David Johnson, from Texas Tech, brought a background in Vietnamese history and was an obvious choice as a research assistant for our two authors working on volumes in the Vietnam War series. Justin Blanton, from the University of North Carolina, seemed an unlikely fit given his focus on ethnic and colonial history in South America, but his knowledge of Brazil and Portuguese proved a perfect complement to the work of our Spanish-speaking historian writing a volume in the Cold War series on the Army in Latin America. Grant Harward, of Texas A&M, wrote his dissertation on the Romanian Army's role in the Holocaust and proved to be a strong contributor as a researcher and information paper writer for the HQDA Studies and Support Division. Wesley Hazzard, of the University of Southern Mississippi, specializes in the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and worked for our Force Structure and Unit History Division. He received a letter of appreciation from the Adjutant General of the Army for unearthing records at the National Archives that have proven critical in the review of Presidential Unit Citations for World War II divisions. Mason Watson, of Ohio State, focused his studies on Britain in World War I and thus was a natural fit to assist in the ongoing one hundredth anniversary commemoration. He performed above and beyond when he stepped in to do additional research and writing and helped complete one of our commemorative pamphlets after the original author was sidetracked by other obligations.

In addition to garnering work experience, the GRAs have been exposed to the federal history community through a regular professional development program. They received briefings and tours from the history programs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Department of State, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and Marine Corps museums. CMH ultimately hired Watson and Harward as CP 61 Pathways interns; Watson will work in the Histories Directorate and Harward with the Army Medical Command history office. The Navy hired Blanton as a contract historian. Johnson and Hazzard returned to their schools to wrap up their Ph.D.s with dissertation fellowship grants from the Center. The next crop of GRAs reported for duty on 1 August and will have their hands full filling the shoes of their predecessors.

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
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Innovative Doctrine, Topics, and Techniques for the Twenty-First Century

By Charles R. Bowery Jr.



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Developing and Conducting a Staff Ride for Yorktown, 1862


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
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
New Book from the Joint History Office

The Joint History Office recently published a new title, *The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations* by Christopher J. Lamb. President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS *Mayaguez* merchant ship is one of the best documented but least understood crises in U.S. history. America's behavior is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence over frustrations from losing the war in Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why contributes to perplexing explanations for U.S. behavior.

With previously unused sources and penetrating analysis, Lamb's *The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations* demonstrates how three decades of scholarship misrepresented U.S. motives and why the common allegation of civilian micromanagement during the crisis is wrong. This work extracts lessons for current issues such as mission-command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. Hardcover copies are available for purchase from the Government Publishing Office, and a free digital version can be found at http://www.jcs.mil/About/Joint-Staff-History.

New Publications from CMH

The Center of Military History (CMH) is pleased to announce the publication of two new titles in its U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series. The first of these, *Supporting Allied Offensives: 8 August–11 November 1918* by Paul B. Cora and Alexander A. Falbo-Wild, covers the American Expeditionary Forces' (AEF) participation in Allied actions in various sectors of the Western Front in the final months of the war. As increasing numbers of U.S. troops landed in France in late 1917 and early 1918, AEF commander General John J. Pershing initially resisted French and British efforts to amalgamate fresh American forces directly into



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Army Engineer Association

From left to right: Maj. Gen Russell L. Furan (Ret.), Adrian Traas, Lt. Gen. Todd T. Semanite, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Bradley J. Houston

the depleted Entente armies. However, the crisis of the German Spring Offensives that began in March 1918 forced Pershing to moderate his hardline stance on amalgamation, and he allowed American units to participate in combat operations as part of Allied forces for the remainder of the war.

The second pamphlet, *Meuse-Argonne: 26 September–11 November 1918* by Richard S. Faulkner, examines AEF participation in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive—the most vital American military contribution to the Allied effort during the war. On 26 September 1918, the American First Army launched a massive attack between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River northwest of the French town of Verdun. The narrative of this volume spans the forty-seven days of the AEF's key role in the Grand Allied Offensive on the Western Front, designed to stretch the German Army past its breaking point. From the outset, the inexperienced Americans faced a determined enemy on daunting terrain, with both natural and manmade fortifications that would challenge the First Army's ambitious operational plan. Although heavy casualties, troop exhaustion, and tangled logistics slowed the AEF's initial momentum, the doughboys capitalized on the strength of their manpower and firepower, as well as their newfound combat experience, to press forward and turn the Germans out of their defenses.

These booklets have been issued as CMH Pub 77–6 and CMH Pub 77–8, respectively. Both pamphlets will be available for requisition by Army units through their normal channels, for download on the CMH Web site, and for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

CMH Historian Awarded the de Fleury Medal

At a recent meeting in Crystal City, Virginia, the Army Engineer Association awarded the de Fleury medal to former CMH historian and retired Army lieutenant colonel Adrian G. Traas for his outstanding contributions to the Engineer Regiment as an engineer officer. The de Fleury Medal is awarded to individuals who display outstanding leadership, dedication, and a commitment to excellence that epitomizes the spirit of Army Engineers. Traas' professionalism, technical and tactical competence, and unmatched work ethic are in keeping with the finest traditions of military service and reflect great credit up on him and the Engineer Regiment. He is the author of *Engineers at War*, which CMH published in 2010. It covers Army Engineers during the Vietnam War. For more information please see CMH's online publication catalog, https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/91/91-14.html.

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THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY AND ARMY STAFF RIDES

INNOVATIVE DOCTRINE, TOPICS, AND TECHNIQUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY



By Charles R. Bowery Jr.

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CMH Historian David E. Hilkert conducts a staff ride of the Battle of First Bull Run for members of the Headquarters Command Battalion from Joint Base Myer–Henderson Hall.

In October 1988, General Carl E. Vuono, then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, authored the lead article in *The Army Historian*, the predecessor of this magazine. The Center of Military History (CMH) devoted the entire issue to staff rides, and General Vuono wrote eloquently about the value and power of staff riding as an educational experience for soldiers. Vuono noted in his article that "history puts today's decisions in perspective against those of past commanders," and that the study of military history "infuses with living immediacy the matrix of tactics, logistics, command, terrain, and technology." When properly prepared and facilitated, the staff ride is a unique venue to accelerate that immediacy by, again in the words of General Vuono, "narrowing the gap between peacetime training and war."[1]

In 1988, the U.S. Army was reaching the height of its post-Vietnam recovery. The recovery process had technological components in the "Big Five" weapons systems, but, equally as important, were the doctrinal, educational, and cultural changes. My predecessor in 1988, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, had coedited *America's First Battles* (Lawrence, Kans., 1986) two years earlier. That same year, the Army War College published the first of its landmark series of staff-ride guides for Civil War battles. This intellectual ferment pushed staff riding back into the Army's training and education mindset, and there it has remained.

Thirty years on from the Army's intellectual renaissance, innovative approaches to staff-ride doctrine, techniques, and topics expand the reach of this timeless educational and training opportunity. As our Army's institutional efforts focus on building readiness and developing the future force, staff rides offer a low-cost, high-yield way to develop resilient, thoughtful, and tactically and technically sound soldiers and civilians. Properly organized and facilitated, a staff ride creates a matchless environment for the development of historical mindedness in the participants. Since publishing William Glenn Robertson's *The Staff Ride* in 1987, CMH has embraced the development of staff-ride doctrine as part of its proponent responsibilities for the Army Historical Program.

Today, it is time to reconsider the staff ride in light of the need for new doctrine, expanded topic areas, and twenty-first century techniques. Smart application of these innovations will ensure that the U.S. Army continues to leverage, as the Foreword to Robertson's pamphlet put it, this "unique and persuasive method of conveying the lessons of the past to the present-day Army leadership for current application."[2]

As it is presently constructed in CMH Pub 70–21, the Robertson pamphlet, a doctrinal staff ride is a phased event consisting of preliminary classroom analysis of the subject (a battle or campaign), extensive field study on the ground, and systematic integration of lessons learned after the field visit. The field-research phase traditionally focuses on a campaign, battle, or engagement within a battle, as a case study in the ride's objectives. The participants frequently assume the roles of historical actors, and brief other students on their character's actions at various points. The staff-ride leader is the facilitator of this interaction. Robertson clearly distinguishes a staff ride from other types of educational excursions involving historical events or military doctrine, such as a Tactical Exercise Without Troops or a simple guided tour.

The staff-ride doctrine, combined with the foundational goal of staff riding: "to place students on an actual piece of terrain, confront them with an operational situation, and stimulate them to reach conclusions or derive lessons from the experience," is the Army's current staff-ride framework.[3] It is time to expand this framework.

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Hilkert discusses the fighting at McPherson's Ridge during a Battle of Gettysburg staff ride conducted for Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets from the University of Michigan.

The first step in this process will be a new Army staff-ride doctrine. Over the next year, CMH will revise and reissue *The Staff Ride*. The new pamphlet will be published in hard copy, but an ePub version will also be available, in order to expand the tools available for staff-ride planners and facilitators. The ePub version will be particularly valuable, as it will incorporate moving maps, video of staff-ride techniques, and presentations of artifacts, primary sources, art, and World Wide Web links to resources both within and outside the Army.

The levels of war offer numerous opportunities to leverage staff riding outside the traditional focus of campaigns and battles. The Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy has been an innovator in this area. They conduct nontraditional staff rides such as Cold War and Holocaust rides in Eastern Europe, a World War I staff ride in France that sees war through the lens of literature, and a modern Asia staff ride that examines the geopolitics in that area.

Over the past year, CMH has expanded its repertoire as well. Our staff rides traditionally have focused on [illegible] Virginia Civil War battles and [illegible] coln assassination. These rides [illegible] tailored to different audiences [illegible] discussion topics such as [illegible] mination, military justice, civil [illegible] relations, and unconventional [illegible] For example, the Lincoln assassination staff ride begins in northwest Washington, D.C., at the Surratt Boarding House, where the conspirators planned the attack. It then proceeds to Ford's Theater and then crosses the street to Petersen House. After an optional trip to the Surratt Tavern in Charles County, Maryland, the ride concludes at Fort McNair, in the restored courtroom where a military commission tried and convicted the conspirators. Historians from CMH have conducted this ride for diverse groups such as the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army and several non-Department of Defense federal agencies.



U.S. Army Center of Military History

Hilkert discusses the escape of several of the conspirators during a Lincoln Assassination staff ride. This stop during the staff ride takes place near the tennis courts (background) on Fort Lesley J. McNair, the former site of the gallows, where four of the conspirators met their end.

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Officers and civilian employees from the Army Judge Advocate General's office assemble outside the entrance to Ford's Theatre as part of the Lincoln Assassination staff ride.

The new CMH Pub 70–21 will expand the traditional boundaries of staff riding to incorporate a variety of techniques beyond the battlefield case study, while still reinforcing the value of the time-tested original. A guided Socratic discussion, where participants comment on specific topics without character briefings, might outwardly resemble a portion of a guided tour, but it is an educational experience in its own right when properly prepared and facilitated. This discussion may be the best option for a group that has limited time or little interest in detailed, character-based preparation or comprehensive preliminary study. The U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College is an advocate of the Operational Decision Game (ODG), in which participants use the historical conditions of the campaign, battle, or event to arrive at strategic, operational, or tactical decisions that are independent of those historical events. The ODG is particularly effective for staff rides involving operational or tactical-level staff. The Virtual Staff Ride (VSR), pioneered by the Army Command and General Staff College, leverages technology to take participants to historical venues that may be inaccessible—such as to eastern Afghanistan and the 2008 Battle of Wanat, or to World War II–era Stalingrad. The VSR could be valuable in a Professional Military Education setting, where VSR content can be nested with specific learning objectives.


The primary value of staff riding is that it deepens participants' intellectual foundations in their duty position or occupational specialty. Subject-matter expertise in the historical events being studied is often beside the point, and may even detract from true learning. There are a variety of paths leading to this intellectual growth; a military history staff ride is one of these paths. Through effective engagement with historical events both on and off the battlefield, using techniques tailored to participants, and supported by updated doctrine, the staff ride will continue to be an effective, low-cost tool for military training and education.

Charles R. Bowery Jr., a retired Army colonel, is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a former military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He served as an Apache helicopter pilot in Iraq, and commanded an attack helicopter battalion in Afghanistan. He is the coauthor of *Lee and Grant: Profiles in Leadership from the Battlefields of Virginia* (New York, 2004).

Notes

1. Carl E. Vuono, "The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting," *Army Historian* 12 (October 1988): 1–2.
2. William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), p. v.
3. Ibid., p. 4.

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THE OTHER SIEGE

Developing and Conducting a Staff Ride for Yorktown, 1862

By J. Britt McCarley

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The U.S. Army began to use historical staff rides in the formal leader development of soldiers about 1906–1907. After decades of episodic success in developing and conducting additional curricular rides, the Army finally institutionalized the staff ride as pedagogy in its service schools by the mid-1980s. Since then, the Army has used a straightforward, three-part, doctrinal staff-ride methodology—preliminary study phase, field study phase, and integration phase. This method inculcates deep understanding of the profession of arms and of the military art and science in both the practitioners and participants of the staff ride. As a result, the staff ride has become a fixture of post-school professional development for units and staffs. Today, practically all Army organizations use the staff ride also as a team-building event and to strengthen esprit de corps.

During the preliminary study phase, staff riders use a broad range of historical sources to thoroughly examine the battle or campaign and the critical locations they will later visit; then they go to those places in the field study phase to evaluate soldiers' decisions and actions on the very ground where they occurred. Finally, in the integration phase, they draw logical parallels and make cogent connections between the historical events and related elements of today's Army profession.[1]

Background

As chief historian of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and director of its Military History and Heritage Program, I have the great privilege of overseeing, in most of the Army's service schools, the program that teaches the staff ride to students as a form of leader development. Historians from TRADOC, assisted by its museum professionals, work with commanders, commandants, and their teams to conduct staff rides as one type of professional development. Since TRADOC's establishment in 1973, our headquarters (HQ) has been located at Fort Monroe, Virginia (1973–2011), and now at nearby Fort Eustis. In that time, the HQ's Military History and Heritage Office (MHHO) historians have conducted hundreds of professional-development staff rides for units and even occasional leader-development staff rides for Army schools, such as the U.S. Army Logistics University at Fort Lee, Virginia, aimed at field grade officers and senior level civilians. For many years, our go-to staff ride has been the internationally significant 1781 Siege of Yorktown, Virginia. The location is managed today as the Yorktown Battlefield unit of the National Park Service's (NPS) Colonial National Historical Park. Yorktown is where, in October 1781, the Americans and their French allies defeated the British and their German auxiliaries in one of the Revolutionary War's last engagements. The victory soon led to peace negotiations and eventually to the 1783 Treaty of Paris recognizing the United States as an independent nation.

When the MHHO moved to Fort Eustis in summer 2011 as part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process, we found ourselves on an Army installation containing remnants of numerous Confederate earthworks from the American Civil War's 1862 Richmond Campaign. This move opened a door of opportunity to develop a staff ride covering the 1862 Siege of Yorktown, the Virginia Peninsula's "other siege," which is relatively unknown by comparison.

We began building this new staff ride in November 2011, when the Fort Eustis archaeologist showed us practically all the rebel fieldworks on post. Because the federal government bought the land that is now Fort Eustis in 1918 as part of the World War I mobilization effort, the Civil War forts, trenches, redoubts, and batteries within the installation went largely untouched over the years. However, some have suffered foundation damage from tree growth and some have been harmed by foot traffic, such as one located too near a recreational riverside beach.[2] As we read the primary and secondary sources on the 1862 siege, we extended our fieldwork to portions of parks in Newport News, Virginia, and the Yorktown Battlefield, both of which have miles of earthworks associated with the later siege. Many have survived along interpretive trails and even seemingly being abandoned deep in the woods. After extensive study, we conducted our first staff ride of the 1862 Siege of Yorktown in 2012 and continue to do so. With each ride we further refine our use of historical sources and the historic ground itself. The rest of this article will first summarize the siege for context, and then it will take the reader, location by location, through this newest staff ride, ending with some of the insights we use to connect the historic event to today's Army.

The Siege

In July 1861, the Battle of First Bull Run, the Civil War's initial large-scale engagement occurred near Manassas, Virginia, about twenty-five miles outside Washington, D.C. Several months after the battle, President Abraham Lincoln appointed Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to command the Union's nascent Army of the Potomac, which was being formed to protect the U.S. capital. Remaining in the Manassas area were the victorious Confederate forces that

General McClellan



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would soon form the nucleus of the Army of Northern Virginia. It would be under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, formerly the Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army. During the winter of 1861–1862, the Lincoln administration pressured McClellan to take the Army of the Potomac to the field, defeat the Confederates under Johnston, capture the rebel capital at Richmond, Virginia, about 100 miles to the south, and hopefully end the war. Claiming unpreparedness of the forces under his command, McClellan delayed starting the campaign until late March 1862. During the winter, Lincoln and McClellan debated the best route to Richmond—overland past Fredericksburg or overwater and overland via the Chesapeake Bay. The general eventually chose the latter route by way of the Virginia Peninsula.


After arriving by ship in the Fort Monroe area on 2 April, McClellan marched straightaway on 4 April. The bulk of his Army of the Potomac trooped northwest along two parallel roads toward Yorktown and Williamsburg, the latter about halfway along the seventy-five miles to Richmond. Because McClellan's maneuver scheme had been developed from a map incorrectly depicting local geography, his infantry columns collided unexpectedly on 5 April with Confederate Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder's Army of the Peninsula behind its main line of resistance along the course of the Warwick River. For the next month, the Army of the Potomac reconnoitered the rebel lines looking for positional advantage, fought a reconnaissance-in-force on 16 April at a point of presumed weakness, and constructed numerous, massive earthworks near Yorktown. McClellan intended to use them to employ about 100 siege-caliber artillery pieces—first to blow a gaping hole in the enemy line near the Warwick River's headwaters, and then to conduct a general assault through the breach to potentially fight the campaign's decisive battle. Throughout that same month, the Confederates reinforced Magruder's troops with Johnston's army to the point where, despite arriving Northern reinforcements, the force ratio had




General Johnston



General Magruder



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been reduced from the initial robust Union four-to-one to a scant two-to-one. Not wanting to receive a massive bombardment and then fight an open-field engagement, Johnston withdrew toward Williamsburg and ultimately to Richmond on the night of 3–4 May 1862, thus ending the Civil War's Siege of Yorktown.[3]

The Staff Ride

After the preliminary study phase, each location visited for discussion and analysis during the field-study phase is called a stand, a proper staff ride term derived from the early twentieth-century U.S. Army practice of conducting staff rides on horseback. Along the way, participants would dismount and "stand" on the ground to consider the significance of any given place. The MHHO's 1862 Siege of Yorktown staff ride routinely includes nine stands.


At all staff-ride locations, we adhere to the standard analytical framework developed by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute—of orientation (to the place), description (of leaders' decisions and soldiers' actions), and analysis (in comparison to elements of the military art and science and aspects of the profession of arms). Known by the abbreviation ODA, this framework allows staff ride participants to engage in logical and purposeful exchanges with each other.

Located along the western shoreline of Mulberry Island overlooking the James River is Stand 1. Mulberry Island, which is actually a peninsula, forms most of the Army's Fort Eustis portion of today's Joint Base Langley-Eustis. Stand 1 serves to connect the ride's preliminary study phase to the field study phase. It sets the siege in proper strategic and operational context, and ensures that the participants fully understand that Virginia's James River was a major avenue of approach to Richmond. Thus, it was an area that Confederate naval vessels and fortifications had to deny to the U.S. Navy.

Stand 2 is the massive eight-acre Fort Crafford, which the rebels built as a covering work early in 1862. It was to prevent the Union Army from laying siege to the nearby Mulberry Island Point Battery that the Confederate Navy manned and armed. It worked in conjunction with other neighboring riverside forts to create a corridor of fire along a narrow section of the James River to keep the Union Navy from sailing inland toward Richmond.

The final Fort Eustis location is Stand 3, which is the Minor Farm Line. As the name indicates, the Minor family owned the farm on which Magruder's troops built a line of still largely pristine redoubts and connecting curtain trenches. These were to prevent any

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A painting of Fort Crawford by Sidney E. King

Union amphibious force that might land on Mulberry Island from advancing along the road dividing the island in half—thus gaining access to the rear area of the main Confederate Warwick River Line.

At this point, the staff ride leaves Fort Eustis, preferably by the Shellabarger Gate, which connects to a bridge over the Warwick River at a point where the waterway downstream gives way to tidal flats upstream near its head of navigation. Because the river is the peninsula's primary terrain obstacle behind which the Southerners contested McClellan's advance to Richmond, seeing the waterway early in the staff ride forms a useful image in participants' minds and facilitates the rest of the ride. The next two stands are in parks managed by the City of Newport News with numerous, well-interpreted historical placards produced by the city's historian.

Adjacent to Fort Eustis and overlooking the Warwick River is Stand 4, the Lee's Mill Redoubt, named after the tide mill there in 1862. Nearby, elements of the Army of the Potomac first encountered the enemy on 5

One of the best preserved redoubts from the Minor Farm Line, showing an angle, the dry ditch, and the sally port (middle-left of the photo), which provided access to the gun platforms within the work.



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The Dam No. 1 battlefield straddles the city of Newport News's Lee Hall Reservoir (in the middle distance) and contains such interpretive resources as historical waysides, trails, and monuments; remaining Confederate earthworks are in the woods beyond the footbridge that crosses the reservoir.

April. Torrential downpours inhibited McClellan's use of the region's two primary roads: the Great Warwick Road and the York-Hampton Highway. The Union Army employed both as its principal avenues of advance westward. After observing the sheer size of the redoubt, the staff riders review and analyze numerous written communications between politicians and generals of both sides. These communications led McClellan to adopt siege warfare as his method and led to Magruder's decision to stand and fight from behind strong, but still incomplete, earthworks instead of withdrawing west toward Richmond.

Stand 5 is the site of the so-called Battle of Dam No. 1 on 16 April 1862. It occupies several acres of land within Newport News Park and lies astride the city's principal freshwater reservoir, which is the dammed Warwick River. By the campaign's start, Magruder had overseen construction of three military dams to supplement two civilian ones connected to mills, thus turning the Warwick into a highly effective, wide, shallow obstacle to maneuver. Union reconnaissance on 6 April identified

Along one of the walkways (foreground) to the Revolutionary War's Surrender Field (visible through the trees on the right) is Union Battery No. 6 (tree-covered mound on the left), which was to hold siege-caliber mortars for McClellan's intended bombardment of the Confederate earthworks protecting Yorktown.



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


Today's George P. Coleman Memorial Bridge spans the York River where it narrows. Confederate guns on both banks denied the river as an avenue of approach to Richmond.


the area around Confederate Dam No. 1 as a weak point and possibly vulnerable to a Union frontal attack. Ten days later, McClellan reluctantly agreed to a limited reconnaissance-in-force, which he directed not to develop into a general engagement. Throughout 16 April, Union infantry and artillery scouted, probed, and attacked. On one occasion, a handful of companies of a Vermont infantry regiment crossed the flooded Warwick and seized a short section of curtain trench near several dug-in Confederate field artillery pieces. Magruder's overall defensive arrangement devoted minimal force to digging and improving earthworks, while holding the bulk of his infantry to the rear to repel any Union attempts to penetrate the line. His plan worked to perfection on that day, as Confederate regiments and whole brigades massed on the relatively few Union soldiers clinging to their shallow penetration of a forward infantry line. The engagement ended in Union retreat, after they sustained about twice as many casualties as the Confederates. McClellan was now unshakably committed to a siege culminating in massive bombardment and general assault through a breach in the enemy lines much closer to Yorktown. Stand 5's site contains numerous monuments, placards, trails, and fortifications on both sides of the reservoir, perfect for lengthy and productive discussion and analysis.

The next three stands are in the NPS's Yorktown Battlefield and are barely distinguishable from the 1781 siege locations, which themselves are, by federal enabling legislation, the Colonial National Historical Park's primary interpretive focus. Right along the York-Hampton Highway, which was

These siege-caliber Parrott rifles in Union Battery No. 1 on the south bank of the York River, at the mouth of Wormley Creek, fired 141 rounds into the Yorktown waterfront and convinced Confederate General Johnston to retreat toward Richmond.



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one of McClellan's avenues of advance along the peninsula in early April, is Surrender Field, where the British and Germans laid down their arms to conclude the Revolutionary War siege. Along a walkway to a pavilion overlooking Surrender Field is Stand 6, Union Battery No. 6 from 1862. One of fifteen numbered batteries and four lettered redoubts that the Army of the Potomac built to hold and protect Union artillery, No. 6 was to contain siege-caliber mortars to contribute to the massive Union bombardment planned for 5 May. The shelling was to be aimed at the nearby dry-ground interval between the Warwick River's headwaters and the neighboring draws that converge to form tidal Yorktown Creek. This battery location is an opportune place to discuss how McClellan intended to use firepower to give his army an advantage in fighting possibly the war's decisive battle to preserve the Union and its location very near Yorktown—ironically also the scene of the decisive last large engagement of the American Revolutionary War.

Branching off the York-Hampton Highway, opposite the Yorktown National Cemetery that contains dead from the 1862 Richmond Campaign, is Goosley Road, which currently runs on a centuries-old roadbed and largely bisects the pivotal dry-ground interval. At this point is Stand 7, where, well into the siege, the Confederates completed the White and Red Redoubts to cover surrounding key terrain. Stopping here, at the NPS's road entrance to a 1781 site, to consider the importance of the ground in 1862, is optional. However, driving through the area gives staff-ride groups a feel for its proximity to the greatest concentration of nearby Union siege batteries completed by the time Johnston opted for retreat to the west.

Stand 8 can be reached from the NPS Visitor Center parking lot. Even today, Yorktown is mostly covered on three sides by immense rebel earthworks which were constructed essentially on the trace of the 1781 British works. The NPS interprets the fortifications chiefly from a Revolutionary War perspective, but Civil War photographs reveal that what remains now is mainly from 1861–1862. Through a large gap in the earthworks near the Visitor Center is the undulating plain upon which most of the 1781 siege occurred. Much of the eastern face of Yorktown's immediate 1862 defenses is visible from here as well. It was these numerous large-caliber rebel guns that McClellan intended to avoid directly attacking by using methodical siege tactics. Also, constant sharpshooter (i.e., sniper) activity, long a characterization of sieges, was especially evident in this area.

Stand 9 is on the York River waterfront in a park jointly administered by York County and the NPS. Arriving there after driving through the vil-

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The author (left) and an HQ TRADOC staff section after concluding the integration phase of an 1862 Siege of Yorktown Staff Ride. The phase took place on the York River's south bank between its narrows and the location of Union Battery No. 1 (along the far shoreline visible on the left).

lage of Yorktown gives the staff-ride group a chance to see how war, occupation, and historic preservation have essentially prevented the town from evolving much further than a leftover (but still beautiful) colonial Virginia tobacco seaport. Standing on the south bank of the river, the end of the siege can be discussed and analyzed. Visible is the George P. Coleman Memorial Bridge, which spans a half-mile over a narrowing of the York River. Yorktown itself is in plain view. In the opposite direction, the location downriver where Union Battery No. 1 was built near the base of a modern red-and-white-striped condensation tower can also be seen. On 1 May, 100 and 200-pound Parrott rifles from that battery opened fire on Yorktown's wharves and quickly stopped all boat traffic in and out of the town from upriver. Johnston concluded that when McClellan finished preparing all his siege batteries, the Army of Northern Virginia, which had arrived in force and absorbed Magruder's Army of the Peninsula, would soon receive a massive artillery bombardment and a general infantry assault that could decisively conclude the siege. Predictably, on the night of 3–4 May, one day before McClellan was to begin his mighty shelling, Johnston withdrew his army—eventually all the way to Richmond—where the campaign ended in a week of battles in summer 1862. While leaving Yorktown, the Confederate Army emplaced "torpedoes," which today we would know as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and they caused some casualties as Union troops began to occupy the town. McClellan responded emotionally and controversially when he forced Confederate prisoners of war to find and remove the remaining booby traps.

On the riverbank, the staff ride ends with the integration phase. It most often includes consideration of the tactical and law-of-land-warfare implications of IEDs and their earlier "torpedo" counterparts; the operational results of the delay caused by the month-long siege on the rest of the Richmond Campaign; and the strategic effects of the siege on the Lincoln administration's eventual issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in part to undermine the South's economy and morale.

The integration phase can conclude with more specific ties to today's Army. For example, senior leaders, especially general officers and civilian executives, can benefit from a closer examination of Generals McClellan, Magruder, and Johnston and how they—as army-level commanders—handled the challenges facing them on the Virginia Peninsula in 1862. This element of study addresses one of the staff ride's enduring strengths, that is, examination of the human dimension of war. Though Magruder is the least well known of the trio and his Civil War reputation is generally poor, he emerged from this Yorktown episode as an unexpected and notable, albeit brief, success.

Moreover, the U.S. Army's recent focus on Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) includes such considerations as a return to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and the continuing importance of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) activities. Yorktown in 1862 incorporated land, sea, and air (observation balloons) operations; it was the largest campaign of the Civil War in terms of total troop commitment; and the Confederate navy and army's efforts to deny Union forces access to the James and York Rivers as avenues of advance and lines of communication fit the A2/AD profile. At that time, no element of the Confederate military performed better A2/

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AD-like duties than the CSS *Virginia* ironclad, a kind of wonder weapon which kept the U.S. Navy and its ironclad, the USS *Monitor*, from using the James River during the siege. It denied the Union Army access to Mulberry Island and Richmond and thus focused McClellan's campaign on the Virginia Peninsula and the adjoining York River for lack of better alternatives.

The reliable principles of war, lately increased from a traditional nine to twelve and long a staple of Army officers' precommissioning education,[4] can always serve as a basic analytical framework for practically any staff-ride effort. Also, the daily violence, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA, in current doctrinal parlance) of the 1862 Siege of Yorktown shed light on VUCA as a constant factor in war. Finally, although Yorktown in 1862 did not include a large, set-piece battle, like Gettysburg or Antietam did, its nontraditional character as a doctrinally incomplete semisiege and the dispersed nature of its hallowed ground nonetheless offer relevant insights into the timeless universals of the military art and science.[5]

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NOTES

1. The U.S. Army codified its staff-ride doctrine in the late 1980s with William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987, revised 2014). Robertson chronicled his efforts to reestablish the staff ride in the curriculum of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in William G. Robertson, "The Staff Ride Returns to Leavenworth," *The Army Historian* 2 (Winter 1984): 5–6. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) published its own staff-ride guide in the mid-1990s: Marine Corps University, *Staff Ride Handbook* (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University, 1996). The USMC handbook also includes a section on battle analysis methodology, which is a critical-thinking methodology that has long been a feature of officer education at Army service schools. In standard Army practice, mastering battle analysis methodology enables learning and implementing staff-ride methodology in a process of progressive and sequential instruction for company-grade Army officers. The Army's early efforts to devise and use what we call the staff ride today, which also included simultaneous activity at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., are well related and analyzed in: Carol Reardon, *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), pp. 34, 47–48, 50–66. In 1988, CMH devoted an entire issue of its professional bulletin for Army historians to the staff ride: *The Army Historian* 12 (October 1988). Two articles that address the pedagogy of using Civil War battlefields as, in effect, outdoor classrooms for soldiers are: Ethan S. Rafuse, "How to Teach a Civil War Battle," *Organization of American Historians Magazine of History* 27, no. 2 (2013): 17–22; and Christian B. Keller and Ethan S. Rafuse, "The Civil War Battlefield Staff Ride in the Twenty-first Century," *Civil War History* 62, no. 2 (2016): 201–13. The venerated American Battlefield Trust devoted most of the summer 2018 edition of its quarterly publication to how and why the American military visits and studies historic battlefields: *Hallowed Ground* 19, no. 2 (June 2018). Finally, one can explore the variety of staff-ride endeavors both inside and outside the military by simply googling "staff ride." Applications of the essential methodology are numerous and often creative.

2. Pete Regan, *Bound in a Brilliant Tide: The History of Mulberry Island, Virginia* (Fort Eustis, Va.: Cultural Resources Management Office, n.d.), pp. 32–34.

3. By far the most inclusive and overall best history of the 1862 Richmond Campaign is Stephen W. Sears, *To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992), especially pp. 1–62. The only recent book-length study of the 1862 Siege of Yorktown is John V. Quarstein and J. Michael Moore, *Yorktown's Civil War Siege: Drums Along the Warwick*, Civil War Sesquicentennial Series (Charleston, S.C.: The History Press, 2012). During the Civil War sesquicentennial, CMH published eighteen pamphlets on the war's U.S. Army campaigns, including the following which incorporates the 1862 Richmond Campaign: Christopher L. Kolakowski, *The Virginia Campaigns, March–August 1862*, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2016), pp. 26–49. A little known, but well-executed monograph on Mulberry Island's Civil War fortifications is Emma-Jo L. Davis, *Mulberry Island and the Civil War, April 1861–May 1862* (Fort Eustis, Va.: Fort Eustis Historical and Archaeological Association, 1968). A staff ride–like guide to the 1862 Richmond Campaign's battlefields is Brian K. Burton, *The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), especially pp. 1–25, 38–46. A recent conference paper on the "Cram Map controversy," which involved basing McClellan's scheme of maneuver for the opening march of the campaign on a faulty map of the Peninsula's geography, is J. Britt McCarley, "For Want of an Accurate Map Was an 'American Waterloo' Lost? Geography as an Underappreciated Element in the 1862 Siege of Yorktown," Society for Military History Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky, April 2018.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3–0, 17 Jan 2017, pp. I-2, A-1–A-4, accessed 9 October 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf.

5. One aspect of the staff ride that is routinely poorly executed, or in too many cases simply omitted, is the concluding integration phase, which provides the enduring relevance of the ride by connecting it to such professional interests as doctrine, training, and operations. Often, through poor time management during the field study phase, the staff ride will reach its natural culmination before integration of the Army's current concerns occurs. Therefore, this article makes it a point to address several recent doctrinal and operational developments that connect directly to today's Army profession. In keeping with the U.S. Army's current three-layered approach to writing doctrine, the trio of Army Doctrine Publication 3–0 *Operations*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3–0 *Operations*, and Field Manual 3–0 *Operations* are all replete with specialized terms and doctrinal frameworks that are ideal for analysis during staff rides. They should be used with care and discretion so as not to commit presentism and thus distort the past to fit today's needs. Like all Army Historical Program offices, the TRADOC MHHO conducts oral history interviews with the command's senior uniformed and civilian leaders, including biannual sessions with each Command General (CG) of TRADOC. Two recent CGs, General (Ret.) Robert W. Cone and General (Ret.) David G. Perkins, provided information during their oral history sessions on the Army's recent doctrinal shift toward MDO, LSCO, and A2/AD as concerns with near-peer and peer competitor conflict have increased lately. And last, the venerable principles of war have a history, which is explored in two studies: Maj. John I. Alger, *The Origins and Adaptations of the Principles of War* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975); and John I. Alger, *The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

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STAFF RIDING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A NEED FOR PEDAGOGICAL CHANGE?



BY CHRISTOPHER S. STOWE, BRADFORD A. WINEMAN, AND PAUL D. GELPI

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American and international military officers and senior enlisted personnel employ the Socratic-dialogue approach during a staff ride at Cedar Mountain Battlefield, Virginia.

For over a century, the historical staff ride has been lauded as an effective teaching tool for military professionals to refine decision-making and critical-thinking skills. Many, if not all, staff rides conducted currently by Professional Military Education (PME) institutions adhere to one of two methodological approaches: the character-driven (or role-player) ride or those adopting a traditional Socratic-dialogue method. Each has its devotees within the PME establishment and each offers distinct returns in its approach.[1]

Yet, since the dawn of the twenty-first century, criticism of staff riding has emerged to challenge the exercise's utility. This article briefly examines the historical context for staff rides, analyzes prevalent approaches to modern rides, identifies common deficiencies in their methodologies and, most importantly, emphasizes an alternate way to execute future rides. It encourages military schools to return to the intellectual spirit of staff riding as informed by the Clausewitzean concept of "reenactment," as a means to better execute the PME mission to develop critical thinkers and creative problem solvers.[2] It maintains that decision game–driven staff rides are the most effective way to develop and refine skills invaluable to the twenty-first century military and civilian national-security professional. Decision game–driven staff rides offer a unique learning experience that encourages students to gain constructive leadership experience within a framework that inspires critical thinking and the creative spirit.

To varying degrees over the last eighteen years, members of the Ameri-

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Members of the Battle of Cedar Mountain staff ride discuss the engagement.

can military have extolled the staff ride as a superior exercise for current and future commanders to develop decision-making, leadership, and warfighting skills against the background of historical events. Indeed, the October 1988 issue of *The Army Historian* contained essays from such luminaries as then-Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono, Brig. Gen. Robert A. Doughty, former head of the Department of Military History at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, and Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, onetime Army chief of Military History. They promoted the staff ride as perhaps the finest peacetime learning method "to bring together," as Vuono wrote, "the realities of war."[3] In the thirty years since, however, a small number of voices have emerged to question not only staff ride pedagogy, but also the exercise's worth for the military professional. Maj. Matt Cavanaugh, in an unpublished essay for the USMA Master Teaching Program, asserted that "the . . . Army simply assumes that the . . . staff ride is a valuable educational tool."[4] He cites contemporary criticism that modern rides lack a coherent instructional framework based on educational theory, are increasingly devoid of intellectual rigor, and adhere to an oft cited (but outmoded) Army guide for practitioners—*The Staff Ride* by William G. Robertson.[5] Eugenia C. Kiesling, a West Point Department of History professor, is perhaps more incisive in her reproof. Modern staff rides, she contends, "have . . . shed some of their essential features . . . to become, instead, tours."[6] In this atmosphere, the staff-ride experience often becomes a vehicle for subject-matter experts (often military historians but not always) to showcase their knowledge to a passive student audience. While still useful as an informational tool, these tours fail to engage students either in exercising their critical thought or refining their decision-making skills. Perhaps worst of all, Kiesling maintains, are subsequent efforts to package the "takeaways" from said experts into scripted publications—to be used by any military member tasked with leading a staff ride, regardless of audience, intent, or level of student preparation.

The use of decision games as a means to educate American military professionals dates to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the U.S. Army first adopted Prussian and German-inspired instruction methods, including the staff ride, for its officer training. Initial American staff rides emphasized history-driven approaches to instruction, with officers from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, engaging in lively debate while on Civil War battlefields. During the discussion process, students reflected on such abiding military issues as command and control, logistics, morale, and medical care, mainly through the examination of the decisions of prominent Union and Confederate leaders. The use of decision game–type exercises, however, was not unusual during the earliest iterations of staff riding. Additionally, they played a fundamental role within the Army War College's map exercises and war games that preceded some, if not all, of

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its staff-ride efforts. In these classroom sessions, faculty presented students with detailed planning scenarios drawn from past events that often deviated significantly from the historical narrative in important ways. These scenarios, whether adhering to history or not, forced officers to consider carefully the organizational factors, time-space concerns, and intelligence variables that are so vital to effective military planning.

The War College's games were akin to those in the Prussian Grand General Staff's *Moltke's Tactical Problems from 1858 to 1882*.[7] Students, using the games assigned them, would present their courses of action (COA) to faculty, who graded the submitted product in both form and content. The absence of a single solution, however, marked a difference between *Moltke's Tactical Problems* (fifty-five of its sixty-six games have a selected solution) and these nascent map exercises and war games. This distinction was an important one. A key component built in to prevent an overreliance on history as a guide and, moreover, as a means to avoid ex post facto decision making, was the omission of the names of historical commanders when the students engaged in problem framing, developing COA, and writing orders. In doing so, these exercises—and decision games played on the battlefield—fostered critical thinking and refined decision-making skills. The intent of these exercises was not to mimic the decisions of past leaders or produce the "correct" solution. The controlling principle was to encourage the students to consider complex military problems independently of historical influences.[8]

Staff riding in the modern era reflects both similarities to, and clear differences from, its late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century antecedents. Most current military rides conducted by PME institutions across the services adhere to one of two distinct methodological approaches: the character-driven (or role-player) ride and the Socratic dialogue method. Each has its devotees within the military-education establishment.

The character-driven ride immerses its participants in a historical campaign by allowing staff riders to assume the persona of a major military or civilian actor. This approach enables an individual staff rider to become a limited subject-matter expert for their character. With fellow role players of equal preparation, this style facilitates a rich and triangulated discussion among riders, their peers, and ride facilitators. This method, when performed well, often generates meaningful takeaways for its participants. After preliminary reading, field study (the execution of the ride itself), and integration (or "reflection") sessions, students better appreciate the inherent complexities of leadership, command and control, and operations, regardless of time and place.[9]

Of course there are drawbacks to the character-driven method. Most apparent is its focus on historical personalities that, in turn, can deemphasize discussion of such military variables such as the principles of war, the component parts of military planning and decision-making processes (e.g., the Military Decision-Making Process; the Marine Corps Planning Process), and the use of military ways and means to achieve political ends. Indeed, such a methodology may encourage individual students to prepare their persona without addressing adequately the strategic, operational, and tactical contexts that shape a battle or campaign, preventing the holistic understanding that a staff ride should impart on its participants. Likewise, if a student's character is one whose contributions were of passing consequence during a campaign, or one who became a casualty during the operation, then the student may become disengaged from the staff-ride process after their character becomes less relevant. Yet the principal disadvantage of the role-playing approach is a tendency among its participants to engage in group recitations of the campaign's narrative—through the eyes of its major players. It fails to encourage them to embrace, without the shackles of hindsight, their own creative- and critical-thinking skills in the solution of real-world, if historical, scenarios.[10]

The Socratic-discussion method mitigates some weaknesses of the character-driven method, but perpetuates others. An obvious strength of Socratic dialogue is that it solicits engagement among the entire group rather than targeting single participants to summarize the actions of selected characters. This flexible methodology can, if conducted skillfully by students and facilitators, enable the group to conduct the ride in true seminar-learning fashion. It often opens up discussion threads—warfighting functions, maneuver warfare, elements of national power, and civil-military relations in wartime are four examples—that may not be explored fully in a character-driven staff ride.[11] A Socratic-dialogue staff ride, nevertheless, may devolve, like its character-driven counterpart, into a discussion of the decisions made during an action at the expense of fostering genuine creative thinking among its participants. Most importantly, the Socratic process can, as any discussion facilitator has discovered, become less productive if students intellectually detach or lack adequate preliminary study. Well-prepared and highly motivated leaders and participants are essential prerequisites to execute a wide-ranging, Socratic dialogue within the staff-ride construct.

The Marine Corps University's Command and Staff College (CSC), in revisiting and refining both Prussian and American pedagogical methods, has made decision games an important component of its staff rides. At CSC, staff rides fall under the Leadership Department, which conducts two rides—Chancellorsville and Gettysburg—as part of its curriculum each academic year. While these are historic battles and could fall under the College's War Studies (military history) curriculum, the CSC has placed them instead in the Leadership Department because their purpose is to serve as an exercise for students to develop their decision-making and critical-thinking skills in an historical warfighting context. The entire CSC curriculum focuses on critical thinking and the operational level of war; its students will graduate and eventually move on to battalion-level command or to positions on higher-level staffs as planners. The CSC endeavors

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The staff-ride group during an operational decision game–scenario atop Henry House Hill, Manassas National Battlefield Park, Virginia

for its students to focus on why key decisions were made during these campaigns and how these decisions are tied to the strategic aims and intent of their higher commands.

A critical feature is the execution of the staff ride itself. The CSC has recently shaped its staff rides better to reflect the model perfected primarily by Carl von Clausewitz. This model is captured by historian Jon Sumida in *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to* On War. Clausewitz, according to Sumida, encouraged his readers to put themselves in the mind of the decision maker at a critical point in a campaign and walk through why a decision was made, without the prejudice of what occurred historically. Clausewitz termed this intellectual process "reenactment" and asserted that it was the key to developing an understanding not only of command, but also of war itself; it is not for students to judge historical leadership in an operation, but to develop their own solutions to problems given the same knowledge as the historical leader.[12]

The CSC adheres to the Clausewitzian concept of reenactment and implores its students to forswear the historical decision and the events that followed. Instead, it attempts to find key decision points where a commander had to make a strategic or operational-level choice. The student will take the exercise from there. Here is an example of a Strategic Decision Game (SDG) from the 1781 Yorktown, Virginia, campaign:

New York City

YOU ARE THE COMMANDING GENERAL, BRITISH FORCES IN AMERICA. It is late October 1781. You have just now learned that your principal offensive force in the southern colonies, numbering over 7,000 men, has surrendered at Yorktown, Virginia, to a coalition force under the leadership of the insurgency's military commander. On the day of the surrender, you dispatched reinforcements numbering 5,000 men and a relief fleet to extricate your embattled southern command. Its mission has, with the news of surrender becoming known, been overcome by events. You maintain robust military and naval forces in New York which, when combined with scattered combat power in Nova Scotia, South Carolina, and Georgia, number between 26,000–30,000 men. Assets in the West Indies, too, would increase forces available in North America. The loss at Yorktown has, however, damaged not only your cherished "southern strategy," but has delivered a blow to British national policy and prestige. The sitting ministry may become imperiled as a result of this turn of military events, and cries are likely to escalate within Parliament to end operations in North America—which have never been popular

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The 2018 U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College elective staff-ride class at the Groveton Monument, Manassas National Battlefield Park

at home and have by now become but a single element in an escalating global conflict against your "traditional" Old World enemies.

You are keenly aware of your strategic advantages/disadvantages at this stage of hostilities, and your immediate civilian superior, the Secretary of State for America, has advocated always for a firm stand against the insurgents. Your next move may have momentous consequences for not only your American strategy, but your national military and security strategies as well.

General, what are your orders?

During the staff ride, a selected student receives the scenario, has a few minutes to devise a COA, and briefs the COA to peers. The peer group then critiques the COA for its positives and negatives, a process that stimulates a professional conversation about the factors influencing the decision to be made. Often, additional students will present alternate COAs and the discussion evolves. Throughout the exercise, the learning objective is not to examine and pass judgment on a decision made over 200 years ago or to produce a single correct answer to a problem. Instead, the learning objective is to understand the variables and considerations that inform decision-making. Decision game–based learning, therefore, demonstrates that each choice has its own immediate consequences and subsequent near- and long-term effects. Above all, as Clausewitz strove to demonstrate, these decisions should generate an appreciation for the difficulty of the decision-making process, particularly when made under the duress of a high-operational tempo and combat.

As part of the CSC elective-course curriculum, the faculty also offers a five-week seminar on staff-ride pedagogy. The principal aim of the elective is to provide CSC students the intellectual and methodological tools to conduct staff rides for their units after they conclude their studies and return to the operating forces. After conducting seminar-style discussions on the uses and abuses of modern staff rides and a deep secondary-source dive into the 1862 Second Manassas campaign (the historical subject of the staff-ride elective), a cohort of approximately fifteen CSC students conducts an operational-level ride. The campaign, which began with the Battle of Cedar Mountain near Virginia's Rapidan River on 9 August 1862 and concluded with the engagement at Chantilly, Virginia, on 1 September 1862, has much to offer the modern national-security professional. It was a campaign defined by transformational national policies, consumed by civil-military frictions, and replete with operational challenges involving mass armies. In completing the three phases of the ride, CSC students gain insight into the nuances of leadership under stressful conditions, consider time-space factors in planning and executing deep operations, and ponder the relationships

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among ends, ways, and means in war, and other factors. The faculty adviser encourages students to take creative approaches to devise and implement staff ride stops (called stands), allowing them the freedom to employ decision games, in addition to character-driven and Socratic approaches, to facilitate their understanding of the issues and overall learning experience.

By all accounts, the student experience is beneficial. Essential staff-ride-planning variables, such as determining which themes to reinforce throughout the ride, should be resolved prior to the ride's execution. Moreover, each teaching method presents challenges for the seminar students. For the purposes of this essay, we are showcasing operational decision games (ODG) to the exclusion of other methods. Note in the examples provided the multitude of options that can be employed in the decision-game approach. The example below was conceived by a CSC student-officer and executed at the site indicated:

Rappahannock Station (Remington), Virginia

YOU ARE THE COMMANDING GENERAL [FEDERAL] ARMY OF VIRGINIA. You have suffered several defeats to this point at the hands of a rebel force in the region between Washington, D.C., and the secessionists' declared capital of Richmond, Virginia. Using terrain, you achieve interior lines to consolidate and regroup. On 20 August 1862, nearly your entire force is consolidated north of the Rappahannock River.

You determine that several of your recent setbacks are due to your lack of knowledge of enemy intent/actions. You have prioritized logistical efforts to improve your army's cavalry sustainment, and requisite supplies were received and distributed from Rappahannock Station to your cavalry units. Organizationally, you have restructured your dispersed cavalry units to create a division consisting of 3X brigades, led by one commander.

You have arrayed your army at critical Rappahannock River ford sites (Kelly's, Beverly's, and Freeman's) and are defending the south side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station with an infantry brigade (–) and two artillery batteries. Your principal defensive lines, however, consist of two corps (+) and massed artillery extending along the north bank of the Rappahannock. You have available one infantry corps as a reserve. It is 1400, 21 August 1862, and your cavalry has been resupplied. You summon your newly appointed cavalry commander to your command post.

What are your orders to him?

Importantly, while the bulk of the information contained within the above decision game has a basis in historical fact, a single variable—that of a unified Army of Virginia cavalry division commanded by a single officer—strays from the Second Manassas campaign narrative. This is welcome, even encouraged, to dissuade students from adhering to the historical record in fashioning their response(s) and to encourage their "creative spirit," as Clausewitz famously wrote, to be "free to roam."[13]

Another ODG (this one created by CSC civilian faculty) from the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign further illustrates the possibilities available to challenge students when employing history as a learning tool. Notice, again, that a single element—the sending of more robust reinforcements from the Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Maryland, garrisons to the Federal Army of the Potomac—has strayed from the historical narrative, potentially altering the options available to staff riders as they consider a COA:

Taneytown, Maryland

It is 1830, 1 July 1863. YOU ARE THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. The Commanding General of the U.S. Army has directed you to protect both Washington and Baltimore, as well as operate against the enemy's forces arrayed in Pennsylvania. Your headquarters is in front of defensive positions you have today selected astride Big Pipe Creek, Maryland, with the intent of luring the enemy into battle. This morning your advance corps arrived on your orders at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, some thirteen miles north of your current headquarters, after receiving reports that your cavalry had encountered the enemy there. Although the corps commander informed you of his intent to defend the town—which conformed to the amount of discretion you extended to him in your orders—he was killed almost immediately after he committed his corps. A general with whom you are less familiar commands the force at Gettysburg—now two infantry corps strong—and may not be privy to your latest intent. Consequently, you dispatched one of your most-trusted subordinate officers, a man fully cognizant of your intent, to take temporary command of your forces in Gettysburg and assess the situation. His initial report has just now arrived and you learn from it that two enemy corps pushed your two corps out of Gettysburg. Your forces now hold a prominent height south of the town. Your trusted subordinate claims that the hill is good defensive terrain and that your advance forces have regrouped sufficiently to hold the position if they are reinforced.

Fresh information received at headquarters indicates that the disposition of one enemy corps remains unknown. The enemy's infantry appears to be converging upon Gettysburg but you lack conclusive information to confirm their intent. Additionally, an enemy cavalry division had positioned itself three days earlier between you and the nation's capital, but you now (similarly) lack conclusive intelligence of more recent enemy cavalry dispositions or intent. Your orders from

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the commanding general are clear: stay between the enemy and the nation's capital. Only an hour ago, you learned that your request for a "composite corps" of reinforcements from the defenses of Washington and Baltimore has been approved. These forces number some 12,600 men according to the latest army returns. Defending at Big Pipe Creek seems the most feasible, acceptable, and suitable way to ensure you stay between the enemy and the capital while engaging enemy forces. Still, the enemy is miles away from Taneytown. Two of your corps have been hotly engaged at Gettysburg and at least one more corps should arrive in its vicinity before sundown. The "composite corps" cannot be expected to be present in the area of operations for a matter of two to three days. Your subordinate commanders need guidance, as the time has arrived to commit to Gettysburg, Big Pipe Creek, or elsewhere.

General, what are your orders?

Staff rides offer modern military and civilian national-security professionals a useful means to develop their decision-making skills. Staff rides also facilitate the development of the military professional's "5,000-year-old mind"—an event that allows one to learn from the historical experiences of others and to gain a greater professional understanding that can be beneficial in the current operating environment.[14] In doing so, staff rides allow students to gain valuable decision-making and leadership experience within a framework that encourages and promotes critical thinking. They can test their creative spirit in a manner that is not on the job training—with all the attendant consequences of learning while doing in a combat environment. As the historian Jay Luvaas observed, "Obviously history served Napoleon not so much because it provided a model to be slavishly followed, but because it offered ways to capitalize on what others before him had experienced."[15]

Character-driven and Socratic-dialogue staff rides offer valuable learning experiences; however, both kinds—by their design—tend to emphasize what happened historically. Thus, these staff rides tend to deemphasize the development of decision-making skills and, in their focus on the historical record, discourage students from thinking creatively and critically. In contrast, decision game–driven staff rides develop and refine these invaluable skills.

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NOTES

1. Portions of this essay appeared previously in Bradford A. Wineman, Christopher S. Stowe, and Paul D. Gelpi, "The Staff Ride: A Model for the 21st Century," *Marine Corps Gazette* 102, no. 7 (July 2018): 70–75.

2. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to* On War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 177–78.

3. Carl E. Vuono, "The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting," *The Army Historian* 12 (October 1988): 1–2; Robert A. Doughty, "Studying the Operational Level of War: A Staff Ride to Sedan (1940)," *The Army Historian* 12 (October 1988): 3–6; Harold Nelson, "What the Staff Ride Can Depict: Face of Battle, Clash of Wills and Arms, Generalship, and Cause and Effect," *The Army Historian* no. 12 (1988): 15–17.

4. Matt Cavanaugh, The Historical Staff Ride, Version 2.0: Educational and Strategic Frameworks, Center for Teaching Excellence, United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 2014, accessed 11 October 2018, http://www.usma.edu/cfe/literature/cavanaugh_14.pdf. Cavanaugh advocates use of the Experiential Learning Model (or ELM) as a means to both conduct staff rides and as a measure of performance/assessment. The ELM is, in fact, the preferred instructional model at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

5. William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987).

6. Eugenia C. Kiesling, "The United States Army's Historical Staff Rides: History and Historiography," *Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 2005): 48–58.

7. *Moltke's Tactical Problems from 1858 to 1882*, ed. The Prussian Grand General Staff, trans. Karl von Donat (London: W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd., 1894).

8. Carol Reardon, *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1990), pp. 42–49, 50–56; Carol Reardon, "From Antietam to the Argonne: The Maryland Campaign's Lessons for Future Leaders of the American Expeditionary Force," in *The Antietam Campaign*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 289–315.

9. Christian B. Keller and Ethan S. Rafuse, "The Civil War Battlefield Staff Ride in the Twenty-first Century," *Civil War History* 62, no. 2 (2016): 201–13; Robertson, *The Staff Ride*, pp. 11–18.

10. For a defense of assessing the decisions of historical actors to foster critical-thinking skills, see Keller and Rafuse, "Civil War Battlefield Staff Ride," pp. 207–208.

11. Keller and Rafuse, "Civil War Battlefield Staff Ride," pp. 204–5; Nelson, "What the Staff Ride Can Depict," pp. 15–17; see also Clay Mountcastle, "Gettysburg: The Army's Living Classroom," *Civil War Monitor* 3, no. 2 (2013): 28–29, 92; O. James Lightizer, "Preserved Battlefields as Training Grounds," *Civil War Monitor* 6, no. 3 (2016): 18.

12. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, pp. 45, 177–78.

13. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89.

14. In a 20 November 2003 email, General James N. Mattis, United States Marine Corps, observed that "we have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. 'Winging it' and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of competence in our profession." Quotation in Jill S. Russell, "With Rifle and Bibliography: General Mattis on Professional Reading," *Strife* (Blog), 7 May 2013, accessed 15 October 2018, http://www.strifeblog.org/2013/05/07/with-rifle-and-bibliography-general-mattis-on-professional-reading/; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 318.

15. Jay Luvaas, "Military History: Is It Still Practicable?" *Parameters* 25, no. 2 (1995): 91. The 1995 article is a reprint of Luvaas' 1982 *Parameters* article.

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NONTRADITIONAL STAFF RIDES



at WEST POINT

By Jason Musteen


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For two weeks now we have fought to free ourselves from different things. Some of us have fought for freedom from biases . . . some for freedom from the weight of death that permeates the fields of France, and some for freedom from the fear that we may one day repeat the mistakes of the past."[1] This is how one West Point cadet struggled with his thoughts at the end of an atypical staff ride, one that spent very little time on tactics and operations, but instead examined culture, strategy, loss, and memory. "I suppose I am fighting all of those battles, but specifically, I am fighting for meaning. I want to understand what all of this means for my own time and my own service. I pray that's a fight that I never stop fighting."[2]

The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point makes extensive use of traditional operational staff rides. Groups of cadets, large and small, conduct several staff rides each year to the battlefields of Gettysburg, Antietam, Saratoga, Normandy, and others, evaluating terrain and operations. The academy tailors each of these studies to the needs of the participants, adjusting the pedagogical approach and specific discussion points, demonstrating the inherent flexibility and versatility of operational staff rides. It is this flexibility that makes staff rides such a valuable tool for commanders and educators. Technology adds to that flexibility and changes our concept of what is possible. Already, three-dimensional simulations and virtual reality (VR) provide a resource-efficient way to see and interact on the terrain, and advancements continue to improve the quality of VR options. Augmented reality is another tool being used to enhance field studies on actual battlefields. Just as emerging technology continues to expand the possibilities and alter our understanding of operational staff rides, we can also adjust this concept through nontraditional staff rides that look beyond operations and tactics and instead look to military culture, strategy, and memory to produce responses like the one shared by the cadet above.

At West Point, the Department of History conducts several nontraditional staff rides each year during spring break and summer sessions. Supported by generous donors who fund margin-of-excellence educational opportunities through the West Point Association of Graduates, these nontraditional staff rides often focus cadet study at the strategic level of warfare, or they might not even have a primarily military focus, yet they still serve the academic and military education of cadets. They typically require an examination of politics, economics, and society, or sometimes religion, culture, and language. They are interdisciplinary in approach, bringing in aspects of political science, international relations, law, literature, and philosophy. Each one is different according to the selected goals, yet they each serve USMA's mission "to educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the nation as an officer in the United States Army."[3]

As an undergraduate university, West Point has several advantages that strengthen these nontraditional staff rides. For example, the academy typically offers summer staff rides as a three-credit history course, which allows the instructors and cadets to conduct a rigorous preliminary study phase that requires participants to read several books and articles. The participants then discuss those reading assignments during classroom sessions, and they augment those readings and discussions with films or perhaps other educational outings. The staff rides usually include eight to fifteen cadets, led by two or three instructors. Many are overseas, but some take place in the United States. All seek to merge academic learning



Cadets survey the divided geography of Cold War Germany by following the course of the Berlin Wall by bike

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United States Military Academy

Cadets pose at the Reichstag in Berlin after studying nationalism and historical memory during the Cold War Staff Ride.

and professional military education with leadership and character development. A donor who has supported some of these nontraditional staff rides best summarized their value: "If I can move you physically, I can move you emotionally."[4] Like with traditional staff rides, it is that stirring of emotions while on-site that becomes the catalyst for learning and development.

These nontraditional staff rides maintain many recognizable elements common to operational staff rides. They all follow the three phase approach of preliminary study, field study, and integration. They include extensive travel and navigation across terrain, which includes an emphasis on the human environment. And they require a broad examination of historical decisions and actions along with a consideration of possible alternatives available at the time. Yet they differ from more traditional staff rides in several ways. They provide broader strategic context within which militaries operate, or they might consider the consequences of warfare. They might even focus on nonmilitary events or examine various national or regional identities and cultures.

Contextualizing Military Operations

One purpose of the nontraditional staff ride is understanding the broader strategic context in which soldiers fight. Rather than focusing on the tactical or operational levels of war, these staff rides focus on strategy and tactics. For example, the Department of History annually conducts a Cold War Staff Ride to key arenas in Eastern Europe. After a week of intensive preliminary study, the cadets visit: Berlin, Germany; Vienna, Austria; Prague, Czech Republic; Budapest, Hungary; and Kraków and Warsaw, Poland. They examine the origins, progress, and conclusion of the Cold War. The study helps contextualize strategic thought and decisions across both NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Warsaw Pact nations. The staff ride offers an expanded notion of the battlefield—one where airlifts, border defense, and espionage defined the conflict, and the human terrain is as important as the lines on the map indicating where the Iron Curtin fell.

At each location, cadets link historical study to the challenges they will face in their own careers. One particular focus is national identity and an examination of how nations tell their story. In 2018, one cadet recognized that "it is important to understand our allies' and our enemies' histories in order to be better equipped to make decisions."[5] Another theme of the study is the strength of the human spirit and the desire for freedom. After visiting the locations of the Velvet Revolution of 1989 in Prague, another cadet said it had shown him "what people are willing to do for freedom. As an officer, I hope I can encourage my soldiers to do the same."[6] Such strategic themes also translate down to the personal and individual. "I learned a great deal about traits necessary for good officership," said one cadet at the end of the staff ride, "including the importance of hope and positive outlooks in the face of adversity."[7]

Considering the Consequences of Warfare

Another purpose of nontraditional staff rides is to consider the experiences of combat for soldiers and the consequences of combat for states and nations. As part of the centennial commemoration of World War I, cadets participated in staff rides to the Western Front in 2014, 2016, and 2018. Rather than examining operations, the staff ride served to explore individual and national memory and commemoration of war. Reading poetry, literature, and memoirs written by the soldiers who fought the war, cadets wrestle with loss, grief, and the challenges of company-grade leadership. At one point, the cadets rose before 0400 and occupied a portion of an extant trench line in an unmaintained section of a farmer's woods near the

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Cadets visit Kościusko Mound in Kraków, Poland, to study the historical connections between Poland and the United States, and their influence on the course of the Cold War.

Somme River. Standing just below the century-old parapet, the cadets silently stood at attention for thirty minutes and wordlessly observed the sunrise over no-man's-land. Then they gathered in the quiet and read two poems that each describe a different morning routine on the front—one violent and the other monotonous. After a lengthy discussion of the experiences of lieutenants in the trenches, the cadets walked 200 meters to a small British cemetery where 2d Lt. David Cuthbert Thomas is interred. Thomas had been a friend of the poets Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves, and all had served together in the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Standing at Thomas' grave and reading Sassoon's and Grave's recollections of his life and death, the cadets discussed the weight of sacrifice.[8] They also noted the alarming proximity of the living to the dead in World War I. Stand-to-Arms and funerals were both part of a soldier's regular routine, so after burying their friend, the young poets simply turned and walked back to their trench. And so did the cadets.

The officers leading the staff ride offered their own stories of loss—of friends and of their soldiers. This makes the academic personal. As cadets saw their officers struggle with words and memories, they surely began to wonder how they would serve and lead. Most considered, perhaps for the first time, how they might respond to the losses of their soldiers or their friends. They listened intently as an officer described serving as a rear detachment commander and casualty notification officer, visiting families he had come to know and love, and then delivering the news that shattered their world. With discussions moving back and forth from the past to the present, the cadets began to truly understand the gravity of the path they have chosen to pursue, and it humbled them. "I can feel the past, present, and future collide in a way I haven't quite experienced time before," one cadet said.[9] They ask themselves if they will ever be prepared to lead others, and then they determine that they will strive to be.

In yet another staff ride, cadets blended aspects of a traditional operational study with the greater analysis of an expanded historical context. Trading in their 2018 spring break for the opportunity to conduct a staff ride, cadets visited five states to study American westward expansion and the changes to the ideas of American freedom and opportunity that the frontier helped shape. The staff ride challenged cadets to reflect critically on the causes and consequences of westward expansion and the Army's role in the process. Although the staff ride included a tactical analysis of the Little Bighorn battlefield, the scope and overall goals were much larger. Focusing on the years 1848 to 1909, cadets visited battlefields, museums, cultural sites, and Indian reservations to explore how environment, industries, and culture of the frontier influenced the development of the western United States. The staff ride encouraged cadets to understand how local context influences critical constructs of race, gender, freedom, and opportunity.

Following the Oregon Trail west from Fort Kearney, Nebraska, the staff ride forced cadets to address military and nonmilitary leadership challenges created by continuously living and operating in austere environments. Cadets then considered how those challenges must be confronted within a framework that adheres to Army values, even when service takes them abroad. After studying the traditional American narrative of the West, the cadets then examined some of the same elements of that history from the Lakota perspective with a trip to the Pine Ridge Reservation of the Oglala Sioux in South Dakota. Cadets gained an appreciation of the Lakota historical perspective, the organization and conflicts within Lakota society, the oft-contentious relationship between the tribe and the federal government, and how military service today provides opportunities and challenges for tribe members. Cadets examined the connection between land and religion, seeing for themselves with a visit to Badlands National Park how the environment influences Lakota spirituality. They also considered how narratives of the American West remain ideologically contested by

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Cadets with Colonel Jason Musteen at the Tyne Cot Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery, Belgium

comparing Mount Rushmore and the Crazy Horse Memorial in the Black Hills. All agreed that the intellectual skills they had gained will make them better officers.[10]

The Importance of Nonmilitary Events to Military Operations

In addition to exploring context and consequences of military operations, some nontraditional staff rides focus on critical nonmilitary events that have shaped the world in which we operate and in which the soldiers serve. Each year, USMA's Department of History teams up with the Department of Law and the Department of English and Philosophy to conduct an American Civil Rights Staff Ride. The staff ride uses immersion to study historical and contemporary issues in American civil rights. In educating cadets to be leaders of character, these nontraditional staff rides use history to help develop an appreciation for the diversity of the American experience, so they will better understand each other and the soldiers they will soon lead. Like with any staff ride, the preliminary study phase is key to maximizing the understanding of the field study. In advance of the most recent iteration of the staff ride in the summer of 2018, cadets read several books and numerous articles in preparation, and their discussions drew on many contentious current events. They also benefited from guest speakers and seminar discussions, and their staff ride experiences allowed some of them to play leading roles in the dedication of West Point's new cadet barracks, named in honor of USMA graduate and commander of the Tuskegee Airman, General Benjamin O. Davis Jr.

The staff ride moved by rail and van from West Point through the South, with discussions at commemorative sites and critical locations in the fight for civil rights. For example, in Leesburg, Georgia, cadets visited an old stockade where, in 1963, police officers had detained forty-three African American teenage girls for forty-two days for demonstrating in favor of integration. In addition to this sort of environmental analysis, the staff ride incorporated literature, poetry, music, and food to gain a richer appreciation for cultures of the South. Cadets met governors and former governors, state legislators, attorneys, civil rights leaders, Freedom Riders, author John Grisham, and average Americans living in the shadow of the past and in the reality of strained race relations. The staff ride was far more than a tour of sites; it was a dynamic exchange with participants of the events. While visiting the stockade in Leesburg, the cadets met two sisters who had been held there in 1963 and heard their story. At Tuskegee University in Alabama the cadets struggled with the awful truth of lynching through personal stories and data-based criminal analysis. In Mobile, the cadets met the district attorney who prosecuted the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald. Standing at the tree where it happened helped the cadets appreciate how recently these events occurred, and how their legacy continues to shape America.

Though they dealt with sometimes incomprehensible realities, the cadets quickly grasped the importance and the value of the history they studied. That understanding shaped their thoughts of current topics, as well. For example, in New Orleans, cadets visited Lee Circle, where they saw a tall, yet empty, pedestal. Where a statue of Robert E. Lee recently stood,

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they wrestled with another issue from history that defines the present—Confederate memorialization. This issue strikes close to home for cadets, as the Academy has buildings, streets, or awards named for Robert E. Lee and P. G. T. Beauregard, both USMA graduates and former Superintendents of West Point. The staff ride also forced them to consider the role of the U.S. Army, whose obligations have always extended well beyond fighting and winning the nation's wars. On a previous iteration of the staff ride for example, the cadets visited Little Rock Central High School in Arkansas. Among the challenging issues they considered was President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to deploy the 101st Airborne Division to enforce integration in opposition to the Arkansas National Guard, which had been called out by Governor Orval Faubus to prevent the entry of nine African American students to the high school.

Col. Ty Seidule, head of the Department of History at West Point, often reminds historians that what they study will change their character. A cadet participant on the Civil Rights Staff Ride confirmed that thought: "I am not sure I can accurately describe the emotion or enlightenment I gained from this trip. What I do know is our intellectual pilgrimage throughout the South changed us for the rest of our lives."[11]

Geopolitical and Cultural Considerations

Another purpose of these nontraditional staff rides is to explore geopolitics and understandings of other cultures. The staff rides allow cadets to interact with and think like someone different than themselves, crucial skills for Army officers to develop. Cultural staff rides allow West Point cadets to become more empathetic by immersing them in a foreign culture. The questions and discussions these staff rides generate are typically broad and far-reaching, requiring the cadets to consider new and different perspectives. This, in turn, often leads them to think more about themselves, their own society, and the intersection of their perspectives with the foreign culture.

A recent staff ride took cadets to Japan to study the evolution of Japanese identity from the Edo period (1603–1867) to the present. Cadets examined the geopolitical position of Japan by exploring Japanese history and contemporary culture. Cadets experienced ancient traditions at Himeji Castle and with a traditional tea ceremony in historic Kyoto. Participants then encountered modern culture, by navigating the Shinkansen bullet trains between metropolitan areas. Studying the key terrain of Tokyo and Osaka, the cadets compared ancient and premodern Japanese identity to current notions of Japanese character. Cadets were surprised to find both continuity—the ancient Japanese warrior culture still present in salarymen—and change—a Japan that defines itself by economic rather than military might. Cadets spoke with average Japanese citizens on a regular basis and often had their own worldviews challenged. One cadet met two Japanese men who blamed the rise of China on American intervention against Japan during World War II. All the cadets recognized the difference between how the history of the war is told in the United States and how it is told in Japan.

Like with the Civil Rights Staff Ride, cadets were forced to consider how the past shapes contemporary culture and how modern culture shapes competing narratives of the past. Recognizing that paradox, one cadet said that while she "learned so much history, [she] simultaneously experienced Japanese culture in a way that helped [her] understand their perspective of history."[12] Some of the cadets noted how the Japanese cultural and religious practices of honoring one's ancestors have contributed to how we remember World War II. "Does this create a false 'warrior identity?'" one wondered.[13] This question led her to consider the sources of her own identity: "I need to be more open-minded, yet logical, to ensure that as an Army officer, my views and identity are not coming from one side of history."[14] These experiences prompted deep discussions and intellectual growth for these future officers who might one day be forced to operate in culture much different from their own. These experiences are impossible to replicate



Cadets study the Memorial to the Missing of the Somme at Thiepval, France.

United States Military Academy

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Cadet Sophia Hein plays "Last Post" in honor of fallen British soldiers at Loos, France

in a textbook and cannot be matched on a traditional staff ride.

In the summer of 2019, the Department of History is planning a similar cultural interdisciplinary staff ride to Washington D.C. and Vietnam. Cadets and officers will study both sides of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam in 1995, a highly controversial diplomatic issue with strategic impact in the important region of Southeast Asia. Cadets will interview key actors on both sides of the debate, to include Vietnam veterans, diplomats, and members of the National League of POW/MIA Families and visit the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. In Vietnam, cadets will grapple with how and why relations between the two countries have changed since the 1970s by visiting large corporations, government agencies, and several other locations, and will explore the tradeoffs made during the normalization process. Such an approach will teach cadets critical analysis, how to weigh competing perspectives, and why the legacy of the Vietnam War remains important even today. The Department of History has repeatedly found that exploring issues like this compels cadets to think deeply about their own decision-making process and how they negotiate complex decisions.

Conclusion

Nontraditional staff rides can pursue many different goals, consistent with William Glenn Robertson's injunction that a staff ride's "sole purpose is to further the professional development of U.S. Army leaders."[15] As an under

Former Governor of Mississippi William F. Winter at his home in Jackson, discusses memories with cadets.




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graduate university with generous donor support, West Point has an obvious advantage over other Army units in conducting nontraditional staff rides. However, these types of studies do not have to be the exclusive domain of cadets. At the core of each of these studies are concepts important to all soldiers in all units, such as critical thought, the challenge of leadership, understanding culture and human nature, and character development. With the support of West Point's Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, a recent USMA graduate led his battalion through an innovative nontraditional staff ride he organized in Poland. As the culminating event of a three-month professional leader development program, his staff ride took the battalion's leadership through the Army Regulation 15–6 investigation process using a World War II case study from the German Army in 1941.[16] After studying the historical record of three German company commanders and their different responses to an order to murder Jews, the officers visited the Auschwitz concentration camp. "This was an absolutely life-changing event for me," one of the staff ride participants said. "I am so thankful for this opportunity and know others in the [battalion] are as well. I will never forget this experience and the lessons I learned throughout."[17]

Additionally, these nontraditional staff rides exercise participants' strategic thought, and would make a great addition to the training and development program of strategic-level staffs. Army culture often privileges tactical experience over strategic thought and assignments. The key to promotion, even into the general officer ranks, and assignment to strategic-level leadership frequently requires a strong tactical pedigree. Although operational staff rides and battlefield studies are of proven value, the Army's senior leaders would benefit from strategic-level nontraditional staff rides, as well. They are particularly well-suited for higher institutions of professional military education and could be incorporated into existing programs.

As the Army continues to prepare soldiers to succeed in a complex world, while acknowledging the uncertainty of the future, leaders across the Army can leverage the proven worth of the nontraditional staff ride to address the types of scenarios and challenges our leaders face.

Cadets and officers pose after studying the historical roots of contemporary Japanese culture in Tokyo.



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NOTES

1. Staff ride attendee's conversations with author.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Donor conversations with author.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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8. Robert Graves, "Not Dead," in *Fairies and Fusiliers* (London: William Heinemann, 1919), p. 67; Siegfried Sassoon, "A Letter Home" in *War Poems of Siegfried Sassoon* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2004), pp. 44–46.
9. Staff ride attendee's conversations with author.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. William Glenn Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), p. 5.
16. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers*, AR 15–6, 1 April 2016.
17. Evan Kowalski, "16th Special Troops 'Vanguard' Battalion Develops Leaders through Innovative Curriculum, Staff Ride," U.S. Army, posted 21 December 2017, accessed 10 September 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/198488/16th_special_troops_vanguard_battalion_develops_leaders_through_innovative_curriculum_staff_ride.

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VIRTUAL STAFF RIDES

THEIR BENEFITS AND METHODOLOGY

BY CURTIS S. KING

Virtual terrain from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

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Virtual terrain showing Battery Wagner

Like traditional staff rides that take place on the actual terrain of a battle, virtual staff rides (VSRs) are powerful instruments for the education of modern military professionals. If done properly, a VSR will allow participants to study a battle or campaign in great depth, thereby gaining insights into warfare that are timeless, yet relevant to current military operations.[1] This article examines the ways in which VSRs bring value to the Army's educational system and the methodology used in conducting a VSR. Through this examination, it will become readily apparent that almost all facets of a VSR are tremendously similar to a staff ride conducted on a battlefield. Before looking at the value and methodology of VSRs, it is important to clarify some terms and provide some background to the development of the virtual ride.

When discussing the VSR, this article is referring to the model used by the Staff Ride Team of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This is not in any way meant to overlook other techniques of using computer technology to execute or enhance the study of a battle or campaign. That said, the CSI Staff Ride Team model is based on the principle that a VSR should follow closely the methodology of a traditional staff ride that is conducted on actual battlefield terrain (hereafter referred to as a "ground" staff ride). The U.S. Army's manual for staff rides, *The Staff Ride* by William G. Robertson, was published before the development of VSRs, but its definition of a staff ride applies to both ground and virtual staff rides.

> A staff ride consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.[2]

Like the ground ride, the VSR is based on a three-phase structure, but unlike its ground counterpart, the VSR uses computer-generated terrain in the field-study phase. Aside from the use of virtual terrain, a VSR follows the methodology of ground staff rides in almost every aspect. However, the difference in terrain does call for some techniques unique to a VSR, which is covered later.

The developmental history of the VSR at Fort Leavenworth provides some interesting context into the purpose and reasons for conducting a VSR. In 2005, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) commander, Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, directed the CSI Staff Ride Team to develop a VSR based on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). General Wallace was a strong supporter of ground staff rides, which often dealt with battles from the American Civil War, Revolutionary War, and Indian Wars because of the readily accessible battlefields in the United States. Knowing this, the CAC commander sought to expand the time frames covered by the CSI Staff Ride Team's available rides and urged the creation of new rides that covered more current conflicts such as OIF. Because it would be difficult, expen-

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sive, and dangerous to travel to Iraq, an OIF staff ride demanded a way of bringing the terrain to the classroom. After extensive research, the Staff Ride Team contracted for software and a 3-D artist/terrain developer (referred to as a "VSR technician") that fulfilled the needs of this new type of staff ride. Those needs included the creation of actual terrain and the ability to build in terrain features that might no longer exist (such as destroyed structures) or have changed over time (such as a river that has changed course). Also essential for a VSR was the ability for a participant to move freely within the terrain (unlike many simulations that only allow a limited number of terrain paths). Finally, the software needed to be portable so that the Staff Ride Team could conduct VSRs at sites outside of Fort Leavenworth. With these requirements met, the Staff Ride Team conducted the first VSR in May 2005 as part of a Command and General Staff College (CGSC) elective course on OIF. Soon after, CSI was conducting OIF VSRs for organizations throughout the U.S. Army in addition to its CGSC course.

In 2008, the CSI Staff Ride Team developed its second VSR, this time covering Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan. As before, this VSR was initially developed to fill the need for a CGSC elective. Not long after, it began to be used throughout the Army as units requested the ride at their home stations. Over time, the team has developed nine additional VSRs. Some of these continue the original intent of covering more recent engagements, such as the Coalition Assault on Fallujah, Iraq in 2004 and the Battle of Wanat in Afghanistan in 2008. Others have been developed around older battles to include the German assault on Stalingrad in World War II and the United Nations defense at Chipyong-ni in the Korean War. As of 2018, the demand for VSRs throughout the Army continues to grow, and the Staff Ride Team continues to develop new VSRs while executing numerous rides from its existing catalogue.

When discussing the value of staff rides (ground and virtual), it is useful to start with the goals of studying military history in general, as described in the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation, *Military History and Heritage Education Program* (MHHEP). "The goal of MHHEP is to ground soldiers and leaders in military history and heritage so they can use historically-informed critical and creative thinking/reasoning skills as the basis for complex problem-solving and decision-making."[3] Staff rides support this overarching goal by providing an in-depth examination of a campaign or battle that is enhanced by knowledge of the terrain and is applicable across time. Most military-history instruction looks at broader trends in warfare—vast topics like entire wars; social, political, and economic influences ; and organizational/structural histories such as the development of the U.S. Army mechanized forces. The staff ride is different. It focuses on distinct events and allows for participants to hone their critical thinking skills on themes that include the "dynamics of battle, especially those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat," "the nature of the face of battle, the timeless human dimensions of warfare," and "case studies in leadership," both positive and negative.[4]

BENEFITS

While the value of a VSR has much in common with its ground counterpart, the virtual version has benefits that a ground staff ride lacks. First, there is the ability to create and access terrain that is otherwise difficult or dangerous. Afghanistan and Iraq VSRs are prime examples. Similarly, it allows access to terrain that no longer exists. Two examples that address this challenge are the Battery Wagner VSR and the Battle of Stalingrad VSR. Battery Wagner, part of the Civil War's Charleston Campaign and made famous in the movie *Glory* (1989), has been destroyed by sea erosion and the island on which it was located has a dramatically changed configuration.

Likewise, the modern city of Volgograd bears little resemblance to the Stalingrad of 1942. The intense firepower brought to bear in the battle destroyed almost all of the city's original buildings. The VSRs for these battles use virtual terrain that replicates the actual sites at the time of the battle. A second benefit of the VSR is its lower cost; it takes much less funding to have the CSI Team come to a unit's home station, than to have an entire unit travel to a battlefield site. In particular, many Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) detachments, which often have limited budgets and are often located far from battlefields, choose a VSR to conduct a staff ride.

The VSR's technology also offers unique benefits. A notable advantage is the capacity to move from stand to stand rapidly. A stand is a location on the terrain where staff riders stop and conduct a discussion that is tied to the site. In a VSR, you can jump from one location to another instantly, or you can "fly" to the next stand either along the roads or directly through the air. This can save hours that would be spent on ground transportation getting from site to site. Another benefit is that participants can get aerial views of the battlefield which cannot be perceived from the ground. These aerial perspectives are excellent for orienting the students. Finally, a VSR can give the view of a battle's air components. For example, the Operation ANACONDA VSR includes stands that involve U.S. Air Force assets as well U.S. Army aviation elements. In these instances, the VSR technology allows participants to take the perspective of the pilot, the crew, and any ground force being inserted by aircraft.

Considering all these positive aspects, there are, however, some drawbacks to a VSR. Perhaps the greatest weakness of a VSR is that it is usually presented at participants' home station. This can sometimes lead to students treating it as just another class in the same familiar setting. Ground rides at locations "away from the flagpole" separate students from their daily routine and encourage them to become more immersed in the battle. Participants tend to do more preparation in the preliminary study phase as well as in the field. Instructors must make an extra effort in a VSR to ensure that students prepare, participate, and

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try to shed their home station routine for the time that they are on the staff ride. Another potential problem is a well-intentioned desire to put too many students through the field phase at one time. Ground rides and VSRs are best conducted in groups of twenty or fewer people per instructor to allow for group interaction and participation. Occasionally with a VSR, units will treat it as a typical classroom experience and think of the field phase as a traditional lecture with fifty to 100 people in a single session. Not only does this severely limit participation, interaction, and critical thinking, these large audiences often find it difficult to see the nuances in the virtual terrain, no matter how large the projection screen. Even if the numbers are kept low, instructors must work to get the students to interact and make use of the terrain.

Methodology

Before delving into the methodology of a VSR, it is useful to explain how the Army University Press generates virtual terrain. The creation process is a collaboration between a VSR technician and a historian. The VSR technician starts by downloading Digital Terrain Elevation Data of the area to be simulated. This data is the "frame" of the topographical information and is the base for the rest of the terrain elements. The technician then adds satellite imagery to the frame, providing a surface for the elevation data. Often the imagery must be manipulated to remove or change surface features, such as roads that did not exist at the time of the battle. The VSR technician then creates models of features that are above the surface—buildings, trees, and bridges, for example—and places them on the terrain, thus creating a 3-D environment.

As mentioned previously, the foundation of the methodology of a VSR is like that of a ground staff ride and based on three phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration. Before examining the way in which a VSR executes in these phases, it is worthwhile to clarify some confusion concerning ground staff rides that exists in the Army historical community and in the Army at large. The CSI Staff Ride Team follows the Army's model for staff rides as set forth in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's publication, *The Staff Ride*. Col. Arthur L. Wagner and Maj. Eben Swift developed the Army's original concepts for a staff ride at Fort Leavenworth and William Glenn Robertson revived them in *The Staff Ride*. The vast majority of Army organizations that conduct staff rides also follow this guide. This does not mean that the CSI Staff Ride Team follows *The Staff Ride* is to be followed slavishly. In fact, one of the cornerstones of a staff ride is tailoring it to fit the audience. This can range from a ride having weeks of preliminary study, to a high-profile staff ride for the TRADOC commander and his subordinate commanders, to an ROTC class that may have time for only a single short reading for preliminary study and a one- or two-hour-long field phase. Because Robertson's book was written before the development of the VSR, there is no official Army model for VSRs. Even so, the CSI Staff Ride Team follows as closely as possible the methodology in *The Staff Ride* when planning and conducting a VSR.


Methodology — Similarities

Ground staff rides and VSRs have almost no differences in the preliminary study and integration phases. In a VSR, just as in a ground ride, "the purpose of the preliminary study phase is to prepare the student for the visit to the site of the selected campaign" and "the preliminary study phase may take various forms, depending upon the time available for study and the needs of the participants."[5] These forms may include, but are not limited to, readings, classroom instruction—which may also include briefings and presentations from the students—maps, terrain boards, movies, and music, as well as an examination of weapons, uniforms, and other equipment from the period. Students may also be assigned roles (normally as various leaders on either side) to focus their preliminary study, and sometimes the role is carried over into the field study. Alternatively, students may be assigned topics or various doctrinal principles (for example, principles of war or warfighting functions) to study to gain a greater focus. In the initial study phase, limited time may preclude the use of some (or most) of these forms of preliminary research, but at a minimum the students should read a battle or campaign narrative. This is to ensure that they know the key leaders, and the movements and engagements of the leaders' units, before the field phase. This preparation allows the student to focus on the terrain in the field phase, which enhances the educational value of the ride. Otherwise, students tend to overlook the terrain aspect while trying to grasp the facts of the battle.

The integration phase of a VSR similarly follows the same principles and methods of a ground staff ride. In this phase, students "analyze the previous phases and integrate what they learned in each into a coherent overall view."[6] There are a myriad of techniques for conducting the integration phase, and asking broad, open-ended questions is one that works well. Ultimately, the goal is for students to integrate lessons from the field phase, specifically the terrain, with the preliminary study to gain insights that are applicable today. The integration session is often relatively short—thirty minutes to 1 hour—and can be conducted at the site of the field phase, or another location (such as a restaurant or a unit's home station), after the field study is complete. However, a VSR's integration phase is usually conducted in the classroom soon after the last stand of the field phase. In this case, we recommended a break for the students, perhaps a bit longer break than usual, to allow them to gather their thoughts and assimilate the entire ride. Also, when the integration session of a VSR begins, the terrain should still be displayed so that it can be referenced during discussions. This is another advantage of a VSR. In a ground ride, it is not feasible to return to all of the stands as can be accomplished instantly with virtual terrain.

Although the field phase of a VSR differs greatly from that of a ground

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Virtual terrain from the Battle of Chipyong-ni showing the village of Jipyeong-ri

staff ride, there is some commonality. Both rides divide the field-study phase into a series of stands. The format for conducting a stand, while equally flexible in both, generally follows the pattern of orientation, description, and analysis (ODA). Orientation is usually the responsibility of the instructor; he or she familiarizes the students to the terrain, pointing out cardinal directions and key aspects of the landscape relevant to the battle or campaign. During the description portion, the instructor and students explain the events that took place at the location, or sometimes describe events that relate to the location in time or theme. If there has been enough time for extensive preliminary study, the students can handle the description of the events (for example, engagements, unit movements, and leaders' decisions), and avoid lengthy accounts from the instructor. Analysis at the stands should be an open discussion among the students (facilitated by questions from the instructors) that allow learning points and insights to be shared. In both types of rides, the analysis phase should be questions that get the students to think and interact. Sometimes these are historically focused questions such as "evaluate the location of the observation post at Wanat, was it the best location, why was it chosen?" Also, the analysis part of a stand is ideal for insights about the relevance of the historical action to today's warfare. An example from the Chipyong-ni VSR would be the following: "why is Maj. Gen. Almond so far forward at the second battle of Wonju and is this in keeping with the current US doctrine of mission command—why or why not?" All three elements of ODA do not have to appear in every stand or always in the same order, but they are a good general framework for the organizational of the material in a field stand.

There are several other aspects of a field phase common to both VSRs and ground rides. It is worth reiterating that in both types of staff ride, small groups are the best way to keep student interest and involvement at a high level. Stands are usually done while stationary on the ground, but sometimes there is information provided while moving over the terrain (virtual or ground), such as talking about the route or the fighting that occurred while on the move. Usually, the instructor provides this information as it is difficult for student interaction while moving in the terrain. Vignettes are used often throughout the field phase of a VSR or ground ride. These commonly take the form of quotations (or paraphrasing) that tell stories of courage or fear in the face of battle, give insights into a commander's character or decision-making, provide humor, or bring the human element into the staff ride in some other way. Instructors use "walkbooks" and visual aids, usually maps, to assist them in executing both types of staff rides. Though their visual aids are in different media—oversized, mounted map boards for ground rides; Microsoft PowerPoint slides for VSRs—the purpose and type of information provided is the same.

Methodology — Unique Aspects

Even though the similarities between ground rides and VSRs are extensive, there are several important aspects of the field phase that are unique to the VSR. First, there is the physical location—the classroom. In this setting, students are normally sitting, often behind desks, rather than standing as they would at a battlefield. With this in mind, in order to give the students the feel of the actual terrain, a VSR requires two computers with

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two projectors and screens (or large-screen televisions). One screen shows the virtual terrain and another shows slides (usually maps) at the same time. Showing these features simultaneously emulates the ground ride technique of standing on the terrain while referencing a visual aid. If one screen is larger than the other, the terrain is normally projected onto the larger screen. This serves to emphasize the importance of the terrain—always the focus of the field phase whether a VSR or ground ride.

Despite a different physical setting for the field-study phase, a VSR effectively presents the virtual terrain to give the students an experience extremely close to that of being on a ground staff ride. To do this, the students must be engaged with the terrain. In a ground ride, the students are immersed in the terrain. They have the freedom to look at different parts of the ground and move around to see alternate viewpoints. The same is true in a VSR, but students might assume that the terrain is controlled only by the instructor (though a technician). An instructor could compound this assumption by clinging to the directions in the walkbook and not involving the students. One way to avoid this is to have students come up to the screen and point out terrain items. If a student asks a question or makes a comment, they should be encouraged to come to the screen to use the terrain for illustration. Participants may also use laser pointers to reference terrain locations on the screen. The instructor can also ask students if they want to look in another direction, or move slightly within the stand for a different view. One example of student involvement with the terrain is in the Palm Sunday Ambush (Iraq, 2005) VSR. At one stand in the ride, participants are at a location on a side road from the ambush site with three vehicles in a Military Police (MP) squad. There are several options facing the MP squad leader for how to react to the situation. The instructor can ask the students to describe those options and have the VSR technician move in the virtual terrain in the same way that the students are describing, thus allowing the students to control the terrain moves instead of the instructor.



The setup of a VSR classroom

Conducting the field phase in a VSR allows for different approaches to orient of the students. Due to the unique capabilities of VSR technology, the instructor can acquaint the students to the battlefield by taking an aerial view of the entire battlefield. For example, before going to the stands in the Fallujah (Iraq) VSR, the CSI Staff Ride Team instructor will show the entire city's virtual terrain from above to familiarize students with the major terrain features involved in the fighting. From that bird's-eye view, the instructor works from west to east, and as he or she calls out each piece of terrain, the VSR technician zooms down to the location to get a closer view and then zooms back out. This kind of overall orientation can be done at several points in the field phase to help students place individual engagements into the context of the overall battle. While this technique is valuable, the instructor has to be careful not to overuse the aerial orientation. Students should view traditional ground-level orientations at most of the stand sites so that they see the terrain as the participants did at the time of the battle.

A quality VSR will mesh terrain and visual aids much the same way a ground ride does, even though the terrain is virtual and the visual aids are computer slides. An essential step to making this work is for the instructor and VSR technician to rehearse extensively before the execution of the field phase. Students (and even instructors) can get "lost" in the virtual terrain because of the speed at which viewpoints can move. Frequent orientations to the virtual ground, while at the same time referencing the visual-aid maps is the best way of minimizing this problem. Throughout, instructors encourage students to ask questions about the terrain and to feel free to have the technician go back to a piece of ground for clarification.

Visual aids (particularly maps) are essential in the VSR, as long as they do not take the focus away from the terrain and the conduct of the field phase. While pictures of people, equipment, and other items can be placed into the slides of a VSR, they can also be distractions and are best kept as part of the preliminary study phase. The best type of illustration for a VSR (or a ground ride) field phase is a photo or painting that can be replicated by the terrain view at a stand—serving as a powerful connection to the past.

Conclusion

In sum, the VSR has great value for the Army's military history program. While the CSI Staff Ride Team's VSRs are not the only way in which virtual technology can be used in a staff ride, this version, relying heavily on the methodology of a ground staff ride, has great utility. The success of the VSR program can be seen in participant feedback. Written After Action Reports have included such comments as "I have a greater respect for the differing terrain throughout the region" and "definitely provided a better level of realism."[7]


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Virtual terrain of Iraq displaying the 2005 Palm Sunday Ambush



A virtual view of Stalingrad showing the Commissar's House



Verbal feedback has also been positive. For example, several soldiers who had participated in a ground staff ride at Chipyong-ni recently executed a VSR for the same battle with a CSI team. Those soldiers remarked at how real the terrain looked and how the VSR was just as valuable as their ground ride. As a final glimpse into the utility of a VSR, there are the insights of eight soldiers who were in the action at Wanat and later participated in a Wanat VSR. They all remarked on the realism of the virtual terrain, the value of moving freely through the terrain to see multiple vantage points, and the powerful experience of feeling like they were back on the same ground.

Those looking for more information on the CSI Staff Ride Team's VSRs can access them through the Army University Press website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Staff-Ride-Team-Offerings.

Dr. Curtis S. King, is a historian on the Staff Ride Team of the Combat Studies Institute, Army University Press, and is an adjunct professor at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas.

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NOTES

1. For the sake of brevity, this article primarily concerns battle and campaign staff rides, while recognizing that other events, such as natural disasters, can be sources for staff rides.

2. William Glenn Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), p. 5.

3. U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Military History and Heritage Education Program: TRADOC Regulation 350–13,* 22 February 2018, accessed 10 October 2018, http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/regulations/TR350-13.pdf.

4. Robertson, *The Staff Ride*. On pages 5–6, Robertson lists thirteen potential objectives or goals for a staff ride. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, nor must every ride attempt to achieve all of these goals.

5. Robertson, *The Staff Ride*, p. 11.

6. Ibid., p. 17.

7. After Action Report, copy in author's files.





The view from a gunner's position at Wanat (right) and the same view displayed virtually (center)

The terrain orientation view for the Fallujah VSR (top)

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NMUSA FEATURE

ARMY EMBLEM TAKES SHAPE

BY THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Even before a guest enters an exhibit gallery, the National Museum of the United States Army—currently under construction at Fort Belvoir, Virginia—establishes the connection between the visitor, the American soldier, and the U.S. Army.

As individuals approach the entrance to the museum, several pylons will greet and escort them through the main entrance. These stainless steel columns continue along the left side of the lobby before turning left and assembling into formation, thus creating the *Soldiers' Stories Gallery*, which will feature the biographies of ordinary soldiers. Immediately to the right of this gallery and dramatically inset into the white terrazzo floor at the center of the spacious lobby is the full color Army emblem, twenty-one feet in diameter. The David Allen Company—under contract with Clark Construction Group, LLC, and the Army Historical Foundation—constructed the emblem using a unique flooring process.

Terrazzo is a composite material consisting of chips of marble, quartz, granite, and glass set with a binder. As Mabry Sumner, chief of facilities and security for the museum, explains, "Terrazzo has become one of the most innovative and cost-effective flooring materials. Using terrazzo for the flooring provided the opportunity for this striking design and the use of custom coloring—each terrazzo color formulated for the emblem was coordinated through the United States Army Institute of Heraldry to ensure its accuracy."

The creation of the emblem was a multiweek process. It began with constructing and laying a metal frame to precise measurements in order to replicate the emblem. After specially trained craftspersons securely anchored the frame to the subfloor, they began filling in the frame with colored terrazzo. Each color was poured individually, and in carefully timed segments, so the terrazzo could be spread properly into their exact shape before drying. "This is a simplified example," added Sumner, "but imagine the process of framing and filling in colors to create a work of stained glass." Once all the individual colors set, the workers sanded and polished the entire piece to complete the project. A protective covering currently safeguards the emblem until the building's potentially damaging interior construction is complete.

"Seeing the finished product and the enormous letters of 'This We'll Defend' in the emblem is inspiring to all of us involved in this project," remarked Museum Director Tammy Call. "It will be a fitting tribute to all of our nation's soldiers that this insignia will welcome and bid farewell to our visitors and staff each day."

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All photos property of National Museum of the United States Army

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NEW IN PRINT

THE GREAT WAR
U.S. ARMY ARTIFACTS

BY DEBORAH A. STULTZ

As part of its efforts to mark the centennial of World War I, the U.S. Army Center of Military History has published *The Great War: U.S. Army Artifacts*. This full-color book uses high-resolution photographs and a wealth of historical research to showcase objects relating to the First World War from the collections of the Army Museum Enterprise (AME).

The AME oversees the historical and material culture of the U.S. Army. It preserves, presents, and interprets the Army community for soldiers and civilians. The AME manages over thirty museums (and their collections) in the United States, Germany, and Korea, and is also directing the construction of the National Museum of the U.S. Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The artifacts presented in the book are a small sample of the more than 34,000 World War I artifacts in the AME's vast collection. Although the soldiers and civilians who served during the Great War are no longer here, we can hear and understand their stories through these objects. The artifacts give us a profound connection to the events of one hundred years ago.

Technological innovation made World War I the first modern, mechanized, and industrial war, and the artifacts show how those who participated in the war made sense of their difficult surroundings on a day-to-day basis. Air combat became common for the first time. A corporal's diary includes drawings and notes on aircraft tail shapes to assist him in identifying whether a plane was friend or foe. In the trenches, the doughboys routinely faced poison gas attacks and had to carry respirators and protective masks. They sometimes personalized these objects with their name or their unit's insignia. World War I also brought about advancements in medicine and medical treatments. Motorized ambulances could transport the sick and wounded away from the infectious conditions of the battlefield, increasing their possibility of survival. Red Cross brassards and red vests identified medical orderlies and ambulance drivers. The United States faced many logistical challenges in fighting a war overseas. Soldiers not only battled the enemy on the front lines, but also established base camps, built roads, constructed rail lines and bridges, kept draft animals and carrier pigeons, and prepared food. Mobile kitchens were developed to serve hot food to the troops at the front. During the Great War, the U.S. Army grew in unprecedented numbers. Soldiers came from every state in the nation and included African, Hispanic, and Native Americans. Some soldiers brought a little bit of their home with them to Europe, such as a Texas flag, and some brought pieces of the war home with them, such as a vase made from a shell casing. Women also joined the war effort by attending service schools, volunteering with civilian service organizations, becoming nurses and signal operators, building equipment and armaments on the home front, and selling war bonds. Their uniforms echoed those of the soldiers they supported. These objects, and many more featured in this book, provide us with indelible insight into these lives from a hundred years ago.

Shown here are some pages from this unique book. Sarah G. Forgey, Chief of Art, AME, served as editor, selecting the featured items to highlight key aspects of the wartime experience. The AME's curatorial team—Alan T. Bogan, Paul M. Miller, and Carrie M. Gabaree—have shared insights about the objects and their owners. Historian Brian F. Neumann provided background and context. Photographer Pablo Jimenez-Reyes ensured high-quality photographs for every artifact shown. Former Army Staff Artist Gene Snyder designed the volume.

The volume will be available in November 2018. It can be purchased by the public from the Government Publishing Office by itself or as part of a handsome boxed set with its companion, *The Great War: U.S. Army Art*.

Deborah A. Stultz is an editor at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

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Livens Projector and Equipment
U.S. Army Chemical Corps Museum, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri



The Livens Projector was a British-produced weapon designed to fire or "project" a cylindrical canister containing poison gas, high explosive, or incendiary oil into enemy positions. Soldiers typically buried them up to their muzzles when in firing position and discharged them electrically. The 1st Gas Regiment used this system.[15]

This watercolor painting by an unknown artist, titled *The Carrying Party*, depicts American soldiers carrying Livens Projector canisters to the front.

[15] Crowell, *America's Munitions*, p. 210.



Renault FT Light Tank "Five of Hearts"
Company C, 344th Battalion, Tank Corps
National Museum of the United States Army,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia




The AEF organized a Tank Corps in 1917 in France. By 11 November 19
five heavy battalions and ten light battalions existed, four of which had
in combat. While tank production in the United States was proceeding,
few American-made tanks reached France before the Armistice. The Am
acquired all tanks used in combat by the AEF from our allies—heavy ta
from the British and light tanks from the French.[16]

Company C, 344th Battalion, Tank Corps, used this French-made, two-
tank during World War I. The battalion was part of the 1st Provisional Ta
Brigade commanded by Col. George S. Patton. The tank was nicknamed
of Hearts" because of its identification markings. The French assigned su
and numbers from playing cards to identify tanks.

The Five of Hearts saw heavy combat in the Fléville sector during the Me
Argonne Offensive. During its support of the 16th Infantry of the 1st Divi
the turret and 37-mm. gun mount became so jammed with bullets that they
could not be used. Soldiers left the tank on the field of battle after the infan
secured the area, but later recovered it. In 1919, it was sent to Camp Meade
the U.S. Army Tank Corps Headquarters—as a memorial to the corps' ser
in the First World War.

[16] *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, Vol. 3, Part
pp. 491–98.

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Portable Towed Sterilizer and Disinfector
U.S. Army Museum Support Center,
Anniston Army Depot, Alabama



...nts in medical science, a ...ended U.S. Army, poor ...nditions in the front lines and ...of France, and the anticipation ...casualties required the ...of new equipment for clothing ...tion and surgical dressing ...ices.

...Army tested portable disinfectors ...during the Mexican Expedition. ...g World War I, the Army extended ...use to evacuation hospitals and ...hospitals lacking fixed disinfectors. ...e portable units used steam ...formaldehyde to kill infectious ...nisms such as lice. Medical ...nnel also used them to sterilize ...gical dressings in large quantities. The ...rtable disinfectors could be towed by ...ses or trucks to rest areas to fumigate ...e clothing of soldiers just out of the ...front lines.

...The American Sterilizer Company of ...Erie, Pennsylvania, made this example. ...The cylindrical boiler is used to generate ...steam, and there is a formaldehyde ...generator located below the large ...chamber that held uniforms being ...disinfected.[10]

[10] Wolfe, *The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, Volume III*, accessed 3 May 2018, http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwi/finance_supplyich14rev.html.

Pattern 1917 Corrected English Small Box Respirator Gas Mask and Carrier
Sgt. Vernon E. Rings, Company F, 321st Infantry, 81st Division
U.S. Army Chemical Corps Museum, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Sergeant Rings carried this gas mask during his service in the AEF. The accompanying record card notes that the Army issued the mask to Rings in August 1918 and he experienced a mustard gas attack while wearing it in October in either the Ban-de-Sapt or Saint-Dié sectors.

Sergeant Rings personalized the carrier for his mask by drawing the division's "wildcat" insignia on it and by recording locations where he served. American companies produced "corrected" gas masks such as this beginning in May 1917. The masks were meant to resist the effects of gas better than the previously issued British small box respirator.[12]


[12] Crowell, *America's Munitions*, pp. 331–44; *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, Zone of the Interior: Organization and Activities of the War Department*, Vol. 3, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988 [reprint]), pp. 416–19.



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
BOOK REVIEWS

A Field Guide to Antietam: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People



By Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler
University of North Carolina Press, 2016
Pp. vi, 347. $23

A Field Guide to Gettysburg: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People, Second Edition



By Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler
University of North Carolina Press, 2017
Pp. vi, 477. $24

Dual Review by Nathan A. Marzolli

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of Civil War battlefield guides published. They aim to update and supplement the U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles series that Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson pioneered nearly three decades ago. Although these guides usually vary in style and technique, the purpose of such books are generally similar: to direct the reader on an all-encompassing battlefield tour. They provide maps and a wealth of information describing the events that happened, analysis of command decisions, and often personal vignettes of the men who fought there. Carol Reardon, the George Winfree Professor of American History at Pennsylvania State University, and Tom Vossler, a retired U.S. Army colonel and former director of the United States Army Military History Institute, are not new to this genre. In 2013, the two authors released the innovative *A Field Guide to Gettysburg: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2013)—the second edition of which is reviewed below. It not only described the tactical fighting from 1–3 July 1863, but also included the personal accounts of human tragedy that befell both soldiers and civilians. The two authors have teamed up again to write a similar book, this time for America's bloodiest single day in history, titled *A Field Guide to Antietam: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People.*

According to the authors, these field guides are "designed to help you discover for yourself the heroism and the tragedy that unfolded on this landscape." Therefore, "you must spend time on the battlefield itself" (p. 9). Each book consists of several individual tour stops, with many of these having a few substops. Each begins with an orientation to the landscape, and identifies—often with an excellent modern-day photograph—a specific location and direction in which to stand in order to get the best view of the action described in the accompanying text. The orientations also identify many of the most prominent visual landmarks to help readers get their bearing and understand how the action that occurred at this stop fits into the battle as a whole.

The Antietam field guide consists of twenty-one individual tour stops. Each stop may answer up to six important questions: What Happened Here?; Who Fought Here?; Who Commanded Here?; Who Fell Here?; Who Lived Here?; and lastly, What Did They Say about It Later? Although each applicable question is answered thoroughly, this wealth of information is concurrently the biggest weakness and strength of *A Field Guide to Antietam.* On the one hand, the guide is simply too verbose for the user to try and complete the tour in one day; most stops consist of at least several pages of text, and the book encompasses over 300 pages. For more concise descriptions of the battle actions, this reviewer would recommend Ethan S. Rafuse's *Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide* (Lincoln, Neb., 2008).

This should not deter the Antietam enthusiast from picking up a copy of Reardon and Vossler's guide, however. Despite the abundance of text, the biggest strength of the book is also the amount of detail that the authors have provided. Many parts of the battle covered in *A Field Guide to Antietam* have not been included in other guides. These include the final Confederate effort to retake Dunker Church from Brig. Gen. George S. Greene's division, the actions of Confederate artillery on Cemetery Hill throughout the battle, and the final stand of Col. Hugh B. Ewing's Kanawha Division brigade after the attack of Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg in the forty-acre cornfield.

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In addition to the descriptions of battlefield actions and tactics, this guide also provides the reader with an interesting look into the lives of people who were in Sharpsburg, Maryland, during the battle. This not only includes the thousands of men who fought there, but also the many civilians, with familiar names such as Mumma, Miller, Rohrback, and Poffenberger, whose lives were permanently affected by the conflict that raged over their properties on 17 September 1862. Reardon and Vossler also cover parts of the important postwar struggle to memorialize the battle and eventually establish the Antietam National Battlefield.

The overall breadth and attention to detail within the Antietam guide is incredible, and nearly everything that would allow for a fluid and polished battlefield tour is supplied for the reader. The book's introduction includes two pages titled "Helpful Hints for Touring the Battlefield," which covers everything from park access, to roads, to the restroom locations to allow for the greatest personal comfort during the tour. Furthermore, at tour stops that include multiple substops, the authors indicate how far one will have to walk, the type of terrain (e.g. paved, gravel, dirt, etc.), or if the user will remain in sight of their vehicle. The authors and publishers will have to keep in mind that some information—especially the park hours and fees—will have to be frequently updated in order for *A Field Guide to Antietam* to remain effective.

The quality of the content for each tour stop is generally very good. The maps are colorful and comprehensive; the directions (both driving and walking) between each stop are clear; and the modern-day color photographs help the user in orienting themselves to the battlefield. The tactical descriptions of "what happened," especially in the often-confusing Miller cornfield, are sometimes a bit confusing, however, due to the chosen order of the tour stops. In addition, this reviewer would have liked a discussion of South Mountain, and an order of battle. Nevertheless, Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler's *A Field Guide to Antietam* is an excellent addition to the genre of Civil War battlefield guides. Although it would be cumbersome to use for completing a full tour of Antietam in a single day, it is an excellent resource full of interesting and pertinent information that will give the reader "a better appreciation of the complexities of mid-nineteenth century combat from the perspectives of both senior leads and privates in the ranks" (p. 18).

The University of North Carolina Press has also now released an updated and expanded second edition of Reardon and Vossler's *Field Guide to Gettysburg*. The content and structure of this updated edition is similar to the first edition and to the *Field Guide to Antietam*. Like those books, each tour stop begins with an orientation to the landscape, and identifies a specific location and direction in which to stand in order to get the best view of the action described in the accompanying text. This section also identifies many of the most prominent visual landmarks to help readers get their bearing and helps them to understand how the action at this stop fits into the larger perspective of the battle. The main addition to this second edition of *A Field Guide to Gettysburg* is the inclusion of two additional tour stops, "The Fight on the Harmon Farm," and "Powers Hill." This increases the number of stops to thirty-six. These additions are a welcome improvement because they help the reader to further comprehend and understand the three days of fighting at Gettysburg. The Emanuel Harmon farm was the location of intense action between Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith's famed "Iron Brigade" and Brig. Gen. James J. Archer's brigade on 1 July 1863. During the battle, Confederate soldiers burned the farm's buildings to the ground. Over the ensuing 150 years, this part of the battlefield remained in private hands; it was the site of a popular hotel, a mineral water–bottling operation, and most recently the Gettysburg Country Club, which featured a nine-hole golf course frequented by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 2011, the Conservation Fund, with the assistance of the American Battlefield Trust, purchased the property and transferred ownership to the National Park Service.

Powers Hill is another welcome addition to this field guide. This prominence, which rises above the Baltimore Pike, was the location of Union artillery which supported the Union XII Corps in the vicinity of Spangler's Spring and lower Culp's Hill. A short, but steep, trek up its slopes rewards one with a clear view over to Spangler's Spring, thanks to the recent preservation efforts of the American Battlefield Trust and the National Park Service. In addition to these major changes, the Second Edition of *A Field Guide to Gettysburg* includes some minor updates to the maps, photographs, and text.


Most of the positive attributes of Reardon and Vossler's other guides transfer to this updated version. The overall breadth and attention to detail within this guide is robust, and nearly everything that would allow for a fluid and polished battlefield tour is supplied for the reader. The only major downside with this book—something consistent with the authors' previous two works—is that the plethora of information sometimes makes the text difficult to navigate during a battlefield tour. Union and Confederate orders of battle would also be welcomed in any future editions for quick reference to the opposing armies' structure.

The University of North Carolina Press has hit another homerun with Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler's second edition of *A Field Guide to Gettysburg*. Their work continues to set the standard for studies of Gettysburg and battlefield guides for every major battle of the Civil War.

Nathan A. Marzoli is a historian in the Force Structure and Unit History Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A U.S. Air Force veteran, he completed a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in history and museum studies at the University of New Hampshire. His primary research and writing interests focus on the Civil War—specifically the study of Union soldiers and their relationships with their home communities. He is the author of "'We Are Seeing Something of Real War Now': The 3d, 4th, and 7th New Hampshire on Morris Island, July–September 1863," which appeared in the Fall 2017 issue of *Army History* and won an Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award.

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Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation



By Earl J. Hess
Louisiana State University Press, 2017
Pp. xx, 341. $45.95

Review by Mark L. Bradley

Historian Earl J. Hess has added a much-needed volume on logistics to his impressive list of Civil War books. As the title indicates, the focus is on transportation, which he divides into four major systems: rail-based, river-based, coastal shipping, and wagon trains. Hess classifies the first three systems as national or strategic in scope, and the fourth system as local or tactical. On a lesser scale, he also briefly discusses the use of pack animals, cattle herds, and individual soldiers as means of military transportation. Hess argues that logistics played a crucial role in the outcome of the Civil War: "Northern officials crafted the most sophisticated supply arrangements ever seen up to that time. Their Southern counterparts put together a pale imitation of that Northern system, and this is one of the many reasons the Confederacy lost the war" (p. xix).

In Chapter 1, "The Logistical Heritage," Hess surveys the history of military transportation from the ancient Greek and Roman armies to the American and European armies of the mid-nineteenth century. "In every age," he writes, "problems associated with logistics and supply involved rather similar solutions" (p. 1). Hess indicates that these lessons had to be relearned by successive generations of logisticians, who were, by and large, indifferent students of history. He notes that the Civil War was the first major railroad war, and that quartermasters worked out "problems that would continue to stymie German quartermasters in the Franco-Prussian War five years after Appomattox. The world tended to overlook the lessons of the Civil War just as American quartermasters tended to ignore the world's lessons in logistics" (p. 16).

"Quartermasters North and South" is the subject of Chapter 2. In describing the impact that one man could have on logistics, Hess quotes a committee report from the Confederate Congress: "A poor quartermaster 'may effectually check the progress of an army, and the demands of an [infantry] officer may destroy the most perfect administration' of the transportation system" (p. 17). Quartermasters comprised a select group of officers who—not unlike present-day sports referees—tended to be taken for granted unless they happened to blunder at an inopportune time. Hess extols the diligence of Union quartermasters, who compiled a "mountain of material . . . concerning all phases of their important work," whereas "Rebel officers were terrible record keepers" (p. 31). Given this apparent lack of conscientiousness, it is hardly surprising that "Confederate transportation history tends to be the story of unsolved problems, irreparable difficulties, and frustrated attempts to make a success out of failure" (p. 32).

Hess believes that blame for the Confederacy's inadequate military transportation network starts at the top. At the outset, President Jefferson Davis should have appointed a "transportation czar with real power to keep the wheels moving" (p. 32). But the fault was not solely Davis'. "The entire Confederate government was loath to exercise the extraordinary power displayed by the Federal government" (p. 33). As a result, the Southern transport system eventually deteriorated to the point that it barely functioned, "and the rank and file [in gray] suffered far more than their counterparts in blue" (p. 33).

Chapters 3–8 cover "The River-Based System;" "The Rail-Based System;" "The Coastal Shipping System;" "Wagon Trains;" "Pack Trains, Cattle Herds, and Foot Power;" and "Troop Transfers," demonstrating the Union's superiority in each type of transportation. During the war, for example, Northern railroad companies laid 4,500 miles of new track and began to forge a truly national transportation network, while Southern rail lines rapidly fell into disrepair owing to a lack of resources.

As for troop transfers, Hess notes the Union Army's impressive feat of transporting Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's XI Corps and XII Corps—roughly 20,000 soldiers and their baggage—by rail from Virginia to Tennessee in the fall of 1863. But he also concedes that the journey of the 7,000-man remnant of the Confederate Army of Tennessee from Mississippi to North Carolina in the closing months of the war, while on a more modest scale than Hooker's transfer, "was nothing less than a miracle" (p. 213).

To offset the North's superiority in transportation assets, Confederates targeted Federal steamboats (Chapter 9) as well as their railroads, coastal vessels, and wagon trains (Chapter 10). Although the Union Army managed to keep its river-based transportation system operational, the rail-based system proved far more vulnerable to attack. As railroad sabotage escalated, Union commanders often retaliated with severity. In 1864, Federal officers in Kentucky punished guerrilla activity by shooting captured saboteurs, deporting Rebel sympathizers, and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.

No commander, North or South, understood the strategic significance of railroads better than Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, who devoted considerable time and effort to destroying enemy rail lines and equipment. Among the Confederate generals who proved adept at wrecking railroads was Robert E. Lee. In October 1863, Lee "dedicated his army to tearing up in a thorough manner [a section of] the Orange and Alexandria Railroad" (p. 238). It is ironic that Lee's action, while intended to restrict Union mobility in the short term, could also be construed as a self-inflicted wound in the long term, for it damaged a lengthy stretch of railroad in northern Virginia.

In his conclusion, Hess argues that the American Civil War had much to teach both contemporaries and later generations about modern logistics. But just


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as few Union and Confederate quartermasters profited from the examples of their predecessors, so too did few of their successors learn from them. Thanks to Hess' excellent volume, the subject of Civil War military transportation is no longer a closed book.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina* (Lexington, Ky., 2009). His current book project is the official Army history of logistical support in Vietnam.

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Summer Lightning: A Guide to the Second Battle of Manassas



By Matt Spruill III and Matt Spruill IV
University of Tennessee Press, 2013
Pp. xx, 324. $32.95

Review by Adam West

Summer Lightning: A Guide to the Second Battle of Manassas is the seventh book in Matt Spruill III's collection of battlefield guides, and it is the second one in which his son, Matt Spruill IV, has collaborated. Both authors are retired Army officers, and Matt Spruill III is a former Gettysburg battlefield guide. Their brief bios on the back cover indicate to readers that they are in for a detailed, in-depth look into one of the lesser-known battles of the American Civil War. The book does not make an argument for or against the actions and decisions of either side. It is purely a guidebook intended to give readers a thorough understanding of what was taking place at all points on the Manassas battlefield throughout the three days of conflict.

The book begins by setting the stage for the battle and examines the dispositions of both armies during the summer of 1862. As Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac advanced on Richmond from the Virginia Peninsula, smaller forces under Major Generals John C. Frémont (located west of the Shenandoah Valley), Nathaniel P. Banks (in the Shenandoah Valley), and Irvin McDowell (north of Richmond) supported him. But McClellan's plan was disrupted when Maj. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson confronted Banks during his famed Valley Campaign. Threatening Washington, D.C., the Valley Campaign drew the forces under Frémont and McDowell into the Valley in pursuit of Jackson. At this time, General Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia and immediately focused on pushing McClellan's army away from Richmond. The armies under McDowell, Frémont, and Banks were organized into one army under the command of Maj. Gen. John Pope, named the Army of Virginia. Lee, still facing off against McClellan, but concerned about Pope's army concentrating north and west of Richmond near Warrenton, sent Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope's advance on Richmond. Because Pope was slowly advancing southward, and McClellan was making no move, Lee decided to join his army with Jackson in confronting the more immediate threat posed by Pope. Lee and Pope engaged in a face-off across the Rapidan River, until Pope pulled back behind the Rappahannock River. Lee then sent Jackson on a wide, encircling march around Pope's right flank in an attempt to turn it. Jackson managed to get behind Pope and cut his lines of communication to Washington, then seized his forward supply depot at Manassas Junction. His position along the Rappahannock now untenable, Pope sent his army in two separate columns northward to pursue Jackson, trap him at Manassas, and cut him off from Lee's army—a well-conceived and aggressive response to a decisive move by his opponent. However, Pope was unaware that Jackson had already departed Manassas and had taken up a strong defensive position, concealed on high ground overlooking the Warrenton Turnpike where one of Pope's columns would pass. This set the stage for a battle that, although it has not received the same amount of attention as other Civil War conflicts, was decisive and crucial to how the war progressed.

The Spruills guide readers to begin a tour of the battlefield at the Manassas National Battlefield Park's Visitor Center on Henry House Hill. The authors then direct readers to a location along the Warrenton Turnpike (U.S. Route 29), facing the high ground to the north where Jackson's men were lying in wait behind an unfinished railroad line. The reader is given directions to various points on the battlefield corresponding with location of major actions and gives the reader a first-person view of what the ground looked like to the units involved. With the outstanding detail the authors give about the size and number of units engaged and their deployments and maneuvers, the reader can easily visualize the battle unfolding. The maps, instead of being oriented north-south, are oriented to the reader's point of view from where they are standing on the battlefield. These maps show landmarks and the dispositions of the two armies.

Even though the book is meant to be taken along on a battlefield visit, those reading from home will find it easy to follow the Spruills' descriptions of the battlefield that enable them to visualize it almost as if they were there. The guide is an easy read, yet still detailed enough to paint a clear picture for those visiting vicariously.

The Spruills have also included official reports, letters, and diary entries from soldiers and officers who participated in the battle or witnessed it. These are interspersed with the locations on the battlefield guide so that readers can discover what was happening and what

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was about to happen from gripping, firsthand accounts.

In addition to being a battlefield guide, the book's plethora of information makes it a must-have reference for any military historian (or military-history enthusiast). Army leaders will find many case studies embedded within the story of the battle that demonstrate good and bad leadership. The guide successfully balances between scholarly and entertaining narrative, making it perfect for readers of all backgrounds.

Capt. Adam West was commissioned through officer candidate school into the U.S. Army Adjutant General's Corps, and is currently assigned to the 3d Security Force Assistance Brigade. He earned a bachelor's degree in political science from Brigham Young University-Idaho and is completing a master's degree in ancient and classical history through American Military University.

Small Town America in World War II: War Stories from Wrightsville, Pennsylvania



By Ronald E. Marcello
University of North Texas Press, 2014
Pp. xvi, 452. $24.95

Review by Mark A. Snell

Ronald E. Marcello, professor emeritus of history at the University of North Texas, was the director of the university's Oral History Program and is a native of Wrightsville, Pennsylvania, home to the twenty people whose interviews comprise this book. *Small Town America in World War II* is in the style of Studs Terkel's 1985 Pulitzer Prize–winning "*The Good War:" An Oral History of World War II* (New York, 1984), except it is much more limited. Terkel's work was both national and international in scope, while Marcello's focus is on a small, blue-collar town astride the Susquehanna River in south central Pennsylvania. Because of Marcello's intentional geographical limitation, his potential pool of interview subjects was much smaller than Terkel's broad sample. In addition, Terkel's interviews were conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Marcello's interviews occurred more than a half century after the war, when the conflict's participants were in the twilight of their lives and when their memory would have been far less sharp and precise. Professor Marcello attempted to overcome these problems by doing "extensive background research beforehand and going into the interview armed with an outline of the topics to be discussed" (p. 8).

After a short overview of Wrightsville's history (which includes a Confederate invasion and brief skirmish during the Gettysburg Campaign) as well as a discussion of Marcello's interview method, the rest of the book is divided into six thematic sections: the home front, the North African and Italian theaters, the Northwestern European theater, the Pacific theater, stateside military service, and the occupation of Germany. The collection of interviews is followed by a brief, concluding chapter. By far, the war against Germany receives the most attention, with ten interviews (each a stand-alone chapter) devoted to Italy/North Africa/Northwestern Europe. Marcello does not tell us why there is such a disparity. The section about the home front contains six interviews, including three women (two industrial workers and a government nurse). Of the three male civilians who were interviewed, one was a foundry worker, one a foundry executive, and one was a teenage school boy (the older brother of Marcello). Disappointingly, only two of interview subjects had served in the Pacific—a sailor and a Marine Corps antiaircraft artilleryman. The two veterans who served stateside included a Naval Reserve WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) member who achieved the rank of chief petty officer and an Army Air Forces sergeant who spent the war in Oklahoma training B-17 crews. Three of the chapters are devoted to the experiences of one man—Staff Sergeant Mervin Haugh—a tanker who fought in three different theaters of operations. Most of the interviews were conducted with U.S. Army veterans; the majority served in infantry or armored divisions.

Marcello's mastery of the oral history technique—knowing the right questions to ask—is apparent in the way that he draws out his subjects' memories of the global conflict. He also weaves together the narrative by inserting the necessary historical background within those accounts, allowing each story to flow in a readable and understandable way. Each chapter also includes both explanatory and bibliographic endnotes.

The strengths of *Small Town America* are the stories themselves, told by participants who not only endured the Great Depression and the war, but who went on to live long lives and thus were able to contextualize their wartime experiences. For example, a Signal Corps master sergeant in the 4th Infantry Division recalled, "During the Battle of the Bulge, I saw what happened to replacement troops. . . . I saw troops come up who still had the chalk marks on their helmets to signify troop movements and troopships or replacement depots. They were sent to the front one day, and the next day the trucks were coming back with mattress covers over the dead guys. So replacements had very little chance of surviving. . . .You'd think of what kind of family they had—whether they were married or single, their mother their father . . . . I don't

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know why but that went through my mind and I got to thinking about it. It was pitiful to know that these guys would never get home" (p. 227). Marcello finishes this particular oral history by informing us that the master sergeant was a career soldier, eventually becoming "responsible for White House communications during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower and had forty men under his supervision . . . [who] accompanied the president on trips to Camp David, the Eisenhower farm at Gettysburg, and several European summit conferences . . . . [He] retired to Wrightsville after his twenty-seven years of military service" (pp. 230–31). These and other fascinating yet poignant accounts are the heart of *Small Town America in World War II.*

Full disclosure: I am a native of York County who has visited Wrightsville on numerous occasions over the course of my life, and I have intensively studied the history of the area. As such, I probably had greater expectations for *Small Town America* than most historians and laypeople. My biggest disappointment is that Marcello had the opportunity to compare and contrast his hometown with similar small towns in Pennsylvania, or for that matter, other towns across the United States. He failed to do so. For example, were Wrightsville's wartime and postwar experiences measurably typical or different than similar communities? Were the individuals who served in the armed forces representative of the demographics of the town, county or even state? Why or why not? How many men and women actually served in the armed forces? How many were wounded or killed? Marcello's concluding essay, "Home," briefly and sometimes tangentially addresses some of these issues, but only in a very general fashion. These limitations restrict the book's usefulness primarily to readers keenly interested in York County history or students attempting to learn more about the impact of World War II on the lives of common citizens. Nonetheless, it is a good read and makes an interesting case study of a relatively obscure Pennsylvania town during the Second World War.

Dr. Mark A. Snell served in the Army for more than twenty years in a wide variety of assignments, initially as an enlisted soldier and then as an ordnance officer. From 1987–1990, he was an assistant professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy. Upon his retirement from the Army, he became the founding director of the George Tyler Moore Center for the Study of the Civil War and professor of history at Shepherd University in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. He retired again in 2013. He is the author or editor of numerous books and essays on the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. His most recent book is titled *Gettysburg's Other Battle: The Ordeal of an American Shrine during the First World War* (Kent, Ohio, 2017).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1977–1980



By Steven L. Rearden and Kenneth R. Foulks Jr.
Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015
Pp. xi, 351. $29.95

Review by John C. Binkley

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1977–1980, by Steven L. Rearden, in collaboration with Kenneth R. Foulks Jr., is the twelfth volume of the official history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) role in the development of national security policy. As with the previous volumes, the organization of this book is thematic in nature—some chapters focus on the role of the JCS as it relates to specific geographic areas, such as Western Europe or Latin America, and some chapters focus on policy questions, such as budgets, arms control, or defense organization. Rearden has wide experience in official histories, having contributed to other JCS histories and to the history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The book's primary theme is the tension that existed between President Jimmy Carter's administration and the Joint Chiefs. While such tensions maybe considered a normal part of American civil-military relations, the situation during the Carter administration was exacerbated by a series of events that took place in the previous decade: the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Vietnam War, and the erosion of the Chiefs' role during the Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense. By the early 1970s the prestige of the JCS had substantially diminished. Although the JCS had started to reassert its role, it took a serious step backward during the Carter administration because the administration sought "to rely more on diplomacy and moral suasion to achieve American security objectives," (p. 1) than the use of traditional military power. Even the selection of the Chiefs during this period was marked by officers steeped in technological competency as opposed to political or military strategy. The result, from the authors' perspective, was a JCS made up of "competent but compliant" officers who wanted a more robust military presence in the world, but rarely pushed back against the administration's desire to use softer forms of national power.

While each of the thematic chapters has the ability to stand alone as an interesting case study in civil-military affairs, one of the more interesting chapters deals with development of

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the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the Persian Gulf. On the one hand, the Defense Department and the majority of the JCS, especially Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Haywood, were the leading proponents for a forward leaning strategy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and advised the creation of a permanent force in that geographic area. On the other hand, the president and the State Department were more cautious about the placement of military forces in Southwest Asia. The chapter also gives insight into an interesting side-story of interservice conflict, as the Marine Corps sought to carve out a specific role for itself with the formation of the RDF, while the majority of the JCS believed that any Persian Gulf initiative should be joint in nature. Ultimately, it was the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Iran, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the articulation of the Carter Doctrine that finalized the formation of the RDF.

Another interesting chapter is the one that analyzes the Chiefs' role in the all-important area of arms control and the negotiations surrounding the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) arms treaty. This chapter begins to pull back the veil surrounding the inner workings of the JCS and exposes the differences that can arise between the civilian and military perspectives. According to the authors, the essential issue was the JCS' concern that arms control was doing little to limit effectively the growth of the Soviet atomic arsenal. This generalized problem was exacerbated by the administration's desire for deep cuts in nuclear weapons. The Chiefs looked at such reductions with great caution, believing that U.S. and Russian views on cruise missiles, as well as the role of the new Russian Backfire bomber, were essentially irreconcilable without substantial modernization of the American nuclear arsenal. Despite the Chiefs' concerns, the administration went forward with the negotiation of SALT II. The authors expose the differences among the members of the JCS, with the majority concluding that the SALT II treaty was the best that could be accomplished, while others, including the JCS' own negotiator, Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, opposing the treaty as fundamentally dangerous to America's security interests. In the final analysis, SALT II was never ratified due to the deteriorating relationship with Russia following its invasion of Afghanistan.

Although each of the book's chapters supplies an interesting story in its own right, it should be noted that official histories by their nature have pluses and minuses. This history is no exception. One positive factor is the use of declassified documents which can substantially assist future research. Additionally, the various chapters reveal in a clear and concise fashion the issues confronting the JCS, the positions generally held by the JCS, and the opinions held by the civilian leaders within the administration. The footnotes and the text lay a solid foundation for additional research. A final benefit is that we begin to see, albeit in a limited way, the internal workings of the JCS and the differing service views.


Notwithstanding these positive aspects, there are several problems that any researcher using this work should note. It is apparent that this volume originally was written during the 1990s, and was published with little updating of the research. Thus, the work fails to incorporate the last two and a half decades of scholarship on the Carter administration. Second, as in many official histories, this volume lacks an analytical aspect and tends to simply recite the facts without getting into the reasons why people and organizations took the positions they did, and why agreement or disagreement existed. For example, it would have been interesting if the authors tried to explain why the Carter administration selected the different members of the JCS. That might have substantiated the authors' contention that the members of the JCS were "competent but compliant" in their role. It might have also shed some light on why the members of the JCS took the positions they did. Moreover, with some exception, the authors do not go into the different service positions. Even when they do, as indicated above in the chapter on strategic arms negotiations there is little exploration of why the individual members of the JCS concluded the way they did. While I recognize that this is a history of the role of the JCS, it is impossible to understand the positions taken by an individual chief without consideration of the positions taken within the services. The authors could have taken better advantage of the military services' very sophisticated oral history programs and their own internal studies to give context to the individual Chiefs' positions.

Despite some of the deficiencies associated with this official history, it must be noted that official histories such as this one form an important foundation for a researcher's work. They supply the bedrock on which further research is conducted. Without such histories, researchers would have a much more difficult time understanding the complexities and inner workings of the national security community and its decision-making processes. Consequently, this work should be on the bookshelf on any scholar interested in exploring the role of the JCS.

This volume and other official JCS histories are available online in PDF format at http://www.jcs.mil/About/Joint-Staff-History.

Dr. John C. Binkley is a professor of history and political science at the University of Maryland University College. He is also a former faculty member of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has written for journals such as *Military Review*, *Parameters*, and *Armed Forces & Society*. He is currently working on a monograph about the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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By Thomas M. Renahan
Potomac Books, 2017
Pp. xii, 520. $36.95

Review by Matthew J. Margis

The war in Iraq played a key role in American foreign policy through three presidential administrations. Most accounts of the war come from military or journalistic sources, and describe the war's operations and influence on policy initiatives. Thomas M. Renahan offers a different perspective. In *The Struggle for Iraq: A View from the Ground Up*, Renahan provides an account of his experiences as an American civilian working with Iraqi citizens and other expatriates to introduce democracy and expand civil rights in the war-torn nation. Renahan worked in Iraq's major regions (southern Iraq, Baghdad, and Iraqi Kurdistan) during three distinct phases of the war. His book serves as a compelling narrative of one man's efforts to advance democratic institutions, promote free elections, and fight corruption.

Known as Dr. Tom by his Iraqi counterparts, Renahan arrived in Amarah, the capital of Maysan Province in southern Iraq three days before American forces captured Saddam Hussein. Working for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Renahan acted as an adviser to the new Maysan Provincial Council, and helped launch a major democracy campaign. The author recounts his optimism during the early stages of American occupation as well as Iraqi enthusiasm for their projects. Eventually, increased violence forced USAID to relocate Dr. Tom to Kuwait. Within a few weeks, Renahan was back in the United States, and USAID abandoned many of his projects. Renahan returned to Iraq in late 2005, this time as the national anticorruption manager for the Iraq Civil Society Program in Baghdad. Serving during the height of sectarian violence, Renahan's narrative reflects the unfortunate realities of assassinations, revenge killings, and collateral damage. Renahan's gut-wrenching stories about the deaths of his close friends and colleagues remind the reader of the costs of war on Iraqi citizens.

Renahan's third tour in Iraq began in 2007. Unlike in his earlier positions, Renahan found himself working in the relative safety of Iraqi Kurdistan. Serving as a consultant to the Minister of Municipalities of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil, Iraq, the author traveled throughout the region. He met with local leaders to discuss civil works projects and infrastructure development, and then reported back to the minister.


Taken together, Renahan's three accounts give the reader a glimpse of life in Iraq immediately following the U.S. invasion, during the height of violence, and in the aftermath of the Iraq "surge." Through his voice, one can appreciate the risks Iraqi citizens encountered as they commuted each day and worked with aid organizations. Renahan's narrative shows how extremists used a culture of violence to terrorize an entire nation, and how such violence takes a toll on the local population and the émigrés working within Iraqi society.

The book's strongest moments come from the author's engaging and often heartbreaking stories. Renahan describes the close friendships he formed and his depictions give life to the characters. Readers will feel connected to the men and women who became Dr. Tom's surrogate family. Renahan recounts his guilt when USAID pulled the plug on his project in Southern Iraq, and he describes his frustrations when he was unable to finish his early initiatives. He expresses his emotions when he heard that assassination squads murdered some of his closest friends. The author discusses his sense of loss and helplessness that arose from these senseless attacks and how he persevered through it all. Yet Renahan's story can be optimistic. He describes moments where his democracy team or anticorruption group made great strides and set the groundwork for further success.

This work is not just Renahan's memories of his experiences, however. While including historical sections for context, the author describes his role in aid programs within the framework of Iraq's political and cultural history. Dr. Tom outlines the problems his agencies faced and the cultural, social, and bureaucratic hurdles his teams needed to overcome. Throughout this work, Renahan offers solutions to improve Iraq's democratic process from the top down. While his solutions address specific issues, they would require a reorientation of American policy, and are thus unrealistic. Nonetheless, his proposals spark curiosity and prompt a recalculation of preconceived notions about the situation in Iraq. Ultimately, the author contends, America's role in Iraq is not over. Renahan argues that the United States owes it to the Iraqi people to continue to support them militarily and politically and ensure their young democracy can take hold in the region. This book would be a valuable addition for anyone interested in studying the nuances of Iraqi society between 2003 and 2017.

Matthew J. Margis is a historian in the Field Programs Directorate at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). He earned his Ph.D. from Iowa State University in 2016 and worked at the National Archives and Records Administration before joining CMH. He is currently working on the Center's series covering Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

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By Edward M. Coffman
University Press of Kentucky, 2014
Pp. 201. $40

Review by Thomas Bruscino

Let's get the critique out of the way: the title for this book is all wrong. Edward M. Coffman's life work was never about battling over history. Coffman wrapped his arms around the past. *The Embraced Past*—that's a better way to understand this book and its contents. His volume is a collection of articles, essays, and reflections that is at once a primer on Coffman's career and a guide to how to "do" history.

Edward Coffman is an emeritus professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and one of the leading lights in military history. (Full disclosure: he was my dissertation adviser's adviser, and served as a reader on my master's thesis.) His career has been at the center of the rise, partial fall, and complicated resurgence of academic military history. He earned a Ph.D. in the subject before the field really had a foothold in the discipline; his scholarship and students led the military history field during the Cold War years; his retirement coincided with the spate of departments cutting military historians in the 1980s and 1990s; and his ongoing writing and mentorship have helped to allow the field's return to relevance in recent years.

His story is made evident by the chapters in *The Embattled Past*. The essays fall into two broad categories that roughly divide the book: first, examples of Coffman's scholarship, and second, discussions of the historian's craft. Practitioners dominated most military history writing before World War II. They used the past to better understand their craft, and as a result they focused on the strategic and operational side of the field. Coffman could write to that audience—his account of the United States in World War I, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (New York, 1968) is definitive—and this collection includes articles intended to provide lessons on the transition to peace, the relationship between the professional and civilian military traditions in America, and America's overall strategy for the First World War.

Strategic and operational issues, vital though they are, tell only part of the story, and no one understood that better than Coffman. Strategic and operational histories can and often do focus on ideas and institutions or decisive points and divisions, at the expense of the people who make those things real. Coffman never lost sight of people. Long before it became voguish, he made it his life's work to write a social history of the officers, soldiers, and families of the U.S. Army. Together, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York, 1986) and *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004) represent his magnum opus. They are unlikely to be surpassed in telling of the everyday lives in and around the Army from independence to World War II. Three essays in this volume, on the 15th Infantry Regiment in China, the Philippine Scouts, and Dwight Eisenhower's West Point roommate Paul Hodgson, serve as case studies of Coffman's style of social military history.

Coffman became the progenitor of what was once known as the new military history. We now know it more simply as social military history. It dominates the field, and has allowed military historians to reengage with a larger field that is focused, perhaps overly so, on issues of race, class, and gender. Social military history has gotten military historians back into history departments. While we can lament the decline of academic operational military history, the Coffman-style of military history has pried open the door to returning operational military history to the academy.

The second half of *The Embattled Past*, the far more personal half, explains how he became a vanguard in military social history. Included are reflections on the craft of history from the last thirty years of Coffman's career. Pride of place belongs to his 1997 review on the course of military history in the United States after World War II, which ought to be required reading for all aspiring military historians as an overview of their field. But the rest of the chapters reveal, perhaps unintentionally, the ways in which Coffman helped influence the account of that history. His essay on oral history and his tributes to historians Thomas D. Clark and Forrest Pogue stand out in that regard. Interviews have always had a role in the writing of history, but Coffman correctly notes that systematic oral history, the large-scale gathering of recollections of all participants in historical events, began in earnest with battlefield interviews during World War II. Pogue participated in those interviews, saw their value, and carried the practice into his work on George C. Marshall. Early in his career, Coffman assisted Pogue in those efforts. Given his delight in sharing personal stories, Coffman immediately grasped the value of oral histories in telling the tales that have too often been left in the margins. We have all become the beneficiaries of the inclusion of perspectives of junior officers, enlistees, women and minorities in the military, and military families.

The only new contribution to *The Embattled Past*, Coffman's account of his interview of Douglas MacArthur, drives home another point. The rise of social history has too


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often been accompanied by the idea that the stories of great men have been overdone. Commonly known as "great white man history," it has become passé for academics. In recent years, it has too often been left to journalists and amateur historians who are dedicated but often untrained in the skills of academic history. Coffman's MacArthur interview shows how histories of great men are still be important for historians to undertake. For Coffman, the stories of generals need to be told too, and oral history allows for an accounting that makes better sense of memoirs and archival documents. MacArthur was Coffman's biggest, but by no means only, catch. He interviewed and corresponded with hundreds of famous and infamous historical figures over his career.

In reading *The Embattled Past* and seeing just how much ground Coffman covered over the years, this historian's feelings of inadequacy were tempered only slightly by knowing that at least that trail has been blazed. In addition to his published work, the Coffman papers are available for researchers at the Marshall Library at the Virginia Military Institute. A pilgrimage to Lexington is in order, as is much more new work along the lines laid out by Edward M. Coffman. I can think of no greater tribute to one of the finest scholars and teachers our field has ever known.

Thomas Bruscino is an associate professor at the U.S. Army War College. He is the author of *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along* (Knoxville, Tenn., 2010). He is currently at work on a history of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost



By Cathal J. Nolan
Oxford University Press, 2017
Pp. xiii, 709 $34.95

Review by John R. Maass

Although it is difficult to summarize a thesis-driven, 700-page interpretive study in a brief review, the author himself provides perhaps the best synopsis of *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost.* "Although grand-scale battles are far less decisive in history than is commonly believed," Cathal J. Nolan writes, "the idea of them fascinates. We are drawn to celebrate battles because they seem to deliver a decision" (p. 4). For centuries, chroniclers and scholars have "traditionally looked for the key moments that turned wars toward finality, pointing especially to lopsided and grand-scale battles as the key mechanism of decision by force" (p. 3). While Nolan points out that studies of decisive battles abound and remain popular today, he refutes the premise that individual battles win wars.

The author concludes that "battles did not usually decide the major wars of the modern era" (p. 2), and that since the 1600s, only a few battles during wars among great western powers and Japan "have proved to be more than locally or tactically decisive" (p. 7). He points out that numerous generals and admirals "who won hugely lopsided battles went on to lose the wars of which they were a part," as "truly decisive battles" were rare and "accomplished little" (p. 3). Questioning the common characterization of "decisive battle," the author argues instead that "it was attrition rather than battles that decided most modern Great Power wars, though seldom by choice at the outset" (p. 6). "Human and material attrition," Nolan states, "are far more important in determining outcome" (p. 4). Large wars among the great powers were characterized not by high stakes battles in which one side risked soldiers, materiel, and viability, but by a "protracted stalemate born from a rough strategic balance, broken only after attritional wearing turned wars into contests of endurance" (p. 7). Covering the Battle of Cannae (216 BC) to the Battle of Okinawa and the end of World War II in the Pacific (1945), though not comprehensively, Nolan is guided by the premise that "despite battle's abiding allure, we must study war and not just battle" (p. 7).

In a sweeping overview of the emphasis among belligerents on fighting risky, throw-of-the-dice battles on land and sea, Nolan finds that these engagements—Lützen (1632), Fontenoy (1745), Borodino (1812), and Sedan (1870), to name but a few—did not decide their wars' outcomes. Nolan does point to a few such battles that were in his estimation decisive, such as Leuthen (1757) and Königgrätz (1866). For the most part, however, his persistent argument is that wars were won by endurance, resources, and logistics, and not the gamble of a great captain seeking a crushing defeat of the enemy early in a conflict, before the opponent could marshal the forces and guns to protract it. Wars of grinding attrition were much more common, Nolan finds, and were seldom won on a flat, green battlefield between two forces lined up to fight it out on a single day. This was especially true beginning with the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte, who ushered a new era of warfare characterized by advanced weaponry, the mobilization of whole nations for war, and "mass conscript armies" (p. 575).

Nolan's study is a thought-provoking one, and will likely generate debate among scholars. Despite the book's title, the author limits the scope of his work almost exclusively to European warfare, and with the exception of World War II, he largely ignores

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American conflicts. The absence of examples and analysis of the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War is particularly glaring in that a useful comparison could have been made with European examples, and readers could have seen how the American context melded with (or contradicted) Nolan's argument. Moreover, in the attrition versus all-or-nothing battle contrast, is there nothing to learn from post–World War II conflicts? And how do the Cold War, various insurgencies, and the West's recent (and ongoing) operations fit in to the author's thesis? Curiously, Nolan does not include the last seven decades in this work.

Readers and historians familiar with the earlier work of Russell F. Weigley (*The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* [Bloomington, Indiana, 1991]) and Walter Millis (*Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* [New York, 1956]) will recognize that Nolan has plowed some familiar ground in that both of these earlier scholars also concluded that, in Weigley's words, "the age of battles . . . proved to be an age of prolonged, indecisive wars. . . ."[1] Additionally, Nolan may have overstated the futility of battles. He focuses on the ineffectiveness of battles as quick, one-shot, war-winning fights designed to bring conflicts to end suddenly before soldiers and supplies were used up. What he leaves out, however, is that wars consist of many battles—can there really be a war without them? Few conflicts have ever been won in a single stroke, but the threat of them influences belligerents to negotiate wars' end. A battle may not be decisive while the smoke still obscures the field, but its horrors may steer leaders and civilians to act to end a war—through diplomacy, surrender, or other strategies. That does not undermine Nolan's correct assertion that "wars were driven and largely determined by finance and administrative capacity," and logistics (p. 83).

Although Nolan's prose is excellent and his narrative is well-organized, he often gets entangled in the details of some battles to no apparent benefit. Blow-by-blow accounts of Austerlitz and Sedan, for example, are not necessary for the demonstration of the author's thesis and significantly lengthened the book. Several of the maps are poorly executed in that they provide no legends, and the lack of a bibliography is also disappointing. Still, *The Allure of Battle* is a valuable new look at western wars and how they were fought.

Note

1. Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. xii.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the National Museum of the U.S. Army. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from the Ohio State University. He is the author of *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811*, the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series (Washington, D.C., 2013), and of the books, *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2015) and *George Washington's Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2017).

ARMY HISTORY

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take, or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images, if necessary.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images on readable electronic media (DVD, CD, USB flash drive) by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Collins Hall, Bldg. 35, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.

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CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

JON T. HOFFMAN



FROM GREEN TO TAN

The Center of Military History (CMH) is making steady progress on launching the Army's official history series covering the conflicts since 11 September 2001. Unofficially dubbed the Tan Books in homage to CMH's World War II series that is widely known as the Green Books, we are unabashedly modeling this effort after that earlier successful program. CMH has been planning the series for some time, beginning with the issuance of a concept paper in 2016. The Conference of Army Historians in July 2017 hosted a four-hour session on the topic, followed by a two-day symposium in December at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, with representatives from throughout the Army and Department of Defense (DoD) history programs. Dr. W. Shane Story, chief of General Histories Division here at CMH, then drafted an execute order (EXORD) defining a plan for the Tan Books. CMH circulated it to command history offices for comment in April 2018, then revised it based on the feedback. The Center briefed Mr. Mark F. Averill, the acting Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, on the draft EXORD in July. The brief provided background information on prior series covering conflicts from the Civil War through Vietnam, a proposed list of volumes, options for sourcing the work, and anticipated challenges to overcome (especially declassification). At the end of August, Mr. Averill submitted the draft EXORD to the office of the Secretary of the Army for approval.

The current draft of the EXORD grounds the series in the 2018 National Defense Strategy guidance to "emphasize intellectual leadership and military professionalism [by] deepening our knowledge of history."[1] It projects a total of forty-two volumes covering operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the institutional Army since 11 September 2001. CMH proposes editing and publishing all volumes, and researching and writing thirty-two of them. Commands have volunteered to produce manuscripts for the other ten books. The Center will assign some of the volumes to its permanent civil-service authors, but is looking to ramp up the effort with contract historians, with the goal of completing the series within twenty years. The total anticipated cost, over and above the already budgeted labor cost of civil service positions, is less than forty million dollars. By way of comparison, we know that the Army spent forty-five million (in current dollars) from nonappropriated funds to support the Green Books, and that amount covered perhaps one-third of the full cost of that series. CMH hopes that the Secretary of the Army will sign the EXORD, just as Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson issued the War Department Circular in February 1946 to launch the World War II official histories. In addition, the Center has proposed that the Army request a DoD-funded effort at U.S. Central Command to declassify records, so that all the services and the Joint Staff can complete unclassified histories in a timely manner, support veteran claims, and permit wider use of official records in professional military education.

While we await the Secretary's decision on the EXORD, CMH already has begun execution with the resources we have available. Two permanent civil service authors are researching and writing books. Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser is writing the *Surge in Iraq* (2007–2008) and Mr. Mark J. Reardon is revising his manuscript on *Building the Iraqi Army*. Dr. J. Travis Moger is working on a campaign pamphlet covering the Army in the Middle East from 1991 through 2001—a precursor to a full volume that will set the stage for the rest of the Tan Books. In the latter part of fiscal year 2018, we signed two contracts related to the series. Mr. Robert L. Bateman, a prolific author and retired Army officer, is authoring a volume on Army doctrine after 11 September 2001. Mr. Benjamin Brands, a former Army officer and West Point history instructor, will be writing a campaign pamphlet covering the preparation and conduct of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It will serve as the basis for a future book on that topic. Cadet Command and West Point's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis have started joint work on a volume covering Army recruiting and initial training, while The Judge Advocate General has initiated work on legal operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Twenty years is an ambitious schedule for the Tan Books, but the Center completed seventy-one of the seventy-nine volumes of the Green Books by 1969, twenty-three years after that series officially got underway. We hope that the end result of our new effort will be as highly regarded as the World War II series, no matter how long it takes.

1. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, p. 8, accessed 23 October 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

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ARMY HISTORY
The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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ARMY HISTORY

HONORING THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II

U.S. ARMY HISTORICAL PLANNER 2019

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Cover: *Remagen Bridgehead*, by Stanley Dersh, oil, circa 1948

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FOREWORD

WORLD WAR II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. The truly global war was waged on land, on sea, and in the air for over six years, but 1944 was in many respects the climactic period that determined the outcome. While the Allies had been slowly rolling back Axis conquests for some time, 1944 saw the initiation of major offensives that would ultimately win the war. The invasion at Normandy on 6 June (Operation OVERLORD) started the liberation of France and would lead directly to the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. The invasion of Saipan on 15 June marked the beginning of the campaign to seize the Mariana Islands in the Pacific, and precipitated the naval battle of the Philippine Sea, which effectively ended Japanese naval air power. The invasion of Leyte on 20 October initiated the liberation of the Philippines and brought on the naval battle of Leyte Gulf, which destroyed most of the remaining Japanese surface fleet. Once secured, the Marianas served as the base for the bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland and the launching point for the B–29s that would drop atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Seventy-five years after those events, World War II remains very relevant and has much to teach the nation and our Army—about the profession of arms, military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in a coalition war. For those who want to learn more, the U.S. Army Center of Military History Web site (https://history.army.mil) provides a wealth of information, to include access to the official Army histories of the war and the campaign pamphlet series published for the fiftieth anniversary. This desk planner serves as a year-long commemoration of the conflict, as well as a reminder of the collective valor and determination of all who contributed to victory. We hope that it helps educate and inspire today's citizens and soldiers, and preserves the memory of what our forebears did to uphold freedom in the world.



Charles R. Bowery Jr., SES
Chief of Military History

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DECEMBER 2018

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
						1
2	3	4	5 Battle of Ormoc begins (1944)	6 Battle of the Buri Airfields begins (1944)	7 Japan Attacks Pearl Harbor (1941); Philippine Islands Campaign begins (1941); Central Pacific Campaign begins (1941)	8 U.S. Declaration of War against Japan (1941)
9	10 Japanese invasion of the Philippines begins (1941); Battle of the Buri Airfields ends (1944)	11 U.S. Declaration of War against Germany and Italy (1941)	12 Battle of Ormoc ends (1944)	13 Battle of Metz ends (1944)	14 Battles of Breakneck and Kilay Ridges end (1944)	15 Bismarck Archipelago Campaign begins (1943); Invasion of New Britain (1943); Battle of Mindoro begins (1944); Luzon Campaign begins (1944)
16 Battles of Mount Austen, Sea Horse, and Galloping Horse begin (1942); Ardennes-Alsace Campaign (Battle of the Bulge) and Battle of Elsenborn Ridge begin (1944); November Offensive ends (1944)	17 Battle of St. Vith begins (1944); Malmedy Massacre (1944)	18	19 Battle of Bastogne begins (1944)	20	21	22
23/30 (23rd) Battle of St. Vith ends (1944)	24/31 (31st) New Guinea Campaign ends (1944)	*Christmas Day* 25	26 Battle of Elsenborn Ridge ends (1944)	27 Battle of Bastogne ends (1944)	28	29

World War II was the largest armed conflict to engulf the world. Because of the declaration of a limited emergency, the Army experienced a substantial increase in its peacetime strength through recruitment, drafts by Selective Service, and activation of Reserve and National Guard units for training in the months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. On 7 December 1941, the U.S. Army had a strength of approximately 1,643,000 soldiers, including both ground and air forces. By the end of the war in September 1945 there were approximately 8,267,000 members serving. The Army represented 70 percent of the total U.S. Armed Forces for the war period, with 11 million men and women in its ranks.

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JANUARY 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
		New Year's Day East Indies Campaign begins (1942)	2 Battle of Buna ends (1943); Battle of Saidor begins (1944)	3 Bulge Northern Shoulder counteroffensive begins (1945)	4	5
6	7 Battle of Bataan begins (1942)	8	9 Invasion of Luzon at Lingayen Gulf (1945)	10	11	12 Battles of Cassino begin (1944); First convoy moves on the nearly completed Ledo Road (1945)
13	14	15	16 First and Third Armies link up at Houffalize, Belgium, to split the Bulge (1945)	17	18	19
20 Battle of the Rapido River begins (1944)	*Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.* 21 Naples-Foggia Campaign ends (1944)	22 Battle of Sanananda ends (1943); Battle of Anzio (Operation SHINGLE) begins (1944); Battle of the Rapido River ends (1944); Rome-Arno Campaign begins (1944)	23 Battles of Mount Austen, Sea Horse, and Galloping Horse end (1943); Papua Campaign ends (1943)	24 New Guinea Campaign begins (1943)	25 Ardennes-Alsace Campaign (Battle of the Bulge) ends (1945)	26
27 First Bombing Raid on Germany by Eighth Air Force (1943)	28 India-Burma Campaign ends as first convoy from Ledo reaches Chinese border (1945)	29 Central Burma Campaign begins (1945)	30 Battle of Cisterna begins (1944); Cabanatuan POW Camp Raid (1945)	31 Eastern Mandates Campaign begins (1944); Battle of Kwajalein Atoll begins (1944); Second Battle of Bataan begins (1945)		

Often overshadowed by operations elsewhere, the Allied effort in Italy was vital to victory in Europe. In January 1944, U.S. Army and Allied forces fought to crack the formidable Gustav Line, seize strategic Monte Cassino, and outflank Axis forces by landing at Anzio. These operations led to the liberation of Rome and the eventual defeat of the Axis in Italy and prevention of their redeployment to Western Europe.

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FEBRUARY 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1 Battle of Cisterna ends (1944)	2 Battle of Loi-kang Ridge (1945)
3 "Four Chaplains Day" - USAT *Dorchester* torpedoed (1943); Battle of Manila begins (1945)	4	5 Drive on Roer Dams begins (1945)	6	7 Battle of Kwajalein Atoll ends (1944)	8	9 Drive on Roer Dams ends (1945); Battle of Guadalcanal ends (1945)
10 Battle of Saidor ends (1944); Battle of Hurtgen Forest ends (1945)	11	12 Egypt-Libya Campaign ends (1943)	13 Dresden Bombing Raids begin (1945)	14 Battle of Sidi Bou Zid begins (1943)	15 Bombing of Monte Cassino (1944); Dresden Bombing Raids end (1945)	16 Second Battle of Corregidor begins (1945)
17 Battle of Sidi Bou Zid ends (1943); Battle of Eniwetok Atoll begins (1944)	*Washington's Birthday* 18	19 Battle of Kasserine Pass begins (1943); Battle of Iwo Jima begins (1945)	20 "Big Week" (Operation ARGUMENT) Air Offensive begins (1944)	21 Guadalcanal Campaign ends (1943); Second Battle of Bataan ends (1945)	22 Northern Solomon Campaign begins (1943); Battle of Eniwetok Atoll ends (1944)	23 Battle of Intramuros, last enemy stronghold in Manila, begins (1945); Liberation of Los Baños POW Camp (1945); Operation GRENADE, crossing of the Roer River (1945)
24	25 Battle of Kasserine Pass ends (1943)	26 Second Battle of Corregidor ends (1945)	27 Southern Philippines Campaign begins (1945)	28 Japanese invasion of Java (1942)	Battle of Los Negros begins (29 February 1944)	

In the racially segregated U.S. Army of World War II, African American soldiers contributed to victory by serving in two infantry divisions (one in the European theater the other in the Pacific), and a number of nondivisional combat units—including one parachute infantry, one armored reconnaissance, three tank, and several tank destroyer, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and barrage balloon battalions—and an Army Air Forces fighter squadron, as well as in numerous engineer and service support units. The service and sacrifice of approximately 900,000 African American men and women in the U.S. Army and Army Air Forces during World War II were instrumental in achieving desegregation of the armed forces shortly after the war.

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MARCH 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1 Battle of Bismarck Sea begins (1943); Battle of Walawbum begins (1944)	2
3 Battle of Manila ends (1945)	4 Battle of Bismarck Sea ends (1943)	5	6 Battle of Walawbum ends (1944)	7 Battle of Remagen Bridgehead (1945)	8 Construction of Alaska Highway begins (1942)	9
10 Battle of Mindanao begins (1945); Fire bombing of Tokyo (1945)	11	12 Battle of Manus Island begins (1944)	13	14	15	16
17	18 Battle of the Central Visayas begins (1945)	19	20	21 Rhineland Campaign ends (1945)	22 Central Europe Campaign begins (1945)	23 Battle of El Guettar (1943); Rhine Crossing (Operation Plunder-Varsity) (1945)
24/31	25 Battle of Manus Island ends (1944)	26 Hammelburg POW Camp Raid begins (1945); Battle of Iwo Jima ends (1945); Battle of Frankfurt begins (1945); Ryukyus Campaign begins (1945)	27 Battle of Nhpum Ga begins (1944); Hammelburg POW Camp Raid ends (1945)	28	29 Battle of Frankfurt ends (1945)	30

Approximately 150,000 women served in the U.S. Army during World War II, initially as members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), then with the Women's Army Corps (WAC). Members of the WAC contributed by serving in many administrative functions and service support units of the Army and Army Air Forces. It marked the first time women served in a capacity other than nursing and as full members of the U.S. Army.

Notes:

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APRIL 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1 Mop-up of the Ruhr Pocket begins after First and Ninth Armies link up at Lippstadt (1945); Battle of Okinawa (Operation ICEBERG) begins (1945)	2 India-Burma Campaign begins (1942)	3	4 North Apennines Campaign ends (1945)	5 Po Valley Campaign begins (1945)	6
7	8	9 Surrender of Bataan (1942); Battle of Nhpum Ga ends (1944)	10	11	12	13
14	15	16 Battle of Ie Shima begins (1945)	17 Air Offensive Campaign against Japan begins (1942); Mop-up Battle of the Ruhr Pocket ends (1945)	18 Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (1942); Operation VENGEANCE - Admiral Yamamoto's plane shot down (1943); Famed War Correspondent Ernie Pyle killed on Ie Shima (1945)	19	20
21 Battle of Ie Shima ends (1945)	22 Battle of Hollandia begins (1944); Battle of Aitape begins (1944)	23	24 Battle of Aitape ends (1944)	25 American and Russian Forces link up on the Elbe River (1945)	26	27 Battle of Hill 609 begins (1943); Battle of Hollandia ends (1944)
28	29	30				

The New Guinea Campaign approached its climax in April 1944 when U.S. Army forces conducted amphibious assaults at Hollandia and Aitape. The soldiers won decisive victories, which caused the Japanese to abandon all their remaining positions east of Hollandia and withdraw to new defenses at Wakde and western New Guinea. The capture of vital airfields during the operations, and subsequent use by U.S. Army Air Forces, was instrumental in the Allies gaining air superiority in the Southwest Pacific area.

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MAY 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			1 Battle of Hill 609 ends (1943); Operation CHOWHOUND, the food airlift to the Netherlands, begins (1945)	2 Italian Campaign ends with surrender of Axis Forces in Italy (1945)	3	4 China Defensive Campaign ends (1945)
5 First Battle of Corregidor begins (1942); China Offensive Campaign begins (1945)	6 First Battle of Corregidor ends (1942)	7 Fall of Bizerte, Tunisia (1943); German surrender at SHAEF headquarters in Rheims, France (1945)	8 Operation CHOWHOUND ends (1945); Po Valley Campaign ends (1945); Victory in Europe (VE) Day (1945)	9	10 U.S. Surrender of the Philippines (1942)	11 Second Battle of Attu begins (1943); Central Europe Campaign ends (1945)
12	13 Tunisia Campaign ends (1943); Surrender of Axis Forces in North Africa (1943)	14	15 Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) established (1942)	16	17 Siege of Myitkyina begins with seizure of airstrip by Merrill's Marauders (1944); Battle of Wakde-Sarmi ("Lone Tree Hill") begins (1944)	18 Battle of Wakde Island begins (1944); Battles of Cassino end (1944)
19	20	21 Battle of Wakde Island ends (1944)	22	23	24 Battle of Anzio ends with junction between II and VI Corps (1944)	25
26 Burma Campaign ends (1942)	*Memorial Day* 27 Battle of Biak Island begins (1944)	28	29	30 Second Battle of Attu ends (1943)	31	

In May 1944, after four years of discussion, analysis, and debate, General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, decided that the Army's ground combat power would be built around a force of ninety divisions. He recognized that creating any more would dilute the quality of manpower and trained officers, while increasing the difficulty of providing replacements for the losses sustained in ongoing and future operations.

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JUNE 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
						1
2	3 Aleutian Islands Campaign begins (1942)	4 Battle of Midway begins (1942); Liberation of Rome (1944)	5	6 Battle of Midway ends (1942); Invasion of France (Operation OVERLORD) – D-Day – Normandy Campaign begins (1944)	7 Japanese Invasion of Attu and Kiska (1942)	8
9	10	11 Egypt-Libya Campaign begins (1942)	12	13	14 Eastern Mandates Campaign ends (1944)	15 Western Pacific Campaign begins (1944); Battle of Saipan begins (1944)
16	17	18	19	20 Battle of Central Visayas ends (1945)	21 Bombardment of Fort Stevens, Oregon, by Japanese Submarine (1942) Battle of New Georgia begins (1943);	22 Battle of Cherbourg begins (1944); Battle of Okinawa ends (1945)
23/30 (30th) Battle of Rendova Island (1943); (30th) Battle of Nassau Bay begins (1943)	24	25	26	27	28	29 Battle of Cherbourg ends (1944)

On 6 June 1944, D-Day, the invasion of France on the Normandy coast remains arguably the largest amphibious operation in military history. In the American sector, no less than five U.S. Army divisions—three infantry and two airborne—plus a number of separate combat and support units participated in the assault echelon. Follow-on units poured into the beachhead to eventually constitute the 12th Army Group, the largest combat formation in the Army's history. Near simultaneously, U.S. Army troops participated in the Marianas Campaign, beginning with the 15 June Battle of Saipan in the Pacific.

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JULY 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1 Women's Army Corps (WAC) established (1943); Leyte Campaign ends (1945)	2 Battle of Nassau Bay ends (1943); Ryukus Campaign ends (1945)	3 July offensive in Normandy begins (1944)	*Independence Day* 4 China Defensive Campaign begins (1942); Luzon Campaign ends (1945); Southern Philippines Campaign ends (1945)	5	6
7	8	9 Sicily Campaign begins (1943); Battle of Saipan ends (1944)	10 Invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) and Battles of Biazza Ridge and Gela begin (1943); Battle of Driniumor River, or Aitape, begins (1944)	11 Battle of Biazza Ridge ends (1943); Battle of St. Lô begins (1944)	12 Battle of Gela ends (1943)	13
14	15 Central Burma Campaign ends (1945)	16	17	18	19 Battle of St. Lô and July offensive in Normandy end (1944)	20 Battle of Mount Tambu begins (1943)
21 Battle of Guam begins (1944)	22 East Indies Campaign ends (1942); Fall of Palermo (1943); Battle of Munda begins (1943)	23 Papua Campaign begins (1942)	24 Hamburg Firebomb Raids (Operation GOMORRAH) begin (1943); Normandy Campaign ends (1944)	25 Northern France Campaign begins (1944); Normandy Breakout (Operation COBRA) begins (1944)	26	27
28 Battle of Biak Island ends (1944)	29	30	31 Normandy Breakout (Operation COBRA) ends (1944)			

The Normandy Campaign reached its climax in July 1944 when U.S. Army forces captured the strategic transportation hub at St. Lô, broke free of the hedgerows of the Bocage into open country, and advanced out of the invasion toehold on the coast of Europe established on 6 June. The war of maneuver that characterized the Northern France Campaign, and the liberation of France from German occupation, then began in earnest. Meanwhile in the Pacific, the Marianas Campaign continued as Army troops participated in the liberation of Guam and Biak Island off the coast of New Guinea.

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AUGUST 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
				1 Ploesti Oil Fields Bombing Raid (1943)	2	3 Hamburg Firebomb Raids (Operation Gomorrah) end (1943); Siege of Myitkyina ends (1944)
4 Battle of Munda ends (1943)	5	6 Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima (1945)	7 Battle of Guadalcanal begins (1942); Battle of Mortain begins (1944)	8 Battle of Brest begins (1944)	9 Battle of Driniumor, or Aitape River ends (1944); Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki (1945)	10 Battle of Guam ends (1944)
11	12 Battle of Baanga Island begins (1943); Battle of the Falaise Pocket begins (1944)	13 Battle of Mortain ends (1944)	14 Japan accepts surrender terms (1945)	15 Second Battle of Kiska (1943); Invasion of Southern France (Operation Dragoon) (1944); Battle of Mindanao ends (1945)	16	17 Sicily Campaign ends (1943); Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids (1943)
18	19 Battle of Mount Tambu ends (1943); Dieppe Raid (1942); Battle of the Falaise Pocket ends with closure of pocket (1944)	20	21 Battle of Bougainville ends (1945)	22 Initial Army Air Forces Units Arrive on Guadalcanal (1942); Battle of Baanga Island ends (1943)	23	24 Aleutian Islands Campaign ends (1943)
25 Liberation of Paris (1944); Red Ball Express begins (1944)	26	27	28	29	30	31

In August 1944, the offensive in Western Europe continued as the U.S. Army and Allied forces defeated German counterattacks and smashed through stubborn defenses to liberate Paris by late August. Meanwhile, U.S. Army and Allied forces invaded Southern France in mid-month and forced the Germans to retreat. With the ports of Northern France not yet fully functioning, the supply line stretching from the Normandy beaches was severely taxed. To maintain the pace of advance, Army logistical units initiated the "Red Ball Express." In an extraordinary effort, continuous motor convoys carried all classes of supply over carefully regulated routes to keep combat units in the fight until the ports were opened and the lines of communications shortened.

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SEPTEMBER 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	Labor Day				6	7
	Battle of Wakde-Sarmi (Lone Tree Hill) ends (1944); Formal surrender of Japan (1945)	Italian Campaign begins (1943); Surrender of Fascist Italy (1943)	Battle of Lae begins (1943)	Battle of Nadzab (1943); Battle of Nancy begins (1944)		
8	9 Invasion of Salerno (Operation Avalanche) (1943); Naples-Foggia Campaign begins (1943); Rome-Arno Campaign ends (1944)	10 North Apennines Campaign begins (1944)	11	12	13	14 Northern France Campaign ends (1944); Southern France Campaign ends (1944)
15 Rhineland Campaign begins (1944); Battle of Nancy ends (1944); Battle of Morotai begins (1944); Battle of Peleliu begins (1944)	16 Battle of Lae ends (1943)	17 Operation Market-Garden (1944); Battle of Eindhoven (1944); Battle of Nijmegen begins (1944); Battle of Angaur begins (1944)	18 Battle of Brest ends (1944)	19 Battle of the Hurtgen Forest begins (1944)	20 Battle of Nijmegen ends (1944); Battle of Angaur ends (1944)	21
22	23	24	25	26	27 Battle of Metz begins (1944)	28
29	30					

Conducted at more than 225 American universities, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) offered classes in engineering, foreign languages, and medicine to meet the wartime demands for junior officers with technical skills. The ASTP solved the problem for numerous land-grant universities, whose constitutions included the agreement to train militia officers, when the Army suspended certain advanced elements of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). Because recruits were expected to become officers upon completion, the ASTP provided a continuous and accelerated flow of high quality technicians and specialists needed by the Army that both helped the war effort and offset the ROTC enrollment turndown.

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OCTOBER 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
		1 Capture of Naples (1943)	2 Battle of Aachen begins (1944)	3	4 Battle of Morotai ends (1944)	5
6	7 Battle of New Georgia ends (1943)	8	9	10	11	12
13 Initial Army ground unit arrives on Guadalcanal (1942)	*Columbus Day* 14	15 Initial Army ground units land on Peleliu (1944)	16	17 Leyte Campaign begins (1944)	18	19
20 Invasion of Leyte (Operation King II) (1944)	21 Battle of Aachen ends (1944)	22	23 Battle for Henderson Field begins (1942)	24	25 Battle for Henderson Field ends (1942)	26
27	28 Construction of Alaska Highway completed (1942)	29	30	31		

In October 1944, U.S. Army forces in Europe broke through the West Wall, or Siegfried Line, and entered Germany. They were soon engaged in the bitter fighting at Aachen and in the Hurtgen Forest as enemy troops, now fighting to defend their homeland, stiffened their resistance. In the Pacific, the long-awaited liberation of the Philippines began when Army units landed on Leyte Island, and with the aid of Filipino forces, battled Japanese defenders unwilling to yield.

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NOVEMBER 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1 Battle of Bougainville begins (1943)	2 Battle of Schmidt begins (1944)
3	4	5	6	7 Battles of Breakneck and Kilay Ridges begin (1944)	8 Invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Algeria-French Morocco Campaign begins (1942); Battle of Schmidt ends (1942)	9
10	*Veterans Day* 11 Algeria-French Morocco Campaign ends (1942)	12	13	14	15	16 Red Ball Express ends (1944); November Offensive, drive on Roer River, begin (1944)
17 Tunisia Campaign begins (1942)	18	19 Battle of Buna begins (1942); Battle of Sanananda begins (1942)	20 Battle of Makin Atoll begins (1943)	21 Northern Solomon Campaign ends (1944)	22	23 Battle of Shoestring Ridge begins (1944)
24 Battle of Makin Atoll ends (1943); First B-29 attack on Japan (1944)	25	26	27 Battle of Peleliu ends (1944); Bismarck Archipelago Campaign ends (1944)	*Thanksgiving Day* 28	29	30 Battle of Shoestring Ridge ends (1944)

In the Pacific theater during November 1944, U.S. Army forces were engaged in the desperate battles of Breakneck, Kilay, and Shoestring Ridges on Leyte, brought the battle for the Island of Peleliu to a successful conclusion, and ended the Northern Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago Campaigns.

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DECEMBER 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
1	2	3	4	5 Battle of Ormoc begins (1944)	6 Battle of the Buri Airfields begins (1944)	7 Japan Attacks Pearl Harbor (1941); Philippine Islands Campaign begins (1941); Central Pacific Campaign begins (1941)
8 U.S. Declaration of War against Japan (1941)	9	10 Japanese invasion of the Philippines begins (1941); Battle of the Buri Airfields ends (1944)	11 U.S. Declaration of War against Germany and Italy (1941)	12 Battle of Ormoc ends (1944)	13 Battle of Metz ends (1944)	14 Battles of Breakneck and Kilay Ridges end (1944)
15 Bismarck Archipelago Campaign begins (1943); Invasion of New Britain (1943); Battle of Mindoro begins (1944); Luzon Campaign begins (1944)	16 Battles of Mount Austen, Sea Horse, and Galloping Horse begin (1942); Ardennes-Alsace Campaign (Battle of the Bulge) and Battle of Elsenborn Ridge begin (1944); November Offensive ends (1944)	17 Battle of St. Vith begins (1944); Malmedy Massacre (1944)	18	19 Battle of Bastogne begins (1944)	20	21
22	23 Battle of St. Vith ends (1944)	24	*Christmas Day* 25	26 Battle of Elsenborn Ridge ends (1944)	27 Battle of Bastogne ends (1944)	28
29	30	31 New Guinea Campaign ends (1944)				

As 1944 came to an end, the month of December proved decisive for the U.S. war effort. Shortly after U.S. Army forces took the fortress city of Metz, the Germans launched a massive offensive against Belgium in a desperate gamble to capture the port of Antwerp and disrupt the Allied onslaught. In the Alsace-Ardennes Campaign—later called the Battle of the Bulge, from the salient created in the Allied line—U.S. Army units at first retreated but then recovered, conducted a heroic defense of vital positions that stemmed the tide, counterattacked with a vengeance, and resumed the relentless advance against the Germans. In the Pacific, the advance across the Island of Leyte progressed and the New Guinea Campaign ended in an Allied victory.

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JANUARY 2020

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			New Year's Day 1 East Indies Campaign begins (1942)	2 Battle of Buna ends (1943); Battle of Saidor begins (1944)	3 Bulge Northern Shoulder counteroffensive begins (1945)	4
5	6	7 Battle of Bataan begins (1942)	8	9 Invasion of Luzon at Lingayen Gulf (1945)	10	11
12 Battles of Cassino begin (1944); First convoy moves on the nearly completed Ledo Road (1945)	13 *Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.*	14 Battle of the Rapido River begins (1944)	15 Naples-Foggia Campaign ends (1944)	16 First and Third Armies link up at Houffalize, Belgium, to split the Bulge (1945)	17	18
19	20	21	22 Battle of Sanananda ends (1943); Battle of Anzio (Operation SHINGLE) begins (1944); Battle of the Rapido River ends (1944); Rome-Arno Campaign begins (1944)	23 Battles of Mount Austen, Sea Horse, and Galloping Horse end (1943); Papua Campaign ends (1943)	24 New Guinea Campaign begins (1943)	25 Ardennes-Alsace Campaign (Battle of the Bulge) ends (1945)
26	27 First Bombing Raid on Germany by Eighth Air Force (1943)	28 India-Burma Campaign ends as first convoy from Ledo reaches Chinese border (1945)	29 Central Burma Campaign begins (1945)	30 Battle of Cisterna begins (1944); Cabanatuan POW Camp Raid (1945)	31 Eastern Mandates Campaign begins (1944); Battle of Kwajalein Atoll begins (1944); Second Battle of Bataan begins (1945)	

January 1945 saw the Allied forces advancing on all fronts. In the Pacific theater, the liberation of the Philippines drew closer as U.S. Army divisions invaded Luzon, the largest island in the archipelago. Before the month ended, American and Filipino prisoners held at Cabanatuan were liberated and the Second Battle of Bataan began. In the China-Burma-India theater, the India-Burma Campaign ended as the Southern Burma Campaign began, and the first motor convoy traversed the Ledo Road to open the overland supply route between India and China. In Europe, the northern shoulder counteroffensive phase of the Ardennes-Alsace Campaign began, First and Third Armies linked-up in Houffalize, Belgium, to split the "Bulge," and by the end of the month the salient was eliminated.

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
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The Chief's Corner

Charles R. Bowery Jr.

A Historic Transition: CMH Realignment to TRADOC

Under the leadership of Dr. Mark T. Esper, the twenty-third secretary of the Army, the Department of the Army began a series of management reforms in the spring of 2018, with the ultimate objectives of reducing the size of the headquarters, focusing the headquarters on policy and management, and empowering the Army Commands (ACOMs) to accomplish daily Army activities. These changes should allow for greater focus and more efficient execution of the secretary's enduring priorities of readiness, force modernization, and reform. At the beginning of this process, the ACOMs offered suggestions for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), activities and missions that they could assume. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recommended a realignment of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) from the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army to TRADOC. This is one of a number of realignments which will centralize responsibility for training and education programs within TRADOC.

In its more than one hundred years of existence, the Army's historical office has had different physical locations and chains of command, but its mission has remained the same. The Army's official historians, archivists, and museum professionals are custodians of our institutional memory and material culture. Army historians who teach in service schools create and sustain historical perspective and critical thinking skills across the force. Our distilled mission—to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve—encompasses those missions. However, CMH has long wrestled with the complexities of accomplishing related, but distinctly different, missions for the Army: providing historical support to HQDA, administering an Army-wide historical program, and fostering professional collaboration among *all* Army historians. Realignment to TRADOC will allow us to do all of this more effectively, through stewardship of an Army Historical Program that is more unified and collaborative, with enhanced relevance to the force.

The discipline of history, within and outside of the Army, has been under great strain for some time now. Undergraduate enrollment in history courses has been on the decline for several years, and within the Army, history instruction and the staffing of command historical offices have been steadily reduced. History of the Military Art, the two-semester sequence that has been a core academic requirement at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for decades, was recently cut in half, to one semester for all cadets (history majors take both semesters). At both West Point and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, core military history instruction has been focused on the twentieth century and after, neglecting the foundations of the American military experience and the genesis of the concept of civilian control of the military. With just three exceptions, Army operational units at division-level and above have eliminated or declined to fill their command historian positions as they deal with budget cuts and other restructuring actions. The evidence is undeniable: our historical mindedness as an institution is under threat. This situation makes the third of the missions above, while not specified in our regulations or policy, almost as important as the other two.

I believe that our entire Army should have a greater degree of historical literacy: a baseline familiarity with the themes, events, and personalities that form the bedrock of our communal consciousness. If you ask any current or former Marine, regardless of rank, about the historical touchpoints of their Corps, they will tell you about Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sanh, and Fallujah. Many will know about Presley O'Bannon, Archibald Henderson, Dan Daly, or Chesty Puller. We should expect the same conversance with history and heritage in our own ranks—Yorktown, Gettysburg, the Meuse-Argonne, the Bulge, Inchon, Dak To, and George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant,

Continued on page 51

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NEWS NOTES







CMH Volume Translated into Japanese

A 2006 Center of Military History (CMH) book, *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II*, by James C. McNaughton, has been translated into Japanese and published by the Sairyusha publishing house in July 2018. The Japanese edition, titled *Mou hitotsu no taiheiyōsensō: Beirikugun nikkei nisei no gogaku-hei to jōhō-in* (*Another Pacific War: U.S. Army Nisei Linguist Soldiers and Intelligence Staff*), was translated by Mr. Yukio Morita, a Japanese scholar who specializes in the Nisei experience during World War II. The translation will add to a growing body of Japanese-language scholarship on American Nisei soldiers and civilians. For thirty years, McNaughton served in several positions with the Army History Program before his retirement in 2017. He wrote much of the book while serving as command historian for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, California. He is also the author of *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (CMH Pub 70-121-1). His final assignment was as chief of the CMH Histories Directorate. CMH originally published *Nisei Linguists* as CMH Pub 70-99-1 (paper), and it is available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Call for Submissions: The Army and World War II in the Pacific

With the seventy-fifth anniversary of World War II upon us, *Army History* is specifically asking for article submissions covering any aspect of the U.S. Army in the Pacific Theater. In addition to the standing invitation for articles, the details of which appear in every issue of *Army History* in the Call for Submissions box, we are now looking for contributions that touch on the wide range of topics related to the Army in the Pacific. Our intention is to publish a few quality pieces in the Winter 2020 issue. Articles should be between approximately 4,000 and 8,000 words with endnotes. The use of primary sources is highly encouraged. It is recommended that authors adhere to the CMH Style Guide (https://history.army.mil/howto.html). Submissions should be in Microsoft Word format, double spaced, in Times New Roman 12-point font, and should be sent by 1 September 2019 to the following email address as an attachment, usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

1st Annual Conference on World War II

The 1st Annual Conference on World War II convenes at the Wyndham Hotel in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 8–10 November 2019. Cosponsored by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Society, this event will feature engaging presentations and discussions by several internationally recognized speakers. Dennis E. Showalter delivers the keynote address about the importance of World War II military history. James M. Scott, Craig L. Symonds, Cate Lineberry, Nigel Hamilton, Nina Willner, Stephen Harding, Flint Whitlock, Christopher L. Kolakowski, and Steven J. Zaloga address topics including D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, women in military intelligence and the medical services, Anzio, the campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1945, and Franklin D. Roosevelt at war. The registration fee of $225 (increasing to $250 after 1 October) includes all speaker events plus a cocktail reception and lunch. An additional private tour of the Eisenhower National Historic Site plus a large privately owned collection of tanks, equipment, and rare memorabilia is available for $110. Rooms at the Wyndham start at the special conference rate of $119. Register at americashistoryllc.com, email info@AmericasHistoryLLC.com, or phone 1-703-785-4373.

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"Is That the End or Do We Go On?"

The Battle of Kohima, 1944

By Christopher L. Kolakowski




Imperial War Museum

A Japanese roadblock on the Imphal-Kohima Road being dismantled by men of the West Yorkshire Regiment.

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Left to Right: General Kawabe, General Sakurai, General Mutaguchi, General Tanaka

thought in offensive terms for 1944. Lt. Gen. Kawabe Masakazu's *Burma Area Army* held the country with forces scattered along the major invasion routes. In southwest Burma stood Lt. Gen. Sakurai Shozo's *Twenty-Eighth Army* with the *54th, 55th,* and *2d Divisions*, the last having just recovered from a mauling at the Battle of Guadalcanal. In central Burma, the *Fifteenth Army* under Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya faced India with the *15th, 31st,* and *33d Divisions* supported by the division-sized *Indian National Army* (*INA*). The independent (and elite) *18th "Chrysanthemum" Division* under Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi opposed Stilwell, and Maj. Gen. Matsuyama Yuzo's *56th Division* held the Burma Road along the Burma-China border.[3]

Wingate's 1943 operation had inspired Mutaguchi about the feasibility of advancing across the mountains into India, specifically the border area around Imphal. Capturing Imphal and the surrounding area would eliminate a major British base in eastern India and hopefully cause restive elements of the Indian population to revolt against British rule in a larger version of 1942's Quit India Movement. Mutaguchi also recognized that a victorious invasion of India would enhance both his personal and Japan's national prestige, especially given the many reverses Japan suffered in the Pacific in 1943. In January 1944, Imperial General Headquarters sanctioned Mutaguchi's plans.[4]

The March on Delhi

Throughout February, Mutaguchi's forces made their final preparations for the advance into India. Although Tokyo portrayed the *Fifteenth Army*'s advance as a "March on Delhi," and Mutaguchi himself dreamed of conquering India, Kawabe's orders limited Mutaguchi to taking Imphal and the surrounding area. While the *15th* and *33d Divisions* and the *INA* attacked Imphal from three sides, Lt. Gen. Sato Kotoku's *31st Division* would secure the north flank by capturing Kohima. Significantly, the Japanese left the Allied base at Dimapur, forty-five miles west of Kohima and on the key Bengal and Assam Railway, off their list of objectives. This was a major omission, as taking Dimapur would sever the major transportation artery linking Allied forces in eastern India and strangle supplies for both Stilwell's forces and the airlift to China. The Allies did not know of this limitation and remained sensitive to any threat to Dimapur.[5]

On 6 March, the first of Mutaguchi's forces moved forward, with the rest following in stages over the next nine days. They faced 70,000 British troops around Imphal and the hamlets to the north, all under the command of Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Scoones' IV Corps. Scoones answered to the Fourteenth Army under then-General William Slim, who oversaw the entire front along the India-Burma border from the Bay of Bengal to Stilwell's advance in North Burma.

IV Corps stationed most of its strength south and east of Imphal, represented by the 17th, 20th, and 23d Indian Divisions with supporting units. Thirty miles northeast of Imphal at Ukhrul was the two-battalion 50th Parachute Brigade under Brig. M. R. J. Hope-Thomson, whereas twenty-five miles east of Kohima stood Lt. Col. William Felix "Bruno" Brown's 1st Assam Regiment, a locally recruited unit. The weight of Sato's advance would encounter these two units.[6]

Slim knew Mutaguchi's offensive was coming; he planned a phased withdrawal to Imphal to fight the decisive battle there. However, General Scoones was to decide the timing of the movement. The battle developed gradually, causing Scoones to order the withdrawal at a point almost too late. Moving with speed and ferocity, the Japanese soon pressed IV Corps back toward Imphal. South of town, the 17th Indian Division fought its way out of encirclement twice to reach Imphal. At the end of March, Japanese forces cut the Imphal-Kohima Road, isolating IV Corps.[7]

Meanwhile, the 15,000 men of Sato's *31st Division* slashed their way into India. The division formed three columns, centered on each of its three component regiments: *58th* on the left, *124th* in the center, and *138th* on the right. Their advance crossed several parallel mountain ranges, each over 5,000 feet in elevation. "In general, the advance of the Division was relatively smooth," noted a staff report, "but the transportation of supplies through the rugged mountain ranges was extremely difficult . . . The men also suffered from exhaustion and malnutrition."[8]

Sato's left column brushed up against Hope-Thomson's paratroopers at Sangshak, near Ukhrul. Although outside his zone of operations, the column commander, Maj. Gen. Miyazaki Shigesaburo, diverted southward and attacked Sangshak on 22 March. Over four days the Japanese stormed successive hill positions as the paratroopers

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


Left to Right: General Sato, General Scoones, General Slim, Lieutenant Young

eld on tenaciously. On the morning of 27 March, Hope-Thomson's men cut their way ut to Imphal. The battle cost the Japanese 00 casualties and 5 precious days.[9]

Further north, the Japanese *138th Regiment* encountered Brown's Assam Regiment. he main body held Jessami with Lt. John Jock" Young's A Company defending an utpost at Kharasom. Brown and Young had rders to fight "to the last man and the last ound." Both places received attacks on 26 March, and over the next five days both units eld their own. But they had lost communiation with Kohima, and recall orders could ot be issued. A U.S. colonel flew a Piper ub to airdrop orders, which Brown finally eceived on 31 March; he pulled back 1 April. oung never got the message, but on his wn ordered his men out. "I shall be the last an," he declared, and with difficulty got is company moving toward Kohima. No ne ever saw Young alive again, nor was his ody identified. But these sacrifices were not vain—they delayed the Japanese advance nother five critical days.[10]

Slim well understood the importance of iese developments. A captured Japanese rder from Sangshak confirmed his worst ars. "Within a week of the start of the panese offensive," he recalled, "it became ear that the situation in the Kohima area as likely to be even more dangerous than at at Imphal. Not only were the enemy olumns closing in on Kohima at much eater speed than I had expected, but they ere obviously in much greater strength." im had expected a strike toward Kohima a Japanese regiment, but the entire *st Division* was on its way. "We were



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Left to Right: General Giffard, Brigadier Warren, General Grover

not prepared for so heavy a thrust," Slim admitted. "Kohima with its rather scratch garrison and, what was worse, Dimapur with no garrison at all, were in deadly peril."[11]

Slim needed reinforcements in a hurry. He asked his superiors, General Sir George Giffard of 11th Army Group and Supreme Commander of Southeast Asia Command Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, for air transport. Mountbatten directed thirty U.S. aircraft be diverted from ferrying supplies to China to fly the 5th Indian Division into Imphal from the Arakan. In one of the first strategic air movements of its type, two brigades and the divisional troops flew into Imphal over seven days, 19–26 March. The division's third brigade, Brig. D. F. W. Warren's 161st, had been diverted to Dimapur and Kohima, and arrived in late March to assist the defense. Lt. Gen. Montagu G. N. Stopford's 33 Corps Headquarters and Maj. Gen. John M. L. Grover's 2d British Division, both training in southern India, also started for Dimapur.[12]

At Stilwell's request, Allied commanders met at Jorhat on 3 April to discuss the situation. Stilwell offered Slim the elite Chinese 38th Division to help hold Dimapur and the railroad. Stilwell warned, "it would mean stopping his advance, probably withdrawing, and certainly not getting Myitkyina before the monsoon," recalled Slim. "I was sure this was Stilwell's great opportunity. I, therefore, told him to retain the 38th Division . . . and to push on to Myitkyina as hard as he could go."[13]

Stopford arrived on the scene 23 March, although his headquarters did not formally open until 3 April. Slim gave him several missions, starting with protecting Dimapur and the railroad. Once done, his corps was to reopen the road to Imphal. Grover's division was on the way, but for the moment Stopford's only field force was Warren's brigade, just arriving at Kohima. Stopford felt that even though holding Kohima was of major importance, Dimapur was the more critical position to defend. Despite protests from local commanders, the 161st received orders to retrace its steps to Dimapur. On 31 March, Warren's men retired to Nichugard Pass, ten miles east of Dimapur. Over the next days, elements of the 2d British Division arrived on the scene to reinforce the Dimapur defenses. On 4 April, the 161st Brigade was ordered back to Kohima.[14]

Warren's men promptly got back on the road. By the time his lead battalion, the 450 men of Lt. Col. John Laverty's 4 Royal West Kent (4 RWK), reached Kohima, the siege was underway.

Kohima Phase I: Siege

Kohima town sits at a pass that provides the vital link between Imphal and the interior of India. The town and its namesake ridge sit along and astride the key Imphal-Dimapur Road, and several other tracks into the hills all intersect at Kohima. The area has traditionally been a communication route between Burma and India, and had been the scene of fighting in the 1870s.

Kohima Ridge is really a series of hills running north-south along the road to Imphal. Gently sloping saddles connect each feature. Since development as a supply base a year earlier, some of its various hills had become known by their function. From south to north, they were GPT (General Purpose Transport) Ridge, Jail Hill, DIS (Detail Issue Store), FSD (Field Supply Depot), Kuki Picquet, and Garrison Hill. A northwest extension of Garrison Hill housed a hospital and became known as IGH (Indian General Hospital) Spur. Thick woods, interspersed with the town's and base's structures, covered most of these hills. Garrison Hill was terraced and landscaped, and included the home (complete with clubhouse and tennis court) of the deputy commissioner for the area, Charles Pawsey. The Imphal-Dimapur Road skirted the ridge to the east before turning west past Garrison Hill. Treasury Hill and a Naga Village settlement overlooked the ridge from the northeast; those heights also extended north to the hamlet of Merema. Southward loomed the imposing Pulebadze Mountain, whereas three miles to the west rose a knoll topped by the village of Jotsoma. Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast.[15]

On 22 March, Col. Hugh Richards arrived from Delhi to take command of the garrison at Kohima. He faced the daunting problem of organizing a defense with limited combat troops and constantly changing forces. Richards quickly determined to concentrate his limited forces on Kohima Ridge itself. He sent away most of the logistical troops, evacuated the hospitals, and organized the men in the replacement depot into platoons

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o be assigned to combat units. Richards vas the one who recalled the Assam Regiment, and protested Warren's withdrawal o Dimapur. He also unsuccessfully sought o keep a battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment that had orders for Imphal.[16]


One advantage Richards enjoyed was the oyalty of the local Naga people. Throughout he battle they assisted the British as guides, orters, and spies. Pawsey had spent years mong them as Deputy Commissioner, and id not want to abandon what he regarded s his people. He also understood that if he eft, the British would lose face forever. The Nagas recognized his importance; "Charles awsey," affirmed one, "was one of the reasons he Nagas remained loyal to the British . . . His action at a critical time improved the mage for the British administration." Pawsey emained at Richards' side through the attle. Thanks to intelligence from the Nagas, Richards could track the Japanese approach.[17]

Sato planned a two-pronged advance on Kohima. Miyazaki and the *58th* would drive straight up the Imphal road, while the *138th* secured the Naga Village and swung around behind Kohima to cut the road to Dimapur. The *124th* would be in reserve.[18]

On 3 April, Brown brought the Assam Regiment into the perimeter. Of 500 men who started the campaign, 280 remained, but they were a welcome reinforcement. The next day, Richards' outposts made first contact with the Japanese. The West Kent, plus a company from 4th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment, arrived with artillery in the late afternoon of 5 April before the Japanese closed the road west after sundown. This left Richards with 2,500 men, 1,000 of which were noncombatants. The garrison's combat strength centered on 4 RWK, assisted by the Assam Regiment, five detached companies of Indian infantry, a battalion of the paramilitary Assam



A sketch of Colonel Richards drawn during the siege by then-Major Charles Borrowman




Rifles, and the half-trained Nepalese Shere Regiment. There was plenty of ammunition and food to last for weeks, although water was short.[19]

Warren led the rest of his troops forward and found Japanese shellfire already striking around Garrison Hill. He quickly realized his entire brigade could not fit into the perimeter; he took position at Jotsoma and formed an all-around defense. His artillery would assist the defense of both Jotsoma and Kohima.[20]

Kohima faced its first test on the evening of 5 April, as Miyazaki's men attacked GPT Ridge and Jail Hill. The latter held out, whereas the troops defending the former gave way and retired toward Dimapur. The Japanese swung east and repeatedly attacked Jail Hill on the 6th, forcing its evacuation. That night, a company of 4 RWK wiped out a Japanese penetration into the structures between FSD and DIS; an exploding ammunition dump flushed many Japanese into the open where the British gunned them down. Daylight on 7 April revealed forty-four Japanese bodies in the defile between the hills. Other Japanese had sheltered in the tandoor ovens of a bakery, and L. Cpl. John P. Harman went in with grenades, dropping one into each oven. Two men, including an officer, survived and Harman captured them. He carried them back to British lines over his shoulder like logs. The British found the officer had a map of Japanese artillery positions around Kohima. "This is even worse than Sangshak," some of the

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Japanese prisoners complained, surprised at the defense's steadfastness.[21]


After forty-eight hours, the pattern of the siege grew apparent. The Japanese would fire furiously at dusk in what the defenders called the "evening hate." Repeated night attacks denied anything but the most fitful sleep, whereas during the day, snipers, machine guns, artillery, and mortars harassed Kohima's defenders. British artillery from Jotsoma, aided by spotters in Kohima's perimeter, engaged the enemy as needed. The loss of GPT also meant the loss of most of the garrison's water access except for a small spring on Garrison Hill; Richards' had to limit his defenders to one pint of water per man per day.

Japanese attention next shifted to Garrison Hill, as elements of two Japanese battalions attacked up the terraced slopes from the Naga Village against the reinforced company holding the terraces. Mortar fire blanketed the British positions as the Japanese pressed upward. Indian Bren gunners defended to the last as the tide washed over them. Pawsey's residence fell, and the defenders, reinforced by A Company of the West Kent, took position at the tennis court. Supporting fire came from the clubhouse, with a pool table and other furniture providing platforms for the Brens. There the Japanese surge stopped, leaving the width of the tennis court between the two sides. These lines would not move for weeks.[22]

Farther south, the Japanese had placed a machine gun overlooking DIS that threatened to make the British position untenable. In broad daylight, Harman single-handedly attacked the position and killed the crew. He hoisted the gun over his shoulder and started back to the lines, seemingly unconcerned about the danger. A heretofore hidden Japanese machine gun shot him dead. This action, plus the one at the bakery the day before, earned Harman a posthumous Victoria Cross.[23]

Meanwhile, Grover's 2d Division struggled to open the road. On 8 April, Sato's *138th Regiment* had reached Zubza, thirty-two miles from Dimapur, and set up several defended roadblocks in the ten miles between Zubza and Jotsoma. Warren tried to break out westward, but found the defenses too strong; he also needed to defend his artillery position. Grover's British troops would have to fight their way in.

Despite Stopford's urging to take risks, Grover was torn between the imperative of relieving Kohima or protecting the road to Dimapur with only two of his three brigades on the scene. He posted Brig. J. D. Shapland's 6th Brigade along the road and sent his lead brigade, the 5th under Brig. Victor Hawkins, forward. With tank support from


Courtesy of the Kohima Museum

Corporal Harman

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The view looking east, with Jail Hill in the center and the main road running round it. Treasury Hill and Assam Rifles Barracks are slightly left and the Naga Village is in the extreme top left

M3 Grants, the infantry slowly advanced toward Jotsoma.[24]

Richards and Laverty tracked these movements via the 4 RWK's headquarters' radio link to Warren. Laverty was somewhat jealous of his prerogatives regarding his battalion, and maintained control of this connection to the outside throughout the siege. This tension between the two senior officers did not matter much, as Capt. Tom Coates of the West Kent explained. "The siege was primarily a privates' battle," he recalled, "and our success was due mainly to the very high morale and steadiness of the NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and men."[25]

The garrison weathered more attacks over the next four days. Despite the enemy's best efforts to break through, the lines held. But casualties mounted, and it forced Richards to abandon DIS. Meanwhile, more wounded crowded into IGH Spur, filling the area behind the sector held by Brown's Assam Regiment. There, doctors led by the indefatigable Lt. Col. John Young, did what they could despite enemy activity and scarce water. Medical supplies were running low, and Japanese shelling made the situation at the hospital worse. Aircraft had dropped some water canisters to the garrison with mixed success, but the wounded needed more than water. Young appealed to Richards, who on the evening of 12 April asked for an airdrop of medical supplies, to which Laverty added mortar ammunition and grenades.[26]

That night, the garrison repelled another attack. On the morning of 13 April, the Japanese deliberately shelled IGH Spur, inflicting over fifty casualties on already wounded men and killing three doctors. In the afternoon, the drumming of aircraft engines could be heard from the west. Three U.S. C-47s appeared and came in low over the ridge. They parachuted water and the requested supplies, but almost all of it drifted into the Japanese lines. The Japanese used some captured mortars to shell Kohima's defenders with the airdropped rounds. A little later, Royal Air Force (RAF) transports successfully dropped ammunition and medical supplies to the garrison, but the ammunition had been meant for the artillery at Jotsoma and was the wrong caliber for any of Kohima's guns.

These developments, plus the weeklong strain of constant siege, sapped the garrison's morale. The 4 RWK war diary called this day "The Black Thirteenth." Richards sensed the mood and issued an order of the day. "The relief force is on its way," Richards told his men, "and all that is necessary for the Garrison now is to stand firm, hold its fire and beat off any attempt to infiltrate among us. By your acts you have shown what you can do . . . I congratulate you on your magnificent effort and am confident that it will be sustained."[27]

That night, the Japanese attacked the garrison from north and south. They got within the trenches on FSD, held by two



View of the Garrison Hill battlefield

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Men of the West Yorkshire Regiment clear a roadblock on the Imphal-Kohima Road.

understrength 4 RWK companies. In close-quarters combat, which in one case involved a man strangling a Japanese officer with his bare hands, the defenders drove off the attackers. At the tennis court, B Company of the 4 RWK endured repeated attacks. A Bren gun jammed, and some Japanese rushed the position; the gunner died but another soldier beat off the attackers with a shovel. The Assam Regiment reinforced the sector the next day.

For Kohima's defenders, the next few days were blurs of shelling, sniping, and attacks from Japanese troops. Artillery from Jotsoma and RAF Hurricane fighter-bombers lent their firepower to the defense when possible. Thirst increased despite rain coming on 14 April, as there were few facilities to catch the water. Blasted trees no longer gave shelter from the weather or concealment from the enemy, and many snared supply parachutes. But the garrison stood firm because of the sights and sounds to the west.[28]

As Kohima endured, Hawkins' brigade fought to open the road. Rain slowed operations and limited the use of tanks. On the 14th, Warren promised Laverty and Richards: "I'm doing my best, but intend to make a proper job of it." Late that day, Hawkins launched an attack on the last position between his men and Jotsoma; it fell the next morning. At 1100 on 15 April the 5th Brigade and 161st Brigade joined hands.[29]

Warren signaled this news to Kohima, and promised relief on the 16th. He sent 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment (1/1 Punjab) attacking eastward with some success. But Grover arrived in the afternoon and postponed the final relief attack for one day, citing lack of "time for recce [reconnaissance] . . . and lack of adequate provision for the security of the right flank of the brigade." Warren regarded those as acceptable risks in view of the garrison's condition, but had to acquiesce to the postponement. The British defeated the Japanese attacks on the road on 16 April, but the threat of being cut off remained. Despite only a mile or so remaining to Garrison Hill, on the morning of 17 April, Warren postponed his relief effort yet another day.[30]

The garrison's morale wavered at these repeated delays of rescue. Grim jokes about help never arriving circulated among the soldiers, and both officers and men began to lose confidence they would get out of Kohima alive. In the hospital, wounded officers asked for their sidearms back—they wanted a quick end when the Japanese came.[31]

On the night of 17 April, the Japanese preceded a mass charge against FSD with heavy artillery fire. The exhausted defenders reeled backward and were pushed off both FSD and Kuki Piquet by the early hours of 18 April. "We couldn't do a thing sir," reported a West Kent soldier to an officer on Garrison Hill. "The Japs were simply all over us."

This defeat left Richards and his garrison with a perimeter roughly 350 yards wide by 350 yards deep, centered on Garrison Hill. There was no further retreat possible; it was do or die. Every man who could, including the wounded and Richards himself, took a weapon and went to the line. The defenders peered into the darkness and braced for an assault. Dawn would save them, but hours of darkness remained.

As they waited, a young soldier turned to Richards. "Sir, can I ask you a question?"

"Of course," Richards replied. "What is it?"

"When we die, sir, is that the end or do we go on?"[32]



The tennis court and terraces of Pawsey's residence in Kohima

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British troops advance along the Imphal-Kohima road behind M3 medium tanks, c. June 1944.

Kohima Phase II: Fightback

Dawn broke on 18 April without a Japanese attack. Instead, British artillery and air strikes hammered Japanese positions in the surrounding hills. The garrison saw tanks and infantry advancing from the west. The relief force cleared a roadblock at mile marker forty-five, then clawed its way east toward Garrison Hill. Shortly before noon, the infantry, 1/1 Punjab of Warren's brigade, reached IGH. The siege had been broken.[33]

Immediately after the linkup, Young began evacuating the wounded into waiting trucks, which sped them to Dimapur. Over the next two days, fresh troops from Shapland's 6th Brigade replaced Kohima's weary and exhausted defenders. The Japanese made half-hearted attempts to attack, but the relief went on without interruption. Richards finally left on 20 April after handing over command to Shapland himself.[34]

Garrison Hill's appearance shocked Shapland's troops. "The place stank," recalled Maj. John Nettlefield. "The ground everywhere was ploughed up with shell-fire and human remains lay rotting as the battle raged over them. . . . Men retched as they dug in." The amount of wreckage impressed others. "It was possible to pick up anything from a Tommy-gun to a pair of ladies' shoes," noted Lt. Col. Wilbur Bickford, commanding the 1st Royal Berkshire. "The place was a veritable paradise for flies."[35]

Kohima's relief came at a bad time for Sato. Not only had he failed to fully capture Kohima Ridge, he now received orders from Mutaguchi to detach three battalions of infantry and one of artillery under Miyazaki to Imphal, where Mutaguchi planned to use them to break into IV Corps' perimeter from the north. Sato assembled the force, two battalions of the *124th*, one of the *138th*, and *3d Battalion* of the *31st Mountain Regiment*, south of Pulebadze near the village of Aradura. Meanwhile, the rest of the *138th* and *124th*, bloodied in battles along the road, fell back to defensive positions at Merema and Kohima. The *58th* held its ground on Kohima Ridge, and Sato decided to use its ebbing strength to attack Garrison Hill one more time.[36]

General Grover also took this time to deploy his division and decide his next move. Captured documents revealed both Mutaguchi's orders for the detachment and Sato's plans to comply. Prodded by Slim and Stopford, who were in turn pushed by messages from Washington and London, Grover decided to attack with his entire division. Hawkins would move to Merema and then south of Kohima, while Shapland would attack from Garrison Hill outward. Brig. Willie Goschen's 4th Brigade (minus one battalion remaining to protect the road) would march from Jotsoma to Pulebadze in an effort to flank Sato's troops to the south. Warren's tired force would help protect the road to Dimapur.[37]

Sato's men attacked Garrison Hill, now held by the 1st Royal Berkshire and 2d Durham Light Infantry (DLI), on 23 April. The Royal Berkshire at the tennis court held firm, and the DLI fought a back-and-forth action that ended with the defenders back in their positions after hours of heavy fighting. For the Japanese, the fighting had wiped out nearly four of the seven attacking companies, and those losses were irreplaceable. Sato realized that if he detached the forces Mutaguchi wanted, his division would likely be unable to hold its positions around Kohima, which was essential to preventing Imphal's relief. He cancelled Miyazaki's marching orders and ordered all of his units to the defensive.[38]

Meanwhile, Grover's brigades moved forward. After trying and failing to get tanks up the back side of Garrison Hill, Shapland's infantry secured positions overlooking the intersection below Pawsey's house. Although the Japanese still held the terrace itself, tanks could now round the bend and come up Pawsey's driveway—although not immediately as it took several days under fire for engineers to regrade a curve in the driveway to fit a Grant tank. Farther north, Hawkins' brigade reached Merema and probed southward toward the Naga Village. To the south, Goschen's infantrymen encountered little opposition but the terrain slowed their pace to a crawl. "It was a case of up one steep khud [ridge] and down the other side, then up a steeper and down again," recalled an officer. "To anyone who hasn't soldiered in Assam the physical hammering one takes is difficult to understand. The heat, the humidity, the altitude, and the slope of almost every foot of ground, combine to knock hell out of the stoutest constitution." Rain, intermittent to this point, started in earnest on 28 April; it rained at least once every day for the rest of the battle.[39]

Grover had expected to have cleared Kohima by 30 April, but the slow pace of operations forced him to recast his plans. On 4 May, the earliest 4th Brigade could be ready, he sent his entire division forward. During the night, Hawkins' 5th Brigade, every man wearing gym shoes, infiltrated the Naga Village and occupied the northwest portion early on 5 May. The brigade repelled repeated ferocious counterattacks. In the center, Shapland's infantry failed to dislodge Kuki Picquet's defenders although the DLI managed to get atop FSD for a short time. Supported by tanks and elements of Warren's brigade, a renewed attack cleared all but the eastern slopes of Kuki Picquet and FSD by dusk on 7 May.

Farther south, Goschen's men ran into the *124th Infantry*, having been sent by Sato to GPT to prevent just such a flanking move. The 2d Royal Norfolk, in the lead of

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Courtesy of the Kohima Museum

Captain Randle


Imperial War Museum

General Messervy

the column, encountered several Japanese bunkers whose fire held up the advance. Capt. John Niel Randle, in command of the battalion's B Company despite wounds, attacked and destroyed a bunker, using his dying body to block the embrasure so his company could advance. He received a posthumous Victoria Cross, the second of two awarded at Kohima. By 7 May, GPT's crest was in British hands.[40]

At this point, Grover's advance paused as other units joined the action. To the east, 23d Brigade of the Chindits advanced into Sato's rear. To Kohima came the independent 268th Lorried Infantry Brigade to relieve some of Grover's units for a short rest. Maj. Gen. Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division headquarters, the division artillery, and the 33d and 114th Indian Infantry Brigades also began arriving on the scene. The 33d Brigade reinforced the area around FSD.[41]

Sato, on the other hand, had received nothing in the way of supplies or replacements for his mounting casualties. Several of his infantry units had sustained fifty percent or greater losses, and all of his men were starving to some degree. By mid-May "only a small amount of ammunition remained, reserves of provisions as well as forage were dangerously low, and local stocks of food were practically exhausted," noted a staff report. "The Division was, in fact, rapidly losing its offensive ability."[42]

After a period of regrouping, on 11 May the British attacked all along the line. They cleared the tennis court and all of Kohima Ridge in three days of heavy fighting. Hawkins fell wounded as his brigade fought against dogged resistance to advance in the Naga Village. Gurkhas of 33d Brigade stormed Jail Hill and cleared it by 14 May. Parts of Messervy's 7th Indian Division attacked the Naga Village the following week, and by 26 May virtually all of the Japanese positions in and around Kohima had been captured. Stopford could now turn his divisions southward to exploit the victory and open the road to Imphal.[43]

Sato understood what these developments meant. His division had suffered losses that made it a shadow of its former self. The monsoon was starting, and his tenuous overland communications became more fragile by the day. On 25 May, he signaled Mutaguchi his intention to withdraw unless supplies arrived within days. None came, so on 31 May, Sato ordered his men to leave Kohima. Most would go east, with a battalion-sized group under Miyazaki to fight a delaying action along the road to Imphal. "Retreat and I will court-martial you," radioed Mutaguchi when informed of these orders. "Do as you please," Sato shot back. "I will bring you down with me."[44]

Pursuit

On 2 June, Sato's headquarters and infantry abandoned the Naga Village. After a sharp fight in the Aradura area, Miyazaki's men retired southward toward Imphal on 5 June. The British detected the slackening of Japanese resistance, and Stopford urged his two division commanders, Grover and Messervy, to press the attack. Messervy moved his division east and southeast toward Jessami and Ukhrul, while Grover directed his men south along the Imphal Road. The IV Corps position was seventy-five miles away.[45]

"As the advance progressed, the magnitude of the Japanese defeat began to be realized," recalled Brig. M. R. Roberts, whose 114th Brigade led the 7th Indian Division's advance. "Arms, equipment, and guns were found abandoned along the track in increasing quantities." Sato's retreat was becoming a rout.[46]

Messervy's men found worse as they penetrated deeper into Sato's rear areas. "In their cautious progress, the brigade passed through and around deserted camps of leafy huts, concealed strongpoints, living accommodation for thousands," recalled an officer of the division artillery. "Unburied dead lay everywhere, many untouched, some fat and well-looking, others emaciated, filthy skeletons. Typhus, that scourge of armies, had done its work . . . Naga tribesmen started bringing in Japanese prisoners too sick to move, filthy skeletons, raving, weeping and gibbering in their madness, the ultimate resistance of their minds broken by the unspeakable hardships to which their bodies had been subjected."[47]

Meanwhile, Grover's 2d Division started southward toward Imphal. Miyazaki's men took up bridges, laid mines, and set up roadblocks on the narrow and twisty road, but the British kept a close pursuit. The Japanese stood at the villages of Viswema and Mao Songsang, where the road narrowed between heights to the west and a deep valley to the east. Both times British infantry flanked the Japanese position and forced a retreat. Grover alternated brigades to always keep a fresh unit at the front of the pursuit.[48]

By 18 June, the 2d Division stood just north of Maram, at mile marker eighty on the road and forty miles from Imphal. There, Miyazaki had organized a roadblock he thought could hold for ten days. The 5th Brigade attacked down the road under cover of smoke and air strikes, while a bulldozer followed behind to clear the block. The position fell within hours, and the Japanese fled eastward. The 4th Brigade passed through and advanced another eight miles before overrunning the *15th Division*'s headquarters. The 6th Brigade next took up the advance.

On 22 June at 1030, the DLI met advance elements of 5th Indian Division at mile marker 109 in Kangpokpi. After eighty-five days of isolation, IV Corps at Imphal again had land communication with the outside world. That night, a truck convoy drove from Kohima to Imphal with headlights blazing.[49]

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An M3 medium tank at Kohima in June 1944

Imphal's relief signaled the final failure f Mutaguchi's invasion. In early July, he ccepted defeat and ordered his battered orces back to Burma. "All hope of capturing mphal or Palel was now gone," stated a staff eport, "and the *Fifteenth Army* realized would be fortunate if it could extricate self from its extremely hazardous position ithout greater losses." Within a month of mphal's relief, the troops of *Fifteenth Army* ad almost completely abandoned India. he dream of a March on Delhi was gone.[50]

ONCLUSION

he Battle of Kohima proper lasted two onths, from 5 April to 5 June 1944. In the vo months of combat, the British lost 4,064 asualties. Richards' garrison contributed 1 to this total, whereas the 161st Brigade st 462—a combined approximate total one in three. Grover's 15,000-man 2d ivision lost 2,125 men around Kohima, d Messervy's division lost 623 of 12,000 three weeks of battle and one month of rsuit. As for the Japanese, Sato took 15,000 en into India; 6,264 were killed, wounded, died of disease. Another 2,800 required mediate hospitalization upon returning Burma, leaving only 5,936 men fit for ty at the end.[51]

Kohima also cost the two principal vision commanders their jobs. On 4 July, opford, increasingly dissatisfied with over's methods, relieved the 2d Division mmander and sent him home to Britain. e next day, the Japanese removed Sato m command of the *31st Division*; "I do t intend to be censured by anyone," Sato announced to his staff. "Our *31st Division* has done its duty." After several months of staff duty in Burma, officials sent him home on a medical furlough and he saw no further active service.[52]

Kohima was the high-water mark of Japanese fortunes in Southeast Asia. Sato's retreat started a yearlong rollback of the Japanese front line that ended with the liberation of Rangoon in May 1945. Never again would the Japanese wield the initiative in Southeast Asia as they did during the thrust into India.

Had Richards' gallant defenders been overrun, the Japanese could have blocked any attempt to relieve Imphal for some time, perhaps permanently. They also would have threatened Dimapur and its railway, and certainly been in a position to block the line with detachments. This hazard alone would have affected the supplies going to Stilwell and China. Less supplies on the railroad would have slowed or stopped air operations in China, and the pace of Stilwell's campaign against Myitkyina. Victory in Kohima ensured that these things did not happen.

Today, Britain remembers Kohima, along with Imphal, as one of its greatest battles of all time. The Kohima Museum in York, England recalls the battle and the 2d Division. Japan recognizes Imphal-Kohima as one of its worst defeats, but also one of its larger battles; each year Japanese tourists come to visit the battlefields and often hunt for the remains of relatives lost in the invasion. India has somewhat belatedly recognized the importance of these engagements, and local preservation and tourism efforts are underway to promote their importance.

Garrison Hill now lies in the middle of Kohima, which has grown to engulf most of the 1944 battlefield. The area around the Pawsey residence is now the Kohima War Cemetery, maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. The terraces remain, and now hold 1,421 graves of those who fought on and around that hill. The battle's 917 Hindu dead, since cremated, are also remembered. Stones also mark the precise location of the famous tennis court, which is next to the cemetery's Cross of Remembrance. It is a focal point of visits to the cemetery and the battlefield.

At Garrison Hill's base is a monument to the 2d Division, made of stone from a nearby quarry. It contains an inscription by John Maxwell Edmonds that today is known as the Kohima Epitaph. It charges the viewer and offers a timeless reminder:

When you go home
Tell them of us and say
For your tomorrow
We gave our today

Author's Note

The author thanks Yaiphaba Kangjam, Lowrie Tucker, and Rob Palmer for their research assistance. This article is dedicated to the Royal Norfolk Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and 86 Battery Royal Artillery—all units at Kohima to which the author has ancestral ties—and their comrades, some of whom never came home.

Place names used in this article are as they stood in 1944. Japanese names are provided surname first.

About the Author

Christopher L. Kolakowski is the director of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia. He received his bachelor's degree in history and mass communications from Emory & Henry College and his master's degree in public history from the State University of New York at Albany. Kolakowski has worked with the National Park Service, the New York State government, the Rensselaer County Historical Society, the Civil War Preservation Trust, Kentucky State Parks, and the U.S. Army. He is the author of *The Civil War at Perryville: Battling for the Bluegrass* (Charleston, S.C., 2009); *The Stones River and Tullahoma Campaign: This Army Does Not Retreat* (Charleston, S.C., 2011); *Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941–May 1942* (Jefferson, N.C., 2016); *The Virginia*

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Campaigns, March–August 1862 (Washington, D.C., 2016)—a pamphlet in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Campaigns of the Civil War series—and "The Coming of Modern War: The Coalition War in Burma, 1944" which appeared in the Spring 2018 issue of *Army History*. He is currently working on a book about the 1944 India-Burma Campaigns which is scheduled for release in 2020.

NOTES

1. Arthur Swinson, *The Battle of Kohima* (New York: Stein and Day, 1967), p. xiii; William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Cassell, 1961), p. 317. The original edition was published in 1956 while Slim was Governor-General of Australia.

2. Excellent popular histories of the Burma operations in World War II are Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War, 1941–45* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) and Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–45* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). For official accounts, see Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan* Volumes I–V (London: H. M. Stationary Office 1957–69; Naval & Military Press reprint, 2004); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1955); and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1958).

3. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 71–81. The *54th* and *2d Divisions* arrived in Burma in stages throughout the first months of 1944. General Mutaguchi had commanded the *18th Division* until being promoted to command of the *Fifteenth Army*. In April 1944, the *18th* and *56th Divisions* came under the newly created *Thirty-Third Army*.

4. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 75–81. See also A. J. Barker, *The March on Delhi* (Dehra Dun: Natraj, 1990).

5. Allen, *Burma*, pp. 150–155; 188–190; Barker, *March on Delhi*, p. 15–16.

6. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 202–04, including Sketch 6.

7. Barker, *March on Delhi*, pp. 93–130. The 17th Indian Division's nickname was the "Black Cats;" during the withdrawal they successfully fended off the *33d Division*, nicknamed "White Tigers."

8. Yamaguchi Jiso, *Burma Operations Record: 15th Army Operations in Imphal Area and Withdrawal to Northern Burma* (Tokyo: U.S. Army-Japan, 1952), pp. 88–90, 118. Hereafter cited as BOR. The *31st Division* was based on the *Kawaguchi Detachment* as a cadre. The *124th Infantry* had previously fought at Guadalcanal.

9. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 236–38.

10. A searing account of these fights is in C. E. Lucas Phillips, *Springboard to Victory* (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 79–90.

11. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, p. 305.

12. Barker, *March on Delhi*, pp. 120–25. See also Kirby, *War Against Japan*, Appendixes 25 and 26, for details and statistics related to air transport operations in Burma and India from February through August 1944. The 5th Indian Division had no airborne training, and many of its men had never flown before.

13. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, pp. 271–73.

14. Lucas Phillips, *Springboard to Victory*, pp. 91–117; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, pp. 311–13.

15. Personal visit, 19–21 September 2018; see also Bisheshwar Prasad, *The Reconquest of Burma, June 1942–June 1944*, Vol. I, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 1958, reprint 2014), pp. 272–74.

16. Ibid.

17. An excellent source on the Naga experience is Charles Chasie and Harry Fecitt, *The Road to Kohima: The Naga Experience in the 2nd World War* (Tromsø, Norway: Barkweaver 2017), passim. The quote comes from p. 83.

18. BOR, pp. 119–23.

19. A detailed order of battle of the Kohima garrison is in Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, p. 416.

20. Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, p. 276.

21. Ibid, p. 277; Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 66–67.

22. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 301–02; Lucas Phillips, *Springboard to Victory*, pp. 160–65.

23. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 70–71. Harman is buried in the Kohima War Cemetery.

24. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, p. 305; see also Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 76–87.

25. Lucas Phillips, *Springboard to Victory*, p. 119.

26. Ibid, pp. 182–84; see also Kirby, *War Against Japan*, p. 301.

27. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 81–84; see also Lucas-Phillips, *Springboard to Victory*, pp. 185–95.

28. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 81–84; see also Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 304–05.

29. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 87–91.

30. Ibid.

31. Allen, *Burma*, pp. 236–38.

32. This and preceding paragraphs are based on Lucas Phillips, *Springboard to Victory*, pp. 211–214. Colonel Richards related this exchange to Lucas Phillips.

33. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 297–312; Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 95–96.

34. Ibid.

35. Quoted in Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 102–03.

36. BOR, pp. 123–25. Some accounts say Mutaguchi's order arrived 17 April; this source says "about 19 April."

37. Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 286–89.

38. BOR, pp. 124–25; Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 111–14.

39. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 114–31; see also Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 335–39; and Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 288–91.

40. Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 291–95; Kirby, *War Against Japan*, pp. 335–39. Brigadier Goschen died in this action. Randle is buried in the Kohima War Cemetery.

41. M. R. Roberts, *Golden Arrow: The Story of the 7th Indian Division* (East Sussex: Naval & Military Press 2014 [reprint of 1946 original]), pp. 121–136. Roberts commanded 114th Brigade at Kohima. Messervy commanded British 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions in North Africa 1941–42; he later became the first Commander in Chief of the new Pakistan Army.

42. BOR, p. 139.

43. Ibid, pp. 139–42; Roberts, *Golden Arrow*, pp. 121–36; Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 294–300. This offensive opened the same day as Operation DIADEM against Cassino in Italy, the attack that led to Rome's liberation on 4 June 1944. In some bunkers on GPT, the Royal Norfolks found regimental cap badges of an early-war design; they had been taken from members of the regiment's 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions who had surrendered at Singapore in 1942. The author had a relative in 6th Royal Norfolks who survived captivity.

44. Quoted in Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, p. 230; see also BOR, pp. 142–43.

45. Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 300–10; Roberts, *Golden Arrow*, pp. 137–38.

46. Roberts, *Golden Arrow*, p. 137.

47. Quoted in Roberts, *Golden Arrow*, pp. 144, 146.

48. The best summary of this pursuit is Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, pp. 305–10.

49. Ibid.

50. BOR, p. 154.


51. British losses come from Kirby, *War Against Japan*, p. 526; Japanese losses are from BOR, p. 164. Prasad gives slightly different numbers for Sato's division—20,000 in strength and 13,000 casualties of all types, drawn from a report to Southeast Asia Command at the end of the war. Regardless of the numbers used, 31st Division was shattered at Kohima.

52. Swinson, *Battle of Kohima*, pp. 244–53.


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
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




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German Howitzer Installed in World War I Tableau

By Paul Morando

Over the last quarter, exhibit construction has greatly increased at the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), as we install key elements.

Recently, workers carefully placed a German 10.5-cm. light field howitzer in the World War I immersion tableau inside the *Nation Overseas Gallery*. The howitzer was a standard weapon used by Germany during the First World War. It fired a shell weighing around thirty-two pounds and had a maximum range of over 10,000 yards.

The overall scene will depict a battle-ridden landscape from the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in 1918, along with five cast figures representing American soldiers from the 140th Infantry, 35th Division, as they assault a German machine gun position.

Exhibitors will construct the ground form of the tableau using historical references and images to accurately capture the look and feel of the battlefield. The fighting took place on part of the overgrown Verdun 1916 battlefield and the harsh terrain consisted of eroded craters, pieces of barbed wire, foliage, and debris. Amid the landscape will be the battle-damaged howitzer, slumped over on its side, laying across a muddy road as the soldiers charge ahead. The howitzer will be portrayed as being partially destroyed by American artillery fire, and will be subject to a scenic treatment of mud and debris.

An elevated glass bridge will guide visitors across the entire scene. Innovative show-control technology utilizing large-scale video projection, timed lighting, and surround-sound effects will immerse visitors and bring the entire diorama to life. To the right of the scene will be a Renault FT–17 tank known as the "Five of Hearts." This tank is the only surviving FT–17 tank known to have been used by the American Expeditionary Forces. Exhibitors installed it in August 2017 before the Museum walls were constructed.[1]

Curators put much effort into the installation of the howitzer: the angle and height had to be exact before workers constructed other exhibit elements around it to complete the tableau. The inclusion of the howitzer adds important visual interest to the exhibit. Although this particular gun was not one of the pieces captured by the 35th Division in the Meuse-Argonne, it is one of the hundreds of German artillery pieces captured and sent to the United States after World War I.

The Army recovered this gun from a veterans' hall in southern Virginia in relic, or relatively poor, condition and it has been stabilized for display. Before coming to NMUSA, it was part of the collection of the Ordnance Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Now that the howitzer is in place, the construction of the rotunda that houses the immersive exhibit is under way. Once complete, it will be one of the more dynamic components of the *Nation Overseas Gallery*.

Paul Morando is the Chief, Exhibits Division, of the National Museum of the United States Army.

NOTE

1. Patrick R. Jennings, "'The Big Four' Move In!" *Army History* 106 (Winter 2018): 32–37.

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A Soldier's Trophy

Remembrance Through Artifacts

By Dieter Stenger

World War I ended on 11 November 1918, after more than four years of fighting. The American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were a key factor in the defeat of Germany, capturing some 49,000 German soldiers and 1,400 guns in six months. More than 1 million American soldiers saw action and the AEF saw 50,280 killed and 200,600 wounded. The industrialization of warfare transformed the fighting and left many veterans blinded, disfigured, and psychologically impaired. Their memories, embodied within artifacts picked up on the battlefield and brought home, not only serve to recall their sacrifices and hardships, but also celebrate their achievements.[1]

The collecting philosophy of the Army Museum Enterprise recognizes that these "artifacts serve as a primary source of information, a segment of reality from another place and time, and serve a cultural purpose that fulfills a universal human need to provide context and connection in order to understand our past in ways that are real, visual, and tactile . . . which informs our understanding of the capabilities and constraints governing the actions of the past or persons and events otherwise forgotten."[2]

Cpl. Swain Matthew Pearson, a member of Company A, 348th Machine Gun Battalion, 91st Division, brought home the German M1916 steel helmet shown here. Pearson was inducted into the U.S. Army on 17 September 1917 and arrived in France sometime after July 1918.[3] The only division without previous combat experience, the 91st proved its worth during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive as it broke through two German lines and penetrated a third, advancing eight kilometers. Moreover, the 91st drove the Germans out of the villages of Véry, Épinonville, Gesnes, Éclisfontaine, and the Tronsol Farm. On 31 October, during the final drive to destroy the Germans in Belgium, the Division was on the attack until the war ended, capturing the towns of Audenarde, Welden, Petegem, and Kasteelwijk.[4]

The German M1916 Stahlhelm (steel helmet) offered far greater protection against shell fragments and replaced the Pickelhaube (spiked helmet). It consists of three parts: the shell covers the head; the visor offers shade and protection against bad weather; and the neck guard protects the ears and neck. The iconic helmet lugs on either side of the dome provide ventilation and points for hanging a ballistic frontal armor plate, issued primarily to sentries and machine gun troops. The helmet's camouflage pattern, which is the most common pattern encountered on German helmets, made use of earth tones and irregularly shaped polygons to obscure the helmet's outlines and help it blend into the environment.

The guns of World War I have now stood silent for more than a century, but surviving memorabilia, such as this helmet, connect us directly with the soldier who brought it home. The helmet is now preserved at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where it is displayed in the "Good-Bye Broadway, Hello France: America in the Era of World War I" exhibition, open through November 2019.

Dieter Stenger is a curator of arms and ordinance with the Army Museum Enterprise, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

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OTES

1. Richard W. Stewart, ed., *The United tes Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008*, 2nd ed., nerican Military History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army nter of Military History, 2010), pp. 51–52; Michael E. ane, "The Day the Guns Fell Silent," *The Washington Post*, 10 v 2018, accessed 19 Nov 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ tory/2018/11/10/day-guns-fell-silent/.

2. Christopher Semancik, *Army Museum Enterprise Collections ilosophy*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, October 2018, copy curators files.

3. Military History Institute, *AHCAS 2609 Shelf Report for CCN 8683*, copy in curators files.

4. I-E Section, 91st Infantry Division, *The Story of the 91st Infantry ision: August 1917–January 1945*, pp. 1–4, Lone Sentry, accessed Nov 2018, http://www.lonesentry.com/91stdivision/ch1.html.

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THE DEADLIEST ENEMY

The U.S. Army and Influenza, 1918–1919

By Kathleen M. Fargey

The world has been devastated by one of the worst scourges in history. It took a terrible toll from our army camps. It shattered every organization trained to combat such a condition by attacking the individual cogs in the machine and many of the most important of these succombed *[sic]*. —Maj. Ellis K. Kerr, Medical Corps, U.S. Army[1]



Influenza Ward No. 1, U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 45, Aix-les-Bains, France

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Troops wearing masks march through the streets of Seattle, c. 1918

The Longer War

In the first several months after the Armistice of 11 November 1918, much of the chaos created by World War I continued to affect America and the world. On the last day of fighting, many military commanders insisted on prosecuting the war up until the last moment, causing approximately 11,000 casualties on all sides before the Armistice officially began at 1100, leaving those bereaved and wounded that day with little inclination to celebrate. It took months of complex negotiations involving twenty-seven nations before the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, officially ending the war. In the meantime, fighting continued for many. A Polish uprising in the German province of Posen in late 1918 lasted into February 1919, when an armistice was agreed, but Polish and Soviet troops clashed into 1921. The Easter Rising in 1916 led to fighting between British forces and Irish rebels into 1921 and then a civil war among Irish factions (over the terms of Ireland's independence) lasting until 24 May 1923. In the former Russian Empire, civil war continued into October 1922 between the Red Army of the Bolsheviks and the White Army attempting to stem the Communist revolution. Discontent over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and other postwar arrangements in the reshaping of nations and empires would affect significant portions of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa, and the punitive treatment of Germany created fierce resentment. Such discontent would fuel further violence in the following decades.[2]

The deadliest enemy to strike during the war ignored the Armistice to wage its third and final campaign during the first half of 1919. With its common ally, pneumonia, influenza came back to a make one final cull. In early April, it had perhaps its biggest impact on history: President Woodrow Wilson became severely ill and was never quite the same in mind or body afterward, suffering a follow-on stroke in September. After working so hard for an equitable "peace without victory," Wilson seemed to lose much of his will after his apparent bout of influenza and gave in to French demands that Germany be made to accept occupation and pay heavy reparations.[3]

Though we tend to think of World War I dangers in terms of artillery, gunfire, poisonous gas, and barbed wire, the influenza pandemic had a much greater impact than occasional references would suggest—it played a central role in the lives and deaths of American servicemembers. According to the Center of Military History's fact sheet on the U.S. Army in World War I, more than 50,500 U.S. servicemembers were killed in battle or died of combat wounds during World War I. A severe new form of influenza killed about 55,322 U.S. servicemen in Army camps, on Navy installations and ships, and in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) overseas. This influenza also affected civilian communities, taking the lives of about 675,000 Americans and millions of people worldwide (estimates range between 20 and 50 million, with some estimates as high as 100 million), making the 1918–1919 flu the deadliest disease in history.[4] Symptoms included body temperatures up to 105 degrees, delirium, and as author Lynette Iezzoni puts it, coughing up of "pints of greenish sputum." Flu weakened the body's defenses, often allowing secondary pneumonia, which caused most of the deaths, to invade, filling lungs with blood and other fluids and turning oxygen-deprived skin blue. Influenza occasionally led to other respiratory conditions or severe complications such as meningitis, internal bleeding, and organ damage. At Camp Meade, Maryland, 1st Lt. James M. McTiernan, a

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Emergency hospital during influenza epidemic, Camp Funston, Kansas

doctor with the Army's Medical Reserve Corps, recalled forty-eight influenza patients who developed otitis media (a potentially dangerous infection causing middle ear swelling) which physicians treated by making incisions into the ear drum. Doctors also observed thirty-seven cases of ear complications among influenza patients at the Army's Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington, D.C.[5]


The theory accepted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and many historians is that "Spanish influenza" (so-called because unlike French newspapers, Spanish ones ran uncensored reports on the disease) originated in Haskell County, Kansas, early in 1918, and spread in three waves. By the first week of March 1918, a severe strain of flu had infected soldiers at Camp Funston, which was part of Fort Riley, Kansas. As the military sent large numbers of soldiers and sailors to military establishments all over the United States, influenza traveled with them. By May 1918, American servicemen had brought the flu to Europe. Theory holds that this influenza virus then mutated into a deadlier form which struck during the fall of 1918. In Europe, the flu spread to Allied forces, to the German military, and into civilian populations, and then to Asia, Africa, South America, and back to North America. The third and final, but less lethal, wave of Spanish flu occurred in early 1919. The 1918–1919 flu affected between 20 percent and 40 percent of American military personnel.[6] It is therefore at the center, not the periphery, of the American military's World War I experience.

Most military camps and U.S. civilian communities experienced their greatest crises during the second wave of the pandemic from August to October 1918, but with the third wave occurring in 1919, U.S. soldiers' battle against influenza became the later, as well as the deadlier, of their two wars. By looking at five Army locations—Camp McClellan, Alabama; Camp Merritt, New Jersey; Camp Meade, Maryland; Camp Greenleaf, Georgia; and Gièvres, France—we can examine how the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic affected the U.S. Army.

Camp McClellan, Alabama

Camp McClellan (renamed Fort McClellan in 1929), is one of several major Army camps established in 1917. About six miles from both Anniston and Jacksonville, Alabama, Camp McClellan was a National Guard camp which received troops from New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. In May 1918, it became a field artillery brigade firing center. At its peak strength in October 1918, the camp housed nearly 28,000 soldiers, mostly in tents. The 29th Division trained at McClellan before deploying overseas in June 1918. The camp hosted the Headquarters of the 6th Division and parts of the 7th, 9th, 12th, and 98th Divisions.[7]

Influenza arrived at Camp McClellan on 20 September 1918, and the height of the epidemic there was between 10 and 20 October. Officials quarantined the camp from 2 to 14 October. When regular medical facilities filled up, camp officials used recreational buildings, tents, and



Interior view of ward, U.S. Army Base Hospital, Camp McClellan, Alabama

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A memorial monument at Camp Merritt dedicated to those who died there from the flu.

canvas-covered boardwalks as additional wards for flu patients. According to a senior surgeon, "Medical officers inspected the entire command daily, and isolated suspicious cases in the end of company streets. All cases with a temperature above 99 were sent to the base hospital." Military authorities also attempted to prevent the spread of infection by keeping buildings clean, airing out tents and bedding daily, exposing troops to fresh air, and keeping recovering patients isolated for an additional ten days. Units which seemed prone to illness were sprayed with chemical agents in an attempt at decontamination.[8]

The senior surgeon cited an influx of new troops, causing "temporary overcrowding and unavoidable exposure," in the two weeks preceding the onset of influenza as a factor in the camp's epidemic. Quarters and clothing for newly arriving troops (some of whom arrived drenched by a cold rain) were initially inadequate. Soldiers were quartered in tents, and doctors imposed a strict limit of five men per tent in an attempt to limit the spread of flu. Soldiers recovering from flu, once they had normal body temperatures for forty-eight hours, were moved from hospital beds to a tent convalescent camp nearby. At the epidemic's peak, Camp McClellan had over 4,900 cases of influenza and pneumonia, and about 228 reported deaths from these causes occurred there in the month of October 1918. Only a few soldiers died in subsequent months.[9]

Camp Merritt, New Jersey

Camp Merritt, New Jersey, was established in August 1917 as an embarkation camp to move troops through the port at Hoboken. Its base hospital opened 9 January 1918. Camp facilities included thirty-nine warehouses, a large bread bakery, and a delousing plant capable of processing 260 men per hour. From December 1917 to November 1918, over half a million soldiers representing dozens of Army divisions deployed overseas from the camp. From November 1918 to October 1919, roughly the same number returned to Camp Merritt from overseas, leaving Camp Merritt with a population of 44,500 at the end of June 1919. From February 1918 through April 1919, the camp's permanent garrison was generally between 4,000 and 6,000, being as low as about 2,000 before and after this period.[10]

Pandemic influenza arrived at Camp Merritt on 16 September 1918, and it took a few days for doctors there to realize that the new flu cases were "of far greater severity" than earlier cases of flu. About a week later, many flu patients developed pneumonia. In three weeks, the base hospital expanded from one influenza ward to fifty-one influenza and pneumonia wards and brought in new medical personnel—many of whom became sick themselves, especially nurses. Another complication was that several sick servicemembers were transferred to Camp Merritt's hospital from other locations, including docked ships. Dozens of enlisted soldiers detailed to assist in the wards had no medical experience. Medical officers transferred influenza patients who developed pneumonia to separate wards to isolate them from other patients. Several autopsies conducted on soldiers who died of pneumonia at Camp Merritt indicated hemorrhages in the lungs and signs of emphysema. By 1 November 1918, 265 of Camp Merritt's 999 pneumonia patients had died, a mortality rate of just over 26 percent.[11]


Camp Meade, Maryland

Camp (now Fort) Meade, Maryland, was another of the large cantonments established in 1917 to handle draftees. It was 18 miles from Baltimore with tracks connecting to the Pennsylvania and B&O Railroads. Meade hosted more than 400,000 soldiers during the war: the 11th and 79th Divisions, parts of the African-American 92d Division, training battalions, a depot brigade, an Ordnance Supply School, and a remount station handling over 22,000 horses and mules. After the Armistice, 96,000 returning soldiers were mustered out at Meade. Meade also hosted medical training for Army and civilian personnel.[12] In November 1917, at



Convalescent house, U.S. Army Base Hospital, Camp Meade, Maryland

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Tents for influenza patients, U.S. Army Base Hospital, Camp Beauregard, Louisiana

the north end of the camp, a base hospital opened with 105 buildings including a pharmacy, a kitchen and various messes, baths, officers' quarters, a chapel, a farm to supply vegetables and decorative flowers, and an exchange with a lunch counter, barber shop, and tailor. Wooden corridors joined thirty-two hospital wards, and there were three isolation wards for dangerous diseases and stand-alone convalescent wards. During the epidemic, all except the isolation wards housed flu patients. There were additional regimental and brigade infirmaries.[13]

On 17 September 1918, a handful of soldiers reported to Meade's base hospital and doctors discovered they had influenza. Camp Meade's doctors were aware of influenza outbreaks at other Army camps and had cleared beds—they had moved patients, convalescents, and staff to tents—in anticipation of the flu's arrival. Company commanders were ordered to ensure ventilation and cleaning of barracks. Nonetheless, the hospital admitted 800 soldiers on 24 September, and officials placed the camp under a quarantine that lasted until 20 October. By the time the epidemic waned in late October 1918, at least 11,000 soldiers (25 percent of the camp population) had gotten sick, and over 750 died, with a mortality rate of 27 percent for those who got pneumonia after catching the flu. Like many other Army camps, Camp Meade had to scramble to set up additional medical facilities and bring in outside help—Army nurse trainees, Johns Hopkins University medical students from Baltimore, and Catholic nuns trained as nurses. Camp Meade was the entry point for influenza into the state of Maryland, including the city of Baltimore, which experienced at least 24,000 cases of flu and 4,125 influenza-pneumonia deaths. However, death rates in Baltimore were lower than in hard-hit Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Boston.[14]

In keeping with wartime censorship and the drumbeat of positive patriotism, newspapers often deemphasized the seriousness of the influenza-pneumonia epidemic at Army camps. Even the *Camp Meade Herald* assured readers that Army doctors had everything under control and that the flu outbreaks would end shortly. The *Harrisburg Patriot* underreported the number of flu patients at Camp Meade (its figures are at odds with those of Camp Meade's Division Surgeon's report). On 25 September 1918, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* was hopeful that no quarantine of Camp Meade would be necessary, but a camp quarantine had already been imposed on 24 September. On 27 September, the *Baltimore American* quoted a local health commissioner's declaration that Spanish flu was no different from regular seasonal flu, which had caused only 103 deaths the previous year—ignoring the fact that in September 1918, flu killed 12,000 Americans. In the gap between these rosy reports and the rapid spread and unusually high mortality rates of flu and pneumonia, rumors arose—generally along the lines that German infiltrators among the U.S. Army medical staff had been caught deliberately spreading flu germs among American soldiers. The *Camp Meade Herald* and other camp newspapers denounced a particular rumor making the rounds in Washington, D.C.: "Within walking distance of Army Medical Department headquarters here, an infantry regiment is encamped. Almost to a man, that group believed that three officers and six nurses had been shot at Camp Meade" for spreading flu.[15]

Although influenza and pneumonia spread rapidly at Camp Meade, affecting soldiers of infantry and service units, nurses, doctors, other medical personnel, chaplains, and volunteers of recreational organizations, some segments of the camp population appear to have benefitted from isolation. Six companies of the 71st Infantry, the unit in which flu first appeared, were moved from their barracks to tents four miles away in an isolated area of the camp, and men in these companies remained free of influenza. African American soldiers living in segregated quarters were not afflicted with influenza at the same rate as whites, although their rate of sickness rose in October just as the rate of sickness among other soldiers decreased. On 26 October 1918, a contingent of about 372 black soldiers was marched out to Baltimore's Mount Auburn Cemetery, which belonged to the African American Sharp Street Methodist Episcopal Church. There they buried the bodies of African American flu victims which had gone unburied for several days as Baltimore's undertakers and gravediggers had been overwhelmed by the

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number of flu deaths and incapacitated by illness themselves.[16]

Camp Greenleaf, Georgia

Camp Greenleaf was established in May 1917 as part of Fort Oglethorpe to provide Army training for medical professionals. In March 1918, Camp Greenleaf's commandant officially took charge of Fort Oglethorpe's post hospital. Greenleaf consisted of medical schools (including dental and veterinary schools), a motor school, and training organizations for sanitary units of field hospitals and ambulance companies, noncommissioned officers of base hospital and convalescent camp units, replacement units for overseas service, and staff for evacuation hospitals and trains. From June 1917 through November 1918, according to War Department records, "6,640 officers and 31,138 enlisted men arrived at, and 4,318 officers and 22,138 men departed from, the camp. During this period 63 base hospitals, 37 evacuation hospitals, 5 field hospitals, 13 hospital trains, 5 ambulance companies, 21 evacuation ambulance companies, 9 convalescent camps, 10 replacement units and numerous detachments were organized."[17] Camp Greenleaf trained and dispatched doctors and other medical professionals who would care for Army influenza patients around the United States and abroad, yet even this medical camp could not escape pandemic influenza.

Thanks to prominent physician Victor C. Vaughan's article in the June 1918 issue of the *Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine*, there is an unusually detailed description of the initial spring 1918 wave of Spanish flu which hit soldiers at Fort Oglethorpe beginning about 18 March 1918. It began with men of the 51st Infantry, and continued to spread over the next two weeks, though only part of Camp Greenleaf was affected. Because many of the flu cases "were not severe," the camp did not compile complete statistics, but Vaughan estimated 2,900 illnesses at Oglethorpe. Doctors did not initially identify the epidemic as influenza. Vaughan described the symptoms of this spring illness as "headache, pain in the bones and muscles, especially the muscles of the back, marked prostration, fever . . . [s]ometimes there was conjunctivitis, coryza [inflammation of mucous membranes in the nose], a rash and possibly nausea." Patients generally recovered within a few days.[18]

On 23 September 1918, the second and deadlier wave of the epidemic arrived at Camp Greenleaf, when an enlisted man who returned from leave in Massachusetts was "sick on arrival." On 25 September, there were twenty-six reported cases of flu at Greenleaf. Officials attempted to isolate patients in specific areas, but partly due to a shortage of tents, they were not successful in preventing the rapid spread of the disease. However, men in the detention area isolated in tents or stalls did not get sick, unlike those housed in regular barracks. Before the epidemic "disappeared completely" by 26 October, there were about 5,160 flu cases at Greenleaf and 999 cases of pneumonia accounting for 325 deaths. Surgeon general's records report a 6.3 percent death rate for influenza at Camp Greenleaf with a 32.6 percent death rate for those who also got pneumonia. Forty-four German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war also died at Fort Oglethorpe in the Fall epidemic, which "greatly interfered" with training at the camp and prevented its personnel from being rapidly transferred to overseas locations—at a time when the Army urgently needed medical professionals. However, Camp Greenleaf did not join many other Army camps in "closing all places of public assembly" during the epidemic.[19]

Gièvres, France


Gièvres, in central France, was connected by rail to St. Nazaire on the Atlantic coast, where freight for American forces arrived. The U.S. Army's 15th Engineers worked for months constructing additional railroad tracks, warehouses, and other facilities for an immense storage depot at Gièvres from which clothing, fuel, food, medicine, and other supplies were moved to troops around the European theater. The depot included



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Medical ward, U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 43, Gièvres, France

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Interior of receiving ward, U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 43, Gièvres, France

4,500,000 square feet of covered storage space and 10,000,000 square feet of open storage space. There was refrigeration space for 5,200 tons of meat and an ice-making facility capable of producing 75 tons of ice daily. In addition to approximately 32,000 Army personnel, the facilities at Gièvres housed Chinese and Spanish laborers and German prisoners of war.[20]

In November 1917, the Army established an infirmary at Gièvres for the 15th Engineers. It consisted of two wooden barracks. It was converted into a post hospital in February 1918 and designated Camp Hospital No. 43 in April 1918. The hospital then expanded to include twenty-four buildings with a 400-bed total capacity by September 1918. In August 1918, Camp Hospital No. 43 began to treat fractures and perform surgeries of the type previously transferred to other hospitals. In February 1919, Camp Hospital No. 43 annexed a former base hospital at Pruniers. Apart from the regular hospital barracks, the Army set up twenty hospital tents to accommodate "the large number of mumps cases brought in with arriving troops."[21]

Many historians believe that U.S. troops carried the flu to France following outbreaks at fourteen large Army camps in the United States in the spring of 1918. By the end of summer 1918, all European armies had been exposed to the flu. Despite the risks of contagion, the U.S. Government decided against halting troop shipments because they did not wish to encourage the enemy. The government considered the sacrifices which influenza would require as a consequence of troop movements as necessary to the war effort. There is incomplete data on the epidemic in France, but between 125,000 and 250,000 civilians and about 30,000 military personnel died there as a result of the flu. The government banned French newspapers from reporting on the outbreak during the war.[22]

Flu first broke out at Gièvres in early June 1918 among Chinese laborers. Characterized by "sudden onset of gastrointestinal and bronchial disturbances," it spread to the rest of the camp despite a quarantine of the Chinese section. This flu typically lasted four days and did not result in any deaths. During August and September 1918, U.S. troops arrived at Gièvres almost daily, prompting the expansion of the hospital.[23]

The second wave of influenza arrived at Gièvres in late October 1918, beginning in the supply depot. This time, many flu patients developed pneumonia and cyanosis (blue-tinted skin due to oxygen deprivation), and there were many deaths, especially among African American soldiers. For those who survived, the illness lasted about fourteen days and recuperation was long and slow. A U.S. Navy medical officer stationed at Gièvres identified factors he believed contributed to servicemen developing severe cases of flu: "physical fatigue, long hours of uninterrupted labor with no relaxation from routine duties, no entertainment or change of scenery, and exposure to cold, inclement weather."[24]

U.S. Army medical officials at Gièvres kept separate wards for patients with specific diseases, including influenza and bronchio-pneumonia—housing patients in tents if space ran out. Sometimes Army officials imposed quarantines on individual units or organizations, keeping them away from the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) facilities and other recreational activities. The Army required all soldiers in units having disease outbreaks to gargle twice a day, and sprayed their noses and throats with an unspecified liquid. Medical staff sterilized mess kits, clothing, and bedding, and sprayed bunks and floors with disinfectants. Guidelines required all those attending the sick to wear masks and gowns. The camp hospital was kept ventilated, and "sputum, urine, and excreta disinfected before being removed from the wards."[25]

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The nurses of U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 43, Gièvres, France

Although the Armistice of 11 November 1918 ended the fighting, it took months to bring thousands of American servicemen home from overseas. Army Camp Hospital No. 43 at Gièvres would continue to deal with flu cases well into 1919. It did not close until August of that year.[26]

Soldiers weren't the only ones to die at Gièvres due to the epidemic. The YMCA sent a number of volunteers to organize recreation for American soldiers in Europe. Alice J. Knight of Natick, Massachusetts, a "missionary deaconess" for the YMCA, died of pneumonia on 21 February 1919 at Camp Hospital No. 43, and YMCA secretary Lorraine Ransom of New Rochelle, New York, died of pneumonia at the same hospital three days later. Both these women are buried in an AEF cemetery in northern France (now the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery).[27]


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The officers of U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 43, Gièvres, France

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Interior view, Receiving Ward, U.S. Army Base Hospital, Camp Devens, Massachusetts

Army Fatality Rates

Many large Army camps have comparable statistics on the number of illnesses and deaths from influenza and pneumonia in 1918–1919, though comparisons must be made cautiously and with the caveat that statistical sources vary. Different statistics cover different time periods: some encompass only the height of the epidemic at a particular location; others cover a longer period. Statistics also reflect different circumstances: some include a camp's total population; others measure only those who became ill or those admitted to a particular hospital.

For Maryland's Camp Meade, flu statistics range from 11,400 to 14,280 illnesses, 607 to 763 deaths, and fatality rates of 4.4 percent to 6.7 percent (variances reflect use of different records and date ranges, and inclusion or exclusion of additional camp infirmaries). The surgeon general's report of 1919 indicates 13,698 flu hospitalizations at Meade from September to December 1918 and 607 deaths (including 56 African Americans), for a fatality rate of about 4.4 percent. Carol Byerly, referring specifically to the base hospital, reports that 27 percent (about 11,421) of Meade's 42,300 troops were hospitalized. Dr. Edgar Sydenstricker's data on the 1918–1919 flu in 118 U.S. civilian communities finds mortality rates of 2.7 percent to 4.6 percent, making Camp Meade's rate comparatively high.[28] However, Meade's statistics roughly match those of several other large Army camps. Camp Dodge, Iowa, had 13,700 flu cases among 33,000 men and 702 deaths. At Camp Devens, Massachusetts, (the first Army camp in the United States to be significantly affected by the second wave of the flu epidemic in fall 1918), 45,000–50,000 men had over 14,000 flu cases and over 500 deaths during the epidemic's peak. Camp Lee, the entry point for flu into Virginia, had over 12,000 flu cases and at least 634 deaths at the flu's peak. Camp Grant, Illinois, with very crowded barracks, had a high death rate: 1,060 deaths among over 10,700 flu cases in a population of 40,000. Camp McClellan, with a smaller population of about 28,000, had fewer influenza cases than many larger camps did, with over 4,900 flu patients during the apex of the epidemic. However, its influenza mortality rate of about 4.7 percent is comparable to those of larger camps. Pneumonia mortality rates for Army camps are largely consistent at about 25 percent to 27 percent, as is the case for Camp Merritt, where 265 of 999 pneumonia patients died for a mortality rate of about 26 percent. Yet at Camp Greenleaf, where 325 of 999 pneumonia patients died, the pneumonia mortality rate was 32.6 percent, and the overall influenza mortality rate was also high at 6.3 percent.[29]

Although about 15,849 members of the AEF died of influenza and pneumonia in Europe, it seems that the Army surgeon general did not collect or publish disease statistics for individual camps or locations there as it did for Army camps in the U.S. Keeping in mind discharges of recovering patients, a general guess as to the prevalence of the flu epidemic at Gièvres, France, during the Fall epidemic can made based on Camp Hospital No. 43's usual capacity of 400, plus its report that influenza taxed that capacity "to such an extent that an average of 350 patients have had to be quartered in tents."[30]

Certain differences in the progress and handling of the epidemic in different Army camps emerge from the information provided above. At Camp Meade, African Americans may have experienced lower rates of illness due to segregation, but at

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Camp McClellan, where black soldiers received inadequate quarters and clothing, and in Gièvres, African Americans experienced higher death rates than white soldiers. Especially isolated populations, like those in the detention center at Camp Greenleaf and certain companies of the 371st Infantry at Camp Meade, managed to escape influenza altogether. Quarantine and isolation measures, however imperfect, were part of the normal Army response to outbreaks of flu and pneumonia, but unlike at other camps hit by the epidemic, Camp Greenleaf kept open its places of public assembly. Camp McClellan, which quartered its soldiers in tents rather than in barracks, limited inhabitants to five per tent. To what extent such measures helped stem the tide of influenza and pneumonia is not clear, but Camp McClellan does appear to have had a lower mortality rate than Camp Greenleaf (4.7 percent versus 6.3 percent). As a transit camp, Camp Merritt handled not only its own local cases of influenza but also flu patients transferred into the camp from ships and other locations. Medical officials at Camp Merritt attempted to isolate pneumonia patients in separate wards, as did officials at Camp Hospital No. 43 in Gièvres. Army medical officials enacted aggressive disinfection efforts, including the use of chemical agents, at many Army camps and hospitals, including Camp McClellan and Camp Hospital No. 43, which even undertook treatment of human waste before disposal.

The common denominator for the various Army posts, however, is the measure of chaos brought by the epidemic. During the influenza crisis, Army camps struggled to secure sufficient beds, medical personnel, and resources for their patients. Despite quarantines, sanitation efforts, and the isolation of patients, influenza and pneumonia affected hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Some Army installations and hospitals experienced outbreaks of severe influenza in spring of 1918, but the most deadly form of influenza arrived that fall, and was soon accompanied by pneumonia, and generally peaked in October. The United States Army took the 1918–1919 flu virus from Kansas to other states and to Europe, from which it encircled the globe.

1919 Reprise

While the final wave of the influenza pandemic was limited at some Army camps Camp Meade experienced only seven



An Army doctor at Camp Devens checks on a patient

influenza-related deaths in the first half of 1919), there are strong hints that the third wave of influenza was more costly at Gièvres, France, and surrounding areas. Private Alva Gressmire of Indiana went overseas with the 64th Engineers in March 1918 and survived earlier waves of influenza only to die of pneumonia on 13 February 1919 in Camp Hospital No. 43. Five hundred thirty-seven American servicemen and civilians who died after the Armistice at Gièvres and in other parts of France are interred or memorialized at the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery in northern France. Several of these individuals, such as 2d Lt. Richard Bishop Alvord of the 119th Infantry, 30th Division (died 27 February 1919); Pvt. Vandee Cotton (a black soldier) of the 335th Quartermaster Labor Battalion (died 13 March 1919); Sgt. Lucien J. Fenouillet of the 73d Aero Squadron (died 24 March 1919); and 2d Lt. Paul Nowers of the Transportation Corps (died 2 February 1919), died of influenza and pneumonia. Many are simply listed as having "died of disease" and among them are likely influenza-pneumonia victims.[31]

In many ways, the full impact of the Spanish flu only began to become clear in the months after the guns fell silent in Europe. Of those who survived, not everyone recovered fully. As a Catholic priest who served at Camp Meade wrote, "They [some of Meade's flu survivors] wake to find the dream a sad reality. [. . .] the mental ward crowded with poor soldiers who will never recover from the [flu-induced] delirium." Some flu survivors developed lasting respiratory conditions. Many family members and friends were left to mourn.[32] Some Army families found out in 1919 that the influenza which had visited them in 1918 was not finished with them. Ettie May Perkins, a nurse at Camp Meade, died of influenza and pneumonia on 4 October 1918. Flu visited tragedy on the Perkins family again in April 1919, when the war veteran husband of Ettie's sister Lizzie died of flu-related spinal meningitis a week after returning from overseas.[33]

Well into 1919, the Army surgeon general and others compiled statistics and reports. On 27 January 1919, the American Red Cross announced more than 200 of its nurses had died "of influenza contracted while administering to influenza-stricken soldiers." On 30 April 1919, the *Baltimore Sun* newspaper cited a newly issued report by the War Department estimating that 51 percent of Army deaths during the war had been caused by disease—and that a further 12,000 deaths from disease had happened since Armistice Day.[34] On 5 April 1919, thirty-six soldiers returning from overseas were sent to the base hospital at Camp Devens to recover from influenza. Camp Devens reported 208 new flu cases and 102 new pneumonia cases among returning troops for the week ending 18 April 1919. The *Washington Post* reported 5,679 new cases of influenza and pneumonia for the week of 26 April among soldiers in the United States according to an Army Medical Department report issued 6 May 1919, which nonetheless represented "a marked decrease" over previous weeks. Also as of late April, 44,172 servicemen lay sick in hospitals abroad (added to 9,428 recovering from war injuries), as the Army Medical Service hoped to bring them home by July 1919.[35]

Of course, they would not all make it home. At the end of March 1919, Haskell Mayo of Bakersfield, Vermont, received a telegram informing him of the death of his son, Pvt. Haskell Mayo Jr., of the 26th Division. He died in France on 12 March due to influenza, just before he was to sail for home. The *Burlington Free Press* noted, "He had participated in the hard fighting in which his division had been engaged without a wound or injury of any kind." On 10 April 1919, the Vermont newspaper, *St. Albans Weekly Messenger*, published Private Haskell's last letter to his father, dated 2 March 1919, in which he reported that his division was due to sail home in April and lamented that he couldn't get home in

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Morgue, U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 43, Gièvres, France

The Threat Remains

Researchers at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases have discovered that all Type A influenza viruses circulating today are genetic descendants of the 1918–1919 virus. Influenza pandemics (generally accompanied by pneumonia) have continued to haunt us. The year 1957 saw a pandemic of "Asian flu," and 1968–1969 saw the "Hong Kong flu" pandemic, which killed more than one million people worldwide. In late 1977, the "Russian" or "red flu" virus threatened people under twenty-five years of age. Researchers Jon Hodge and Dennis Shanks have provided examples of influenza's impact on the U.S. military since 1918–1919, including the following: 1) the U.S. Air Force temporarily suspended bombing missions over Vietnam when the 1968 flu pandemic hit air crews based in Thailand; 2) severe respiratory diseases "often caused by influenza" were the main cause of nonbattle injury and disease for the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War; and 3) in 1996, a U.S. Navy cruiser experienced a 42 percent attack rate of influenza and had to return to port as a result. In early 1976, two potentially dangerous flu viruses circulated in crowded barracks at Fort Dix, New Jersey, but did not erupt into a major epidemic. A new and virulent H1N1 flu caused the World Health Organization to declare a pandemic on 11 June 2009. That year, medical researchers observing U.S. soldiers participating in military exercises in Egypt became concerned by the flu's ability to affect young, otherwise healthy soldiers, to result in respiratory illnesses and other complications, and to affect military operations. Annual estimates regularly include seasonal influenza and pneumonia (counted together in one category) in the top ten medical causes of death in the United States. In January 2017, many French hospitals were reported to be "at breaking point" due to an influx of patients affected by a severe type of flu; hospitals postponed nonurgent operations and implemented emergency plans to provide more beds to flu patients. By September 2017, Australia had also experienced a severe flu epidemic with historically high numbers of flu cases in some of its states.[38]

The 2017–2018 flu season, dominated by the H3N2 virus, has been the worst flu season in the United States in many years. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there have been 12,000 to 56,000 flu-related deaths per flu season (approximately five–six months long) in the U.S. from 2010–2011 to 2016–2017 (West Africa's 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic took 11,325 lives). However, for the 2017–2018 flu season, the CDC believes that about 80,000 Americans died of flu, surpassing the flu mortality rates of the past several years.[39] Additionally, influenza viruses in animals, which could affect humans and develop the ability to spread rapidly from person to person, represent potential pandemic threats. We have medical options—flu and pneumonia vaccines and antiviral (for flu) or antibacterial (for pneumonia) medicines—which didn't exist in 1918. The CDC estimates that for the 2015–2016 season, flu vaccinations prevented 5.1 million illnesses, 71,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 pneumonia and influenza deaths in the United States. However, timely production, distribution, and usage of a large supply of vaccines and medications remains a challenge. The U.S. Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza (DoD

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Pandemic Plan) assumes that an effective vaccine will not be widely available until several months after a pandemic begins. In the meantime, seasonal flu vaccines may provide limited protection against a pandemic virus.[40]

Appropriate medical care is vital. During the Ebola epidemic, life-saving treatments were not readily available in West Africa. The epidemic's mortality rate, 80 percent overall, dropped to 45 percent for those who received hospital care and to 18 percent for those airlifted to developed countries. Among Americans, 95 percent of "influenza deaths" are due to pneumonia which is not treated quickly enough.[41]

Since the DoD Pandemic Plan was developed in 2006, the U.S. military has pandemic exercises in locations such as Germany, Hawaii, Indiana, and South Carolina, involving rapid vaccination of local communities, enactment of quarantines, and communication and coordination with multiple agencies and officials.[42] However, advanced planning isn't always enough. In 1918, officials at Camp Meade anticipated the flu's arrival and cleared hospital beds—and the Army established medical labs at many of its posts—but still the Army was unprepared for the high rates of infection and deaths that flu and pneumonia brought. Even a medical training camp, Camp Greenleaf, experienced high influenza and pneumonia mortality rates. A virulent virus might still overwhelm medical systems. Where plans fail, the ability to adapt rapidly will be vital. Overconfidence must be kept in check. As DoD's plan predicts, "Any effective response [to a severe pandemic] will require the full participation of all levels of government and the private sector."[43]

At 100-years-old, the Spanish flu is already a distant memory. Hardly anyone alive today has personal memories of it. And yet, the 1918–1919 influenza-pneumonia pandemic holds clues to a situation we may again have to face—and reminds us that the flu must be taken seriously. Soldiers may once again be on the front lines fighting against influenza and its allies like pneumonia.

About the Author

Kathleen M. Fargey has a master's degree in public history from Wright State University. She previously worked for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Office of the Federal Register and has been with the Force Structure and Unit History Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History for over twelve years, specializing in the lineages and history of quartermaster, support, and ordnance/maintenance units. She has also researched and written about Civil War medicine and African American units of World War II.

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
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
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BOOK REVIEWS

21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era



Edited by J. Furman Daniel III
Naval Institute Press, 2016
Pp. xi, 159. $24.95

Review by Christian Heller

George C. Scott memorialized General George S. Patton Jr. in the minds of Americans in the 1970 film, *Patton*. Speaking in front of a wall-sized American flag, he stands at attention and salutes while the camera scrolls through close-ups of a spotless uniform and immaculate posture, just as the general would have presented himself. The viewer is first shown his salute and riding crop followed shortly thereafter with a chest of perfectly aligned medals and his pearl-handled revolver. This fictionalized representation of General Patton complete with demand for perfection and authority would be near to historically accurate as J. Furman Daniel III brings him to life in *21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era*.

Patton embraced all aspects of military leadership up to and including the specialized selection of riding boots and his signature sidearm to ensure a flawless, confident appearance at all times. More impressive and longer-lasting, though, is the general's contribution to military theory and the early foundations of maneuver warfare and combined arms operations. Daniel brings Patton to life as a man not only dedicated to his public image, but also profoundly devoted to a lifelong study of military strategy and technology. Convinced as he was of "the importance of his own destiny" (p. 4), George Patton spent his decades in uniform dedicated to the study of warfare which allowed him to appear as a mastermind on the battlefield, "as if he had a natural and instinctive knowledge of the subject" (p. 10).

Daniel selects seven of Patton's writings which together span over three decades of critical thought on leadership, tactics, technology, the future of warfare, and military organization. Daniel begins with Patton's first published article from 1913, "The Form and Use of the Saber." Though the use of swords and cavalry are long outdated to modern warfare, the author chooses the piece to showcase Patton's ability to identify an Army-wide problem with equipment, formulate an effective argument for its replacement, and generate support for change at senior levels. Regardless of the insight into Patton's mind and capabilities, the essay is a fascinating historical glimpse into cavalry-charge tactics on the cusp of revolutionary tactical changes in World War I.

The theme changes with the second selection as the author includes Patton's reflections on his World War I experiences in which he attempts to "grapple with difficult questions regarding leadership, loyalty, and courage" (p. 13). The prologue to the chapter ties Patton's writings nicely to contemporary motivations for military service. This piece, while highly insightful into the sense of pride and discipline Patton demanded of himself and his army, touches lightly on dated ideas of tribal evolution and male motivations for courage on the battlefield. Patton reaches his conclusion that while many great generals may have been intellectually gifted, they principally "owed their success to indomitable wills and tremendous energy" (p. 48), an argument he would reiterate throughout his career.

Daniel returns the reader to Patton's technical abilities with the selection of the 1930 *Cavalry Journal* piece titled, "The Effect of Weapons on War." In it, Patton explores the "perpetual state of flux" (p. 50) between new technologies on the battlefield and the tactics and techniques which develop to counter them. Two main points emerge from this article. First, we see Patton's dedication to understanding the minute details of his armored machines in order to better apply them at the operational level and experiment with their capabilities in the theoretical realm. Second, Patton's belief that good leadership and proper soldiers can overcome nearly any material shortfall is again emphasized when he argues, "few, if any, victories are traceable to weapons. . . . It is the spirit of the men who fight, and the spirit of the men who lead, which gains the victory" (pp. 57–58). This argument is explored further in the fourth chapter in which he develops ideas on the prerequisites for victory in war. While "Patterns of Success" is probably the weakest chapter of the book, it contributes nicely to the perpetual debates between the comparative importance of leadership, technology, and mass on the battlefield.

Patton's 1932 Army War College thesis along with the 1933 article "Mechanized Forces: A Lecture" serve as the zenith of the book. The reader stares back in time before the concepts of maneuver warfare and combined arms tactics had been articulated, debated, and instituted within the armed forces. In both pieces, Patton's aptitude as an academic and thinker are showcased through an uncanny ability to predict both the fighting organizations and unit tactics which would achieve dramatic success in Europe a decade later. The author's introduction to Patton's thesis seamlessly prepares the reader for the discussion of mass conscript armies versus smaller professional armies which occupies the following fifty pages. Truthfully, the thesis should be mandatory reading for any introductory lesson on military organization and structure. "Mechanized Forces: A Lecture" contrasts the French and British employment of tanks in World War I before theorizing on the application of new types of armored units toward existing military tasks like reconnaissance and flanking operations. The chapter concludes with a quite humorous reinforcement of Patton's now established belief in the impermanence of weaponry:

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
When Samson took the fresh jawbone of an ass and slew a thousand men therewith, he probably started such a vogue for the weapon, especially among the Philistines, that for years no prudent donkey dared to bray. Yet, despite its initial popularity, it was discarded and now appears only as a barrage instrument for acrimonious debate (p. 142).

One highlight from the lonely six pages of Chapter 7 are the author's three and a half pages of introduction. Daniel describes the importance of the Tennessee, Louisiana, and Carolina Maneuvers in which Patton's decades of training and theorizing paid off with stunning, rapid victories for his armored forces. The maneuvers so impressed his seniors that upon the outbreak of war, Patton was charged with training over 50,000 U.S. soldiers for imminent combat in the North African deserts. In the final published paper of General George S. Patton Jr., the legendary combat leader dwells not on high-minded theory or abstract concepts of warfare, but returns to the basics of combat with minute technical details and the human factors of desert conflict. In less than three pages, Patton addresses geography, the invasion of airborne reconnaissance, unit formations, bivouac sites, water consumption, food rations, and preventative vehicle maintenance, demonstrating in the end that his genius for war resulted first and foremost from an understanding of the microdetails of soldiers and armies.

If J. Furman Daniel III set out to answer the question, "Who was General Patton?" his contribution of *21st Century Patton* to the U.S. Naval Institute's 21st Century Foundations series answers the question as best any compilation could. The book's contents are impeccably selected, organized, and commented upon to demonstrate that Patton's visible success in war and outward image as a military genius was due to ceaseless and exhaustive preparation. Future military leaders can learn from the general the same lessons for military success with which Daniel concludes: "For George Patton, success was not an accident" (p. 150).

Christian Heller is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, a Rhodes Scholar, and holds a Master's of Philosophy in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford. He currently serves on active duty as an intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps.

War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory



By Nadia Schadlow
Georgetown University Press, 2017
Pp. xviii, 321. $32.95

Review by Wm. Shane Story

I had no idea what "civil affairs" was in 1995 when an assignments officer told me it was my new functional area. I was a captain, an Army aviator, and I had just given up command of an AH–64 cavalry troop to attend graduate school en route to a teaching assignment at West Point. Convinced by doctrine and senior leaders' proclamations that the Army's mission was to fight and win the nation's wars (which from my perspective meant using Hellfire missiles to destroy enemy armor formations), I was surprised to learn that the Army actually assigned personnel to dealing with civilians and their concerns. Believing civil affairs was secondary, or even tertiary, to the Army's raison d'être—and a bad career move to boot—I pushed back on my assignment. I was soon relieved of the unwelcome designation, and reverted instead to operations. Only later did I realize that my ignorance of civil affairs was consistent with how the Army as a whole treats the topic.

In *War and the Art of Governance*, Nadia Schadlow, a former deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration, argues that such ignorance and avoidance contributed to recent operational failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. She even considers it a mental disorder, "American Denial Syndrome," which she defines as "a persistent reluctance, rooted in American history and in civil-military relations, to prepare and train adequately for the political dimension of war" (p. x).

In Chapter 1, Schadlow attributes the disorder to four causes: the founding fathers' aversion to establishing a standing army; ambivalence about governing others rooted in the nation's anti-colonial heritage; Americans' conviction that civilians should be in charge of governance; and, the U.S. Army's belief that it should fight battles, not manage civilians. In this broad-but-shallow survey of American military history, Schadlow depicts Army officers as having to overcome this syndrome repeatedly in postconflict situations to secure American objectives and restore lasting order. Rather than having to relearn the same lessons continually, Schadlow argues the United States should expand the Army and prepare it to both defeat and govern other countries on the way to absorbing them into an American-led global order.

In Chapter 2, Schadlow begins to review American military campaigns in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Time and again, necessity drove Army officers to implement "governance operations" to restore order after successful military campaigns. In each case, commanders acted because American administrations failed to define the national policies these campaigns were supposed to fulfill. The Mexican–American War provides an early example. When Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott occupied Mexico City in 1847, he did so without guidance from President James Polk on postwar policy objectives. On his own authority, Scott established martial law to restore order and implemented indirect rule through indigenous administrators. Fifty years later, during the Spanish–American War, the Army tried to minimize troop deployments to avoid exposing soldiers to tropical diseases. However growing demands from Washington to suppress insurgents and establish civil administration pushed the Army to deploy more forces to fulfill the mandate. Finally, the challenges of occupying the Rhineland after the World War I fully exposed the Army's need to govern defeated states. Maj. Gen. Henry Allen, the commander of American Forces in Germany in 1919, argued the occupation of the Rhineland exposed the folly "that armies could occupy enemy soil and yet dispossess themselves of most of the responsibility of government" (p. 75). Commanders occupying foreign soil frequently found they had to secure more objectives than anticipated and had to develop policies no one realized were important before the operation began.

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Chapter 3 covers World War II and the subsequent occupations of conquered enemy states, which is Schadlow's idealized version of governance operations. The Army began rewriting civil affairs doctrine in 1940 and established a school to train select personnel on military governance. As combat units defeated enemy forces in the European and Pacific theaters, civil affairs teams helped commanders in occupied areas supervise civilians and restore order. The results, she argues, speak for themselves; the occupations of Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea succeeded

> in transforming key states into more democratic and liberally-oriented political and economic systems. The governance operations did so through political supervision and political reconstruction. In addition, the military occupations of these countries served as key instruments for the consolidation of US power during the early years of the Cold War. (pp. 144–45)

In Chapters 4 and 5, which cover the Cold War and the war on terror, Schadlow argues the United States failed to embrace World War II's obvious lesson: that conquering enemy states and absorbing their civil societies into American-run economic and security systems was best for all involved. Instead, there was a hardening of attitudes against military involvement in civil affairs; soldiers and generals alike found civilian needs a distraction from what they believed was the Army's purpose. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, an 82d Airborne Division paratrooper could not understand why he was cleaning streets. "Hell," he said, "we came here to fight" (p. 191). In 2003, American attempts to withdraw from Iraq after the regime collapsed were doomed. Chaos forced commanders to work with indigenous leaders to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance to desperate civilians. "All of the features of American denial syndrome emerged," Schadlow writes, and they "seriously undermined the ability of the United States to achieve strategic success. . . . Senior leaders [who] believed they could avoid the politics of the conflict" were wrong (pp. 260–62).

Schadlow is not a historian and her purpose is not to understand the past but to use it to promote a vision of armed nation building using the U.S. Army. Contrary to her depiction of doctrinal-sounding "governance operations," the Army's roles in Mexico, post–Civil War reconstruction, the suppression of the plains Indians, the Philippines, and the Rhineland did not end happily for all involved. Even her preferred cases, Germany and Japan after 1945, depended on the specific circumstances of those countries' wartime destruction and exhaustion, their unconditional surrender, and their willingness to be absorbed into a prosperous Pax Americana. Recent scholarship demonstrates that neither circumstance was the "Good Occupation" that Schadlow imagines.[1]

I regret not having understood sooner that the U.S. Army is an instrument of policy, that it performs best when commanders understand the policy, and that civilian concerns are fundamental to policy. However, Schadlow's prescription for military governance is a false guide; it sounds logical but lends itself to a bad outcome. Her remedy is threefold: first, the Army must organize and train units to govern occupied areas; second, it must be large enough to occupy other countries for the scale and duration needed; and, finally, the Army must realize its purpose is not just to win wars but to consolidate new political orders in occupied states. Schadlow's argument ultimately fails because every military operation is an anomaly. Her attempt to extrapolate solutions for the frustrations of Iraq from the long-ago occupations of Germany and Japan ignores the policy concerns that were unique to each situation. Moreover, Schadlow's rationale would transform America's generals into proconsuls—leading imperial armies and wielding sovereignty over conquered territories. Schadlow seems to see 1898 as the future, but I consider it ancient history.


Something to be commended in Schadlow's work is its implicit challenge to policymakers to understand their objectives before launching ambitious operations abroad; they should contemplate the end of conflicts before venturing in search of elusive victories. However, postwar cautionary tales would have been more useful than Schadlow's bold assurances that big armies and staying power will set the world aright. War tends to alter the political dilemmas we face but it does not often resolve them, and the past offers little evidence that military governance is the answer.

NOTE

1. Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, "Substituting the Civil Power: Civil Affairs and Military Government in World War II" in *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 25–44; Susan L. Carruthers, "'Produce More Joppolos': John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano* and the Making of the 'Good Occupation,'" *The Journal of American History* 100, no. 4 (March 2014): 1086–1113.

Dr. Wm. Shane Story, a retired Army Reserve colonel, is the director of the General Histories Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has a Ph.D. in history from Rice University and deployed to Iraq as a historian with the Coalition Land Forces Component Command in 2003 and with the Multi-National Force–Iraq in 2007–2008.

It's My Country Too: Women's Military Stories from the American Revolution to Afghanistan



Edited by Jerri Bell and Tracy Crow
Potomac Books, 2017
Pp. xxi, 376. $32.95

Review by Megan Moyette

In *It's My Country Too: Women's Military Stories from the American Revolution to Afghanistan,* editors Jerri Bell and Tracy Crow have compiled an impressive anthology of women's war stories, as told by the women themselves. Beli and Crow, both veterans, started this project after realizing that the voices of our country's female veterans were rarely in print, and never with the same publicity and critical acclaim as men's voices (p. xiii). The editors believe the general public is missing out on important American stories and that women currently serving

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nd those who will come after them, leserve access to histories where they an see themselves reflected. They have one an admirable job in rescuing these oices and giving the world access to an mportant historical arc. These stories re multifaceted and varied, much like he military women who tell them. The ook is at times lively, relatable, and even unny. Other stories are heartbreaking in heir abuse, self-doubt, and loneliness. All f them are important.

There are many reasons women's mili- ary stories have not been given the same ttention as men's. In the American Revo- ution and the Civil War, women had to ress as men in order to fight, so it makes ense that many of their stories will never e known. (One especially memorable xception is the story of two Confederate oldiers who gave birth as Prisoners of War [p. 14].) In later conflicts, women's oles were not considered as exciting or neaningful as men's, because women were ot allowed in combat. But, as Bell and row demonstrate, military women were arely far from danger. During World War I, nurses slept in tents yards away from erman bombs falling during air raids p. 98). First Lt. Sharon Lane, Army Nurse orps, died in Vietnam when an enemy ocket hit her quarters (p. 178).

Perhaps worse than being lost to istory or dismissed as unexciting, female eterans' stories are often hijacked for olitical, social, or commercial agendas p. xv). Women in the military hear ccusations that they joined because ney are victims of the patriarchy (p. xv), ecause they value implementing "social xperiments" over military readiness (p. 4), or because they want to "get some f that good U.S. Department of the Navy rade-A meat" (p. 188). When women emselves answer the question of why ey took up arms, the answer is resound- gly that they were answering "the call f our country in her hour of stress" (p.). Why would a *woman* want to fight the American Revolution? Deborah mpson, who served in the Continental rmy, gives an answer that just as easily uld have been written by a man: outrage at a nation three thousand miles away ould subject the colonists to "plans subjugation, the most unnatural in emselves, unjust, inhuman" (p. 9). The ices in this collection overwhelmingly ove that American women have always taken up arms for the very reason men do: because their country needs them.

Initially, it seems strange that each chapter of the book and each individual story begin with introductions by the editors, since Bell and Crow insist in their preface that women veterans need to tell their stories in their own words. Each of the eleven chapters begins with a brief introduction to women's official and unofficial roles in the conflict at hand. Then, before the women's voices begin, there are further introductions to the individual women themselves. At first, it seems that so much secondary text might drown out the women's voices. However, the brief, interesting introductions to the veterans are necessary because, sadly, very few of them are household names. Even those already familiar with military history will enjoy learning the details and politics behind the formation of female units. It is also interesting to read debates between politicians over whether women should be allowed to serve in combat. These ring especially hollow situated between stories of women running for cover from enemy fire.

The introductions also give the reader a glimpse into the magnitude of the effort that went into creating this book. The stories come from a wide range of sources: published and unpublished memoirs, words lifted from pension dispositions, oral history projects, blogs, and even a few original essays written for this volume. In deciding which voices to include, Bell and Crow consciously avoided creating a "contribution history" that focuses exclusively on the few women already acknowledged as military trailblazers (p. xvi). The editors admirably attempt to rectify the exclusion of minorities' voices by including women of color, immigrants, and members of the LGBTQ community in the volume. By correcting a journalist's intentional misspellings in Harriet Tubman's story (pp. 26–27), Bell and Crow give her words the dignity they deserve and show the familiar American abolitionist and activist in one of her other roles: a warfighter.


By including so many representations and featuring stories from the military's most junior women, Bell and Crow have succeeded in creating a collection that reflects the many different aspects of being a woman in the military. We get glimpses of self-doubt, such as the first female Marine to serve in Vietnam calling herself a "devout coward" (p. 199). We read of a woman serving in an elite WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) unit during World War II who doubted her importance and wondered if she could be doing her part for the country at home, "serving cookies and jitterbugging" and wearing an "aqua prom dress at the USO with our brave boys who have to behave nicely there" (p. 116). Female veterans will also recognize the playfulness and camaraderie that emerges during long stretches of boredom; like racing rafts made of empty water bottles (p. 307) or spraying one another with neon from ChemLights (p. 304). Some women will recognize the delight in finding a male ally or making a perfectly timed comeback to a sexist remark. Others will recognize the feeling of being excluded when every workplace conversation somehow becomes about "whores, strip clubs, and no-boundaries masturbation" (p. 272).

Though Bell and Crow started their research believing that women currently serving, and the public at large, were missing out on the stories of America's female veterans, the editors quickly realized that they had both served without a sense of their own history. They did not know whose shoulders they stood on or who had set the standard of women's service and leadership (p. xiv). This book goes a long way to correcting that deficiency. These stories show us courage and bravery without shying away from alienation, loneliness, self-doubt, harassment, and even assault. The fight these women waged just to be allowed to do the most taxing and dangerous jobs in the world is truly awe-inspiring.

This book should be required reading for women in the military and those who seek to understand them. As the editors well know, it is entirely possible for a woman to serve with no knowledge of her military heritage, but having these stories at hand would certainly be a welcome source of strength, comfort, and the very special camaraderie of being both a woman and a veteran.

Lt. Megan Moyette is a United States Navy submarine officer and an instructor in the History Department at the U.S. Naval Academy.

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By Murray Pittock
Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. xxi, 192. $29.95

Review by J. Britt McCarley

For most interested parties, the 16 April 1746 Battle of Culloden in rainy and windswept northern Scotland is the signature event of the 1745 Jacobite Rising in Great Britain. But there is much more involved in understanding the battle's context, course, and heritage. In Oxford University's *Great Battles* series, Murray Pittock, eminent Scottish cultural historian and professor of literature, interprets Culloden from multiple angles, including national memory, historiography, archaeology, and material culture.

Because Pittock does not employ a traditional narrative method, readers will benefit from first reading "7 Myths About the Battle of Culloden Busted," which summarizes the author's revisionist approach to his subject.[1] These long-held misconceptions are that Culloden was: "a dynastic conflict between the Stuarts and the Hanoverians;" "fought between a modern army and the Highland clans;" "fought between Catholics and Protestants;" "a victory of muskets over swords;" "fought on a badly chosen site, and this was the fault of Charles Edward Stuart [Bonnie Prince Charlie or The Young Pretender to the British throne] and his Irish officers;" "fought to end a British civil war;" and "a defeat for Scottish nationalism." Pittock dispels all these myths in *Culloden* with abundant evidence from various disciplines.

The heart of the book begins with Chapter 2, "Conflicts and Armies: The Rising of 1745," in which Pittock, using fresh interpretation of sources, atypically portrays the Jacobite Army as conventionally organized, armed, and trained. The Jacobites were also outnumbered on the Culloden battlefield by the army of Britain's Hanoverian monarch, George II. Moreover, government troops enjoyed advantages in artillery (especially Coehorn mortars) and cavalry—the latter committed "to break the enemy only when they were already wavering" (p. 56). The combination of these factors leads Pittock to conclude that "in reality the Jacobites were too much of a normal army to do anything but fight [on the offense] at Culloden" (p. 36), rather than dissolve into the countryside and continue the rebellion as a guerrilla force for an indeterminate amount of time.

Pittock covers the battle itself in Chapter 3, "Culloden Moor," the second longest one in the book but still not narration per se. His rebuttals of conventional historical wisdom in these pages are too numerous to catalog here, but several stand out. Rather than resulting from poor decision making, the Jacobites chose to fight the battle on boggy Drummossie Moor rather than other potential locations for at least three sound reasons: it was proximate to their headquarters at nearby Culloden House; it covered the neighboring town of Inverness, which was their supply point (for food in particular); and it was farther beyond the line-of-sight of the Royal Navy in adjoining Moray Firth. Because of the need to attack frontally, "the Jacobite Army relied on its front line to carry the day, and that meant breaking the British formations and driving them off the field" (p. 80). Lasting under an hour, including a less than ten-minute artillery exchange, the battle featured a westerly wind that blew black powder smoke into the faces of the charging Jacobites, who penetrated the British left but could not sustain their advantage. They eventually succumbed to the government's stubborn resistance, voluminous firepower, and enveloping cavalry. According to Pittock, in one of the most revisionist parts of his interpretation, British "dragoons presented a cavalry concentration sizable enough to hit the Jacobite right flank or lead the pursuit of a broken enemy, which is in fact what they did" (p. 82) in both cases. Actually, Pittock maintains, "flanking cavalry . . . is the key to [understanding] Culloden" (p. 158). While total government losses that day numbered in the hundreds, Jacobites killed on the field totaled around 3,000, with many more to die later during the pursuit, which was "immediate, persistent, and brutal" (p. 98). Charles Edward's entourage removed him protesting from the field, and he fled eventually back to mainland Europe.

Pittock covers post-battle developments in Chapter 4, "Aftermath and Occupation." Put succinctly, "the British government had had a bad fight, and the Jacobites would pay for it" (p. 99). The government ceremonially and publicly executed nearly all the rebellion's leaders. Most of the roughly 3,500 prisoners were also executed, were transported to overseas parts of the British Empire, or they enlisted in the army with duty in various pestilential garrisons. With upward of 13,000 troops seizing Scotland, three-quarters of them British regulars, "this was not a Highland pacification but a national occupation," (p. 109) according to the author.

Pittock uses both Chapter 5 "The Battle That Made Britain: Historiography and Evidence in the Case of Culloden" and Chapter 6 "Culloden in British Memory: Objects, Artefacts, and Representations of the Conflict" to discuss and analyze how the battle has been interpreted and remembered. He chooses David Morier's painting, *An Incident in the Rebellion of 1745* (completed soon after the battle possibly using prisoners as models for the Jacobite soldiers), as emblematic of the traditional interpretation of the battle, that is, of kilted, sword-wielding, and primitive but heroic Highlanders pitted against a regular, government army. The contrary is true. As Pittock repeats over and over throughout the book, "the Jacobite Army was a conventional, popular, and substantially non-Gaelic force" (p. 136).

In the final chapter, the author considers his subject from a perspective particularly appealing to this reviewer:

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hat of battlefield preservation and nterpretation. In that regard, according o Pittock, Culloden became "an early nemory site" and eventually "was to ecome a place of pilgrimage for many ho identified themselves as part of the cottish diaspora" (pp. 137, 145). During ne last few decades in particular, the ulloden battlefield has been restored as uch as possible to its 1746 appearance. s size also has been increased, and it eceived a new visitor center in 2007. In ne end, it is the combination of the disci-lines of history and archaeology that ave most shaped the reinterpretation of ne Battle of Culloden. Identifying the entrality of Culloden to modern British istory, Pittock concludes: "It was the last attle fought on British soil and ended the st armed conflict in which the nature of ritain—and indeed its existence—were stake" (p. 158).


As mentioned above, Oxford's *Great attles: Culloden* is not narrative history. a reader wants to precede it by erusing more traditional histories of The '45," several come to mind: Jeremy lack's *Culloden and the '45* (New York: . Martin's Press, 1990), Christopher uffy's *Fight for a Throne: The Jacobite 5 Reconsidered* (West Midlands, ngland: Helion & Company, 2015), and, r the whole Jacobite experience going ack to its 1680s origins, Bruce Lenman's *he Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746* ondon: Eyre Methuen, 1980). Unfor-nately, all of *Great Battles: Culloden*'s lack-and-white illustrations—maps, awings, photos, and paintings—are nerally of poor to mediocre print uality. Nonetheless, Pittock's book ings fresh interpretation to its subject d is well worth the read.

OTE

1. Murray Pittock, "7 Myths About the ttle of Culloden Busted," *History Extra*, 16 ril 2018, https://www.historyextra.com/ riod/georgian/7-myths-about-the-battle-of-loden-busted/, accessed 7 January 2019.

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The Commanders: Civil War Generals Who Shaped the American West



By Robert M. Utley
University of Oklahoma Press, 2018
Pp. xii, 243. $29.95

Review by Frank Kalesnik

Former chief historian of the National Park Service, Robert M. Utley, is one of the foremost experts on the "Old Army" that fought the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century. *The Commanders: Civil War Generals Who Shaped the American West* is his latest contribution to American history. His subjects are Civil War veterans who remained in the Army and rose to command the regionally organized military departments of the service. They include Christopher C. Augur, George Crook, Oliver O. Howard, Nelson A. Miles, Edward O. C. Ord, John Pope, and Alfred H. Terry. These generals achieved varying degrees of success as field commanders and administrators. Utley carefully evaluates their performances before, during, and after the Civil War, with emphasis on their service in the West both in the saddle and behind desks. Authoritative, incisive, and engagingly written, *The Commanders* is an expert analysis of military leadership at all levels of command.

The book begins with a chapter describing the Army in the postwar era. The Civil War Army drew much of its strength from volunteer regiments provided by the states for wartime service. By 1874, the Regular Army's strength was reduced to 27,000. Distinguished volunteer officers were allowed to apply for regular commissions, providing balance to the officer corps. Nelson Miles was one such officer, and he rose to become commanding general of the Army, retiring at the rank of lieutenant general.

While many Army leaders were seasoned combat veterans, the quality of their troops declined after the Civil War. According to Utley, the reenlistment rate was low and the desertion rate high. Promotions up to the rank of colonel were based on seniority, but general officer appointments were highly political, particularly when deaths or retirements created vacancies. Personal rivalries fueled by professional competition and grudges held for perceived slights were common.

Utley's assessment of doctrine and professional education during this period grabs the reader's attention. "Schools sprouted for special training, and professional journals proliferated," he writes. "Yet neither in the schools nor in the instructional manuals was the unconventional warfare practiced by Indians addressed." He notes, "The emphasis was on the next conventional war, to be fought by orthodox strategy and tactics." He concludes, "This thinking, of course, ignored the fact that for a century the prime mission of the army was fighting Indians." (p. 14) Ironic, considering that men who commanded corps and divisions between 1861 and 1865 subsequently led battalions and regiments in actions against Native Americans that would be considered minor skirmishes by Civil War standards.

The author's evaluation of the generals' performance is thought-provoking. He considers Nelson Miles, a Civil War volunteer with no formal military education, to be "the best Indian fighter," but qualifies this statement by noting that Miles, "achieved this record as a colonel rather than as a brigadier." As a department commander, Miles "sinks below mediocrity" (pp. 206–07). This reviewer does not concur with that assessment. In 1886, Miles ended the Apache Wars by securing the final surrender of Geronimo. At the next level of command (Division of the Missouri), he brought the Ghost Dance uprising to a close, held Lt. Col. Edwin V. Sumner (the Seventh Cavalry's commander) accountable for the debacle at Wounded Knee, and continued to seek justice for the Native American survivors of that tragedy up until his death in 1925. Nelson Miles was certainly egotistical—few successful generals are not—but he did not become commanding general of the Army because he was incompetent.

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
Utley also scrutinizes the career of Miles' professional rival, George Crook. A West Point graduate, Crook's Indian fighting career began in the Pacific Northwest before the Civil War, where it resumed afterward. An avid outdoorsman, Crook was the personification of the rugged field soldier (an image Utley considers an affectation). Utley recognizes Crook's relentless Tonto Basin Campaign (1872–1873) against the Apaches in Arizona as his crowning achievement, and rightfully criticizes his lackluster performance in the Sioux War (1876–1877). Utley concludes, "General George Crook does not deserve the exalted view that history accords him. But he does deserve to be remembered as one of the great generals of the frontier army" (p. 66). He also declares, "In short, only one other Indian fighting general, Nelson A. Miles, could match Crook's career as a frontier army leader" (p. 65). This assessment is fair.

The concluding chapter of *The Commanders* summarizes the author's evaluations of the generals, then rates them on their overall performance as department commanders. He rates Augur first, followed by Crook, Pope, Terry, Howard, Miles, and Ord. When focusing exclusively on their combat records as department commanders (and allowing for the fact that some relied on subordinates to conduct operations while they remained at headquarters), the order is Crook, Augur, Pope, Howard, Ord, and Miles (the author omitted Terry). Utley explains that, "Despite Miles' successful campaigns as a colonel, he rates the bottom slot only by virtue of the Apache campaign of 1886" (p. 211). This reviewer believes the author's evaluation is biased; Utley just doesn't like Miles. The bottom line is that Miles had the most successful career, established by success in the field under conditions where his rivals failed.

The Commanders is still an excellent book. It is thought-provoking, highly readable, and a valuable contribution to American military history. Both professional historians and Western enthusiasts will enjoy it tremendously. Professional soldiers will also find it useful, particularly at the current time, when a renewed emphasis on preparing for conventional conflicts makes us forget that, in one form or another, the U.S. Army's primary mission has always been fighting Indians.

Dr. Frank Kalesnik earned his bachelor's degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute and his master's degree and Ph.D. in American history at Florida State University. He has taught at the Virginia Military Institute and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and served as a command historian for both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. He also served for twenty-two years as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. He is currently the command historian for Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918



By Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo
University Press of Kansas, 2018
Pp. xiii, 681. $39.95

Review by Mark Klobas

One of the many lessons contained in Daniel Hughes and Richard DiNardo's history of the imperial German army is the truth of an observation by the former United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, "Time goes by, reputation increases, ability declines." For while the German army came into existence in 1871 enjoying a reputation formed from its Prussian military inheritance and the successes experienced in three recent wars, the reputation was one that proved inhibiting when Germany went to war in 1914. In the four years that followed, the authors argue, the "Prussian way of war" that proved so successful in 1864, 1866, and 1870 led to defeat and the demise of the empire it was created to defend. In this respect, the way of war was a failure of epic proportions.

How the Germans' previous successes led to this failure is an important focus of this book. Hughes and DiNardo underscore this by starting their examination not in 1871 but with the aftermath of the battles of Jena and Auerstädt in 1806. Defeated by Napoleon's forces after decades of coasting on the reputation earned in wars waged by Frederick the Great, the entire Prussian military structure reformed in order to create a force capable of defeating the *Grande Armée*. From this, a socially broader force emerged that won the victories of 1813, 1814, and 1815, and Carl von Clausewitz articulated a new theory of war that emphasized mobile warfare in pursuit of a battle in which the enemy army is annihilated. Many of the army's reforms were rolled back in the decades after those victories in order to maintain the political reliability of Prussian forces (which was important to its other primary mission, the preservation of the monarchy). However, Clausewitz's ideas soon predominated in Prussian Army doctrine, thanks in no small measure to the efforts of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.

For Hughes and DiNardo, Moltke is the pivotal figure in the history of the imperial German army, not just because of his stature as the foremost post-Napoleonic military theoretician of the nineteenth century, but for his practical military reforms as well. His controversial practice of operational flexibility (later known as *Auftragstaktik*) reflected his belief that tactical outcomes drove decisions at the larger operational and strategic level. The scale of war grew in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War with the adoption of conscription and other modernizations by Continental powers, and the German army had to formulate a response. With Moltke's retirement in 1888, this task fell primarily to Alfred von Schlieffen. He reacted to the decreasing availability of maneuver space by adopting a different approach, one that stressed tactical success at key points. Here the authors join colleagues such as Terence Zuber and Hans Ehlert in downplaying the notion of a "Schlieffen Plan," noting the absence of any formal war plans during Schlieffen's fourteen years as chief of the general staff. His approach was largely continued by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. However, the memos

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
nd deployment plans which defined the rmy's reaction to any declaration of war ere regularly modified to reflect changes n Germany's geopolitical situation, such s the growing threat posed by Russia in ne east and Italy's drift away from the entral Powers.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, the mitations produced by these approaches uickly became apparent. A governing ystem highly dependent on personal adership was hobbled by Wilhelm II's mitations, depriving the army of much-eeded institutional coordination. The rmy leadership's educational focus on actics, rather than on broader issues of atecraft, exacerbated the vacuum in rand strategy. Battlefield success was isconnected from any practical plan o end the war. Mobile warfare against pponents of a higher caliber than those in 866 and 1870 produced gains at the cost f unsustainably high casualties, but not ne desired breakthrough. All this forced ne German army's leaders to turn to ositional warfare" on the Western Front, hile maintaining an emphasis on mobile arfare in campaigns against Russia and the Balkans. Though the army adapted ccessfully, the skills of mobile warfare ere lost in the process. When units on the estern Front were retrained in it later in ne war, it was implemented without the aditional goal of the decisive-encounter attle. This effectively conceded the ventual return to the positional warfare at was fatally corrosive to the army's rength. Along with the socially elitist mposition of the officer corps fueling the ss of credibility among enlisted men, it ought about the collapse of the imperial erman army by the autumn of 1918.

This failure to achieve either of its re missions has done little to tarnish e imperial German army's stature as a hting force, however. In this, Hughes d DiNardo's book serves as a valuable rrective. Drawing upon the surviving imary source records, as well as a vast nge of secondary source material in both erman and English, the authors provide eir readers with a comprehensive study the German army's doctrine, strategic anning, organization, and development. e depth of research and scope of analysis ntributes to a balanced assessment of the perial German army, one that explains w it prepared for war and how, in the d, those preparations proved wanting. It is a book that every student of the First World War should read, as well as those interested in moving beyond the reputation of the imperial German army to better understand its true abilities as a fighting force.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is a podcaster with the New Books Network and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.

Angels of the Underground: The American Women who Resisted the Japanese in the Philippines in World War II



By Theresa Kaminski
Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. xii, 497. $27.95

Review by Amanda Williams

Much has been written about World War II in the Philippines. Most of it focuses on General Douglas MacArthur, the 1942 defeat of U.S. and Filipino forces, the treatment of prisoners of war, guerrilla activity, and the 1944–1945 campaign to liberate the islands from Japanese control. In *Angels of the Underground*, Theresa Kaminski weaves these major areas of scholarship into a thoughtful study of women who resisted the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Kaminski's work centers on two American women: Peggy Utinsky and Claire Phillips. After the fall of the Philippines, these women adopted other nationalities to avoid internment-camp incarceration with other Allied civilians. Utinsky managed to convince the Japanese she was Lithuanian, and Phillips was able to pass herself off as an Italian. Armed with these identities, they used their freedom in the occupation's early days to search for their missing husbands. Very quickly however, these quests morphed into efforts to alleviate the suffering of prisoners of war. The women also assisted guerrilla bands and gathered intelligence.

Utinsky, or "Miss U" as she codenamed herself, organized a covert network of sympathizers who smuggled aid to the prisoners of war. A nurse by day, her network reached places like Camp O'Donnell, Cabanatuan Prison Camp, and Bilibid Prison. She was relentless—even returning to her smuggling work after being captured, tortured, and released by the Kempeitai.

Phillips participated in Utinsky's smuggling network but also cultivated close ties with the Japanese. Codenamed "High Pockets" because of her tendency to hide contraband in her brassiere, she opened Club Tsubaki during the occupation. The nightclub was popular with Japanese military officers and businessmen and she used her talent as an entertainer to gather intelligence from her clientele. Her efforts in this area did not always endear her to other resistance members. For women like Phillips, the politics of entertaining the enemy could be difficult to navigate, and even more difficult to explain in the postwar period.

Writing about women and war can be tricky. One of the great strengths of *Angels of the Underground* is that Kaminski rejects the notion of a universal sisterhood in which all women supposedly band together and get along when confronted with crisis. Instead, Kaminski opts for a more nuanced view—that war is a very individual experience and women like Utinsky and Phillips determined "how the war would happen to them" (p. 6). Kaminski argues that even in the absence of a uniform, these women saw themselves as "accountable for their actions during wartime," and believed that they "had to choose a side; they had to take action" (p. 98).

Patriotism alone is often the simplest explanation for their decisions to take action. Kaminski delves deeper and reveals they were also driven by revenge, restlessness, and a desire for recognition. They also had a difficult relationship with each other. These are not the typical qualities of "angels," but in the absence of an idealized sisterhood, both women saved lives by choosing how the war happened to them.

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The memoirs of Utinsky and Phillips provide the basis for much of the book. There is clear evidence that both women embellished their exploits and conveniently left out the awkward, petty, and unheroic bits. Without a doubt they were posterity conscious. So was everyone who wrote a memoir of the war. One of the tasks historians face when working with such sources is to identify and understand what has been included and what has been omitted. Kaminski does this and succeeds in placing both women in the context of the war while not glamorizing their stories or ignoring the controversies. From beginning to end, Kaminski addresses their personality issues and paranoia (which many male operatives also exhibited under stress), the doubts about the tactical value of some of their contributions, their failures in terms of tradecraft and operational security, and the difficulty of corroborating their stories.


In addition to telling the story of Utinsky and Phillips, Kaminski also does an excellent job of bringing Manila to life. Once the "Pearl of the Orient," Kaminski reveals a Manila under siege, the chaos as it is declared an open city by General MacArthur, and the eerie calm before the Japanese takeover. She then details the brutal Japanese occupation that would last nearly three years. This gives the reader an interesting look at MacArthur's departure and return through the eyes of the civilians left behind.

At times the narrative skips around and its pace is a little uneven, but Kaminski makes up for this with the book's wealth of information and her ability to tease out her sources. Scholars of the resistance movement in the Philippines will appreciate the inclusion of Yay Panlilio, Gladys Savary, Millie B. Sanders, Edwin Ramsey, Pilar Campos, and German priest Theodore Buttenbruch. In addition to these women and men, many lesser-known members of the resistance also factor into the story of Utinsky and Phillips.

Angels of the Underground does not answer every question about Utinsky and Phillips, or about the role of women and the resistance in the Philippines. Sometimes it is impossible to untangle these shadowy stories, and sometimes unraveling a thread just adds more mystery. Nevertheless, *Angels of the Underground* is an important contribution to the field of military history. It is a levelheaded, sober assessment of how women experience war.

Amanda Williams serves as the educational manager at the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia. She holds a master's degree in history from Old Dominion University. She specializes in military history, intelligence studies, and women's history.

The Indispensable Force: The Post–Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990–2010



By Kathryn Roe Coker
Office of Army Reserve History
Pp. xxxvi, 553. $30

Review by H. Allen Skinner Jr.

After reading the preface to Kathryn Coker's *The Indispensable Force*, one would assume the book was a historical reference work focused on the United States Army Reserve (USAR) after 1990. Indeed, the director of the Army Reserve history program when the book was published, Lee Harford, describes the book as a "permanent historical reference . . . the institutional memory of the Army Reserve during a critical period of its history, serving as a guide for current and future operations." Furthermore, Hartford declares that the book would not only give senior Army leaders a historical perspective in decision making, but would also prove useful to the general public in understanding the basic history of the USAR (p. xxxv).

Unfortunately, the book falls short of Hartford's promise, as it is riddled with structural flaws which gravely compromise its usefulness. Not only does the book lack the historical depth of a serious work of history, it lacks the clear organizational structure needed in a reference book. In attempting to reconcile two distinctly different objectives, the writer and editors of the book fail to adequately accomplish Harford's goals.

For example, the beginning chapter, misleadingly titled "Post–Cold War Defense Strategy," immediately veers into the participation of the Army Reserve in the First Gulf War—certainly an important topic but hardly germane to the chapter title. The remainder of the first chapter, which is an unreasonably long 142 pages, swerves from topic to topic ranging from personnel, training, base realignment, and family well-being. The chapters that follow are equally large and filled with graphics and PowerPoint data charts that hinder the reader's ability to easily find information. In particular, this reviewer found many of the 276 photographs and reprints of Army artwork did little to support the text. One case in point is an artwork representation of the Audie Murphy competition inserted between Figure I-3 and the "Bottom-Up Review" section (p. 49), a juxtaposition which did not support the flow of the narrative.


Author Kathryn Coker, who spent eighteen years working as an Army Reserve historian before completing the book, appropriately compliments her narrative with twenty-eight figures and five tables which provide detailed historical information which would be of great value to Army decision makers—if properly organized. Continuing with the positive aspects of the book, Coker supports her narrative with detailed endnotes in each chapter. Her endnotes include thirty-one pages of source materials: books, articles, and internal documents produced by the Army Reserve, the Department of Defense, and other Federal agencies. Finally, Coker supplements her research with details gleaned from oral history interviews she conducted with senior Army Reserve leaders.

Despite the manifold flaws present in the book, Kathryn Coker's *The Indispensable Force* should serve as a good starting point for a reader wanting to learn the history of the post–Cold War Army Reserve. Reorganizing the book thematically would go a long way toward improving the usefulness of the end product, and would turn *The Indispensable Force* into what it was originally intended, and best suited: a professional reference book for Army Reserve leaders. To accomplish the task of telling the history of the Army Reserve,

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ne Office of Army Reserve History should reate a separate, in-depth historical study f the USAR's organization since the end f World War II.

H. Allen Skinner Jr., a retired Army National Guard officer, is the command historian for the 81st Readiness Division, U. S. Army Reserve, located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. He is currently working on a staff ride handbook covering the Southern Campaign of 1780, while his staff ride guide for the Battle of Kings Mountain was accepted for publication by the Army University Press later in 2019. He received his master's degree in military history from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 2006.



Review by Edgar F. Raines

enry Ware Lawton, famous in his own ay, is now known only to a few historians ecializing in the Indian Wars, the War ith Spain in 1898, and the Philippine surrection (as this conflict is officially signated). Michael E. Shay, a former perior court judge in Connecticut, and e author or editor of five previous books, eks with some success to restore Lawton the prominence he once enjoyed in *enry Ware Lawton: Union Infantryman, ontier Soldier, Charismatic Warrior.* ie book is the first scholarly treatment Lawton's life. The author's previous ography of Lawton's adjutant general in the Philippines, Lt. Col. Clarence R. Edwards, and his edited edition of the letters of Robert Dexter Carter, a civilian clerk in Lawton's headquarters in 1899, obviously led Shay to his subject.

Lawton, born on 17 March 1843, in Manhattan, Ohio, is a difficult subject for any biographer. His father was a millwright who moved his family from job to job in Ohio and then Indiana. In 1849 or 1850 he left for the gold rush in California. His mother had to depend upon her relatives in Ohio for support—she and her three boys stayed with different kin. She died when Henry was ten. His uncle Andrew, a harness maker, took the boy as an apprentice. Three years later his father returned and took young Henry with him to jobs in Iowa and Missouri. Working with his father, Henry developed wood-working skills. This training would help him later when he served as a quartermaster in the American West. He had some schooling when young, but it was rather sketchy. Despite this, he was attending a Methodist college in Fort Wayne, Indiana, when the Civil War broke out. He volunteered and served as a sergeant in the 9th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers during Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's 1861 campaign. Mustered out after ninety days, he joined the three-year 30th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers as a first lieutenant. The regiment served in what became the Army of the Cumberland. By the end of the war, Lawton was a lieutenant colonel and the regimental commander, but until the Battle of Franklin (Tennessee) in late 1864, there is little in the historical record to describe what he was doing. None of his personal correspondence from the war or the years before survived, and no veterans wrote a history of his regiment. Consequently, the first two chapters of the biography are long on context with only brief glimpses of Lawton. The fact that we have even those glimpses is a testament to Shay's considerable skill as a researcher.

We know that Lawton had impressed senior officers with his leadership skills, because none other than Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan took a personal interest in getting Lawton a commission in the Regular Army after the war. Lawton served in the African American 41st Infantry, later redesignated as the 24th Infantry, and then transferred to the 4th Cavalry. In fact, in these transfers he was following the moves of his regimental commander, Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, who became the Army's premier Indian fighter.

Lawton excelled as a quartermaster, getting supplies and remounts where they were needed to allow his regiment to stay in the field for weeks or even months in a very austere environment. He became an indispensable man, so much so that the teetotaler Mackenzie would overlook Lawton's occasional "sprees." Lawton was an alcoholic: spirits would dog him his entire career.

Lawton remained a fearless combat leader as he demonstrated in campaigns on the southern plains, in the Rocky Mountains, and in the Southwest. Lawton's role in the last campaign against Geronimo is perhaps the most written about of all his service on the frontier. Biographies have analyzed that campaign from the point of view of Nelson A. Miles, Charles B. Gatewood, and Leonard Wood.[1] Having an account from Lawton's perspective emphasizes that he was key to maintaining the persistent pursuit into Mexico that wore down the Apaches, but, even more strikingly, it illustrates how important he was to convincing Miles to personally accept Geronimo's surrender—the final essential step. Lawton's reward was transfer to the inspector general's department in 1888 and promotion to major. Shay has an interesting chapter on Lawton's decade of service in the inspector general's department, but he understates the amount of reform occurring in the Army during that period. Still, promotions came much faster in the staff than in the line. In July 1898, Lawton received a promotion to full colonel, but by then the nation was at war again and Lawton was in Cuba as a major general of volunteers.

Lawton commanded the 2d Division, V Corps, in the Santiago Campaign. He was younger than most of the senior leaders in Cuba. Shay provides a brief, largely descriptive account of Lawton's role in the Battle of El Caney, a little less than two pages. I found this brevity disappointing given that this was Lawton's one opportunity to command a division in combat. Subsequent to the surrender of Santiago, he became the commander of the department of the same name. Soon thereafter he went on a drunken spree of epic proportions. Word reached the White House, and President William McKinley relieved Lawton of his command. McKinley sent him to the Philippines to redeem his reputation.

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Shay does not quite understand the importance of the role that Lawton played in the Fall 1899 campaign designed to destroy the Philippine Army and capture, if possible, the leader of the Filipinos, Emilio Aguinaldo. Because of incessant rain, Lawton dispatched a strike force under Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young to block Aguinaldo's withdrawal into northern Luzon, while he followed with the main force, dropping detachments to block roads. He devoted most of his energies to keeping his and Young's force supplied.[2] The effort failed, but not because of any error by Lawton or Young. The blocking force that landed at Lingayen Gulf failed to exhibit sufficient initiative to block the roads near the coast that Young could not reach in time. By focusing almost exclusively on Lawton and not sketching the larger strategy, Shay undervalues what he accomplished.

In December 1899, while displaying the frontline leadership that had always marked his career, Lawton was killed in action during a minor engagement at San Mateo, outside of Manila. Shay suggests that Lawton accompanied the expedition only because he wanted to secure his promotion to brigadier general in the Regular Army. Possibly, but Lawton was never willing to ask a subordinate to do what he was unwilling to do. The officer corps held him in high esteem. Perhaps for that reason, opposite the entrance to the main dining room of the Army and Navy Club in Washington, D.C., there is a magnificent head-and-shoulders oil portrait of Lawton by Charles Harold L. MacDonald. While Shay's biography could be improved in some areas, it is a valuable book that at least partially fills a real gap in the literature about Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton.

NOTES

1. Peter R. DeMontravel, *A Hero To His Fighting Men: Nelson A. Miles, 1839–1925* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998); Robert Wooster, *Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Louis Kraft, *Gatewood and Geronimo* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931); Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); Jack McCallum, *Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, and Architect of American Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).

2. William T. Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939) provides perhaps the best account of the campaign and its significance. Shay did not, apparently, consult this work.

Dr. Edgar F. Raines Jr. is historian emeritus at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). He is the author of *Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II* (CMH, 2000) and *The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983* (CMH, 2010).

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Alvin York, Audie Murphy, Paul Ray Smith. Through sustained engagement as part of the TRADOC enterprise, we can achieve it. Every Army soldier and civilian should be *inspired* to speak with some personal knowledge of our service's contributions to the nation's development and security. Former Senator and Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb reminds us that military organizations fight well because they recognize and try to live up to their history and traditions.

But this is about more than just heritage preservation and esprit de corps. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Army has proven consistently adept at producing operationally and tactically proficient leaders, soldiers, and formations. As new threats emerge, however, and the post–Cold War, post–September 11th world reshapes itself, it will be increasingly difficult to translate tactical and operational success into sustained strategic success in a joint, interagency, and combined environment. Now, as in previous times of change, asking critical, creative, contextual questions is essential. Historical education creates higher-order thinkers who can develop and implement policy and link ends, ways, and means. We can and should have leaders with historical understanding at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The study of history creates wisdom and perspective, helps leaders to cope with ambiguity and uncertainty, and sharpens critical thinking skills. In a word, history *educates*. Study of history makes us a smarter, and therefore better, Army. General Martin E. Dempsey, former chief of staff of the Army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes the point constantly that historical knowledge is an essential part of strategic thinking and leadership at all levels.

We should take the opportunity provided by this realignment to refocus ongoing efforts to keep the Army's institutional memory on a firm footing. Institutional memory consists of proper record-keeping procedures throughout the Army, the use of those records in the process of designing and implementing policy and strategy, and the custodial care of the Army's material culture. Properly done, this requires the staffing of command history offices at all levels of command from Group and Regiment to Army, and in ACOMs and TRADOC branch headquarters. Command history offices generate annual historical summaries, which supplement the *Department of the Army Historical Summary* produced by CMH. This construct, supported by readily available documentary records, encourages institutional memory. A twenty-first-century Army Museum Enterprise, which uses our world-class artifact collection to train and educate, supplements our documentary record. When we preserve our institutional memory and combine it with rigorous historical education in our schools, the result is an intellectually agile force, with habits of mind sharpened by historical literacy.

Realignment to TRADOC will set the conditions for Army historians (and those who know me, know that I consider *all* of us to be practitioners and stewards of Army history) to have an even greater impact on the force. TRADOC's Army Reform initiatives are grouped into four areas: acquiring soldiers; building and improving Army training and education; integrating missions, processes, and resources; and managing talent. Each of these areas can be enhanced with the expertise and collaboration of Army historians. As TRADOC streamlines programs to acquire soldiers, the Army should use the tremendous emotive power of its long history of service to the nation to increase the impact of recruiting programs. When TRADOC works to *build and improve Army training and education*, we should take the opportunity provided by the realignment to engage across the training enterprise to sustain or increase soldier contact hours in historical instruction, whether in precommissioning sources, basic training, branch schools, professional military education (PME), or in the operating force. Our museum professionals are a key resource, and we should see our museums and training support facilities as platforms for training and education. The realignment of CMH supports TRADOC's effort to *integrate missions, processes, and resources*, giving the Army Historical Program a four-star advocate at the highest levels of the Army leadership. Finally, TRADOC efforts to reform the *talent management enterprise* will create yet more opportunities for CMH and a more unified Army History Program to improve our relevance to the entire force. The creation in 2013 of Career Program 61, serving the Army's official historians, archivists, and museum professionals, is another indicator that the time may be right for this realignment of CMH's authorities.

In July 2019, our Biennial Conference of Army Historians will take place at Fort Eustis, Virginia, TRADOC's headquarters, with the theme of Army Reform Throughout History. We should take that opportunity to collaborate on an enhanced Army History Program. I suggest some directions for this inquiry:

- Emphasis on agreed themes in American military history, and application of those themes across the continuum of recruiting, retention, training, education, and service.
- Rigorous historical instruction in Army schools.
- Better professional integration between official historians and teaching historians.
- A reformed and industry-standard Army Museum Enterprise, with deeper collaboration between official historians, instructors, and museum professionals.
- Improved opportunities for professional mobility across the Army History Program.
- Increased use of Army historical publications in training and PME.

There is a clichéd saying, frequently employed on motivational posters, that ten percent of life is what happens to you, and ninety percent of it is how you react to what happens. This saying is actually quite applicable to our situation now, and I encourage all Army historians to view the CMH realignment to TRADOC as the opportunity of our professional lifetimes to make a real, lasting difference to the institution we all serve and love. If you are a CMH employee, stay plugged into this transition so that you can shape it, and if you are not a CMH employee, but engaging in the craft of history in another part of our Army, look to CMH as a colleague, ally, and resource.

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
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Chief Historian's Foreword

Jon T. Hoffman

Looking Back, Looking Forward

The Center of Military History (CMH) recently received a public inquiry about the genesis of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War book series. It turned out we had a fifty-page working paper on the subject written in 1981, drawn primarily from contemporary records and supplemented by the memory of those who were involved in the early days of the project. It makes interesting reading as CMH moves forward on the new "Tan Books" series covering the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Vietnam effort began in the shadow of the U.S. Army in World War II series, which was then the major focus of the Center's publishing effort. The secretary of war had formally initiated the World War II official history program (eventually known as the "Green Books") with War Department Circular No. 45 issued on 12 February 1946. It succinctly stated the mission: "The War Department will prepare and publish an official history of World War II." In four short paragraphs covering half a page, the directive sketched out the plan for accomplishing that goal. A year and a half later, Chief of Staff of the Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower followed up with a memorandum emphasizing declassification of information to the greatest extent possible to support work on the series.

In contrast, the Army did not issue similar directives for Vietnam, though CMH started work much closer to the events being covered. In July 1965, barely two months after the first U.S. Army ground combat units deployed to the conflict, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., told CMH to prepare a history series "comparable in objectivity and reliability to the one treating World War II."[1] The Center already had a preliminary monograph underway covering the Army's activity in support of the South Vietnamese army before 1965. In 1966, CMH began planning the details of the series, recognizing that because the war was still ongoing, things could change.

There was considerable debate over a number of issues. One was how to cover combat operations, because they did not lend themselves to the typical narrative of a conventional campaign—a starting point, the movement of front lines, and an ultimate conclusion. There was talk instead of documenting selected actions at different command levels to provide a representative sample of the Army's experience in Vietnam. The chief of military history settled the discussion, directing that combat volumes would provide a chronological campaign narrative similar to the Green Books. Another point of contention was how to handle national policy, as classification issues at that level had hampered work on the Korean War series. The result was a focus on the war at the service level and below. Finally there was deliberation whether the Center would do all volumes in the series, or farm out some of the specialized topics to the relevant commands and technical services, as it had done for the Green Books. There was consensus that it would take about six years to produce each book—the same planning factor CMH is using for the Tan Books.

At the end of 1966, CMH adopted a plan envisioning six volumes: advice and support to the Vietnamese 1954–1965, planning and support at the Department of the Army level, combat operations (two volumes), logistics, and combat techniques (covering special operations, aviation, riverine warfare, etc.). On 6 December 1966, two authors formally began work on the planning and support volume. In March 1967, the Center established a Southeast Asia Team of seven historians. The project thus had momentum less than two years into the war. At almost the same time, the chief of military history expanded the series to ten volumes, adding ones on engineering and medical activities, advice and support from 1965 onward, and a one-volume overview of the conflict. To ensure information about national policy decisions would be available, he also believed that CMH "should originate a move which would lead to making the needed Defense Department records available to all service historical offices."[2]

In 1971, the Center undertook a comprehensive review of the series and expanded it to fifteen volumes. It dropped the combat techniques book, deciding that those activities properly belonged in the chronological combat narratives. The additions covered communications, U.S.-based logistical support to the war, a third combat volume for the period around the Tet Offensive, a fourth picking up the action after that, and a pictorial history. Two years later, CMH completed another reassessment, driven by the shortage of available authors, and evaluated cutting the number of volumes in half. The study actually expanded the series by one book, though it changed some of the topics. Over the next eight years, the series grew to twenty-three projected volumes.

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NEWS NOTES



Army History Author Wins James Madison Prize

Dr. Thomas Boghardt is the recipient of this year's James Madison Prize for his article "Semper Vigilis: The U.S. Army Security Agency in Early Cold War Germany," which appeared in the Winter 2018 issue (No. 106) of *Army History* magazine. Given by the Society for History in the Federal Government, this annual award recognizes excellence in an article or essay that centers on any aspect of the federal government's history. The prize emphasizes not only value in furthering our understanding of the federal government but rigor of methodology and the employment of original and underutilized primary source materials. Dr. Boghardt is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH).

Search for Materials

CMH is in search of source material related to Army operations in Southwest Asia, 1991–2001. If you have "green book" journals, documents, narratives, pictures, *Desert Voice* newspapers, or other related material, please contact Dr. J. Travis Moger at jourden.t.moger.civ@mail.mil.

Operations of interest:

- Vigilant Warrior (1994)
- Vigilant Sentinel (1995)
- Desert Strike (1996)
- Desert Thunder (1998)
- Desert Fox (1998)
- Intrinsic Action Rotations

World War II Campaign Brochures Converted to ePub

To coincide with the seventy-fifth anniversary of World War II, CMH is converting all forty of its World War II Campaign Brochures into ePub format. All brochures are currently available in PDF format on the CMH Web site, but ePub format will allow for better viewing and expanded capabilities on tablets and other e-readers. The first batch of seven brochures to be released are *Normandy*, *New Guinea*, *Rome-Arno*, *Southern France*, *Rhineland*, *Leyte*, and *Ardennes-Alsace*, with the rest to follow. These ePub versions include new covers and title pages, contemporary fonts, rescanned and enhanced photographs, additional images, some updated and redrawn maps, a World War II seventy-fifth anniversary logo on the inside front cover, and a new introduction for the series by Jon T. Hoffman, CMH's chief historian. The new ePub editions of these brochures will be available alongside the original PDF versions here: https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-broch.html.

Women's Military History Symposium

On 18 July 2019, the Smithsonian will host a one-day symposium, *Towards a More Inclusive Women's Military History*. The forum will convene students, archivists, scholars, and curators of women's military history—as well as veterans and active members of the military—to share their work, reflect on the past and future of women's military history, and develop a way forward for a more inclusive community across diverse institutions and audiences. Concentrating on the collective network of military institutions located in the Washington, D.C., region, the symposium seeks to build connections and foundations for the broader community of interest. If you are based in the national capital region and interested in attending, contact Miranda Summers Lowe (summerslmm@si.edu).

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"Nothing Daunted"

Andrew A. Humphreys, the Union II Corps, and the Appomattox Campaign

Matthew T. Pearcy

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(*Left*) Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys; (*Top*) Crow's Nest battery and lookout in front of Petersburg, Virginia

Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys (1810–1883) was the best chief of staff in the storied history of the Army of the Potomac.[1] He was smart, meticulous, and obsessively hardworking. He had accumulated in the years before the Civil War more high-level administrative experience than anyone in the Army. Over a period of sixteen months, he served successfully under the mercurial Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and played a vital role in bloody encounters in Virginia at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg. In June 1864, prominent newspaperman and War Department liaison Charles A. Dana called Humphreys "the great soldier of the Army of the Potomac."[2] Others, including Meade and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, admired his talents as a strategist, tactician, and topographical engineer and were effusive in their praise.[3] But the fiery and ambitious Humphreys was always apathetic about the position. Several weeks into it, he grumbled to a friend that "it suits me in nothing, my habits, my wishes, my tastes. It is even more distasteful to me than I can well express."[4] He wanted a top field command, preferably something in the Army of the Potomac, and vowed to quit volunteer service if he did not get it.[5] Then in November 1864, a way opened. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, still suffering from a festering wound received at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, relinquished command of the vaunted II Corps. Grant turned it over to Humphreys and never for a day regretted it.

New Command


On a brisk Saturday morning, 26 November 1864, Humphreys mounted his gray mare, Beckie, and departed from his familiar spot at Army headquarters in the direction of his new assignment. "Expressing their regard," fifteen mounted officers skipped breakfast to accompany him to his new post and remained with him all morning, stomachs growling.[6] The II Corps held a dangerous and fatiguing frontline position on the army's right, east of Petersburg, and it took Humphreys and his entourage more than an hour to navigate the nearly six miles to his new headquarters.[7] There he was warmly received by Hancock, a fellow West Pointer and Pennsylvanian and probably the most consistently successful corps commander of the war. The two were "best of friends," according to Humphreys, and had been "since we first met in the Peninsula [Campaign]."[8] They later fought together at Gettysburg in a desperate effort to resist and ultimately throw back a slashing Confederate attack along Emmitsburg Road.[9] At Petersburg, they were occasional eating (and drinking) companions.[10]

That morning they "passed an hour and a half together," during which Humphreys met with his division commanders. All three were, Humphreys wrote, "known to me and very clever men they are."[11] The best was Maj. Gen. John Gibbon who commanded the 2d Division, but he was "mad," as one staff officer described him, at being passed over for command of the corps.[12] He asked to be relieved, but Meade, and later Grant, talked him down.[13] Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, a gifted 25-year-old officer who later gained fame as an Indian fighter, ably managed the 1st Division. Maj. Gen. Gershom Mott led the 3d Division. He was brave and popular with his men but was, as one contemporary historian wrote, "lacking a little in that stirring ambition."[14]

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General Grant



General Gibbon




General Miles


At midday, Humphreys saw Hancock off to the train for City Point and returned to set up camp. "The transfer to a new command," he wrote to his wife, Rebecca, "is always uncomfortable. There are so many little arrangements to make or to be understood." In this case, however, it was "all . . . done quickly and without fatigue."[15] Before the sun set behind enemy works, he had "tents pitched and arranged" and "settled . . . the servants, the horses, the orderlies, [and] the mail carrier." He met—all on that first day—with each department head, including the "Inspector General, Chief of Staff, Chief Commissary, Chief ambulance, Chief signal, Provost Marshall, Chief of Artillery." He also drafted a general order marking the transition and promising the men that "I shall try to do my duty, and preserve your reputation unsullied."[16] By evening he was content. "Everything is now arranged like an old establishment."[17]

As the new commander of the II Corps, Humphreys could also take satisfaction in knowing that he and his fellow West Point engineers now dominated the highest ranks of the Army of the Potomac. Meade, an 1835 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, was, of course, the commanding general. Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, the "Hero of Little Round Top," had the V Corps; Maj. Gen. John Grubb Parke led the IX Corps; and Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright commanded the VI Corps. Coincidentally, Warren, Parke, and Wright each graduated second in his class at West Point—in 1850, 1849, and 1841, respectively. Humphreys, an 1831 graduate, was five years older than Meade and the oldest major general in the Army. He already had served thirty years as an Army engineer—the vast majority of that time with the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers, which later produced Meade, Parke, and Warren as well. Wright was the product of a companion organization, the Army Corps of Engineers.

Wartime exigencies saw that second engineer entity take over the first to create a combined Corps of Engineers headed by a new chief of engineers at the rank of a brigadier general in the Regular Army. The top engineer job was, as Humphreys foreshadowed years earlier, the only one in the Army "worth striving for."[18] That alone seems to explain his support for the 1863 merger that put him crossways with most of his fellow topographical



General Mott



General Warren

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General Hill

The Union had to discharge thousands of hardened veterans. To replace those wounded, killed, and retired, the Union armies turned to draftees, substitutes, and bounty men. Many were paid as much as $1,000 to enlist, a tidy sum in 1864 and a powerful inducement that lured the uncertain as well as the unscrupulous.[23] These "reluctant soldiers" swelled the depleted ranks of the II Corps and, together with returning veterans, made good nearly all of the losses sustained in the Overland Campaign the previous spring.[24] Still, much of the army was green and of generally poor quality.[25]

These worrying deficits had already brought disaster to the II Corps. After the crater incident in late July, Grant abandoned the frontal assault for a series of flanking maneuvers intended to stretch rebel defenses to the south, weaken the line, and expose the railroads behind Lee's right and rear. These lines were the lifeblood of Richmond. Lee had to hold them or abandon the Confederate capital. In mid-August, Warren and his V Corps destroyed the final few miles of the Weldon Railroad as it approached Petersburg from the south, forcing Lee and his teamsters to haul supplies in wagons by a roundabout way. A week later, Grant followed up with Hancock and two of his divisions (Mott stayed behind) to extend the job. It went well enough at first. By late evening of 24 August they had destroyed an additional eight miles of track and worked their ruin several miles south of Reams Station as far as Malone's Crossing. Under a blazing summer sun, the soldiers raised large fires to heat the rails, bend them, and otherwise render them useless. Some they twisted but, try as they might, could not manage the shape of the II Corps emblem, the trefoil ("Clubs are trump!").[26]

That night, Hancock received a dispatch from Chief of Staff Humphreys indicating that "large bodies of infantry," about 8,000 to 10,000 men, had been seen "leaving their works" about sunset and "passing southward from the Petersburg entrenchments."[27] These were elements of the Confederate Third Corps, under the command of Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill. Forewarned, Hancock returned to Reams Station and settled into open trenches. These had been "hastily thrown up" by the VI Corps two months earlier and were, according to Humphreys, "slight."[28] Hancock made little effort to improve them before the following afternoon when Hill's division smashed headlong into his works. Three green New York regiments under Miles caught the brunt of it, and the line buckled. Some of the soldiers fled, but most surrendered en masse. Gibbon fared little better as his men "fell back in great confusion."[29] It was a rout. Badly stung by the failure of his two crack divisions, Hancock ordered a withdrawal to the east. His losses were 559 men killed and wounded, 2,046 men captured and missing. He had also lost nine cannon and twelve colors, several times the losses at any previous engagement.[30] Hancock blamed the lack of experienced junior officers, some of whom did not speak English, and the poor quality of the new recruits. The whole affair dealt a devastating psychological blow that left Hancock and his men deeply scarred. It forced Grant to admit that the "gallant old corps" was, at the moment anyway, unfit for offensive operations.[31]

In a late November letter to his wife, Humphreys related the sorry condition of his new command—"a corps with a high reputation, but completely broken down, as everyone knew."[32] The terrible battles of May and June and the debacle at Reams Station had nearly extinguished the fire that had always animated the II Corps.[33]




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General Hancock

It needed rest but could find little at its current frontline position in the vicinity of Fort Sedgwick (also known as Fort Hell).[34] For three months, Hancock held the right of the entrenchments before Petersburg. Running for five-and-a-half miles and punctuated by a series of enclosed forts, these were "in close contact with the enemy where the [sniper and artillery] firing was incessant." The danger, as Humphreys explained, was that "troops lose their discipline in long continued campaigns" but "especially if they are kept in trenches" where conditions precluded any "opportunity for drill or rest" or to assimilate incoming recruits who composed more than half of the enlisted men in many regiments.[35] Two days after assuming command, he received orders to transfer his corps off to the extreme left. He was to swap places with his friend and fellow Pennsylvanian, Parke and the IX Corps. This was, as Lyman explained, "a delicate job in the face of the enemy, who are pretty close up; but it was all done in entire quiet."[36] Humphreys located his new headquarters along Squirrel Level Road in the vicinity of Peeble's Farm. From this new vantage point, he was happy to report that for the first time in many months, "virtually the whole corps is resting and in reserve."[37] He could now turn his attention to the heavy work of restoring the II Corps to its former glory.

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Staffing the II Corps

First, Humphreys needed a personal staff that he could trust. His inclination was to bring back the old gang—a coterie of loyal staff officers from his previous division commands.[38] At the top of the list were Captains Carswell McClellan, Henry C. Christiancy, and his eldest son, Henry H. "Harry" Humphreys. His close association with McClellan went back to July 1862 when Carswell, a Williams College graduate and first cousin to former army commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, transferred to the Corps of Topographical Engineers, Army of the Potomac, then under Humphreys. McClellan followed Humphreys as a staff officer through his two division commands before transferring to Army headquarters. He was serving in that latter capacity when Confederates captured him along with 2,500 Union soldiers on 19 August 1864, during Warren's first assault on the Weldon Railroad. McClellan did a two-week stint at the infamous Libby Prison in Richmond and was granted parole on 16 November. Then, "compelled from imperative private considerations," he resigned his commission.[39] Upon hearing from his former commander, he moved to recall his "order for my dismissal" but inexplicably was boxed out.[40] Humphreys blamed it on "personal hostility to [Carswell's cousin] General McClellan in the War Department" though persistent rumors of alcoholism had long followed him.[41] Deeply disappointed, Humphreys had, as he wrote to his wife, "counted much on having him with me. He is a most efficient officer and a devoted friend."[42] His luck was no better with Christiancy who had apparently tired of Army life, returned to his native Michigan, and was, as he excused himself, "expecting to go into business within a month."[43] That left only Harry who had scarcely left his father's side since abandoning his studies at Yale Scientific School for an Army commission in October 1862.



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(*Left to right*) Lieutenant Christiancy, Lieutenant Humphreys, General Humphreys, Captain McClellan, Capt. Adolfo Fernández Cavada


Joining Harry on staff, then, were several exceptional young officers. Two, like Colonel Lyman, were recent Harvard graduates from the Boston elite. They were Lt. Col. Charles A. Whittier and Capt. Charles James "Charlie" Mills, both classmates (class of 1860) of the martyred Col. Robert Gould Shaw of the 54th Regiment Infantry, Massachusetts Volunteers. Whittier came from a family of abolitionists. One prominent relative, John Greenleaf Whittier, was a "fireside poet," a newspaper editor, and close associate of William Lloyd Garrison. In 1861, the younger Whittier received a commission into the famed 20th Regiment Infantry, Massachusetts Volunteers, nicknamed the "Harvard Regiment" for the preponderance of the college's graduates among its officers. Before joining Humphreys late in the war, he was senior aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, then commander of the VI Corps. Whittier was at Sedgwick's side at Spotsylvania when a sniper's bullet claimed the life of the popular general.[44]

Mills studied engineering at the Lawrence Scientific School for two years before the war began and was a nephew of the prominent Navy scientist, R. Adm. Charles Henry Davis, who later served with Humphreys on the U. S. Lighthouse Board. Mills was injured



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Colonel Whittier



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Captain Mills

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Major Livermore

badly at Antietam—shot through both thighs while prone on a sweltering battlefield—and was discharged for disability. He worked briefly for his uncle in the Navy's new Bureau of Navigation but was anxious to return to the war, which he did in January 1864, though he was scarcely fit for it.[45] As a fellow officer recounted, "one leg was shorter than the other and he was obliged to walk with a cane, and climbed with great exertion into his saddle," though "this did not dispirit him at all."[46] He was already on staff when Humphreys took command of the II Corps and soon became, as the general later admitted, "one of my favorites."[47]


A third staff member was Maj. Thomas L. Livermore, who shared a tent with Mills. Born in Galena, Illinois, Livermore lacked the advantages of birth and family but was quick-witted and good with numbers. When war came, he was a student at Lombard University in Galesburg, Illinois, and was anticipating an appointment to West Point. He thus declined service in a company raised in his hometown and, for a time, drilled by a "Mr. U. S. Grant," whom Livermore described as "a leather dealer... who had been a captain in the army, a quiet respectable diligent man." The academy appointment never materialized, and the eighteen-year-old soldier rushed off to Washington, D.C., to enlist as a private in the 1st Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry.[48] By November 1864, Livermore was a captain in the 18th Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, and holding down a staff position in the II Corps.

The Hicksford Raid

As Humphreys pulled his personal staff together, Grant made plans for a third raid on the Weldon Railroad. "If but one Corps goes on the expedition," he wrote Meade, "I would as soon General Humphreys would command it as any other officer." He ultimately decided on a larger force "of twenty thousand infantry" that would combine elements of two corps and so went with the senior Warren and his V Corps supplemented by an additional infantry division from the II Corps—Mott and his 3d Division.

Humphreys stayed behind, but the episode showcased his best brigade commanders. The two could not have been more different in personality or temperament. Brig. Gen. Robert McAllister, a former Pennsylvania railroader and a staid, clean-shaven, Presbyterian teetotaler (nicknamed "Mother McAllister" by his men) was in command of the 3d Brigade. The colorful French artist and aristocrat, Brig. Gen. Régis de Trobriand, a childhood playmate to a grandson of Charles X of France, commanded the 1st Brigade.[49] Humphreys and de Trobriand were, like Mott, veterans of the old III Corps and were well acquainted and friendly.

Very early on 7 December 1864, Mott's division followed Warren out of Petersburg on a southwesterly march along Jerusalem



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General de Trobriand



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General McAllister

Plank Road. A heavy fog soon gave way to warmer temperatures and, despite some early rain, a comfortable autumn afternoon. It was good marching weather. The long blue column covered twenty miles that first day and another fifteen the next, bringing it to Jarratt's Station on the Weldon line. The army's only mounted division, then operating under Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg, had already cleared the area of rebels, burned the station and bridge, cut the telegraph line, and, together with men of the V Corps, begun a somewhat feeble effort to destroy the road.[50] Mott's division guarded the trains before retiring for the night as area temperatures plunged into the teens.[51]

The men awoke to a cold north wind, ate their breakfasts, and moved stiffly down the tracks in preparation for their work of destruction. Mott rode up to his 3d Brigade with instructions but McAllister politely rebuffed him. McAllister later explained, "As I was a builder of railroads, I thought I ought to know how best to demolish them." His plan was simple and effective. He lined his full brigade in single file along one side of track and then, as he explained to his wife, gave an order "not known in tactics and not taught at West Point." It was "Take Hold!" whereupon several hundred men grabbed and loosened one end of the crossties and lifted them waist high in a common effort. Then, to the order of "Turn Over!" the men flipped the entire track. That done, the track broke apart easily, with the ties burned and

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General Gregg

the iron rails melted. The men then moved down the line and repeated the process. The men completed the entire work by 2100, with track demolished for twenty miles to the town of Hicksford (now Emporia) on the Meherrin River. The men then settled in for the night.[52]

The following morning, 10 December, they awoke to a "strange scene." An ice storm had transformed the Virginia countryside into, as de Trobriand later recounted, a "landscape of sugar candy." It was "as beautiful as an opera decoration, and fantastic as a fairy tale, but exceedingly uncomfortable."[53] As late morning temperatures crept above freezing, a slow thaw saw conditions quickly deteriorate. Mud and ice turned the road into a pig wallow. Some soldiers were "almost barefooted," according to McAllister, "shoes having given out as they often do on a long march."[54] And there were other more deadly hazards. Lee had already dispatched A. P. Hill to intercept the column, and it was a race against time to avoid an open fight. Then there was the immediate threat of local guerrillas. These irregulars avoided the main body of soldiers but fell upon stragglers in deadly raids. The guerrillas captured one group of six or seven dalliers and stripped them of their clothing, placed them in a rough circle and summarily executed them—"shot in the head" according to McAllister. The irregulars murdered other soldiers while they slept in local farmhouses—their bodies had been found with "the throat cut, the head crushed in by blows of an ax, and the breast pierced by a knife."[55] These atrocities sparked a blind fury in the men, and, as de Trobriand recalled, "punishment began at the same hour." Union men burned the Sussex County Courthouse and, with Hill and his Confederates forgotten, continued to unleash their rage on the return to Petersburg. They torched thirty or more plantations to include barns, cotton gins, and haystacks. They even burned the large tavern on the Nottoway River before crossing it and stopping for the night.[56] The following day, the weary bluecoats reached Petersburg unmolested and filed back into camp. The Hicksford Raid, as it became known, was the final campaign of 1864.

Wintering at Petersburg

The approaching winter proved to be "one of unusual severity," but the Army of the Potomac weathered it remarkably well.[57] The II Corps had only recently relocated to the extreme left of the Union lines, so the men spent the first days adjusting to their new location and building temporary lodging. Some scratched together wooden shacks. Others remained in tents but put down wood plank foundations. Still others appropriated the crude huts left behind by the IX Corps and made them their own. Many of the officers, like McAllister, put up simple log cabins.[58] But Humphreys preferred a tent when in the field and, in a late-January letter to his wife, was unabashedly sentimental about outdoor life.

> There is the wind still rising and falling in its notes among the pine tops on the grove in which our tents are pitched. How much I shall miss the sounds, familiar to me as the accompaniment of three winter camps, were I transferred to more humanizing scenes. What companionship they have made with me all through life, those sounds of the wind in the pine forests.[59]

Daily necessities were plentiful throughout the winter. The sprawling depot at City Point, a tiny backwater before the war but by 1864 one of the busiest ports in the world, pushed forward a steady flow of food, clothing, ammunition, and other supplies. The numbers were staggering. On an average day, vast warehouses held 9 million standard rations and 12,000 tons of hay and oats. A commissary bakery built on the grounds produced 100,000 servings of bread a day. Two dozen locomotives and 275 railroad cars delivered the goods along a dedicated rail line.[60] Thanksgiving had been an extravaganza as turkeys, chickens, geese, apples, baked beans, and assorted pies arrived by the thousands. This extraordinary bounty was, according to Lyman, "a great treat to our ragamuffins."[61]


With his men settled into winter quarters and their immediate needs met, Humphreys saw to it that training began in earnest. Drilling became part of the daily routine as officers worked to restore discipline, conformity, and trust while teaching and practicing battlefield maneuvers. The 141st



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Union headquarters at Petersburg from 1864 to 1865

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A view of City Point

Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, one of Mott's regiments, followed a typical training regimen. According to its chaplain, it spent the early winter "doing camp and picket duty . . . and engaged in regular drills when not otherwise employed."[62] On 26 December it had its first dress parade since they set out on the spring campaign."[63] Several days later in a formal general order, Humphreys enjoined his division commanders to use "every hour of favorable weather for drills and evolutions. Regular recitations in tactics and regulations should now be had, and the Articles of War should be frequently read. A systematic effort should be made by division, brigade, and regimental commanders to bring their troops to the highest practicable state of discipline."[64]

Humphreys reviewed Gibbon's 2d Division on 12 January and, though a sopped field left his grey mare "floundering in quicksand," was pleased with what he saw. "The troops looked finely, clearly intelligent, active young men with their arms in elegant order."[65] Two days later, Gibbon left to take command of the XXIV Corps in the Army of the James. It was a loss for the II Corps, but Humphreys had a ready replacement in 32-year-old Brig. Gen. Thomas Alfred "Tom" Smyth, a prominent Irish nationalist, former carriage maker, and one of the most experienced and capable brigade commanders in the Army.[66] On 17 January, Humphreys reviewed Mott's 3d Division which he "found in surprisingly good condition. In fact, the whole corps seems to me to be in excellent discipline and improving daily." McAllister's brigade especially impressed him, which he thought "the finest . . . yet inspected."[67] Humphreys hoped "by spring to see the Second Corps as effective as it ever was."[68]

To combat winter doldrums, the Union men turned to all types of entertainment. Music was pervasive. The II Corps had "several bands, but," according to Humphreys, "only two that are remarkable."[69] In late January, he enjoyed "some delicious air from a German band . . . a favorite quartette." He especially liked a song called "The Chapel," with the "words and music being descriptive of the chapel as seen perched in the distance on a mountain peak." Minstrel troupes were popular in camp and often accompanied by a banjo. Humphreys described one show headed by a small man, "his face . . . grotesquely misshapen, his figure dwarfed," and later joined by four or five others, one of whom was "more grotesque, dwarfish, and comical and impish than the first." It was a rousing show. "They danced," as the general recalled, "until they exhausted us with laughter."[70] Horse racing was another popular activity. Thousands attended a St. Patrick's Day race organized by the 1st Brigade (also known as the Irish Brigade) with Humphreys presiding and Warren and Meade in the audience.[71] The brigade erected a grandstand and distributed sandwiches and whiskey punch. Preliminary foot, sack, and mule races set the stage for the main event which included several flat and hurdle races. Livermore's new horse, Ajax, marred the festivities when it "bolted to one side" of an obstacle and struck a soldier of the 69th Regiment, New York Volunteers. The man later died of head injuries.[72]

News from afar was plentiful and practically all good through the winter. December brought word that Union Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas had crushed Confederate Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, a former student of his at West Point, and destroyed the Army of Tennessee as an effective fighting force. The Army of the Potomac celebrated by "firing a hundred shotted guns from the forts." The fall of Savannah, Georgia, a week later had the men "wild with delight." The capture of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, the "Gibraltar of the South" in mid-January and the fall of Charleston, South Carolina, a month later "gave such evidence of waning power [of the Confederacy] that the men began to forecast the day when their services were



Smithsonian Institution

General Smyth

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General Thomas



General Hood

no longer needed." For the men of the II Corps, there was additional and more immediate evidence that the Confederacy was "tottering to its fall."[73]

The months following Lincoln's re-election, which gutted any prospect of a negotiated peace, saw a sharp spike in Confederate desertions. Lyman estimated that 900 rebels had come over the Union lines in the month of February alone and that, notably, "these were old men [veterans]—nearly all of them—and not raw conscripts."[74] That same period saw the return of thousands of Union veterans. Such was their confidence and resolve, wrote one regimental historian, that "conscripts and hirelings were animated by it and the Army of the Potomac was itself again."[75]

While Humphreys prepared his men for a spring campaign that many believed would end the war, he continued to fret about his postwar prospects. The seniority system that determined rank in the old Army was rigid and demonstrably flawed, but it curbed favoritism and corruption and was, if anything, predictable.[76] The war, together with the merger of the two engineer corps, tossed it all in the air, and the resulting uncertainty created enormous anxieties for Humphreys. He shared these with his wife in early November:

> Those who have accepted commissions in the Volunteer Service, like myself, and have served in the highest positions with the highest rank known in the Army . . . [and] have led divisions and corps in battles that are famous, are nothing more in the regular service than they were at the beginning of the war, and when necessity for the large volunteer forces ceases they will have nothing but their old regular army commissions.[77]

His concerns were not unfounded. Promotion in the Army had always been slow, relying as it did on the death or resignation of more senior officers. By the time of the Civil War, Humphreys had decades of distinguished service yet held the rank of captain. He was elevated to major in August 1861 while still with the topographical engineers. His final wartime promotion in the Regular Army came in March 1863, and, despite his volunteer rank of major general and his recent elevation to corps command, he remained yet a lieutenant colonel in the Corps of Engineers.

Meanwhile, men whom Humphreys considered rivals had stayed behind "in Washington, Philadelphia, and New York, and . . . received Corps promotions in the Regular Army owing to the expansion of the Staff Departments." Among these were Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum (superintendent of West Point), Maj. Gen. John Gross Barnard (chief engineer of the armies in the field), and Brig. Gen. Richard Delafield (chief of engineers). Another prominent engineer, Montgomery C. Meigs, became quartermaster general of the Army in May 1861 and held that position throughout the war at the rank of brigadier general.[78] Humphreys' relative position in the field was no better. Fellow engineers Warren, Wright, and Parke—all much younger—ranked him in the volunteer service and threatened to overtake him in the engineer corps as well. Meade was promoted to major general in the Regular Army in early December and, unbeknownst to Humphreys who thought his immediate commander had "done nothing in recommending any corps commanders or myself for anything," Meade had also been lobbying Grant for months to promote Warren, but not Humphreys, to a brigadier generalship in the Regular Army. Warren was, of course, a dear friend and close protégé of Humphreys but fully twenty years his junior.


After two months of "mortification and depression," Humphreys set aside his better judgment and fired off a letter to Grant on 26 February.[79] The trigger was, as he wrote, a list of "recent promotions to the rank of general officer by brevet in the Regular Army by which I find so low an estimate placed upon services in the field and so high a one upon the subordinate administrative duties chiefly not in the field." It was "humiliating in the extreme" and left him with the "depressing conviction . . . that all this extraordinary [field] service counts for nothing." He concluded with the assertion that "these brevets that have been given should follow the promotion of those in the field, not take their place or precede them." Grant never responded, but Humphreys—for whom "the subject . . . never . . . ceased to be a source of unquiet"—believed that his letter would "bear fruit in time" and was on the whole "glad" he sent it. Parke saw a draft copy and commented favorably, "I doubt not [it] will make Genl. G. put on his thinking cap."[80] The Army largely resolved (or rendered meaningless) the issue of brevets on 13 March 1865, when it gave wholesale brevet promotions to thousands of officers for "faithful and meritorious service," including hundreds of staff officers and "desk soldiers" who, as a disgusted Humphreys put it, "have not heard the sound of a battle."[81] The same order brevetted Humphreys to brigadier general for his "gallant" actions at Gettysburg. It was his second such promotion. He had received a brevet to full colonel in December 1862 following Fredericksburg.

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The Battle of Hatcher's Run

In February, the war once again imposed itself on Humphreys and his II Corps. Lee had turned to wagon trains to carry vital supplies from the truncated Weldon Railroad along the Meherrin River and then northeast on the Boydton Plank Road through the town of Dinwiddie and on to Petersburg. The road was vulnerable, and Grant wanted to take a whack at it before the spring thaw. Again he turned to Warren, the horseman Gregg, and elements of the II Corps. But this time Humphreys would accompany his men in what would be his first engagement as a corps commander. In the cold early hours of 5 February, the army's lone cavalry division advanced west from Ream's Station for the plank road with instructions to "intercept the trains said to be on it" and to "do such other injury."[82] Warren and his V Corps followed Gregg along the Vaughan Road, waded across the frigid Hatcher's Run, and advanced to a position about halfway between the run and Dinwiddie.


Bringing up the rear, Humphreys and two of his divisions under Smyth and Mott (Miles stayed behind) approached Hatcher's Run and, instead of following Warren to the west, turned north toward Armstrong's Mill, occupying about two miles between the Vaughan Road and the



General Gordon

mill and covering Warren's right flank. Both divisions "entrenched sufficiently." Situated immediately north of Mott, Smyth held an advanced position within view of the Confederate trenches. Humphreys surveyed the new line that afternoon and saw a "wood road" opening into a field on Smyth's right. "To sit down in this way all day close to the enemy's entrenchments," Humphreys wrote later, "was to invite an attempt on one's flanks, and I anticipated that one would be made on Smyth's right, expecting the enemy to come along the wood road." To foil such an attempt, he "brought over McAllister's brigade of Mott's division and put it along the edge of the wood" where it was hidden from view and positioned to cover the road. At about noon, Humphreys "took a survey" of the brigade, and, according to McAllister, ordered it "to put up breastworks at once."[83] Riding with Livermore, Humphreys also brought up the Harvard Regiment to close a gap between Smyth and McAllister.[84]

Lee was, of course, sensitive to any movement along his right flank and sent elements of Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon's Second Corps and Hill's Third Corps (including most prominently Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division) to meet Humphreys. Arriving late in the afternoon, the rebels "made a determined attack" along Smyth's entire front. Hundreds fell on both sides, but the Union line held.[85] Then, exactly as Humphreys anticipated, "a column of infantry emerged from the woods . . . by the road already mentioned, evidently expecting to find it unoccupied, and that they would take Smyth in flank and rear."[86] Instead it found McAllister's mostly entrenched brigade which "promptly opened a heavy and unexpected



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General Heth

fire upon the enemy's column," forcing it back at once through the woods. Hearing the exchange, Humphreys sent a staff officer to see how they were "making out." McAllister reported back that he was fighting "with and without breastworks and also that he would whip the rebels either way."[87] Humphreys ordered up additional reinforcements and made his way to the action as the Confederates rallied and, accompanied by a rousing rebel yell, charged McAllister in massed columns. The Union soldiers, still outnumbered along a narrow front, "opened a most destructive fire," and again the enemy fell back. Just after dark, the rebels made a second attempt and, as "flashing powder illuminated the battle scene," were repulsed yet again and withdrew. A cheer broke out along McAllister's line.[88] In his first outing, Humphreys notched a win as his men "bravely stood firm and inflicted severe loss on their assailants."[89] He and Gordon would continue to lock horns through the spring. The encounter at Armstrong's Mill also touched off a minor rebel mutiny. According to a captured lieutenant from Heth's division, Robert E. Lee was present at the concentrated attack on McAllister's right and yet "the first efforts failing, the troops could not be got up to the attack." The men of his Mississippi company afterward "heard General Lee say that for the first time his troops failed him."[90]

The II Corps was reinforced that night by both the V Corps and Gregg's cavalry, which had returned to the Vaughan Road after finding little traffic on Boydton Plank Road. The second day brought renewed fighting but mainly involving the V Corps. About noon, Meade ordered Warren and his men forward "to feel the enemy" along his front and "fight him if outside his lines." They enjoyed some early success in the vicinity of Dabney's Saw Mill before a sharp Confederate counterattack overwhelmed whole units, tossing them back in a chaotic retreat. Witnesses described it as "disgraceful beyond anything they have ever seen on the part of the fifth Corps."[91] Amid a violent winter storm the next morning, Warren set out again and recovered part of the ground taken and then lost the previous day but could not—fairly or unfairly—wash away the growing stain to his reputation.[92]

Press accounts called the entire operation a failure, but Meade put a positive spin on it in a telegram to Grant. The Battle of Hatcher's Run extended the Union line southwest by several miles to the Vaughan Road crossing, putting it, as Meade reported, "nearer to threaten the enemys [*sic*] line of communications on the Boydton plank road." He wanted the new spot held, which for Humphreys meant abandoning a comfortable and secure camp for a more forward and exposed position on the extreme left of the Union lines.[93] The move occurred with little fanfare. Humphreys placed his new headquarters about a half mile east of Hatcher's Run near the Wilkinson House, extended the terminus of the military railroad to nearly his front door, and engaged his engineers in the construction of new protective works. Livermore was impressed that, with the entrenching work underway, Humphreys "rode from one end of the line to the other ceaselessly, until his earthworks were completed—a practice of this admirable officer which I never knew to be pursued by any other corps officer."[94] The Confederates kept the Boydton Plank Road open, but Humphreys forced them to extend their own thinly stretched defenses.

Down Time

After overseeing the establishment of his new line and what would be his last permanent camp of the war, Humphreys pressed for a long-promised, two-week leave of absence. Grant approved it on 13 February but only hesitantly and with the caveat that his II Corps commander be subject to recall "at any time by telegraphic orders."[95] Humphreys hoped to enjoy the company of his wife, Rebecca, and to attend a birthday party for his youngest daughter, Leticia.[96] He also planned to shore up support in Washington among political allies for his still-pending (formal) promotion to II Corps command. Little was accomplished in any case before he was recalled to Petersburg after less than a week at home. Grant anticipated some movement by Lee and asked Meade to "please direct Gen. Humphreys, who is now in Washington, to return immediately to his command. He has yet four or five days leave which he will have to take another time when he can be better spared."[97] Humphreys returned to find no activity at all. He grumbled to his wife that "there was no necessity whatever for my returning. Lee has no occasion for withdrawing from Petersburg just now, and he doesn't intend doing it until the last moment." By 10 March, after days of rain and "only grayish light," Humphreys was again "desperately homesick, despairingly so at moments to such a degree," as he told his wife, "that I felt like getting up, walking out of my tent and going home."[98]

As springtime settled on the Virginia Piedmont, Humphreys took solace in the warmer air, longer days, and returning wildlife, especially, as he noted in a letter to Rebecca, "blue birds, robins, and the little twittering yellow birds, and some others whose cheerful notes I recognize." He wrote more frequently in these last quiet weeks of the war, filling long letters with accounts of everyday camp life and mollifying his wife with frequent updates on Harry and their second son, Charley, a young Army captain who was "looking remarkably well," having "taken the excess flesh off. He appears to be very much interested in his duties and very constantly occupied." On 6 March he wrote that Harry "took a flag of truce yesterday and today on my left to enable a party to remove the remains of a private." The senior Humphreys coordinated the effort with the rebel Gordon who responded "in a most courteous manner."[99]

The letters also referenced the more frequent forays into his personal library. He read (or likely reread) at least two books during this period. The first was by Thomas Carlyle, a respected European historian and a famous purveyor of the "great man theory." Humphreys recalled in his own words one of Carlyle's "great principles," probably in reference to the Scotsman's *History of Friedrich II of Prussia* (Leipzig, 1858), that "the art of war has always been the same.

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Library of Congress

General Ord

It is simply common sense, good judgment applied to destruction instead of preservation and improvement." Humphreys also enjoyed William Makepeace Thackeray's *The Four Georges* (London, 1860), a fictionalized account of the personal side of British royal life. He appreciated the tender description of the third George who ended life as a madman, blind and deaf. Humphreys reproduced one particularly melancholy line in a 4 March letter—"All light, all sound of human voices, all reason, all the pleasure of the world were taken from him."[100]

The II Corps had its final wartime review on Thursday, 23 March. The whole body—numbering some 18,000 men—turned out with six batteries of artillery. A gathering crowd of "ladies and gentlemen from Boston and Philadelphia," joined them throughout the late morning. The group included William Biddle, Margaretta Sergeant Meade (Meade's wife) with her daughters, and Elizabeth Russell Lyman (Lyman's wife) and her sister—"both lovely," according to Humphreys, but "especially Miss Russell." Then, just after 1200, about an hour before the scheduled review, skies rapidly darkened as a violent storm moved through the area—"the wind rose to almost a hurricane." Within minutes it was "impossible to see anything five feet from you or to face the wind. Driving dust and sand filled the whole atmosphere and not only rendered it impossible to see but almost to breathe." The storm started fires, downed trees, and killed men. Meade and his entourage arrived in railroad cars nearly two hours late and missed the whole affair. They had lost their way as "fallen trees had impeded their progress." Nevertheless, Humphreys, who conducted the review in Meade's absence, was pleased with his men, "I have never seen so soldierly a review."[101]

The next day, Humphreys and his son, Harry, traveled to Deep Bottom to see fellow West Pointer, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, commander of the Army of the James. They visited a "fleet of Monitors, Dutch Gap and vicinity, and Genrl. Ord's Headquarters and the troops there and the works."[102] They also met with R. Adm. David D. Porter and enjoyed "a fine lunch in his cabin, everything very elegant compared to our own rough establishment within the army." Humphreys reminded Porter where they had previously met—"at Charles Davis's table." As was usually the custom, there was some considerable drinking throughout the evening, and it was 2300 before Humphreys undertook the return trip. It was the early morning on Saturday 25 March when he stumbled into his tent to find some sleep.

The Battle of Fort Stedman

He awoke at 0500 to "a sick headache" and a rumbling sound of "cannonading and some musketry going on." As he clambered to his feet, it was "hot haste" and confusion at corps headquarters while officers, awaiting orders, struck tents, saddled horses, and readied weapons. All could hear artillery pounding away off to the north "as if in a pitched battle," and, as Livermore noted later, false rumors quickly spread "that the enemy had reached the military railroad and were holding it."[103] At 0545, Humphreys received a telegram from Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, the chief of artillery, that bore out the facts. Lee had gathered a large force under Gordon—about half of the remaining infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia—and had undertaken a predawn


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Henry J. Hunt,
shown here as a major general


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A Union picket line in front of Fort Stedman

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attack against the right of the Union lines, capturing Fort Stedman and opening a gap nearly 1,000 feet wide in the line. The rebels initiated a move toward City Point ten miles away, where a visiting Lincoln, together with Grant and Meade, slept unawares through most of the early excitement.[104] Confederate soldiers had cut the telegraph line.[105]

That left General Parke in command of the Army of the Potomac, but he was under siege. Fort Stedman anchored his line just south of Petersburg. As he worked furiously to seal off the Confederate incursion, Humphreys, several miles to the south, updated his division commanders and seized on an active strategy. He would initiate a strong reconnaissance across his whole front to "ascertain the condition of the enemy . . . and to attack their entrenched picket line with a view to assaulting their main works, if the force holding them had been materially weakened" in support of the rebel offensive against Parke. The orders went out. Humphreys led the charge, as Livermore recalled, "into the thickest of it like the old fire-eater he was in battle." Lyman celebrated "good Duke Humphreys, who, spectacles on his nose, rushed violently at the entrenched skirmish line of the enemy . . . with the double view of making a reconnaissance and a diversion, and furthermore of showing the Johns that we were not going to be pitched into without hitting back."[106]

As Humphreys engaged across his whole front, Gordon bogged down and found himself surrounded on three sides as Parke gathered his men on the hills behind Fort Stedman. These included five regiments and about 4,000 men, stretched in a semicircle nearly a mile wide and ready to charge and retake the fort. Wright had a division still en route, but Parke pushed ahead anyway. At 0730 the long line swept down on Fort Stedman from the east. Its success was "immediate and complete."[107] Hundreds of apparently stunned Confederates threw down their rifles and surrendered. There was a momentary hand-to-hand struggle for the rebel flags in the fort, but a squad from the 208th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, shortly won the fight. In the meantime, Humphreys had advanced through the enemy picket line and pushed ahead until 0800 when the assault stalled, as he later wrote, "under the close fire of artillery and musketry of their main works, which proved to be held by a force sufficient to maintain them against assault."[108] Humphreys fell back only to the captured rebel picket lines, which he was determined to hold. The Confederates demonstrated against these throughout the afternoon and evening but were, as Humphreys reported, "thrown back" every time, "leaving his dead and wounded on the field."[109] Lyman wrote to his wife that "our men never behaved better" and then teased her, "Isn't it funny for you to think of the polite Humphreys riding round in an ambulance with you Friday, and, the next day, smashing fiercely about in a fight?"[110] The II Corps casualties were about 500 killed and wounded, equal roughly to the number of enemy killed, but Humphreys also captured over 500 rebel prisoners. Total Confederate losses on the day (killed, wounded, missing, or captured) were 4,000 irreplaceable men—nearly a third of those engaged. Late in the day at Patrick Station, south of Petersburg, President Lincoln and his wife saw trains carrying Union dead and wounded off to distant hospitals. Lincoln lamented that "he had seen enough of the horrors of war and had hoped that this was the beginning of the end."[111] He had fewer than three weeks to live.



An interior view of Fort Stedman

The Final Stretch

Monday, 27 March, saw a new moon overhead—a harbinger of change and herald of fresh plans. On that day, Humphreys learned that he had "at last been assigned by the President to the command of the II Corps."[112] The news, as he wrote to his wife, "came to me by telegraph this evening" and was "of course . . . gratifying." He had heretofore been ad interim. The "one good of it will be the making of Harry a Major, as I shall at once send his name as the senior Aide de Camp with that rank."


Humphreys also noted the return of favored aide Charlie Mills, who had left in late January for his home in Boston suffering from a "bilious colic," "severe dyspepsia," and, as Mills explained in a letter to his mother, "a great deal of pain in my bowels." After six weeks of treatment, he had permission from his doctors to return to the war. He traveled by train through Philadelphia and Baltimore and stopped in the capital to see his uncle Charles Davis ("the Admiral," as he referred to him), and also to make a friendly call on Rebecca Humphreys before pushing on to camp late Sunday. He was warmly received the next morning upon presenting himself at corps headquarters—"everyone seemed glad to see me, and altogether it is delightful to be back."[113] He was pleased especially to see Whittier, his old Harvard classmate. That evening, Humphreys noted to his wife that, despite the young man's protestations to the contrary, Mills was "in delicate health from severe wounds he has received . . . I hope he will be able to remain in the field."

Monday saw Lincoln return to City Point, where former Western Theater generals joined him for a fateful meeting, one that would determine the final tactics of the war while relegating the fighting engineers of the Army of the Potomac—Humphreys, Warren, Wright, Parke, and even Meade—to

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General Sheridan



General Early



Colonel Mosby

subordinate roles. With the latter notably absent, Grant confabbed with his close friend, Sherman, whose devastating march through the Carolinas put his Army of the Tennessee on pace to reach Petersburg by the end of April. Grant determined, however, to push ahead without him, preferring instead his cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, a short, stocky, and bombastic figure who, at Grant's request, left the Western Theater in April 1864 to lead the horsemen of the Army of the Potomac.

Sheridan served for a time under Meade, but the prideful cavalryman bristled at a supporting role. In August, he leveraged his close friendship with Grant for command of the Army of the Shenandoah and was tasked with subduing the wily Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early and his Confederate Second Corps as well as local guerrillas under Col. John S. Mosby. Sheridan's record in the valley was mixed. The decisive battle came in October 1864 at Cedar Creek where he narrowly avoided disaster in a comeback win over a much smaller rebel force. Lincoln rewarded the timely victory, which came just ahead of the 1864 presidential election, by elevating Sheridan to major general in the Regular Army. That placed him over every Union corps commander, ranking the thirty-six-year-old behind only Grant, Sherman, and Meade. In March 1865, Sheridan moved to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, feeling, as he later wrote, "that the war was nearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death." Midnight approached when Grant gave Sheridan his marching orders. The cavalry commander was to lead the Union offensive with a separate command—outside and above the Army of the Potomac—and to include at times the II, V, and VI Army Corps. Warren, Wright, and Humphreys would be subordinate to Sheridan who would answer only to Grant.[114] The objective was to disrupt the nearly nine-month stalemate by unpinning the Petersburg defenses, cutting the one remaining railway line (the South Side Railroad), and isolating and forcing Lee from his entrenchments. Sheridan would target his sizeable force at a lonely country crossroads known as Five Forks.[115]

Grant had already, in fact, put the first pieces of his plan in motion. That same Monday night, he sent Ord and half of his Army of the James—about 16,000 infantrymen—on a "secret march of 36 miles to the left of the Army of the Potomac, taking post," as Humphreys recalled, "in rear of the Second Corps . . . on the evening of the 28th."[116] Arriving unnoticed by the enemy, Ord and his men anchored the Union left, freeing both Humphreys and Warren to withdraw from their works and spearhead the planned offensive. Before dawn the next morning, Warren swung around the extreme left of the Union lines for Quaker Road while Sheridan's cavalry took a longer, more southerly route toward Dinwiddie Court House. Humphreys followed the familiar Vaughan Road over Hatcher's Run, where he pinned his right while wheeling around his left until his corps was in line, facing north, and in contact with Warren's right flank near Gravelly Run. There, Lyman spotted "the sturdy Humphreys, who was gleaning through his spectacles with a fun-ahead sort of expression and presently rode ahead to get his men 'straightened out.'"[117]

The Battle of White Oak Road

The Confederates did not fully engage and eventually fell back to their works along the far side of White Oak Road which ran due west from Boydton Plank Road and intersected Five Forks about five miles out. Recognizing the threat to his right flank and to his last remaining rail line, Lee pulled men from his left and center to reinforce Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett on the right while directing his nephew, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, to hold Five Forks and assume command of all rebel cavalry. Then came the rain. It fell all night and most of Thursday, rendering the roads, according to Humphreys, "impassable for artillery and wagons until corduroyed. The country was flat, covered generally with dense forest and tangled undergrowth, with numerous small, swampy streams, that . . . did not drain the downfall quickly."[118] One chief quartermaster told Lyman "it was the worst day for moving trains he had ever had in all of his experience."[119] During the downpour and under limited visibility, the V and II Corps closed on White Oak Road and the Confederate lines—as near as they could get without triggering a general engagement—and entrenched.

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General Pickett



Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee



General Johnson

As the sun reappeared late on a soggy Friday morning, 31 March, Humphreys mounted his horse and, with flags flying and a staff escort numbering nearly fifty men, rode ahead to the Rainey House for a better look at his own lines and the Confederate defenses opposite. It was about 1100. The house stood near the southern end of a large open field at the intersection of Boydton Plank and Quaker Roads and in plain view of the enemy out about 700 yards. There was a distant rolling of musketry when after some minutes a rebel battery of Napoleons opened on their position, sending 12-pound iron cannonballs "ricocheting around us," as Lyman recalled. He turned at one point and "saw Charlie Mills sitting on horseback, near General Humphreys." The two Harvard men nodded and smiled at each other. Then came another boom, and Humphreys, following the projectile through the air, "saw it strike the ground and bouncing upwards come with a thud into the staff." The men had instinctively spurred away, but the unlucky Mills was struck in his left side, just below the ribs. Larger than a man's fist, the ball ripped clean through him, knocking the twenty-five-year-old off his horse. He landed on his back, opened his mouth once "without utterance," and died. The same shot then tore through the neck of a horse ridden by an engineer officer and brought both down together—the horse dead and the officer shaken but uninjured. The incident rattled Humphreys, and he long mourned the death of a favored aide. He also felt responsible for it and, according to Livermore, "sincerely reproached himself for having ridden out with so many as to attract the attention of the enemy."[120] After sending away his staff, the general resumed his reconnaissance with the understanding that, per guidance from headquarters, "there would be no movement of troops that day, owing to the almost impassable condition of the roads and country."[121]

Lee did not fret the road conditions. His inspection that morning of the White Oak



General Griffin



General Hays and his staff

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Road line identified a wide gap between the Union left held by the V Corps and the nearest cavalry units in the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court House.[122] He ordered a flanking attack and sent in three Confederate brigades under Maj. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, a former West Pointer, disgraced Army officer, and longtime university professor. Though substantially outnumbered, he routed four Union brigades and drove them back across Gravelly Run and down Boydton Plank Road. Some stragglers—"trailing," as Lyman recalled, "sulkily to the rear"—began to trickle into the lines of the II Corps. Miles and his 1st Division occupied that stretch. At noon, and in coordination with Warren and his lone remaining division under Maj. Gen. Charles Griffin, Humphreys threw Miles into the exposed flank of the attacking force crossing to his left.[123] "This was," as Humphreys recalled, "done in a prompt and spirited manner."[124] Two brigades flung freely through the woods west of the Boydton Plank Road and drove the rebels from the field and back into their entrenchments, capturing the flag of an Alabama regiment along with 300 prisoners.[125] Miles then pressed ahead on White Oak Road, moving west and dislodging enemy pickets along the way. To prevent Lee from concentrating against Miles, Humphreys had also sent Mott and Brig. Gen. William Hays forward against rebel positions on their fronts. Neither division broke through, but each made a vigorous assault.[126] The Battle of White Oak Road changed the lines only a little, but the Confederates lost control of the strategic highway and were trapped in their works. Lee also lost contact with his task force around Five Forks, which left the occasionally unreliable Pickett cut off and without guidance at a critical juncture.[127]

The Battle of Dinwiddie Court House

As the fighting on his own front quieted late that afternoon, Warren heard the sounds of a distant battle receding toward Dinwiddie Court House.[128] He correctly inferred that Sheridan was in retreat and in need of rescue. Late that morning, the brash horseman had ridden for Five Forks but a strong force of cavalry supported by infantry met him midway and drove him back in confusion to his starting point. Warren, acting entirely on his own initiative, sent a brigade of men under Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett



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Joseph J. Bartlett, shown here as a major general

"across country," as Humphreys later detailed, "to General Sheridan's support, with directions to attack the enemy in flank."[129] It was getting dark when Bartlett reached the swollen Gravelly Run. He did not attempt a dangerous crossing but engaged Confederates on the opposite side with sniper fire. Nightfall gave cover to his brigade, which Pickett mistook for a much larger force, perhaps even a corps.[130] Completely uncovered and fearing a flank attack, the Confederate commander decided at 2200 to withdraw to Five Forks just as Grant ordered the V Corps to march in support of Sheridan and to "start at once."[131] Warren was happy to oblige, but advised Meade's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb, that there would be some considerable delay. The rebels had destroyed the bridge over the



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General Webb

Gravelly Run, which was in flood and too deep to ford. The crossing would have to be restored, requiring a span of forty feet and the attention of competent engineers to complete.[132]

Also, Warren and his V Corps had just fought a bitterly contested, daylong battle and returned fatigued to their lines. Most of the men were fast asleep by 2200. As Warren himself later explained, "Our troops, so near the enemy could not be roused by drums or bugles or loud commands, but each order had to be communicated . . . from the General till it reached the non-commissioned officers, which latter only could arouse each man by a shaking." And all of this had to be coordinated with Humphreys who had been ordered to fall back on his left to Boydton Plank Road and assume responsibility for that end of the Union line. So timing was an issue as well. Travel conditions remained abysmal. Warren had six miles to cover—at night—over byways already damaged by the winter thaw and heavy traffic. Days of drenching rain had only further degraded "these sandy, clayey roads," as Lyman drolly put it, "to pudding or porridge, as the case may be."[133] Grant dismissed all of this—the abysmal travel conditions, the destroyed bridge, the late hour, the need for secrecy and careful coordination, and the fatigued state of the V Corps—and, without any basis at all, told his cavalry commander to expect Warren "by 12 tonight." After preparing his men, Warren set out at 2300 with his two remaining divisions.[134] It was 0200 before his engineers finished the bridgework and nearly 0700 when his vanguard reached Dinwiddie Court House.[135] Sheridan was, of course, livid and blamed Warren for the delay and the lost opportunity of catching Pickett outside his lines.

The Battle of Five Forks

Lee scored a pair of tactical victories at White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House, but his strategic position had only deteriorated. He was outnumbered more than three-to-one, had fatally weakened his left and center to support his right, and had lost nearly 1500 men whom he could not replace and could ill spare. By the morning of Saturday, 1 April 1865, what remained of the Army of Northern Virginia faced likely destruction. Pickett had abandoned any temporary advantage won over Sheridan at Dinwiddie and retreated to Five Forks, which he had been instructed to hold "at all hazards."[136] He had just 10,000 men. His lines extended for about a mile in either direction of the crossroads; and his left hung in the air. His defensive line was poorly and hastily constructed. And Sheridan was coming after him with overwhelming force. By late morning, Sheridan had under his




Confederate prisoners on their way to the rear, captured at Five Forks, 3 April 1865.

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command 12,000 cavalry and Warren's V Corps numbering almost 16,000 infantry. Humphreys and his II Corps occupied the left of the Union lines south of White Oak Road and were in position to send reinforcements on short notice.

Sheridan, whatever his flaws (and they were many and paramount), was a fighter, and, late that afternoon, he seized the moment, dividing his sizeable contingent and throwing it against both rebel flanks. At about the same time, Grant ordered the left of the II Corps to advance once again on White Oak Road, to hold it, and, as Humphreys later wrote, to "prevent the enemy from sending any force against General Sheridan by that road. This was done at once, and the road strongly held by Miles's division."[137] Pickett held out through late afternoon and into early evening, but by 1900 the battle was over and the Confederates driven from the field. Pickett lost 5,000 men—nearly half his force. Warren had a horse shot out from under him and led a final charge on rebel lines, but none of that saved him. As the men of the V Corps celebrated their great victory, Sheridan fired their commander, sparking decades of bitter acrimony. It unsettled Humphreys, but, in the immediate aftermath, he could do nothing for his friend and former protégé. As the war raced toward its final conclusion, it would occupy his every moment.

The Fall of Petersburg

Grant followed up on the destruction of the Confederate right flank at Five Forks with a night assault all along the Union front at Petersburg. Humphreys opened his artillery at 2100 and sent both Miles and Mott dashing across White Oak Road into the enemy. The two divisions drove in rebel pickets and, according to Humphreys, "got up close to the slashing of the intrenchments" but could not yet carry them.[138] Anxious that Lee might abandon his lines and fall upon the Union cavalry at Five Forks, Grant ordered Miles to disengage and move down the main road to reinforce Sheridan. Livermore hand delivered the guidance to Miles at midnight.[139] Humphreys, still anchoring the left flank of the Union army but now with a reduced force, peeled back his left but, from 0400 on Sunday 2 April, "kept up constant attacks . . . feeling the enemy closely and holding . . . [his two remaining] divisions ready to take advantage of any weakening."[140] A general bombardment continued through early morning, screening

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General Johnston

into a marathon footrace that ultimately stretched over a hundred miles of difficult and generally hostile terrain. Humphreys, a lifelong topographer, described that region as "broken, wooded, thick undergrowth, marshy fields, streams, roads only in name, sparsely inhabited, hardly any one to be seen, and others met with, silent."[149] Exacerbating things, there were no quality maps of the region—only "a general map of it on a very small scale was furnished, which gave next to nothing of importance as to roads, streams and bridges, fords."[150]


The next several days saw the rival armies race westward, in nearly parallel lines and with little fighting, never at a great distance and often in plain sight. Humphreys and his II Corps, following the V Corps out of Sutherland Station that first day, moved west along River Road, crossed Namozine Creek, and camped for the night in "a little white one-story house on the right of the road" near Winticomack Creek, a tributary to the Appomattox River.[151] On Tuesday, Humphreys, still holding close to Griffin, moved over roads rendered almost impassable by rain and, being much delayed by Sheridan's cavalry, which always claimed the right of way, decamped near the aptly named Deep Creek at 1900. Humphreys and his staff were, as Livermore recalled, "nicely fixed in the yard of a large mansion on a hill."[152] There in the early evening Humphreys hastily scratched off a few lines to Rebecca.

> I cannot tell you all that has happened since I last wrote. We are all well and untouched. The only member of my staff hurt was poor Mills, who I wrote you was killed by my side. I have no moment for writing. Was exhausted with loss of sleep and fatigue, but did not feel it until I could sleep, which I did Sunday night.... You know that everything has fallen before us. Lee's loss has not been less than 25,000 men. He cannot make stand again. We shall not have another great battle."[153]

"We must soon," he concluded, "have peace."

At 2100 Tuesday evening, Meade received a note from Sheridan. The horseman was out ahead with the V Corps at Jetersville, a small crossroads on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and reporting "that the whole rebel army was in his front trying to get off its trains; that he expected to be attacked."[154] If the remaining infantry could be "hurried up," he continued, there was a chance "of taking the whole of the enemy."[155] The distance was fifteen or sixteen miles. Meade had been sick for several days with "a distressing cough and a high fever" but gave the order from his ambulance for a 0100 march. Livermore recalled that everyone had finally "got quietly at rest, when orders came to move."[156] But not Humphreys, who was up and ready to go, as Lyman recalled—"sturdy as ever, issuing orders for the advance, with his eyes wide open, as much to say; 'Sleep—don't mention it!'"[157] Marching again in the very early hours of Wednesday, 5 April, the infantrymen had scarcely stretched out their legs when, as Lyman bitterly recounted, "the same cavalry which blocked our road the day before was found ahead again, and we had tediously to wait until after daylight before the road was cleared."[158] During the many hour delay, Humphreys had his men bed down by the roadside and "his rations were, with incredible exertions, gotten up to him, over fearful roads."[159] The column began moving again at 0700 and reached Jetersville in the late afternoon—first the II and then the VI Corps.[160] Amelia Court House was scarcely seven miles to the northeast and directly up the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Grant and Meade drew up plans for a morning march. They had at hand an overwhelming force including Sheridan's cavalry and three Army corps, all told some 60,000 men under arms.


The II Corps awoke on the morning of Thursday, 6 April, to the smell of coffee



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General Barlow


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Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys

and to instructions to prepare for a 0600 march. At the appointed time, however, Humphreys found the officers of his 2d Division headquarters asleep in their tents. It was an inexcusable lapse. He promptly relieved Hays and elevated the reliable Smyth. Later in the day, though, permanent command of the 2d Division passed to Maj. Gen. Francis C. Barlow. The "boy general" was a Hancock protégé and three-year veteran of the II Corps going back to the Peninsula Campaign. He had just that day reported for duty after a lengthy period of convalescence. Yet another Harvard man (class of 1855) and a New York City lawyer of some prominence, Barlow had a long record of distinguished military service in the war, but his health failed him early in the Petersburg Campaign. He returned only after an extended sick leave in Europe and arrived at camp just in time to replace Hays. There was no time for introductions.

After the briefest stay, all three corps were underway toward Amelia Court House.[161] The line advanced about four miles when Humphreys, riding out in front with his staff, discovered "a strong column of the enemy's infantry on the north bank of Flat Creek, moving westward" and fast disappearing into a forest. It was the rear of the main Confederate army, and Humphreys ordered an attack. Miles brought up his guns and began firing into the retreating column. Lyman witnessed the action from afar as "the distant smoke of Humphreys' batteries curls above the pine trees."[162] Mott advanced with his skirmishers and a brigade while Humphreys notified Meade and began preparations to cross the creek with his entire force. He needed to bridge the swollen stream—a hundred feet wide and armpit deep—to move his artillery and trains, and that work began in earnest. Meade at once faced his army about and cut Humphreys and his II Corps loose in pursuit. He sent Wright to the left toward Jetersville and Griffin to the right toward Paineville.[163] Humphreys' engineers completed the bridge work in "an incredibly short space of time," and a sharp running fight commenced at once.[164]

The Battle of Sailor's Creek

The ensuing chase carried Humphreys and his men through broken country consisting, as he later wrote, "of woods with dense undergrowth and swamps, alternating with open fields, through and over which lines of battle [nearly a mile wide along the front] followed closely on the skirmish line."[165] At about 0900, Mott rode up to de Trobriand to confer on some matter and took a bullet through the leg. The Frenchman took command of the division, and Mott retired to the ambulance where his part in the war ended.[166]

Late morning saw a brief engagement at Deatonsville, a junction of two roads and a half dozen brick farmhouses, where Gordon and his rearguard turned to fight but fell back at the first wave of Union skirmishers.[167] Humphreys afterward met with Wright, still following on his left, to coordinate their joint movement.[168] But as Lyman recalled, there was "no rest for the wicked. All day long the peppery Humphreys, glaring through those spectacles, presses hotly in their rear."[169] The enemy would make stand, wrote Livermore, "wherever a favorable position occurred, and our lines, almost without a halt to prepare, assaulted them and drove them from every position."[170] De Trobriand remembers that, about midmorning, Humphreys came up on the line and dismounted. "[W]hile the balls began to whistle around our ears," Humphreys asked his newest division commander "the exact position of my three brigades, consulted a topographical sketch which he held in his hand, explained to me where the road led to, where we had a good opportunity to strike . . . the guns of the enemy's train, . . . which he was particularly desirous of capturing." Then, satisfied on all points but drawing heavy fire, Humphreys said, "I think we had better get further to the rear."[171] Having already covered eleven miles by late afternoon, the running contest continued for several more along Sailor's Creek, "the road . . . being strewn with tents, camp equipage, baggage, battery-forges, limbers, and wagons," all remnants of a fleeing and increasingly demoralized rebel army. Gordon made his last stand of the day near Perkinson's mills where just before dark a "short, sharp contest" cost him 13 guns, 3 flags, 1,700 prisoners, and "a large part of the main trains of Lee's army, which were huddled together in a confused mass at the crossing of the creek."[172]

Among the spoils were barrels of worthless Confederate currency. As rebel prisoners filed past to the rear, several men of Miles' division "asked them when they were paid last," as Livermore recalled, "and with jocular gravity handed out the Confederate bills to them lavishly, and enjoyed the joke hugely."[173] The men also found a rebel spring wagon with the words "General Humphreys' Headquarters" printed in large letters on the side. It belonged to Confederate Brig. Gen. Benjamin Grubb Humphreys, a distant cousin and commander of a Mississippi brigade under Gordon. Miles' division retained the wagon, "much to the amusement of Humphreys."[174] Word in the II Corps was that "Humphreys (meaning their corps Commander) is beating his brother badly."[175] That night, as the men celebrated their victory at Sailor's Creek, Gordon and

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his remaining force escaped north in the vicinity of the Appomattox River where the fight would commence in the morning. All told, it was a banner day for Humphreys, Wright, and Sheridan. Together they had cut off a quarter of the rebel army, destroyed much of its wagon train, and slowed its retreat. Lee quailed over his losses. "My God!" he exclaimed, "Has the army been dissolved?"[176]

The Battle of High Bridge

Humphreys and his men took much needed sleep that night in the vicinity of the Lockett farm while Meade prepared orders for the next day, Friday 7 April. These called for the II Corps "to move at 5:30 a.m., *punctually*" but otherwise differed little from the instructions of the previous day—"to come up with and attack the enemy whenever seen and to move with the utmost celerity."[177] The loose guidance gave Humphreys a free hand in his dogged pursuit of the Confederate army. Lyman, in fact, called him "an erasable pointer."[178] "Sometimes," as Humphreys later remembered, "the marks on the road governed us, sometimes what we could learn from the people, sometimes what we saw of the enemy or learned by contact with him."[179] Two miles into their morning march, he came to a fork in the road—with the left leading to Farmville, a small town situated just across the Appomattox River, and the right to High Bridge. The marks on the road told him that "one main body of Lee's Army [Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's] moved by the left hand road," and off Humphreys went toward Farmville, but he sent staff officers and his escort to the High Bridge "to learn what they could of the enemy." Humphreys proceeded up the road with Miles (1st Division) and de Trobriand (3d Division) and pushed Barlow (2d Division) a thousand yards to the right to advance along a parallel path in closer proximity to the river.[180]

They had progressed only a mile or so before several riders returned with urgent news. A large party of rebels had recently crossed the High Bridge and were attempting to burn it behind them. Just then, as Humphreys later wrote, "smoke from the burning bridge came in sight, having been hidden before by the high ground and forest."[181] He understood the implications immediately. Lee hoped, by crossing the swollen Appomattox and destroying the bridge (the river being too deep to ford by infantry), that he could stymie his pursuers and buy time to rest and feed his exhausted



General Longstreet

army. It was a desperate measure, and its success hinged on the destruction of the crossings.

Humphreys set out immediately to save the bridge, directing Miles and de Trobriand "to turn short to the right and move across the High Bridge Road" and then sending Livermore to find Barlow and direct the 2d Division to make its way to the bridge as well, and quickly. He then moved off in that direction himself, "riding as rapidly as possible." Arriving at 0700, he was on the bluff overlooking the valley. It was an impressive site. Lyman described the High Bridge—an engineering marvel of its age—as a "great viaduct . . . a railroad bridge, nearly 2500 feet long, over the valley of the Appomattox, and is supported by great brick piers, of which the central ones are 140 feet high."[182] There was a second and much smaller structure as well—a crude wagon-road bridge spanning only the river (and not the valley) far below and just to the east of the railroad. Both had been torched from the far side. Flames already engulfed much of the High Bridge, and it was no longer traversable. A Confederate division under Maj. Gen. William Mahone had drawn up on the far side of the wagon bridge. "So strong was his position and so bad the ground we must move over," Humphreys later wrote, "that I thought he had abandoned the wagon road bridge so as to invite an attack."[183]

Nevertheless, he pushed ahead, selecting a position for his artillery (assigning Miles) and sending a dispatch to Griffin advising him to cross the river at Jamestown several miles below and to attack the enemy on his flank. Humphreys then raced down to the wagon-road bridge where he arrived just ahead of Barlow whose division had marched double-quick to the riverbank. They then forced a crossing. Within minutes, lead elements of Barlow's division had seized a redoubt on the opposite side, but they struggled to hold it against a sharp rebel counterattack. Miles then opened with his artillery, and Smyth, commanding Barlow's



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A view of the High Bridge with the wagon bridge visible to the lower right, April 1865

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General Mahone

3d brigade, surged across the bridge in support. The rebel lines held briefly before collapsing and falling back.[184] Then Barlow and his men doused the flames using wet blankets and the contents of their canteens and even throwing up river water. They saved the wagon bridge from serious damage. In the meantime, high above them on the railroad bridge, Livermore and a separate party of pioneers braved the heights and "put out fires while fighting almost hand to hand with the enemy's skirmishers." They "saved the bridge" with the exception of four long spans.[185] Two fell burning into the ravine more than a hundred feet below. After failing at the critical task of destroying the crossings, Mahone abandoned his defenses and moved along the Lynchburg Road in a northwesterly direction toward Cumberland Church while Gordon followed the railroad bed to the vicinity of Farmville. The II Corps then crossed the singed wagon bridge without opposition. Humphreys had denied Lee any respite and scored an important tactical victory that may have shortened the war by several days.[186]

The Battle of Cumberland Church


Humphreys renewed the chase that same morning as temperatures climbed into the sixties but with "a cold, disagreeable rain falling."[187] Again dividing his force, he sent Barlow "to follow General Gordon along the railroad bed [west] toward Farmville" and led the rest of the II Corps—about 12,000 men—after Mahone via "the old stage-road north of the Appomattox River."[188] Several miles up, Barlow overtook Gordon at the intersection of High Bridge and Farmville roads and ordered an attack. The Irishman Smyth led his brigade to within fifty yards of the enemy when a sniper's bullet caught him in the face, knocking him paralyzed from his horse. He died two days later, the last Union general killed in the war.[189] After some confusion and the capture of a hundred or so men from both the 7th Regiment Infantry, Michigan Volunteers, and 59th Regiment, New York Volunteers, Barlow continued his push into the Confederate rear, "cut off a large number of wagons, which were burnt," and followed the retreating rebels to the north side of the river facing Farmville.[190]

Humphreys was having a harder time of it. Along with Miles and de Trobriand, he approached the town of Cumberland Church, about three miles north of Farmville, at 1300 when the column "suddenly came in contact with the enemy, who opened on him with [Col. William T.] Poague's sixteen guns."[191] According to Livermore, it "swept some of the 1st Division down with solid shot, which flew directly down the road up which they were marching in . . . column."[192] A short time later while moving ahead to survey the field, Humphreys and Livermore witnessed the resulting carnage firsthand—"six or eight of our men in the road stone dead, through whom the shot had gone."[193] The two officers dismounted there and walked to the skirmish line "where it was hot work," according to Livermore, but from which Humphreys could see the enemy "well entrenched on a crest in front of us, perhaps four hundred yards away."[194]



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Colonel Poague

His own reconnaissance, together with intelligence gathered from "prisoners taken," persuaded Humphreys that he had bumped up against the entire Confederate army.[195] He sent Livermore to retrieve Barlow and got word to Meade that "Lee's whole remaining force, probably about 18,000 infantry, had been come up with." He recommended that a Union corps "attack Lee from the direction of Farmville at the same time that the Second Corps attacked from the opposite direction." Meade approved and ordered the VI and XXIV Corps, both at or near Farmville, to "cross the river there and attack jointly with the Second Corps."[196] It was a splendid plan but—unbeknownst to either Humphreys or Meade—the Confederates had destroyed the bridges at Farmville. Longstreet had marched through the town earlier that day and, after crossing to the north side of the Appomattox to rejoin Lee, set a proper engineer to the task of destroying the bridges and closing off pursuit from the town.[197] The swollen river was "impassable" for infantry, leaving "everything at a standstill."[198] It would be many hours and well into the night before Wright and his VI Corps could build a substantial foot crossing or bring up a pontoon bridge necessary for the heavy artillery. Until then, the II Corps was on its own. Sheridan had a few scouts about, but nothing in force.

While waiting for Barlow, Humphreys heard heavy firing from the direction of Farmville and reasonably (but incorrectly) assumed that Wright had made a crossing. In accordance with the plan approved by Meade, Humphreys "contracted his left and extended his right to envelop the enemy's left flank."[199] At about 1600 he also threw forward three regiments from Miles' division. Lyman reported it all from his vantage point in Farmville. "[H]eavy firing across the river [coming] from Humphreys, who had . . . struck the whole of Lee's army, entrenched and covering his trains. *Nothing daunted*, he crowded up close and attempted to assault one point with a brigade, but was repulsed with heavy loss."[200] Lee, of course, heard it too. From his headquarters at or near Cumberland Church, a mile or so west of his breastworks, he grumbled, "There is that Second Corps again."[201] Barlow arrived on the field at sunset, but it was dark before he took position and too late for a renewal of hostilities.[202] McAllister, situated in front of the Rice House which served as a temporary II Corps headquarters, made note in his journal that he was "satisfied that Genl. Grant did not want to drive them further but to hold them here."[203]

Peace Proposals

Then came the first of several peace overtures. Grant had taken up residence at a hotel in Farmville and from there saw things plainly. Lee was finished or soon would be. While Humphreys had tied up the Confederate Army at Cumberland Church, Grant sent Sheridan, Ord, and Griffin racing ahead to Appomattox Court House, about thirty miles distant, where Lee had pinned his final hopes on a train of provisions that would soon arrive there by rail.[204] But it was very likely now that the Union cavalry would get there first, seize the supplies, and, supposing that the infantry got up quickly enough, cut off all escape. At 2030 of Friday 7 April, Grant penned a letter to Lee asking the Confederate commander to surrender his army.[205] He then passed it along to his Adjutant-General, Brig. Gen. Seth Williams, with instructions to bring it to Humphreys who was close up on Lee. The letter passed through McAllister's picket line while Humphreys authorized a short truce "to enable the enemy to gather up their wounded, that were lying between the lines."[206] Lee responded an hour later by refusing Grant's overture but asking for terms, and—the letter again passing through the lines of the II Corps—Williams set out on the return to Farmville via the wagon bridge.


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General Williams

As expected, Lee moved off during the night bound for Appomattox Court House. Humphreys roused his II Corps early on 8 April for a sunrise march that would be one of its longest and most excruciating of the war. Following the Lynchburg Road, the corps passed by the Confederate works at Cumberland Church while Wright and his VI Corps—a pontoon bridge finally in place—crossed the river at Farmville and fell in behind.[207] Grant took the wagon bridge instead and for a time joined Meade and his entourage. Still early in the march, Lyman rode ahead to find Humphreys at the Piedmont Coal Company mine "having been out on several roads, ahead of his column, and getting down on his knees and peering at foot-tracks, through his spectacles, to determine by which the main body had retreated."[208] The accumulating debris soon confirmed his choice. Man and horse were yielding to exhaustion, and the retreating rebel column littered the countryside with "everything that belonged to an army," McAllister remembered, including "caissons blown up and wagons left behind" and a "number of artillery pieces . . . found in the woods."[209]

Later that Saturday morning, as Humphreys began closing again on trailing elements of the rebel army, Williams came up with Grant's second letter to Lee. Humphreys sent him ahead with Whittier and two orderlies, all riding under a white flag, to approach the Confederate rear guard,

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A pontoon bridge leading into Petersburg

then under the command of the general's nephew and top cavalry commander, Fitzhugh Lee. Though "our flag seemed prominent," as Whittier later remembered, "the enemy fired and shot one of the orderlies behind us."[210] The small entourage delivered the letter anyway along with word that "there would be no interruptions of military movements."[211] The fast moving Union column had long since outpaced its supply trains, but spirits remained high. Among his men, McAllister heard rumors and "stories afloat." Many of these were "far from the truth, some bordered on it, and all helped to enliven the scene and raise the spirits of the boys who were weak and hungry, having had no rations to eat."[212]

Humphreys received Lee's answer at dusk when the II Corps halted two miles beyond New Store, after a twenty-mile march.[213] He sent Whittier to carry the letter back to Grant's headquarters. The young officer remembered that it was "a long distance from our halting place at evening, and I returned from Grant, . . . leaving at midnight, and not reaching the Corps which had moved on until some hours later." Whittier slept for only a "short time" that early Sunday morning when "awakened by Gen. Humphreys with an apology for asking me to go out again after so hard and long a journey." But Whittier was "only too glad of the opportunity."[214] He gathered up his flag and his orderly and set out on a beautiful but treacherous Sunday morning ride through the woods, eventually finding his way to Lt. Col. Charles Marshall, a longtime member of Lee's personal staff (and a distant relative of Chief Justice John J. Marshall).[215] The two approached Lee together at 0900. The general dismounted, as Whittier remembered, "sat on the stump of a tree and after reading the letter, began dictating a reply." Marshall took it all down. The gist of it was that Lee wanted to meet personally with Grant to "ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposition of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army."[216] Whittier put the letter in his vest pocket and rode for Meade, delivering it at 1000. Grant, who had rejoined Sheridan and Ord, had it in his hand by noon.



Colonel Marshall

The Battle of Appomattox Court House

Humphreys, meanwhile, had roused his men and pushed ahead. En route to Appomattox, he began to pitch into Longstreet, who was by then in command of both the I and III Corps (following the death of A.P. Hill at Petersburg a week earlier). Lee sent Marshall under a flag of truce with "two [separate] earnest verbal requests" asking Humphreys, as he recalled, "not to press forward upon him, but to halt, as negotiations were going on for a surrender." Direct orders constrained Humphreys—the ongoing negotiations were "in no way to interfere with his operations." His temperament and distrust also compelled him.[217] "They shan't stop me!," he retorted along with instructions to "receive the message but push on the skirmishers!" He sent word twice to Marshall that "the requests [for truce] could not be complied with, and that he must retire from the front at once." Lee was, according to Humphreys, "in full sight on the road, not over 100 yards distant from the head of the corps." At 1100, the II Corps came up on Longstreet's command entrenched in the vicinity of Appomattox Court House. Humphreys "at once formed for attack," with Wright and his VI Corps aligned to his right. Then, "at the moment when it was about to begin," Meade arrived with authorization for a one-hour cease-fire, to expire at 1300. Humphreys waited impatiently. Time slowed to pace. At one minute to the hour, he checked his watch, mounted his horse, and gave the order to move. He and his II Corps advanced several hundred yards, far enough to see that the rebel pickets had disappeared, when two men—a Confederate and a Union officer—approached with instructions from Grant. The truce had been extended.[218] The clock ran out on the war several hours later when Grant and Lee negotiated the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Meade delivered the news to the II Corps on horseback, galloping from Appomattox. "Lee has surrendered!"[219] The men of the Army of the Potomac celebrated as they had never before. De Trobriand recalled the mood that suddenly struck—"all hopes of four years at last realized; all the fears dissipated, all the perils disappeared; all the privations, all the sufferings, all the

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The McLean House, where Lee surrendered to Grant

misery ended; the intoxication of triumph; the joy at the near return to the domestic hearth."[220] That evening, Humphreys penned a long letter to his wife detailing the feverish activities of the past few days. His thoughts were drawn particularly to 7 April and Cumberland Church (Farmville) when "I alone had to deal with Lee. . . . I understand some considerable uneasiness was felt for me, but I did not participate in it after I had gotten my corps together." He then detailed the "communication between General Grant and General Lee [which] began to pass through my lines, thickening last night and this morning, terminating at last in the signing of terms of capitulation."[221] Humphreys understood the import of what he and his men had accomplished. "One great source of satisfaction is the fact that the Army of the Potomac has completely destroyed, annihilated the Army of Northern Virginia, its old opponent; has made the most wonderful campaign on record and will now receive the credit it was entitled to for former deeds. Glorious two weeks!"[222] Four years of sacrifice, dedication, and commitment had been vindicated, and he knew it. For a time at least, he allowed himself to revel in it.

Family Reunion

On the Tuesday after the surrender, Humphreys and his II Corps left Appomattox for a forty-mile march to Burkeville, covering a little less than half the distance back to Richmond. There they remained for several weeks. These were restful if not uneventful days, and Humphreys was busy with his pen. He first wrote the father of Charles Mills, "killed by my side by a cannon shot," and admitted that his "sincere sorrow" was "deepened by the reflection that probably the very means I took to shelter my staff against the fire of the enemy's batteries, to which they were fully exposed, led to his death."[223] In a subsequent letter to Rebecca dated 16 April he told of "a rumor prevalent that I am to be the Military Governor of Virginia" though "there is probably no foundation whatever to it, and I certainly hope there is none, for that is the last position which I could wish to see myself placed." The same letter had news that must have reverberated



The first Union wagon train entering Petersburg, April 1865

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
Capt. Henry H. Humphreys

throughout the extended Humphreys clan. He had received a note from his sister-in-law, Margaret dated 9 April and asking for "a letter of introduction to the Command of Troops about Richmond so that she might obtain protection."[224] Margaret was the wife of his younger brother, Joshua—a Richmond resident and a former Confederate naval officer. Like thousands of others, the two brothers had been estranged by the war, and their families had had little or no contact in years. Because Humphreys had married his first cousin, though, Rebecca would have had more than a passing interest in her brother-in-law who was also a first cousin. They had grown up together at Pont Reading, the family estate in Haverford, Pennsylvania. Humphreys wrote Ord who commanded that department "requesting protection for her." He also made plans to meet his brother on the march through Richmond, if it could be arranged amid all the confusion. In closing the letter to his wife, he turned to the murder of Abraham Lincoln—"We were all greatly shocked last evening at hearing of the assassination of the President and of the attempts on Mr. Seward and his son. It is a fearful thing."[225] Humphreys was a Democrat and a conservative, but along with tens of millions of Americans he mourned his president all the same.

On the glorious spring afternoon of 2 May 1865, the corps broke camp for the long march to Washington. The sky was clear with temperatures in the sixties, and the regimental bands livened things up with popular favorites including "When Johnny Comes Marching Home."[226] The Union column stopped in the vicinity of Richmond two days later, and Humphreys went on ahead, as he explained to his wife, to "try to find Josh." He made a late start but searched several places around the city including the home of a mutual friend, but "neither he nor Josh was in town, much to my disappointment." Two days later, as it resumed its march, the corps paraded through the streets of the rebel capital. Just as Humphreys passed "General Lee's house," Harry called to out to his father—"there is Uncle Josh!" The senior Humphreys "at once alighted and stood talking with Josh until the troops began to get up on me—when I went on to the termination of the line in Broad Street." There his brother rejoined him, and the two watched as the entire corps passed. They then rode out together to camp, about six miles from Richmond on the Pamunkey River. Humphreys was relieved to find that "Josh looked much better than I expected to find him." They parted in the morning after a campsite breakfast. Humphreys told his wife that "we had of course a great deal to say to each other and would have much more."[227] But the schism created by war never fully healed. Joshua shortly after resettled his family in Fredericksburg and, after years of failed business ventures, died at the age of 60 in November 1873.


The Grand Review

The last hurrah for the Army of the Potomac came several weeks later in Washington as the Union armies paraded in Grand Review down Pennsylvania Avenue. Meade led 80,000 men from Capitol Hill to the White House, past newly sworn-in President Andrew Johnson and his cabinet as well as Grant, Hancock, and other leading military and government



The Presidential Stand at the Grand Review

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Humphreys (*on the gray horse*) leading the II Corps during the Grand Review

officials. Crowds numbering in the thousands lined the streets. The infantry marched sixteen-across, followed by artillery and then cavalry. In all, the column stretched seven miles long and continued in procession for six hours. The mood throughout the city was "gay and jovial" with the soldiers and the crowds breaking into song as the long train snaked its way through the city.[228]

Humphreys and his II Corps had camped overnight on Arlington Heights opposite the capital. At the prescribed time, they followed Griffin and his V Corps in the long parade. Humphreys came first with six of his personal staff, all on horseback. Then came a regimental band followed by each of his three divisions marching in turn.[229] Two of the commanders—Barlow (2d Division) and Mott (3d Division)—were in place.[230] Miles (1st Division) was not. Grant had whisked him away to take command of the Military District of Fort Monroe, Virginia, where he was, on that very day, overseeing the imprisonment of the Confederate president, Jefferson F. Davis.[231] Photographer Mathew B. Brady captured the head of the column as it moved up the broad avenue. A hazy visage of the newly enlarged Capitol dome is visible about a half mile in the distance. The faces of the riders are all blurred badly, but Humphreys is recognizable on his gray mare, Beckie.[232]

Postwar

Unlike the triumvirate of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, and even top corps commanders like Hancock, Warren, and Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, Humphreys never became a household name. Yet the men of the II Corps and his fellow Army officers held him in the highest esteem. A number of contemporaneous writers and historians, especially John Watts De Peyster and, later, Carswell McClellan, concluded that Humphreys was—at war's end—the best corps commander in the Army of the Potomac.[233] Warren had been fired, if unfairly so. Wright was a fighter but showed little élan for strategy.[234] Parke was a competent field commander but his long-time association with Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside did nothing for his reputation. Also, unlike any of his fellow engineer officers, Humphreys would probably have risen to Army command had the war continued another year. Certainly Grant favored him. Among the final pages of his extraordinary autobiography, Grant identified three "good corps commanders" who "came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention"—these included Major Generals Griffin, Alexander Mackenzie, and Humphreys.[235] The irascible Griffin held corps command for scarcely a week. Mackenzie was a rising star but only twenty-one and less than a year out of West Point by April 1865. Humphreys had however proved his mettle as an exceptional division commander at Fredericksburg,

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Humphreys (*sitting, center*) and his II Corps staff, c. June 1865

Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg; as the best chief of staff that the Army of the Potomac ever had; and as commander of the famed II Corps, which he rebuilt and led with tremendous success against Lee at Hatcher's Run, Cumberland Church, and Appomattox. As McClellan memorialized, Humphreys in those final days of the war "so clung to the rapidly retreating Army of Northern Virginia, that it bled to death under the constantly repeated wounds which he inflicted."[236] While fame unfairly eluded him, Humphreys got much of what he wanted from the war—the admiration and respect of his peers, a Regular Army promotion to brigadier general, and one of the few truly plum jobs in the peacetime Army, that of chief of engineers.

In August 1866, Grant pushed General Delafield into retirement and selected Humphreys as chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, a position he held until his own retirement in 1879. During his thirteen-year tenure, he managed a dramatic postwar expansion of internal improvements and oversaw important surveys and explorations of the American West as well as a complete overhaul of the nation's coastal fortifications. He also established the Army's first engineer school at Willets Point, New York, and served on a number of important boards and commissions, including the Washington Monument Commission, the U.S. Lighthouse Board, and the Interoceanic Canal Commission. He retired at the age of sixty-eight as the second longest serving chief of engineers in history, behind only Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten. Humphreys devoted his last years to penning two important and highly reputable histories of the Virginia campaigns. Having survived unscathed more than forty named battles stretching back to the Second Seminole War (1835–1842), he died quietly in his reading chair at his Connecticut Avenue row house in Washington, D.C., on 27 December 1883.

About the Author

Dr. Matthew T. Pearcy has been a historian with the Office of History of Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in Alexandria, Virginia, since 2006. He worked from 2001 to 2006 as the historian of the St. Paul District of the Corps of Engineers in St. Paul, Minnesota. While there, he joined with Charles A. Camillo to coauthor *Upon Their Shoulders: A History of the Mississippi River Commission* (Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 2004). He has published articles in *Louisiana History, Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, Florida Historical Quarterly, Military History of the West,* and two previous articles on Humphreys in *Army History.* He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of North Texas. He is currently working on a book-length biography of Andrew A. Humphreys (1810–1883).

Notes

1. John J. Hennessy, "I Dread the Spring: The Army of the Potomac Prepares for the Overland Campaign," in *The Wilderness Campaign*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), p. 72.

2. Charles A. Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 192. Dana made the comment in May 1864 while Humphreys was chief of staff.

3. Grant frequently urged Meade to replace Warren with then Chief of Staff Humphreys, as at Spotsylvania. See Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), p. 108. And, of course, it was Grant who signed off on Humphreys' elevation to II Corps command, Ibid., p. 329. Notably, Grant also mentions Humphreys at the very end of his *Personal Memoirs* as one of three "good Corps commanders" who did not get the attention or the credit they deserved. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), p. 610.

4. Henry H. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys: A Biography* (Philadelphia, Pa.: The John C. Winston Company, 1924), pp. 200–201.

5. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 258. In July 1864, Grant offered Humphreys command of the X Corps, of which African Americans comprised about half. Humphreys turned it down, Ibid., p. 241.

6. For location of headquarters at Peebles' House, see Francis A. Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), p. 642; Theodore Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters, 1863–1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from The Wilderness to Appomattox*, ed. George R. Agassiz (Boston, Mass.: Atlantic Monthly

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Press, 1922), p. 279; Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Nov 1864, Andrew A. Humphreys Papers (AAHP), Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP), 33/104.

7. A. Wilson Greene, *Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign* (Mason City, Iowa: Savas Publishing Co., 2000), p. 29.

8. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 259.

9. For Hancock, see Matthew T. Pearcy, "'No Heroism Can Avail': Andrew A. Humphreys and His Pennsylvania Division at Antietam and Fredericksburg," *Army History* 76 (Summer 2010): 14; Matthew T. Pearcy, "Nothing but the Spirit of Heroism: Andrew A. Humphreys at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," *Army History* 88 (Summer 2013): 30.

10. For more on the Humphreys-Hancock friendship, see John Watts De Peyster, "Andrew Atkinson Humphreys," *Magazine of American History* (October 1886): 350.

11. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/104.

12. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 107; David M. Jordan, *Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier's Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 163–64. Irish-born Thomas Alfred Smyth (31-year-old) replaced Gibbon from 23 December 1864–25 February 1865. William Hays then took over command of the 2d Division but was relieved of command on 6 April for sleeping on duty. Francis C. Barlow replaced him. See also Theodore Lyman, *Meade's Army: The Private Notebooks of Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman*, ed. David W. Lowe (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2007), p. 300.

13. Gibbon made it clear to Humphreys that the matter was uninfluenced by any objection of serving under his orders, for he is one of the most accomplished soldiers and highest-toned gentlemen in the army." John Gibbon, *Personal Recollections of the Civil War* (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1988), pp. 273–75. For Grant's letter to Meade on Gibbon, see letter dated 30 November 1864, in John Y. Simon, ed., *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 13: *16 November 1864–20 February 1865* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. 43.

14. The II Corps was something of a coming home for Humphreys, as it had fully absorbed the remnants of the famed "Hooker's Division" of the XII Corps—the division that Humphreys had led at Gettysburg—see De Peyster, "Andrew Atkinson Humphreys," p. 360. For repeated instances where Mott's division "behaved shamefully," see Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, pp. 92, 93, 95, 109–10, 114, etc. Also see Lawrence A. Kreiser Jr., *Defeating Lee: A History of the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), p. 220. Gershom Mott led the 3d Division (II Corps), which had been formed from a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac in March 1864 that discontinued the III Corps and divvied up its troops between two II Corps divisions, the 3d and 4th. Humphreys had held a division command in that now defunct corps under Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles at Gettysburg, so a fair number of the men in the II Corps—particularly in Mott's division—had already served under Humphreys in some capacity. See Francis A. Walker, *General Hancock* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1895), p. 245.

15. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/104.

16. James H. Wilson, "Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys," *Military Historical Society of Massachusetts*, v. 10 (Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1895), p. 89.

17. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/104.

18. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Alexander Dallas Bache, Sep 1855, AAHP, HSP, 4/10. "I do not estimate highly any position in my Corps that I am likely to hold within a reasonable time though appreciate fully the advantage of a commission. A post less than that of Chief of the Corps is not worth striving for."

19. Ltr, Israel C. Woodruff to Andrew Humphreys, 20 Mar 1863, AAHP, HSP, 13/87. "Neither Parke, [Nathaniel] Michler, [James Hervey] Simpson, nor [John N.] Macomb are satisfied." Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck and Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum were the driving forces for the consolidation through Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.

20. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 279 (entry dated 27 November 1864).

21. Ltr, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to Henry A. Cram, 11 Dec 1864, in George Meade, *The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army*, v. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 251.

22. Jones Archer, *Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 196.

23. Andrew A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign, 1864 and 1865: The Army of the Potomac and The Army of the James* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), p. 283 (see footnote); Kreiser, *Defeating Lee*, pp. ix–x; James M. McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 626.

24. Kreiser, *Defeating Lee*, p. 218; Earl J. Hess, *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1997), p. 90.

25. William W. Bergen, "Grant *Finally* Takes Command: How the Race to Appomattox Was Won," in *Petersburg to Appomattox: The End of the War in Virginia*, ed. Caroline E. Janney (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), p. 31; Kreiser, *Defeating Lee*, p. 221.

26. See Kreiser, *Defeating Lee*, p. 137.

27. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 279; Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 584.

28. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 279.

29. Gibbon, *Personal Recollections*, p. 257.

30. Kreiser, *Defeating Lee*, p. 208.

31. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, v. 3: *Red River to Appomattox* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), p. 547. For "gallant old corps," see Lawrence A. Kreiser Jr., "The Fighting Second," *New York Times*, 3 Apr 2012.

32. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 265, 272.

33. Perry D. Jamieson, *Winfield Scott Hancock: Gettysburg Hero* (Abilene, Tex.: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2003), p. 127.

34. Régis de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac* (Boston, Mass.: Ticknor and Company, 1889), p. 688.

35. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 273; Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 30 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/107. For percentages of new recruits, see Robert Wooster, *Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 32.

36. See Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 285, entry dated 30 Nov 1864.

37. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 30 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/107.

38. For more on Humphreys as a division commander, see Pearcy, "'No Heroism Can Avail'"; Pearcy, "Nothing but the Spirit of Heroism."

39. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 23 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/103.

40. Ltr, Carswell McClellan to Andrew Humphreys, 12 Dec 1864, AAHP, HSP, 19/14.

41. William Henry Armstrong, *Red-Tape and Pigeon-Hole Generals: Andrew A. Humphreys in the Army of the Potomac* (Charlottesville, Va.: Rockbridge Publishing, 1999), p. 248.

42. Humphreys still lamented the loss two months later: "If I could get back Carswell . . . and some others, the corps would equal what it was in its proudest day." Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 23 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/103.

43. Ltr, Henry C. Christiancy to Andrew Humphreys, 6 Dec 1864, AAHP, HSP, 19/8.

44. Richard F. Miller, *Harvard's Civil War: A History of the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteer*

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Infantry (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2005), p. 54.

45. Gregory A. Coco, ed., *Through Blood and Fire: The Civil War Letters of Major Charles J. Mills, 1862–1865* (Gettysburg, PA: privately printed, 1982), pp. ix–x; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, ed., *Harvard Memorial Biographies*, v. 2, (Cambridge, Mass.: Sever and Francis, 1867), pp. 141–50.

46. Thomas L. Livermore, *Days and Events, 1860–1866* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), p. 417.

47. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 27 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/8.

48. Livermore, *Days and Events*, pp. 3–5. Augustus Louis Chetlain established the company that was added to the 12th Regiment, Illinois Volunteers, in late April 1861. He later commanded the regiment.

49. For the best description of McAllister, see de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 707; for background on de Trobriand, see William B. Styple, ed., *Our Noble Blood: The Civil War Letters of Régis de Trobriand* (Kearny, N.J.: Belle Grove Publishing, 1997), p. vii.

50. McAllister says the cavalry made "but little progress" overnight and were "utterly astonished and looked on in wonder" at his method. James I. Robertson Jr., ed., *The Civil War Letters of General Robert McAllister* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), p. 554; de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 691.

51. Robert K. Krick, *Civil War Weather in Virginia* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2016), p. 146.

52. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 554; de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 691.

53. De Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 692.

54. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 555.

55. De Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 693; Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 553.

56. George S. Burkhardt, *Confederate Rage, Yankee Wrath: No Quarter in the Civil War* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007), p. 215.

57. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 310. For the severity of the winter, see also George A. Bruce, *The Twentieth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1861–1865* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin, 1906), p. 429; for lack of snow, see Greene, *Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion*, p. 61.

58. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 562. McAllister spent the winter "in a nice little log house." He reported to his wife that "I am very comfortable and have a nice open fire which I enjoy so much."

59. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/113.

60. Bruce Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1953), p. 321.

61. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 278.

62. The Union's Fort Fisher at Petersburg should not be confused with the Confederate Fort Fisher protecting the port at Wilmington, North Carolina.

63. David Craft, *History of the One Hundred Forty-First Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1862–1865* (Towanda, Pa.: Reporter-Journal Printing Co., 1885), p. 233.

64. *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1900), Serial 96, p. 6. For more on "evolutions," see Earl J. Hess, *Civil War Infantry Tactics: Tactics, Combat, and Small-Unit Effectiveness* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), pp. 53, 176.

65. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 12 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/111.

66. Damian Shiels, *Irish in the American Civil War* (Dublin: History Press Ireland, 2013), ebook, see section "The Last to Fall."

67. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, (dated 17 Jan 1865), p. 564.

68. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 12 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/111.

69. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 17 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/112.

70. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 26 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/113.

71. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 18 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/127.

72. Second Lt. Michael McConville suffered a fatal fracture of the skull. David P. Conyngham, *The Irish Brigade and its Campaigns: With Some Account of the Corcoran Legion, and Sketches of the Principal Officers* (Glasgow, Scotland: Cameron & Ferguson, 1866), p. 253.

73. Bruce, *The Twentieth Regiment*, p. 430.

74. Lyman, *Meade's' Headquarters*, p. 305.

75. Bruce, *The Twentieth Regiment*, p. 430.

76. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 49–50.

77. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 12 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/101.

78. Cullum was superintendent at West Point, a position traditionally held by the chief of engineers. Barnard was chief engineer of the armies in the field and had turned down the position of chief of engineers because Delafield ranked him. Delafield took the job as a brigadier general in the Regular Army. Meigs left the Corps of Engineers to head the Quartermaster Corps and was a Brigadier General in the Regular Army.

79. Ltr (early draft), Andrew Humphreys to Ulysses S. Grant, 28 Jan 1865, AAHP, HSP, 19/43. The following sentence was crossed out in the draft: "If it had not been the source of so much mortification and depression I should let it rest."

80. Ibid.; See Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 270–71, for 26 February mailing date and additional coverage of the final letter; Ltr, John G. Parke to Andrew Humphreys, 27 Feb 1865, AAHP, HSP, 19/58.

81. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 12 Nov 1864, AAHP, HSP, 33/101. Joshua Chamberlain also had strong feelings on the matter of brevets; see Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, *The Passing of Armies: An Account of the Final Campaign of the Army of the Potomac* (New York: Bantam, 1992), pp. 297–98. Also see An Ex-Army Officer [pseud.], *A Brief Dissertation on Military Titles and Brevet Rank* (Boston, Mass., 1886).

82. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 312.

83. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 581.

84. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 420.

85. Simon, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 13, 6 Feb 1865, pp. 375–76. See letter from Grant to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton reporting on the battle.

86. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 313.

87. See Gershom Mott's Draft Report on Hatcher's Run, HSP, 19/51.

88. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 584.

89. Mott, Draft Report on Hatcher's Run, HSP.

90. Note, "Statement of Lieutenant Lee," 28 Feb 1865, AAHP, HSP, 19/54. "Lieutenant Lee" (no first name given) was an officer in one of the Mississippi regiments of Joseph R. Davis' Brigade, Henry Heth's Division.

91. David M. Jordan, *"Happiness is Not My Companion:" The Life of General G. K. Warren* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 206.

92. Jordan, *Happiness is Not My Companion*, p. 207; Eric J. Wittenberg, *Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), p. 117.

93. Simon, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 13, 6 Feb 1865, pp. 382–83.

94. Livermore, *Days and Events*, pp. 421–22; Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 269.

95. Simon, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 14, 13 Feb 1865, pp. 17–18.

96. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 1 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/116.

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97. Simon, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 14, 13 Feb 1865, p. 17.

98. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 10 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/122.

99. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 6 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/119.

100. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 4 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 33/118.

101. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 277–78.

102. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 25 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/6.

103. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 427; Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 651.

104. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 320; Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. IV (New York: The Century Co., 1888), pp. 584–89.

105. See Johnson and Buel, *Battles and Leaders*, v. IV, pp. 4, 586 (footnote); Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 25 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/6. Humphreys writes that "for an hour and a half the tel [telegraph] wire was cut."

106. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 324.

107. Johnson and Buel, *Battles and Leaders*, v. IV, p. 588.

108. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 321.

109. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 25 Mar 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/6; 1st Division Report on Battle of Fort Stedman, 28 May 1865, AAHP, HSP, 19/86 for quote on "leaving dead on the field." See also Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 325.

110. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 326.

111. For Lincoln's statement as related by Captain John Barnes, see National Park Service, "President Lincoln Visits City Point and Petersburg, March 24–April 8, 1865," accessed 11 Apr 2019, https://www.nps.gov/pete/learn/news/upload/Lincoln-at-Pete-and-CPrev2.pdf.

112. For copy of telegraph dated 27 Mar 1865, see AAHP, HSP, 19/89.

113. Coco, *Through Blood and Fire*, pp. 247–50.

114. Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, p. 422.

115. Michael McCarthy, *Confederate Waterloo: The Battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, and the Controversy that Brought Down a General* (El Dorado Hills, Calif.: Savas Beatie, 2016), p. 18.

116. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 323.

117. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 329.

118. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 327.

119. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 330.

120. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 4 Apr 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/9; Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 280; Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, pp. 331–32; Higginson, *Harvard Memorial Biographies*, v. 2, pp. 141–50; Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 433; Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to father of Charles Mills, 14 Apr 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/12.

121. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 330.

122. Livermore blamed Warren's 2d Division commander, General Romeyn B. Ayres, who, it seemed, "never secured his flanks." Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 434.

123. Edwin C. Bearss, *The Battle of Five Forks* (Lynchburg, Va.: H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 63; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 332.

124. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 532.

125. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 662. On the significance of Humphreys' flank attack at White Oak, see DePeyster, who argues that it "made Five Forks a possibility." John Watts De Peyster, *La Royale: The Grand Hunt of the Army of the Potomac, on the 3d–7th April, 1865, Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys and the Combined Second-Third Corps Leading the Pursuit*, part VII, (New York: J. R. Huth, 1872), p. ii.

126. Bearss, *Battle of Five Forks*, p. 68; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 333.

127. Bearss, *Battle of Five Forks*, p. 72.

128. Ibid., p. 73.

129. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 336.

130. Ibid., p. 342.

131. Bearss, *Battle of Five Forks*, p. 76; Gouverneur Kemble Warren, *An Account of the Operations of the Fifth Army Corps, Commanded by Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren at the Battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, and the Battles and Movements Preliminary to It* (New York: William M. Franklin, Printer, 1866), p. 18.

132. Warren, *Account of the Operations*, p. 18.

133. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 330.

134. Warren, *Account of the Operations*, (report), p. 22.

135. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 340.

136. Bearss, *Battle of Five Forks*, p. 76.

137. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 362.

138. Ibid.

139. At about midnight on the first of April, Livermore passed along the order for Miles to "go down White Oak road to General Sheridan." Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 436.

140. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 362; Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 436.

141. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 367.

142. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 367. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 669.

143. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 438.

144. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 367.

145. De Peyster, *La Royale*, p. vii.

146. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 368.

147. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 441. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 369.

148. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 369; Henry H. Humphreys, *Major General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, United States Volunteers, at Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862 and Farmville, Va., April 7th, 1865* (Chicago, Ill.: R. R. McCabe, 1896), pp. 39–40; De Peyster, *La Royale*, pp. v, vii.

149. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 285; Catton uses the term "foot race." Catton, *Stillness at Appomattox*, p. 369.

150. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 285.

151. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 442.

152. Ibid.

153. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 283.

154. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 345.

155. Ibid.

156. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 442; Meade, *The Life and Letters*, p. 269.

157. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 346.

158. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 442.

159. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 346.

160. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 675.

161. Humphreys, *Major General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 43.

162. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 350; Carswell McClellan, *The Personal Memoirs and Military History of U. S. Grant versus the Record of the Army of the Potomac* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1887), p. 252.

163. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, pp. 378–79.

164. Ibid., p. 379.

165. Ibid.; Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 448; McAllister remembered "driving the Rebels back over hill and dale, swamp and upland, field and forest." See Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 605.

166. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 735.

167. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 445; Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 351.

168. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 445.

169. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 350.

170. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 445.

171. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 736.

172. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 381.

173. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 449.

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174. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 287.

175. Ibid.

176. Edward H. Bonekemper, III, *Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008), p. 227.

177. Ibid., p. 290.

178. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 353.

179. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 289–90 (see "Letter to William Swinton" dated 8 Dec 1866).

180. U.S. War Department, *The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, serial no. 95 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), p. 683.

181. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 292.

182. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 352.

183. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 292–93; Christopher M. Calkins, *Thirty-Six Hours Before Appomattox, April 6 and 7, 1865* (Farmville, Va.: Farmville Herald, 1980), p. 45.

184. Robert F. Welch, *The Boy General: The Life and Careers of Francis Channing Barlow* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2005), p. 203.

185. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, pp. 681–82; Livermore provides a very detailed account of his efforts to fight the fire on the High Bridge. Livermore, *Days and Events*, pp. 450–51.

186. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 296; De Peyster, *La Royale*, pp. 5, 133; Humphreys, *Major General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 48–50.

187. Lyman, *Meade's Army*, p. 366; Krick, *Civil War Weather*, p. 156.

188. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 388.

189. D. W. Maull, *The Life and Military Services of the Late Brigadier General Thomas A. Smyth* (Wilmington, Del.: H. & E. F. James, 1870), p. 43. Maull was Surgeon in Chief, 2d Division, II Corps; Welch, *The Boy General*, p. 204.

190. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 388; Barlow claimed to have destroyed 135 wagons, Welch, *The Boy General*, p. 204.

191. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 388.

192. Livermore, *Days and Events*, p. 452.

193. Ibid., p. 453.

194. Ibid.

195. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 388.

196. Ibid., p. 389.

197. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 353. The able Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander managed the destruction himself.

198. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 352.

199. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 389.

200. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 352.

201. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 298; Calkins, *Thirty-Six Hours Before Appomattox*, p. 55.

202. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 390; Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 684.

203. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 606.

204. Philip Henry Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General United States Army* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 1992), p. 390.

205. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 439.

206. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 391; Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, p. 300. McAllister scarcely notes his role in transferring the surrender dispatch: "It was sent through our lines at this point." Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 606.

207. Catton, *Stillness at Appomattox*, p. 372.

208. Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 353.

209. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 606. "Shattered and demoralized," Meade, *The Life and Letters*, p. 270.

210. Charles A. Whittier, *Egotistical Memoirs* (Boston: Massachusetts Military Historical Society, 1888), pp. 19–20.

211. Ibid.

212. Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 607.

213. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, p. 392.

214. Charles Whittier, Diary, pp. 19–20.

215. Frederick Maurice, ed., *An Aide-de-Camp of Lee: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall, Sometime Aide-de-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862–1865* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1927), pp. xiii, 263–74.

216. For Lee quote, see Edward A. Pollard, *Lee and His Lieutenants* (New York: E. B. Treat & Co., 1867), p. 163.

217. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign*, pp. 394–95; Charles Marshall, *The Story of Appomattox: An Address Delivered Before the Society of the Army and Navy of the Confederate States in the State of Maryland* (Baltimore, Md.: Guggenheimer, Weil & Co., 1894).

218. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 306–07.

219. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 751–52; Robertson, *Civil War Letters*, p. 607.

220. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, p. 751.

221. Humphreys, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys*, pp. 310–11.

222. Ibid, pp. 311–12.

223. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to father of Charles Mills, 14 Apr 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/13; Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 5 May 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/17, Humphreys mentions that Mill's mother responded with a photo of Charles and a letter "written under the same influence of the same tender feelings that were characteristic of her son."

224. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 16 Apr 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/14.

225. Ibid.

226. J. W. Muffly, ed., *The Story of Our Regiment: A History of the 148th Pennsylvania Vols.* (Des Moines, Iowa: The Kenyon Printing & Mfg. Co, 1904), p. 355.

227. Ltr, Andrew Humphreys to Rebecca Humphreys, 5 and 7 May 1865, AAHP, HSP, 34/17–18.

228. *New York Times*, 24 May 1865.

229. Chamberlain, *The Passing of Armies*, p. 267.

230. "Review of the Armies," *New York Times*, 24 May 1865.

231. Wooster, *Nelson A. Miles*, pp. 39–40; For an excellent account of the II Corps at the Grand Review, see Chamberlain, *The Passing of Armies*, pp. 267–70.

232. Chamberlain, *The Passing of Armies*, p. 267.

233. See, for example, John Watts De Peyster, "Andrew Atkinson Humphreys of Pennsylvania," *Lancaster Daily Intelligencer*, 11 Dec 1886; Wilson, "Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys," p. 95.

234. "Then he [Meade] called Wright slow (a very true proposition as a general one)." Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 138. Also see p. 176 for a 24 June 1864 journal entry—"On this particular occasion Wright showed himself totally unfit to command a corps."

235. Simon, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, p. 610.

236. Carswell McClellan, *General Andrew A. Humphreys at Malvern Hill, VA, July , 1862, and at Fredericksburg, VA, December 13, 1862: A Memoir* (St. Paul, Minn., 1888), pp. 28–29.

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U.S. Army Air Forces 2d Lt. Carter Harman (*standing, left*) with his YR–4B and crew in 1944. Harman made the first helicopter rescue on 23 April 1944 in Burma.

Two Helicopters Installed in Museum Galleries

By Paul Morando

The National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) recently installed two historic artifacts—a UH–1B Iroquois "Huey" helicopter and an R–4B "Sikorsky" helicopter—to their permanent locations above the *Cold War* and *Army and Society* galleries, respectively. The two helicopters are an integral part of the Army's story of rotary-wing aircraft.


The rise of helicopters at the end of World War II transformed how the U.S. Army operated on the battlefield. Initially, the Army used helicopters for transportation, but evolved to have the aircraft carry out more tactical missions such as communication, logistics, and search-and-rescue operations. Leading this role was the Sikorksy R–4B, the first mass-produced helicopter in the world. Designed by Dr. Igor Sikorksy from his famous VS–300 experimental helicopter, his prototype (XR–4) made its first flight in January 1942. A year later, after successful flight tests, the U.S. Army Air Forces purchased one hundred production examples, making it the first service helicopter. With a cruising speed of sixty-five miles per hour and a range of over 130 miles, the R–4B stood out from other rotary-wing aircraft.

The R–4B's maneuverability during sustained flight convinced the Army that it was capable to be used in theater. In April 1944, during training with the 1st Air Commando Group in Burma, a preproduction R–4B conducted the first casualty evacuation by helicopter. The following June, R–4B and R–6A helicopters flew the first combat medevac missions under fire, evacuating dozens of wounded members of the 112th U.S. Cavalry in the Philippine mountains. The Army quickly realized the importance of helicopters and began adding more to their inventory.

The Army's investment in rotary-wing aircraft proved useful during the Korean War, most famously with the Bell H–13 Sioux and its role in medical evacuation of wounded personnel to field hospitals. However, it was the Vietnam War where the helicopter became a permanent part of military strategy. The Bell UH–1 Iroquois, nicknamed "Huey" because of its original HU–1 designation, was the most common utility helicopter used by American forces during the war. The Iroquois, equipped with 30-mm. machine guns and rocket pods, could be used in combat operations, along with reinforcing and resupplying troops on the ground. Once again the role of the helicopter evolved; and with today's sophisticated aircraft, the U.S. Army remains a leader in military aviation.

NMUSA will highlight this evolution by displaying Sikorsky R–4B and Bell UH–1B helicopters. Located in the *Army and Society Gallery*, the R–4B has been restored with the markings

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The soldier cast figures will portray the Huey pilot, copilot, and gunner.

f the Sikorsky flown by 2d Lt. Carter Harman of the 1st Air Commando Group. The UH–1B resides in the *Cold War Gallery* nd is displayed with realistic cast figures: pilot, copilot, and door unner. This restored aircraft was used extensively in Vietnam s a gunship by the 129th Aviation Company, 10th Aviation attalion. Both aircraft tell an important story of the Army's ommitment to innovation and both have found a permanent n the museum.

The National Museum of the United States Army is under construction at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and is expected to open in 2020.

Paul Morando is chief, Exhibits Division, of the National Museum of the United States Army.

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U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight



A Symbol of Spiritual Leadership and Readiness

The Chaplain's Flag of Capt. Julian S. Ellenberg

By Dieter Stenger

Julian S. Ellenberg, a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church, graduated from the U.S. Army Chaplain School at Harvard University on 5 April 1943. He reported for duty in August 1943 with the 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Dix, New Jersey. He received a chaplain's flag, displayed it in his office at Warner's Camp, Seaton, Devonshire, England, and carried it to France on D-Day. Coming ashore at Utah Beach at 0700 on 6 June 1944, some thirty minutes after four waves of assault troops and tanks of the 8th Infantry had landed, Ellenberg experienced intense enemy fire, but provided spiritual aid to the wounded and dying. German artillery shell fragments wounded Ellenberg several times, but he still helped to establish and maintain an aid station, for which he later received the Silver Star.[1]

Easily folded and stored almost anywhere, the chaplain's flag shown here accompanied Ellenberg as he provided spiritual leadership and readiness for the liberators of Europe. The flag's historic journey did not end at Utah Beach. Ellenberg carried it to Cherbourg and during the breakout from the Normandy beachheads. He displayed it on his jeep on 25 August 1944 during the liberation of Paris and it flew over German soil at 0230 on Good Friday, 1945, after he crossed the Rhine at Lauingen. The flag



was with Ellenberg as he entered Augsburg, Germany, on 7 May 1945 and when the war in Europe ended the next day.[2] The Army recalled Chaplain Ellenberg to duty in 1946 and promoted him to major in 1947. In the Korean War, he cared for patients at the Army-operated hospital in Tokyo, Japan. As a lieutenant colonel in 1952, he assumed the post of executive officer, Army Chaplain School, Fort Slocum, New York, and served until he retired as the post chaplain at Fort McPherson, Georgia.[3]

A symbol of hope in 1944, Ellenberg's flag is a tactile symbol of remembrance of the spiritual leadership of the Chaplain Corps. The corps has ministered to the compromised, disfigured, and psychologically impaired members of the armed forces since it was authorized as an Army branch on 29 July 1775, always "serving God and Country." Today, the Chaplain Corps continues Ellenberg's tradition of service by conducting religious services, providing spiritual guidance, maintaining morale, and ensuring commanders respect the free exercise of religion by all soldiers. Chaplains nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the fallen across the full spectrum of Army activity.[4] In 2018, the Army Museum Enterprise conserved Ellenberg's flag and tasked the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Museum at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to keep it under professional museum care.

Dieter Stenger is a curator of arms and ordnance with the Army Museum Enterprise, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



Chaplain Lt. Col. Julian S. Ellenberg, 1952


NOTES

1. "Changes: Armed Forces," *Living Church* 124 (10 Feb 1952): 23. This weekly record of the news, work, and thought of the Episcopal Church credits Chaplain Ellenberg as the first chaplain ashore at Normandy around 0700, although a chaplain of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade Group at OMAHA Beach, also around 0700, may have preceded Ellenberg. See Lyle W. Dorsett, *Serving God and Country: U.S. Military Chaplains in World War II* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2013), pp. 162–64.

2. Daryl Densford, "Chaplain Julian S. Ellenberg," *The Chaplain Kit: The Online Chaplain Museum Providing Chaplain History, Information, and Resources*, accessed 21 Mar 2019, https://thechaplainkit.com/history/stories/chaplain-julian-s-ellenberg/; *250th Anniversary of the Parish of Trinity Church in the City of New York: Catalogue of the Commemorative Exhibition at the New-York Historical Society*, (New York: New York Historical Society, 1947), p. 47.

3. See Julian S. Ellenberg, World War II personnel card, Office of the Chief of Chaplains and Vita, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Museum, Fort Jackson, S.C.; Christopher Semancik, *Army Museum Enterprise Collections Philosophy*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, October 2018, copy in curators files.

4. "Mission," *U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School*, accessed 28 Mar 2019, https://usachcs.tradoc.army.mil/.





Temple University Army ROTC Program

COMMENTARY

MUSINGS OF A STAFF-RIDE FACILITATOR

Gregory J. W. Urwin

Whenever *Army History* arrives in my mailbox, it brightens my day. I experienced even greater pleasure than usual, however, on the arrival of the Winter 2019 issue. As the originator and longtime facilitator of staff rides for Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs at two different universities, I took a keen interest in how the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Combat Studies Institute, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College are reimagining this venerable learning exercise. I gleaned valuable information and insights from the five thoughtful articles *Army History* devoted to this theme, and I identified several ideas to incorporate into the staff rides I will accompany in the future.

My first exposure to the staff-ride experience came in the summer of 1985 when I participated in the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. That now extinct program lasted a full month in those days, with a week devoted to a field trip that stopped at several locations. Our schedule included excursions to two famous Civil War sites—a daylong visit to Gettysburg National Military Park (Pennsylvania) and another full day at Antietam National Battlefield (Maryland). The young West Point tactical officers who were our instructors entrusted us to Dr. Jay Luvaas, a civilian faculty member at the U.S. Army War College, during these outings.

Many military historians consider Luvaas the father of the modern staff ride. A historian with a Ph.D. from Duke University (1956), Luvaas returned immediately to his undergraduate alma

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The author (*center*) and Lt. Col. Robert K. Beale (*far right*) pose with the seniors from Temple University's Red Diamond Battalion within "the Angle" on Cemetery Ridge at the completion of their staff ride, 1 February 2019. (Michael Nguyen, Temple University Army ROTC Program)

proximity of UCA to Pea Ridge National Military Park—three hours away by car in northwest Arkansas.

Local boosters had dubbed Pea Ridge the "Gettysburg of the West," but despite such hyperbole, the site suited our purposes admirably.[2] Every foot of ground over which the opposing armies fought on 7 and 8 March 1862 lay within the boundaries of the park. This meant we could access any sector important to understanding the battle and its outcome.

Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, the dashing former cavalryman who commanded the Confederate Army of the West, embodied the principle of the offensive (one of the U.S. Military's Principles of War, meaning to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative). He also valued the principles of maneuver and surprise. Rather than launch a frontal assault against the smaller Union Army of the Southwest, which Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis had entrenched on the high ground overlooking Little Sugar Creek, Van Dorn directed his troops to march around the Union troops' right flank. Trusting the cloak of night to mask his movements, Van Dorn hoped to place his troops at the enemy's rear and thwart the Telegraph Road—the Union line of communications—by dawn. In Curtis, however, Van Dorn faced a foe who realized the importance of the principle of security. Union scouts had detected the Confederate movement. Curtis also turned out to be an aggressive general. Rather than flee the trap that Van Dorn was trying to set, he simply directed the Army of the Southwest to turn around and then advanced combined contingents of infantry, cavalry, and artillery to engage the enemy. In the end, logistics determined the outcome at Pea Ridge. Van Dorn failed to bring up his baggage train, which carried his reserve artillery ammunition, after the first day's fighting. When the battle recommenced the next day, Confederate cannon fire dwindled, and Union gunners won the upper hand. Curtis sensed what had happened, ordered a general advance along his entire line, and drove Van Dorn's army off the field—a victory that ensured Missouri's retention in the Union.

We launched our first staff ride before William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess published their classic *Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992). To obtain a clear idea of what transpired at Pea Ridge, I approached the battlefield staff, who kindly sent me copies of the detailed and heavily documented studies that the National Park Service had commissioned in the 1950s for the site's interpretation guide. With these tools, I put together a "playbook" that allowed me to offer pertinent statistics and quotations at every stand on the route. In those days, I must confess, I conducted our Pea Ridge visits more like a battlefield tour than a true staff ride. The cadets and the non-ROTC students who accompanied us still seemed to get a lot out of the experience, but like a lot of teachers, there are things I would do differently if I could go back in time.

One year, we opted for variety and staged our staff ride a little farther north at Wilson's Creek National Battlefield. Like Pea Ridge, the engagement that raged along Wilson's Creek on 10 August 1861 featured a wide flanking movement. It also produced



The author (*far right*) and the senior cadets from Temple's University's Army ROTC program at the completion of their staff ride of the Trenton-Princeton Campaign on 27 April 2013. The group stands in front of Nassau Hall on Princeton University's campus, where effective British resistance came to an end on 3 January 1777. Lt. Col. James P. Castelli, then Temple's professor of military science, stands at center in the light blue polo shirt. (Author's Collection)

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lessons concerning the conduct of green troops in combat. Having tried something different, however, we decided that Pea Ridge served our needs better and never returned to Wilson's Creek.

In 1999, I relocated to my current position at Temple University, and my staff-riding days ostensibly came to an end. Although I interacted with Temple's Military Science Department, no one ever asked me to facilitate a staff ride, and I assumed that the cadre handled the task for itself. Then on 3 April 2010, I led a tour of Gettysburg for the Temple Undergraduate History and Social Studies Association and it reawakened my appetite for staff riding. I broached the subject with Lt. Col. James P. Castelli, then Temple's professor of military science. He told me that the ROTC's Red Diamond Battalion had been going without battlefield visits for some time. I offered to help change that, and he accepted.

Located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Temple University is within easy reach of major battlefields from two pivotal conflicts—the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. Residing in a city so steeped in memories of the Revolution undoubtedly influenced our thinking. We chose initially to visit New Jersey and retrace the Trenton-Princeton Campaign, 25 December 1776 to 3 January 1777. This campaign promised to yield numerous benefits from the staff-ride treatment. Although it encompassed three battles (First and Second Trenton and Princeton) instead of one, they were small and simple enough to cover in one day, even while following General George Washington's routes to Trenton on the night of 25–26 December 1776, and to Princeton on the night of 2–3 January 1777. Washington used the principles of surprise and offense to shatter the myth of British invincibility by destroying a Hessian brigade at Trenton and routing a British brigade at Princeton. Traveling the roads Washington took to those two battlefields imbued cadets with a sense of strategic vision. It also highlighted the hardships the Continental Army endured in moving themselves and their artillery to positions from which they could assail their foes. In addition, we stressed the importance of the local militia's insurgency that inhibited the ability of the Hessians at Trenton to communicate with other British garrisons in New Jersey. It kept those isolated troops in a constant state of alarm and left them badly fatigued by the time Washington launched his attack on the morning of 26 December.



Temple University's Red Diamond Battalion in front of Lt. Alonzo Cushing's Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery, Cemetery Ridge, 21 March 2015, after retracing the route of Pickett's Charge, the climax of the Battle of Gettysburg. (Author's Collection)

The Red Diamond Battalion relived the Trenton-Princeton Campaign with positive results in 2011, 2012, and 2013. By then, I had developed more mature ideas concerning what constituted a staff ride, and we adopted the character-driven model. I made up a list of prominent players in the campaign, and cadets adopted those personae and delivered briefings at the various stands. The battles of Trenton and the Princeton fight had inspired several fine books, including David Hackett Fischer's Pulitzer-Prize winner, *Washington's Crossing* (New York, 2004). This made it easier for cadets to research these engagements and their principals.

In 2014, we changed focus and visited Gettysburg National Military Park. While the Revolutionary War is the current focus of my research, this change was better for the students. Gettysburg was a bigger battle and gave us a larger cast of compelling characters and more choice of scenarios. It is often said that more has been written about Gettysburg than any other battle in American history. Whether true or not, numerous books and articles exist—both in print and online—that permit cadets to research almost any facet of the battle.[3] Twenty-first-century university students sometimes find it easier to relate to the combatants at Gettysburg because American literacy rates rose dramatically during the first half of the nineteenth century. This means that a much higher proportion of recorded experiences exist for Gettysburg than for Trenton and Princeton. These letters, diaries, after-action reports, and memoirs are readily available in print and on the Internet. Cavalry played no major role in the Trenton-Princeton Campaign, but the mounted arm, along with infantry and large quantities of artillery, figured prominently in the fighting around Gettysburg. Finally, many volunteers have assisted the National Park Service in returning the land to its 1863 appearance, which enhances the battlefield's utility as an outdoor classroom.

It is impossible to do justice to a battle as vast and involved as Gettysburg in a single day, so I devised an itinerary that presents the big picture while emphasizing a succession of pivotal case studies that illustrate how the battle unfolded.

Our first stand occurs off the battlefield in a nearby parking lot. There, I use my reproduction Model 1853 Enfield rifle musket and Union infantry accoutrements to conduct a briefing on Civil War small arms. This information helps cadets understand the conflict's infantry tactics, which I reference at several points on the battlefield.

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The author briefs ROTC cadets and other Temple University students on the use of the rifle musket, the standard Civil War infantry weapon, at the start of a Gettysburg battlefield staff ride on 21 March 2015. (Author's Collection)

The vehicles carrying the cadets then drive west through Gettysburg along the Chambersburg Pike to our first stand on the battlefield—McPherson's Ridge. This setting is ideal for orienting participants to the battlefield's geography and how Gettysburg's crossroads location brought the opposing armies together. After the cadets channeling General Robert E. Lee and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade explain their prebattle planning and movements, we explore how an engagement between Union cavalry vedettes and a Confederate infantry division escalated into the largest battle ever fought on American soil.

Cadets quickly appreciate the important role played by Brig. Gen. John Buford, commander of the Union Army of the Potomac's 1st Division, Cavalry Corps. True to the principle of security, Buford gathered intelligence on the Confederates' composition, strength, and intentions, while keeping the enemy in the dark regarding Union strategy. Buford also conducted a capable holding action on the morning of 1 July 1863 that prevented his opponents from seizing the high ground northwest of Gettysburg until Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds and the leading elements of the Army of the Potomac's I Corps arrived.

At this point, we do a little walking. First, we cross to the fields north of the railroad cut to consider how advancing Confederate infantry shattered three regiments belonging to Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade from the 1st Division of the Army of the Potomac's I Corps. We then head south to Herbst's woods, where the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps, Army of the Potomac, also known as the Iron Brigade, broke a Confederate attack. The open ground west of the woods is an ideal spot to introduce Civil War infantry tactics. I teach the students how to form a battle line and then go into a column of fours and finally back into line. The realization that Civil War infantry were trained to fight in two ranks set eighteen inches apart—with the troops dressed by touching elbows—usually has a sobering effect on the cadets. This interlude presents the opportunity to discuss the ways mission-command and warfighting functions (or command and control) have changed since 1863 and the challenges officers faced in moving and fighting their commands in the days before radios.

After securing Herbst's woods, we turn north toward the Chambersburg Pike. There, we explore the counterattack on the railroad cut delivered by the Iron Brigade's 6th Regiment of Wisconsin Volunteers and the two unbroken regiments from Cutler's brigade (the 14th and 95th Regiments, New York State Volunteers) that stabilized the crisis on the 1st Division's right. I then wrap up our survey of the first day's fighting by describing the convergence of Confederate divisions from the north and west that eventually compromised the positions of the Army of the Potomac's I and XI Corps and forced their hasty retreat to high ground south of Gettysburg.

For the battle's second day, we drive south along Confederate Avenue to the far end of the famous "fishhook"—the line that some of Meade's corps formed as they converged on Gettysburg on 1-2 July. The next stand is located at Houck's Ridge and Devil's Den, which anchored the left flank of the Army of the Potomac's III Corps after Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles advanced it from its original position on Cemetery Ridge. Houck's Ridge provides an ideal platform for the cadet acting as General Lee to describe his strategy for 2 July. Next, the student portraying Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, the commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia's I Corps, briefs the group on his efforts to assail the Union left and the unexpected delays and obstacles he encountered. The fight for Houck's Ridge threw one of Longstreet's divisions into disarray and caused two of its brigades to fragment, which diluted the Confederate blow on Little Round Top.

As the ride makes its way to Little Round Top, the cadets, most of whom have seen the 1993 film *Gettysburg*, are eager to visit the ground defended by Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers. Once there, however, they learn of the daring and initiative of several other Union officers who also helped to keep that eminence in Union hands. As anyone who has visited Gettysburg knows, Little Round Top makes an excellent natural vantage point for surveying most of the battlefield, and some of the morning's discussions about strategy and terrain can be revisited here to good advantage.

The ride then turns to a consideration of the battle's third day—3 July 1863—and its climax in Pickett's Charge. Stopping at

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The author instructs ROTC cadets and other Temple students on how to form a Civil War–era line-of-battle just east of Herbst's woods during the annual Temple University Army ROTC's staff ride on 21 March 2015. The Army of the Potomac's famed Iron Brigade advanced over this ground to repel attacking Confederates on 1 July 1863. (Author's Collection)

the Virginia Monument, General Lee once again explains his plans and his decision to launch a frontal assault against the center of the Union line. Next, General Longstreet takes center stage to express why he opposed his commander's plan and the reluctant steps he took to execute it. We then advance some distance east of the Virginia Monument to a Napoleon howitzer. From there we can survey the ground where the assault troops—the three fresh Virginia brigades led by Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett and six mauled brigades from Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's III Corps—formed their ranks. We inform the group about the series of left oblique movements made by Pickett's men to ensure they would converge with their comrades from Hill's corps on the objective, the famous copse of trees atop Cemetery Ridge.

At this point, the ride includes an interactive exercise. I have the cadets form the line of battle once again, with their battalion guidon in the center. They receive a briefing on how Civil War infantry advanced under fire, using their regimental colors and a pair of guidons—one posted on each flank—to preserve their alignment. It has been my ambition to have the cadets try to march the entire distance to the Emmitsburg Road in this formation. The Red Diamond Battalion conducts its staff rides in the spring, however, and the ground is usually much too wet to make such an experiment practical. We end up straggling across the field, each person trying to avoid the deepest puddles and the boggiest stretches. As we go forward, I repeatedly point out how the undulating terrain often shielded Pickett's men from enemy fire, which accounts for why so many of them got as far as they did.

Once we clamber over the stone wall that sheltered Cemetery Ridge's defenders (the Army of the Potomac's II Corps), we gather in "the Angle" to consider Pickett's Charge from the Union perspective. The briefings highlight the conduct of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon of the Army of the Potomac's II Corps, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb's 2d Brigade, 3d Division, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, also known as the Philadelphia Brigade, and Col. Dennis O'Kane, who commanded a regiment of Irish immigrants under Webb, the 69th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers. We also take note of Lt. Alonzo H. Cushing, who recently received a posthumous Medal of Honor for his handling of Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery.

Usually, the sun is setting when the ride reaches the final stand, the East Cavalry Field, about three miles east of Gettysburg. Just as Buford's conduct on 1 July underscored the value of well-commanded cavalry to Civil War armies, so did the actions of Brig. Gen. David McMurtrie Gregg on the East Cavalry Field two days later. With two brigades of his own and one under freshly promoted Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer, Gregg checked the attempt of the Confederate cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, to slip around Meade's right to menace the Army of the Potomac. Once again, Union horsemen validated the principle of security.



The author points out the Union dispositions on Cemetery Ridge on 3 July 1863, before leading senior ROTC cadets from Temple University's Red Diamond Battalion and students from his Civil War and Reconstruction class over the ground covered by Pickett's Charge during a Gettysburg staff ride conducted on 12 March 2016. (Temple University Army ROTC Program)

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The author listens as a Temple University Army ROTC cadet briefs her classmates from the Red Diamond Battalion on Houck's Ridge at the south end of the Gettysburg battlefield, 12 March 2016. (Temple University Army ROTC Program)

The East Cavalry Field attracts little traffic, even during the summer—the peak of tourist visitation. This makes it the ideal spot for the integration phase of the staff ride. As we almost always have the place to ourselves, there are no distractions as the cadets express their thoughts.

Different battlefields lend themselves to different themes in officer formation. The events at Gettysburg, for instance, stress the importance of leadership from the most senior levels to the lowest. General Meade received his appointment to command the Army of the Potomac on 28 June 1863, just three days before the fighting at Gettysburg erupted. He was not well acquainted with his command by that time, which meant he had to rely on the judgment and resolve of his subordinates. With the possible exception of General Sickles, they did not fail him. As the seniors of the Red Diamond Battalion make their way around Gettysburg, I pepper them with questions and comments that highlight how corps, division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders had to make snap decisions that meant the difference between victory and defeat. The fact that so many Gettysburg heroes practiced a self-sacrificing style of leadership—and paid for it with their lives—does not go unnoticed. For students who know they may be leading troops in a matter of months, moments like this take on a special resonance.

What goes into developing a successful staff ride? Preparation is first and foremost. In a character-driven staff ride, every participant has a part to play—and that means researching a role and composing a set of intelligible notes for delivering briefings without any appreciable hitches. In ROTC staff rides, shyness can be an encumbrance. Some students are uncomfortable with public speaking. An alert facilitator can usually help a cadet recover his or her stride with a tactful prompt. Knowing there is a safety net in place bolsters cadets' confidence.


In the Red Diamond Battalion, cadet performance in the staff ride has improved over the years as expectations have become clearer and the cadre has improved its preparative techniques. Staff-ride veterans also pass on what they have learned from the experience, which benefits the cadets following in their footsteps. Cadet briefings have improved steadily over the years. During our last staff ride on 1 February 2019, Lt. Col. Robert K. Beale, Temple's new professor of military science, and his cadre prepped the participants, achieving our highest standards yet. I look forward to seeing what next year's senior cadets can do.

After reading the articles in the Winter 2019 issue of *Army History*, I plan to inject additional opportunities for reflection in future staff rides. For instance, I will ask the cadets portraying battlefield personae, "If you were in that officer's place, what would you do differently?" After the cadet's response, the group will be invited to comment. This will generate added critical thinking.



Attired as a British infantryman of the Revolutionary War, the author waits on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River early on 27 April 2013, to begin a briefing on eighteenth-century weapons and tactics to start Temple University's Army ROTC staff ride of the Trenton-Princeton Campaign. This spot is where General George Washington's reduced Continental Army crossed the river on the night of 25–26 December 1776. (Author's Collection)

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The author starts the Red Diamond Battalion's Gettysburg staff ride on 1 February 2019, with a briefing on the use and capabilities of the rifle musket, the standard infantry weapon of the U.S. Civil War. (Michael Nguyen, Temple University Army ROTC Program)

The Red Diamond Battalion is undoubtedly fortunate to be based within driving distance of the storied battlegrounds of Trenton, Princeton, and Monmouth in New Jersey; Bladensburg, Fort McHenry, and Antietam in Maryland; Brandywine, and Gettysburg in Pennsylvania; and Bull Run in Virginia. Even sites of smaller battles or skirmishes can produce valuable lessons under the staff-ride treatment. Battlefields exist with remarkable density in the United States from the East Coast to the Mississippi River and beyond, especially in Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas. Further west there are Indian wars sites, but these are often situated far from ROTC detachments and some are inaccessible because they occupy portions of privately owned land. Nevertheless, the proliferation of virtual staff rides should soon make it possible for cadets to participate in exercises even in these remote locations.[4]

The staff ride is now a commissioning requirement for Army ROTC programs, which means facilitators must keep in mind what U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) wants its charges to derive from that exercise. USACC Pamphlet 145-10, issued on 12 February 2019, states that a staff ride should involve cadets "in a formal battle analysis" by permitting them to discuss "the strategic and operational context" of an engagement and "focusing on the tactical level."[5]

Effective facilitators come from a variety of backgrounds, but they all have certain traits in common. Facilitators are familiar with the battlefield and its surrounding area. They should not only know what happened on the ground in question, but also be able to situate that engagement in the larger context of the war during which it occurred. An ability to make connections between one battle and others—including those from more recent wars—is an added advantage. A knowledge of the weapons systems employed in your battle—and their impact on the tactics of the day—is also imperative.

The facilitator should not think of himself or herself as the "star" of the staff ride. Your job is to help the cadets learn as much as possible—either through their own efforts or with coaching. When I take the field with a class of cadets, I see it as my job to set the stage at each stand by orienting the group to the surrounding geography. Then I get out of the way and let the cadets deliver their briefings, occasionally coming to the assistance of anyone who runs into a snag. Once the cadets finish, I add some additional details that will help them to comprehend the lessons to be learned from that location.

Each facilitator draws on his or her own bag of tricks. In the course of my career, I have published scholarly work on military operations in the American War of Independence, U.S. Civil War, and World War II. I have also taught a U.S. military history survey and a Civil War course for three-and-a-half decades, adding a World War II course to my repertoire in 1999. If you do something often enough, you learn more, and I have managed to fill my head with the kind of facts, anecdotes, and ideas that enliven a staff ride. I also indulged in historical reenacting from 1974 to 2016, reliving the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. Handling the weapons and mastering the infantry drill of those two conflicts imbued me with considerable practical knowledge concerning the life of the common soldier in the 1770s and 1860s. While living in Arkansas, I rose to the level of field command in the Frontier Battalion, a Union living-history organization, and I got the chance to train over two hundred participants in the battalion and brigade evolutions commonly used in the Civil War, and then lead them in simulated combat. It is one thing to read about such things in period manuals, and quite another to perform them. These experiences prepared me to explain what military units did in historical situations and to give cadets a taste of these procedures.

When I facilitate a staff ride, I usually dress as a soldier of the war we are studying. Such behavior will strike some as eccentric, but I find it works well as a teaching tool. I prefer to facilitate staff rides without the benefit of notes, which fosters the illusion that the cadets are dealing with an ambassador from the past. Like some professors, I am something of a ham actor, and I try to immerse the

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The author orients senior cadets from Temple University's Red Diamond Battalion on the lay of the Gettysburg battlefield as seen from McPherson's Ridge, 1 February 2019. (Michael Nguyen, Temple University Army ROTC Program)

cadets in the scenarios by channeling the historical characters involved. There are numerous other ways to put staff riders in the moment, but these methods have worked for me. A facilitator should remember that a staff ride is a sensory exercise as well as an intellectual one.

The staff ride also treats facilitators to rewarding bonding experiences. Even under ideal weather conditions, tramping around a battlefield involves a certain amount of adversity, and the shared hardship usually brings people closer together. The staff rides on which I have participated will always rank among the high points in my years as a professor.

With USACC implementing new standards and developing additional resources, the ROTC staff ride is due to undergo considerable revitalization. That possibly makes this the best time to function as a facilitator. There is no telling where strides in technology and cadet training will take us. That is an exciting prospect, and it will be interesting and fun to see where the staff-ride trail leads.



The author (*left*) poses with the senior cadets from Temple University's Red Diamond Battalion in front of the memorial to Lt. Alonzo Cushing's Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery, within "the Angle" on Cemetery Ridge after the group retraced the route of Pickett's Charge, 12 March 2016. (Temple University Army ROTC Program)

About the Author

Gregory J. W. Urwin holds a Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame and is a professor of history at Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he specializes in American and British military affairs. A former president of the Society for Military History, he has authored or edited nine books, including *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island* (Lincoln, Neb., 1997), which won the General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Award from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Notes

1. Jay Luvaas was a prolific and influential scholar. His better known books include *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); *The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815–1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and such edited volumes as *Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972); *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York: Da Capo, 1999); and *Napoleon on the Art of War* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

2. Curiously, since moving to Pennsylvania in 1999, I have never heard anyone in these parts refer to Gettysburg as the "Pea Ridge of the East."


3. Among the ever-growing mountain of Gettysburg books, I recommend staff-ride facilitators consult Mark Grimsley and Brooks D. Simpson, *Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), and Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, *A Field Guide to Gettysburg: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

4. Because of a book I wrote, *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), the U.S. Marine Corps asked me in August 2009 to conduct a staff ride on Wake Island for Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 211, whose predecessor organization (VMF–211) helped defend the atoll from 8–23 December 1941.

5. Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Cadet Command, *USACC Pamphlet 145–10*, 12 February 2019, pp. 5–6, (accessed 5 March 2019) https://www.cadetcommand.army.mil/res/files/forms_policies/pamphlets/USACC%20Pamphlet%20145-10.pdf.

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REVIEWS



King William's War: The First Contest for North America, 1689–1697
By Michael G. Laramie
Westholme Publishing, 2017
Pp. xvi, 322. $35

Review by John R. Maass

In *King William's War: The First Contest for North America, 1689–1697*, author Michael G. Laramie has written the only modern study of King William's War. He examines the first of four colonial-era wars in North America between Louis XIV's France and England under William and Mary's rule and fills in a large gap in early American military history. With well-chosen illustrations and helpful maps, this book provides a detailed look at the earliest "French and Indian War" (also known as War of the League of Augsburg) involving not only European powers, but also colonists and native inhabitants.

Laramie's opening chapters detail the competing interests of the English, Dutch, and French for the beaver trade in North America in the second half of the seventeenth century. Caught in the middle of this commercial conflict were the Iroquois Indians who sought to dominate the beaver trade and control access to eager Dutch and English buyers at Albany and New York. The Iroquois also came into conflict with western, French-allied Indian tribes that provided much of the Canadian pelts to Quebec. The French also allied with the Wabanaki tribes of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which allowed them to successfully defend much of New France.

Brutality often characterized the war. French and Indian raids launched from Canada, often in winter, devastated the English and their native allies in New England and northern New York. Laramie points out that the French and their allies had the initiative on the frontier for most of the war, especially in raiding the English, picking isolated towns and attacking at will. The French also burned the towns and crops of Iroquois' enemies as their successful campaigns separated the tribes from the English and made them sue for peace.


France was the undisputed victor in the war, "the only war that can be said to have been won by the French" against the English in America (p. 283). French forces and Wabanaki native warriors successfully defended Nova Scotia against American and English attacks, while a large-scale colonial campaign against Quebec led by William Phips in 1690 was a failure. Laramie also details the little-known operations along the rocky shores of Hudson Bay and the Avalon Peninsula of Newfoundland for control of trading posts and rude forts. His narrative also shows why the English and their American colonists lost the war: the lack of an overall military commander in the colonies; the "fractured colonial political system" (p. 284); an absence of colonists willing to sustain the war; and the lack of Royal Navy support for offensive and defensive operations along the New England coast.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the war, which Laramie explores in detail, are the enormous logistical challenges encountered by the European powers and the colonists during the conflict. England provided scant material support for the war, much to the advantage of France. All operations required great effort to recruit troops from small or unwilling populations to undertake complex raids, attacks, sieges, and fort construction with little money, labor, or supplies. Moreover, attacking the enemy or meeting with allies to plan assaults involved vast distances—from Newfoundland to the western Great Lakes and from Hudson Bay to New York City, often during the dead of winter. Combatants fought some of the skirmishes and battles of this war in locations that are remote even today, making it difficult to imagine how the Indians and soldiers of the 1690s managed to reach them on foot or by sail.

Laramie's book is well researched and organized, written in a clear narrative style. His biographical sketches of key leaders such as Phips, Benjamin Church, the Comte de Frontenac, and Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville are enlightening. The book's weakness, however, is that it lacks context. The author provides little detail about how this derivative conflict in North America was part of the larger struggle all across Europe for nine years. Readers will find few connections between events in royal courts and on European battlefields and those in the forests, lakes, and forts of New France, New England, and the Great Lakes. The decisions made at Versailles and London related to the New World struggle are encountered rarely in the text, so that it seems that King Wiiliam's War, as Laramie describes it, might be construed as a purely colonial event. Nevertheless, readers will no doubt enjoy this study that provides a much-needed account of an important conflict.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the National Museum of the U.S. Army. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from Ohio State University. He is the author of *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811*, the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series (Washington, D.C., 2013), and of the books *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2015) and *George Washington's Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2017).

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Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man of the Confederacy

By Earl J. Hess
University of North Carolina Press, 2016
Pp. xx, 341. $35

Review by Michael P. Irvin

Braxton Bragg could very well be the most vilified and denounced general of the Civil War. Surely, he was a staunch defender of the Southern cause and a loyal lieutenant to Jefferson Davis, but his uncompromising demeanor and unyielding obsession with discipline induced many of his officers and soldiers to resist his orders while detesting him as their commander. We know that Bragg possessed a strong sense of duty and a resolute commitment to his soldiers that he displayed from his initial post in Florida in 1861 to his final command in North Carolina in 1865. Nevertheless, if Bragg's name finds its way into a conversation with Civil War enthusiasts today, there is a good chance he will be rebuked for indiscriminate executions of his own men and criticized for mismanaging the Army of Tennessee. Yet, how much of what we truly know about Bragg is excess or representations distorted by the elements of time?

Earl J. Hess, an esteemed military historian and author of several distinguished books, clears the uncertainty with an unbiased and balanced perspective into the narrative of Bragg's controversial time as a Confederate general. His book provides new interpretations grounded in comprehensive research and sound analysis drawn from a variety of primary sources, leaving the reader with little doubt that the conclusions Hess arrives at are judicious and reliable. Hess also challenges longstanding beliefs and examines the verdicts of other notable historians, both past and present, to paint a vibrant picture of Braxton Bragg, the husband and soldier. While this study in no way professes to be a biography, it does provide enough details for the reader to understand Bragg's life before and after the Civil War. This book is an excellent synthesis that delves into Bragg's decisions and relationships as a general combined with the usual superb writing we have grown accustomed to from Hess. More importantly, it is an equitable exploration that reveals how newspapers largely shaped public opinion of Bragg and how a few of his subordinate commanders provoked defiance and opposition among the rank and file toward him.

It is true that an inconsistency exists concerning contemporary thought and memory surrounding Bragg. The negative image so easily accepted of him labels Bragg as commander who freely executed his soldiers at will for minor infractions, while in reality he cared deeply for his soldiers and viewed the army as an extension of his own family. Hess exposes the longstanding fallacy and notes that while Bragg did approve the death penalty for several soldiers, the number of executions during his tenure was less than or equal to other prominent Confederate generals. Hess interprets Bragg's enduring stigma as largely originating in his antagonistic relationship with the press. Unschooled in military arts and unaware of the intricacies inherent in military command, newspaper correspondents and editors provided amateur analysis to the public about Bragg's decisions and the results of his campaigns. Hess suggests that Bragg's unwillingness to entertain reporters in his camp or set the record straight following the war has led to Bragg's unfavorable reputation, stating that, "public opinion, indeed, was Bragg's biggest enemy" (p. 267).

Hess expertly examines the troubled relationships Bragg faced with men like Leonidas Polk, James Longstreet, Benjamin F. Cheatham, and Daniel Harvey Hill. At decisive points in critical engagements such as Perryville, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga, these men were either slow to obey or outright derelict in their duties. Regarding Chickamauga, Hess states that the corps commanders "were willful, unreliable subordinates who could not be counted on to obey orders or to cooperate with their commander" (p. 168). Moreover, Hess illuminates the cancerous effect this had within Bragg's army and reveals why the problems lingered throughout his period in command. While Bragg certainly had his share of supporters within the Army of Tennessee, the faultfinders undoubtedly created complications and stressors that began to influence Bragg's efficiency in decision making. Despite a poor command climate and the resulting fallout, Bragg refused to step down.

The book also effectively calls attention to Bragg's ill-advised decision to openly confront his generals regarding their support and approval of him as their commander. Hess provides an ample amount of detail in his chapter entitled, "Revolt of the Generals," which explains his actions after the lost opportunity at Chickamauga. In a meeting on 10 October 1863, Jefferson Davis personally solicited the generals' opinions about their commander and "not a single voice was raised on Bragg's behalf in this unusual moment in Civil War history" (p. 180). Despite the dissension within Bragg's formation and the continued degradation of his capacity to command the army, Jefferson Davis was immovable in his persistent commitment and support for the embattled commander. The ineffectual and oftentimes insubordinate conduct of Bragg's generals, coupled with his feeble responses, ultimately influenced the strategic success of the Army of Tennessee and certainly tarnished his reputation as a competent and accomplished Civil War commander.


My only critical remark regarding this exceptional work of history is the lack of maps. While Hess presents several suitable photos of key leaders throughout the book, he only provides two relatively simple maps that are absent of specific details. Readers with a strong understanding of Civil War battles and troop movements will most likely get by, but a novice may struggle to envision the particulars. The reader can certainly look up each battle on the Internet to gain a better appreciation for Bragg's decisions, but it decelerates the momentum of the narration to do so.

In general, this book is a first-rate analysis of Braxton Bragg and a superb piece of Civil War history that should be required reading for military leaders. It serves as a lesson to those in command in how perceptions and morale for an entire

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unit can shift with the influence of a few detractors and why well-rounded leadership is critical to success. It also lays bare the consequences for not fully appreciating the media and its sway over public opinion, while also illustrating the pitfalls of blind loyalty to one's subordinates. This is a fresh and welcome study that stands on its own as a fair and equitable treatment of Braxton Bragg. It will be a valued addition to the existing literature for years to come.

Sgt. Maj. Michael P. Irvin is the vice chair for the Department of Professional Studies at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy. He earned his master's degree from Penn State University and he currently teaches history at Park University in El Paso, Texas.



Churchill and the Dardanelles
By Christopher M. Bell
Oxford University Press, 2017
Pp. xvii, 439. $34.95

Review by Mason W. Watson

Assessments of the Royal Navy's attempt to force the Dardanelles Strait in 1915 vary widely. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty when the operation began, argued that the campaign had the potential to shorten World War I, or even to win it outright. Churchill believed that if the commanders on the spot had acted decisively, the British fleet might have broken through to Constantinople, forcing the Ottoman Empire to surrender. The strategic consequences would have been far-reaching, and Britain might have been able to bring the war to a victorious conclusion without the bloodletting of Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele. On the other hand, Churchill's critics maintained that the campaign was never likely to succeed, and that it was attempted only because he—a civilian politician—acted contrary to the advice of his professional military advisers. Postwar commentators pointed to the Dardanelles campaign as an example of the dangers of civilian meddling in military affairs and argued that more than 50,000 Allied soldiers had died because of Churchill's misguided interference.

Author Christopher M. Bell's argument in *Churchill and the Dardanelles* is that neither of these perspectives is wholly accurate. Drawing on a range of contemporary documents, Bell presents a detailed account of the decision-making process that led to the campaign's inception in January–February 1915. Contrary to the "Churchill legend," pervasive after the Second World War, the forty-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty was hardly in a position to personally determine the course of British strategy. While the Dardanelles scheme might never have been considered without Churchill's sponsorship, it could never have been undertaken without the support—or at least acquiescence—of the War Council and the Admiralty staff. Churchill genuinely believed that the plan had the support of his chief naval adviser, the elderly Admiral Lord John "Jacky" Fisher, even though Fisher considered Churchill's scheme to be dangerous at best. But while Fisher made his objections clear in private correspondence with a wide range of figures, he waited until the campaign was already underway before voicing his opposition to Churchill directly. By then, of course, it was far too late.

It is clear that Churchill does not bear sole or even primary responsibility for the Dardanelles venture. His naval advisers had prudently dissuaded him from pursuing other impractical schemes, including the occupation of the German North Sea island of Borkum; they might have handled the proposed Dardanelles campaign in a similar way, especially if Fisher had clarified his views early on. Churchill also cannot be blamed (at least not exclusively) for much of what happened after the operation was launched, including the decision to land troops on the Gallipoli peninsula. Lord Herbert Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, was ultimately responsible for authorizing the deployment of land forces. Political considerations nevertheless ensured that Churchill—not Kitchener—became a casualty of a cabinet reshuffle in the spring of 1915.

Regardless of whether Churchill was to blame for the British defeat in the Dardanelles, Bell maintains that the operation was never the potentially war-winning masterstroke Churchill later made it out to be. In the second half of his book, the author examines the mythology surrounding the "lost victory" in the Dardanelles—much of which Churchill created himself. Sacked from Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's cabinet in the autumn of 1915, Churchill immediately embarked on a campaign to rehabilitate his popular reputation, using the Dardanelles Commission—a parliamentary inquiry into the failed campaign—as a platform to make the case for his own defense. Bell recounts how Churchill went to great lengths to collude with other witnesses, helping to ensure that his point of view was well-represented in the commission's final report.


After the war, Churchill continued his campaign to shape the history of the Dardanelles operation, using his power as a member of Prime Minister David Lloyd George's cabinet to influence the historians writing the official account of the campaign. Churchill ultimately found that the simplest solution was to write the history of the war himself—a course that he would follow with similar success after the Second World War. This was the impetus behind his bestselling memoir *The World Crisis,* which used selective quotations from official documents to represent the Dardanelles campaign as brilliant in conception but tragically flawed in execution. Published during the mid- to late 1920s, Churchill's work struck the right chord at a time when growing disillusionment with the results of Britain's military effort on the Western Front led many to look favorably on the "missed opportunity" of the Dardanelles. By 1939, public opinion had swung almost entirely to Churchill's point of view; when he returned to office as First Lord of the Admiralty at the beginning of World War II, few questioned whether he was the right man for the job.

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As Bell suggests, Churchill's mythologized account of the Dardanelles campaign has its own inaccuracies—but these generally have been overlooked due to the popularity of the "Churchill legend." Bell argues that the Dardanelles had only a fleeting prospect of success, suggesting that the only way Churchill's hopes might have been fulfilled would have been through an amphibious operation to simultaneously seize Gallipoli and force the Dardanelles in January or February 1915. By March it was already too late. And even if this plan for an early combined arms operation had worked, there is no guarantee that it would have achieved the strategic results that Churchill anticipated. It is possible that the Ottomans would just have relocated the seat of government elsewhere and continued the war, even if Constantinople had fallen to the British.

Bell's work is detailed and closely argued, providing a balanced account of the British government's complex and inefficient decision-making machinery in early 1915. The author's emphasis on the role of the popular press is particularly valuable—especially his discussion of the role played by the *Morning Post*'s outspoken editor H. A. Gwynne, who waged a personal crusade against Churchill throughout the First World War. Bell's most important contribution, however, is his discussion of Churchill's myth-making efforts after 1915. While there are a few aspects of Bell's interpretation that are open to question—he dismisses the land campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula, for example, without taking into consideration just how close that campaign came to success—this work nevertheless stands as a valuable contribution to our understanding of Winston Churchill's role in one of the most controversial episodes of British military history.

Mason W. Watson is a history Ph.D. student at Ohio State University, where he has taught courses in military and European history. He received his B.A. from the College of William and Mary in 2012 and his M.A. from Ohio State in 2016. His dissertation deals with the interwar British Army and the memory of the First World War. He is currently working as a Pathways Intern in the General Histories Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.



Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament

By Lawrence S. Kaplan
University Press of Kentucky, 2018
Pp. iii, 233. $80

Review by Shannon Granville

In the introduction to his book on Republican politician Harold Stassen, Lawrence S. Kaplan summarizes the popular perception of Minnesota's unfortunate son: "a figure of mockery as a perennial also-ran on the margins of the history of the twentieth century" (p. 1). Stassen's early career successes as the youthful governor of his home state in the late 1930s and early 1940s made him a promising challenger to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democratic stranglehold over the presidency. However, his repeated failed attempts to secure the Republican presidential nomination between 1944 and 1992 severely undermined his reputation both inside and outside his party. In this new biography, Kaplan aims to separate Stassen's political legacy from his fruitless presidential ambitions. During and after World War II, Stassen was a passionate advocate of a new Republican internationalism, unafraid to challenge his party's isolationist tendencies in order to press for a U.S. commitment to foreign aid and international security. His work as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament in the mid-1950s centered on arms control negotiations, as he sought to develop a nuclear test ban treaty acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet when these negotiations foundered, the trajectory of Stassen's political career fell with them, and he never regained anything close to the status or influence he enjoyed during that period. As a result, his historical role has been overlooked in nearly all histories of the Eisenhower administration—a fault that Kaplan has worked to redress in this book.

Kaplan's biography opens with Stassen's career foundations, including his beginnings as a Republican leader in his native Minnesota, his wartime naval service on Admiral William F. Halsey's staff, and his participation in the U.S. delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the creation of the United Nations (UN). Stassen's forceful personality and penchant for self-promotion—described by Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg as "his belligerent respect for his own opinion" (p. 29)—caused friction with his Republican colleagues, specifically John Foster Dulles. Yet in a nod to Stassen's administrative skills and international connections, in January 1953 the incoming President Eisenhower named him as head of the Mutual Security Agency, responsible for coordinating U.S. military and economic aid. In this position, Stassen pressed for economic and technical cooperation as a tool to promote peace in Europe. Following a State Department reorganization under Secretary of State Dulles in mid-1953, Stassen continued to manage his assistance programs as the head of the new Foreign Operations Administration (FAO). But within a few years, the FAO itself was dismantled—its functions split between the State and Defense departments—and in mid-1955 Stassen received a cabinet-level position as Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament.

Stassen had long been an advocate of controlling the atomic bomb. As early as 1945, he spoke of the need to tame the destructive power of the atom, and advocated a solution in which nuclear scientists would register their peaceful research with the UN Atomic Commission, "a new and higher level of governmental machinery where it can be more effectively administered for the people's welfare" (p. 38). Under Eisenhower, Stassen linked his disarmament work with the president's Open Skies


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proposals for aerial surveillance of military installations, as presented during the 1955 Geneva summit meeting with U.S., British, French, and Soviet representatives. From there, he continued to work with the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament, pressing for limits to nuclear testing and the existing nuclear stockpiles. Yet Stassen's supreme confidence in his own abilities meant that he tended to exceed his remit as a diplomat, to the displeasure of Dulles and other key figures at home and abroad. The tensions between Stassen and his superiors came to a head in May 1957, when he presented a proposed arms control negotiating position to Soviet diplomat Valerian A. Zorin without full consultation from the State Department and the White House, or the approval of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies most affected by its proposals. In the face of disapproval at home and protests from the French, British, and West German leadership, Eisenhower and Dulles rebuked Stassen and curbed his authority. Though the negotiations limped along for a time, they ended in deadlock, and in early 1958 Stassen left the Eisenhower administration. Over the next few decades, he ran for office in Pennsylvania and Minnesota, seeking governorships and congressional seats to no avail, and by the time of his death in 2001, his role in U.S. foreign policy had been all but forgotten.

Kaplan has mined a number of domestic sources on his subject, from Stassen's collection of personal papers with the Minnesota Historical Society to the materials in the Eisenhower Presidential Library to the official State and Defense department files at the National Archives. Most of the personal sources focus on Stassen's immediate contemporaries, although one key source of diplomatic perspectives—the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection held by the Library of Congress—does not appear in this book. Another critical omission, moreover, is the view of Stassen's peers outside the United States. Considering Stassen's regular participation in international meetings and conferences, from his role as part of the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco Conference to his disarmament work with NATO allies, it is unfortunate that Kaplan's biography incorporates little international source material. It would be informative, for instance, to see whether Stassen's overseas trips with the FAO succeeded in raising his profile with his hosts in Europe and Asia, and what sort of impression, if any, he left upon those he met. The files of the French, British, or West German foreign offices might also provide a broader record of the diplomatic gaffe that effectively ended Stassen's disarmament work. Such alternate perspectives would provide a clearer sense of Stassen's historical contribution, supporting Kaplan's endeavor to give Stassen due credit for his service to his country.

Kaplan concludes his assessment of Stassen's career by suggesting that it "seemed to fit the definition of insanity: repeating the same mistakes while expecting different results" (p. 189). Stassen repeatedly overplayed his hand, overestimating his influence and underestimating the degree to which more influential individuals like Dulles disapproved of his actions. Yet other factors outside Stassen's control contributed to the collapse of his disarmament efforts, not least of which was the launch of the *Sputnik I* satellite in late 1957 and its detrimental effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. In this context, Kaplan's biography of Harold Stassen is both a redemptive narrative for its subject and a cautionary tale for anyone with diplomatic or political aspirations, as well as a supplement to the existing literature on the Eisenhower years.

Shannon Granville is the senior editor in the Historical Products Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War International History Project series copublished with Stanford University Press. She has a master's degree in international history from the London School of Economics and a bachelor's in history from the College of William and Mary. Her research interests include Cold War nuclear history, postwar British and Japanese politics, and political satire in popular culture. She thanks Eric B. Setzekorn for his contribution to the discussion portion of the review.



Omar Nelson Bradley: America's GI General, 1893–1981

By Steven L. Ossad
University of Missouri Press, 2017
Pp. xxx, 460. $36.95

Review by Gregory C. McCarthy

In *Omar Nelson Bradley: America's GI General, 1893–1981*, author Steven L. Ossad sets out to prove that his subject is not as dry as often thought. He mostly succeeds, but at the expense of Bradley's sainthood. Ossad provides a thorough biography of one of World War II's slightly less heralded senior generals. Bradley rose through succeeding commands, on the strength of his performance and with the support of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Bradley's reputation for sound judgment, even temperament, and success in increasing levels of responsibility helped him advance. Unlike General George S. Patton, Bradley usually thrived with minimal supervision. As 12th Army Group general in 1944–1945, he commanded the largest body of American soldiers (1.3 million strong) ever to serve under a single field commander.

The book is well researched; Ossad cites Army histories and biographies. Ossad covers the right level of detail, providing enough information for the lay reader and historian alike. He pieces together multiple sources to resolve disputes—for example, if one belated Patton battlefield sighting in North Africa against Eisenhower's orders could have happened (he thinks not). Bradley wrote two autobiographies, *A Soldier's Story* (New York, 1951), based on aide Chester B. "Chet" Hansen's diary, and *A General's Life* (New York, 1983), which was published posthumously. Ossad objects to both books. The former was a rehash of fresh

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controversies (personalities and alliance issues); the latter Bradley had little to do with because of his declining health.

Bradley was the last living five-star general. Because five-star generals never officially retire (and because military academy entrance then marked the beginning of active service), Bradley holds the certainly unbreakable record for longest time on active duty—just under 70 years. However, barely more than six months into his classmate Eisenhower's presidency in 1953, Bradley's public service ended as he vacated the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) job. His falling-out with Eisenhower might partly reflect their similarity. Both were superficially benign and smiling, but stubborn, proud Midwesterners who rose far above their humble beginnings. Apparently, neither could move beyond old slights.

Ossad realistically covers Bradley's flaws: bearing grudges that last for decades; his apparent cover-up of the Patton sick bay abuse incident; and his inability to self-critique. Additionally, his malfeasance in directing close-air support in Operation COBRA in 1944 resulted in the fratricide of his friend, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, a responsibility Bradley evaded for the remainder of his life. Ossad describes correspondence indicating Bradley's affair with the woman who would become his second wife began years before his first wife's death. Ossad is taken aback by the bitterness of Bradley's private response to Patton's accidental December 1945 death. Bradley's near-catatonic immediate response to the Battle of the Bulge is especially damning. Eisenhower never forgives him.

Bradley benefited from good timing. He got accepted to West Point's Class of 1915 ("the class that stars fell on"), which included Eisenhower. He later acquires the highly influential George Marshall as an early mentor and future advocate. Ossad demonstrates convincingly that legendary war correspondent Ernie T. Pyle, initially cool toward Bradley, embraced him as the "GI's General" and is most responsible for bringing him favorable public attention. Readers well versed in World War II will find much familiar: a strained alliance embodied by the insufferable British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, the touch-and-go nature of both D-Day and the Bulge, and the early difficulties in North Africa and the Mediterranean.

There is little discussion of Bradley's personal life. Ossad explains at the outset that correspondence with his first wife cannot be found. Esther Dora "Kitty" Buhler, Bradley's second wife, is suspected in the disappearance of such records. Buhler, a former journalist, controlled Bradley's reputation in his retirement, becoming his late-stage Ernie Pyle. Bradley and Kitty were technical consultants on the 1970 hit movie, *Patton*, and were paid a percentage of the movie's proceeds. The movie portrays Bradley as kindly and avuncular, in contrast to the overbearing protagonist. Bradley eclipsed his longtime rival, Patton, in rank and command and outlived him by thirty-five years.

Bradley was at the center of much of the post–World War II national security structure. Accepting the job grudgingly, he became the first head of the postwar Veterans Administration, then a cesspool of cronyism, corruption, patient backlogs, and overwhelming numbers of returning veterans (one million per month at one point). He then became chief of staff of the Army and subsequently the first CJCS as a result of the National Security Act of 1947. He received his fifth star as CJCS in 1950.

However, all the Joint Chiefs, but primarily Bradley as chairman, bear responsibility for not vetting General Douglas MacArthur's push to the Chinese border in late 1950. President Harry S. Truman and Bradley state MacArthur glibly brushed aside any concerns at their Wake Island meeting. However, the buck stopped with the president as Truman belatedly acknowledged. Additionally, Bradley and his chiefs were not engaged strongly and were actually in quiet opposition to the September 1950 Inchon landing, which succeeded.


Ossad reports that when Truman told Bradley of his intent to fire MacArthur, Bradley, no fan of MacArthur, was not immediately supportive, wanting to discuss it with the Joint Chiefs. Bradley was not certain MacArthur had technically been insubordinate. Bradley memorably tells a congressional hearing that bringing in China is "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy" while leaving out his virtual acquiescence in the run-up to this effort.[1] Moreover, in late 1967, Bradley strongly endorses the Vietnam War after a trip there.

With a career as long and significant as Bradley's, there is much to digest. He tackled every problem as if a corps commander and usually effectively delegated responsibility to functional subcomponents. *Omar Nelson Bradley* will acquaint modern readers with a man born in the nineteenth century and one of the seminal figures of World War II and its aftermath. The book will be of particular interest to soldiers and a useful professional military education addition for continued study of both World War II and leadership, respectively. Ossad has provided a useful contribution.

NOTE

1. Omar Nelson Bradley, testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 15 May 1951, *Military Situation in the Far East*, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732.

Col. Greg McCarthy, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, earned his Ph.D. at Catholic University of America and has deployed to Afghanistan as a Marine historian. He is currently an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies in Washington, D.C.



The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944–1945
By Robert M. Citino
University of Kansas Press, 2017
Pp. xiv, 615. $34.95

Review by Timothy Heck

Robert Citino's *The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944–1945* is the fitting conclusion to his trilogy on the German Army from 1942 through the end of World War II. Currently the Samuel Zemurray

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Stone Senior Historian at the National WWII Museum and formerly a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College, Citino is one of the foremost experts on the German military and its way of war. His preceding works include *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare*, as well as the two previous installments in this series, *Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942* and *The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943*. As with his previous works, Citino writes in an engaging style, supported by extensive archival and secondary research, and presents the German Army's struggles on the personal, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

By 1943, after Italy's defection to the Allies and catastrophic Axis defeats in North Africa and in Stalingrad, Germany's eventual defeat became increasingly inevitable, even to those within the German military. Why, then, did the German military keep fighting? Traditional narratives focus on Hitler or Nazism as the driving force behind continued German resistance. Citino, however, argues that German military tradition and focus on a concept of war based on operational maneuver (*Bewegungskrieg*) kept the armies in the field longer than expected. *Bewegungskrieg* "required brisk maneuver, high levels of aggression, and a flexible system of command" (p. 5), all of which the Germans continued to pursue until the very end. The result was the destruction of Germany, and the deaths of "millions of ordinary soldiers who were willing to fight for the cause and die at their posts" (p. 58).

In postwar memoirs, the German commanders and staff officers pointed to oaths of loyalty to Germany or Hitler as reasons to keep fighting. Citino, however, punctures this self-serving myopia by reminding readers that these same officers were less than loyal to their subordinates and to the millions of German civilians who suffered because of the continuation of the war. Furthermore, he reminds readers that many of these commanders who sacrificed their men in the name of loyalty to Germany were quick to surrender or flee to the Western Allies in the final days of the war, leaving their men to die or be captured by the Red Army.

Citino alternates between Eastern and Western Fronts, drawing common threads between the two. By moving back and forth, the reader is able to view the war as a whole from the German perspective instead of as isolated events. Central to Citino's narrative is the role *Bewegungskrieg* played in German decision making as "the Wehrmacht was marching to the graveyard" (p. 58). Based on mobility, Citino argues German officers were steeped in the historical legacy of *Bewegungskrieg*: Friedrich Wilhelm ("the Great Elector") in 1678–1679, Frederick the Great in 1757, the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914, and France in 1940. By 1944, however, the war had moved from one of movement to a positional one (*Stellungskrieg*), which the Germans (as with their Prussian forebearers) slowly lost as their enemies gained the upper hand.

The German Army, Citino adroitly explains, was surprisingly resilient as the war dragged on. Although no longer the successful force that stormed Europe from 1939 to 1941, by 1944 "German divisions still possessed enormous reservoirs of unit cohesion and staying power in battle, even in the face of Allied superiority in material and fire" (p. 66). Throughout the text, Citino relates example after example of how close the *Wehrmacht* was to victory at the operational level in spite of the odds against them. The German operational defeat, he posits, was far from inevitable even as the Germans struggled to snatch victory from defeat and their wounds and losses became irrecoverable. Strategically, however, Citino successfully argues that Germany was doomed as soon as the phase of *Bewegungskrieg* ended.


Overall, the work is masterful, but there are areas for improvement. First, Citino rarely discusses the contributions of Germany's allies. Romania's defection to the Soviets is well covered but the end of the Hungarian alliance receives just a page, even though Hitler's obsession with Hungary would have dire consequences when the Soviets launched their Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945. Similarly, Germany's relationship with Finland is mentioned only in passing. By ignoring these contributions and their impact on German strategic and operational concerns, Citino does not paint the full picture of Germany's reality. As he writes in his concluding analysis, "*Wehrmacht* commanders paid no real attention to the Axis-allied armies fighting at their side . . . without whom continuation of the war was impossible" (p. 468).

Second, the portrayal of the Red Army requires more nuance than it is given. The Red Army is largely described as a juggernaut or, in the quoted words of General Erich von Manstein, "a hydra" (p. 39). Soviet military art is given a short shrift, especially when compared to analysis of Western campaigning. As an example, Soviet application of *maskirovka* (deception) ahead of the Vistula-Oder campaign, considered a fantastic success and a model for Soviet deception campaigns during the Cold War, was described as almost nonexistent despite documentary evidence to the contrary. With evermore scholarship on the Red Army coming out, the focus on Soviet numerical superiority instead of operational prowess does not advance our understanding of Germany's main opponent.

By focusing on the operational nature of the German model of war, which often overlooked concerns about intelligence, supply, and logistics, *The Wehrmacht's Last Stand* explains not only why but how the German Army fought for so long on so little against the Allies. Through exemplary research (there are almost one hundred pages of footnotes alone), Citino breaks down the idea that Hitler or Nazism were to blame for Germany's defeat. Instead, he effectively argues, the German military's focus on *Bewegungskrieg* had dire consequences for Europe, Germany, and the individual German soldier. This book, like its two predecessors, belongs on the shelves of dedicated military historians.

Maj. Timothy Heck is a Brigade Platoon Commander at 6th Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, United States Marine Corps Reserve. He recently published a chapter on Soviet military art during the Great Patriotic War in Army University Press' *Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (2018). He is pursuing a master's degree at King's College, London.

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The Great War & the Middle East
By Rob Johnson
Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. xxvii, 354. $34.95

Review by Mark Klobas

The First World War is the great force of modern Middle Eastern history, one in which the Ottoman Empire was swept away by the Allied powers and replaced with a series of mandates and protectorates from which the modern states in the region emerged. Because of this, any understanding of the region must begin with the war and the ways in which it shaped the area into what it is today. Though Rob Johnson's book is not the first to undertake this challenge, it is among the best produced in the wave of publications occasioned by the World War I centennial, thanks to his clear assessment of the various participants and the campaigns that they waged.

What distinguishes Johnson's book from its counterparts is his focus on strategy. Throughout the book, he submits the combatants' designs to a straightforward "ends-ways-means" assessment that considers their available goals, plans, and resources. In his evaluation of their efforts on the region's fronts, Johnson makes clear the various challenges that they faced, how they sought to overcome them, and the factors that determined their success or failure. Johnson's scope is broad, encompassing not just the familiar fronts in the Dardanelles, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but the less frequently addressed clash between the Ottomans and the Russians in the Caucasus and the German efforts to foment insurrections in Iran and Afghanistan. In the process, he brings into his analysis regional groups whose role in the war is often underappreciated. This enables Johnson to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the factors that went into formulating the participants' ever-evolving strategies.

These changing strategies reflected the considerable fluidity of events in the area. As Johnson notes, prewar British policymakers were largely content with the status quo in the region. The growing alignment of the Young Turks in Istanbul with Germany, however, changed this, leading the British and their Allied partners to pursue the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This soon proved more difficult than the Allies anticipated. The Ottomans turned out to be more resilient than their recent defeats in the Balkan Wars suggested. Here, Johnson credits the confluence of technologies, such as modern artillery and machine guns, as giving the defense the advantage in the Middle East, much as they had on the Western Front. Underequipped British armies in Palestine and in Mesopotamia suffered defeats in 1915 and 1916, forcing the British to reassess the "means" needed to achieve their "ends." This led to victories in 1917 and 1918 that reflected the importance of planning and preparation over the improvisation and dash that had characterized their successes in previous colonial wars.

For the Ottomans and their German partners, however, the greater limits on their "means" forced them to pursue different "ways" of attacking their opponents. One early result of this was the adoption of a "strategy of revolution," with Sultan Mehmed V declaring a jihad on the Allies soon after the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war. Though the general uprising of Muslim subjects in the British, French, and Russian empires did not take place, the British suppressed risings in western Egypt, Sudan, and southern Iran. The British also faced ongoing efforts to stir up opposition in Iran and Afghanistan as German agents spread propaganda and gold in an effort to inflame long-smoldering resentment toward the British and Russian presence. The Allies returned the favor by courting Armenians and Hashemite Arabs. This required an intricate balancing act between the various tribes in the region and the postwar plans of the Allied powers—one not always performed successfully. The Arab leaders were hardly pawns in this process and they often made their own political calculations by weighing personal ambition and traditional hostility against practical concerns.

It is this rich nuance in his analysis that makes Johnson's book such a valuable contribution to the history of the First World War in the Middle East. Though his coverage of the British (who are the only beneficiaries of any personal archival research by the author) is the most detailed, his assessment of all participants is a straightforward evaluation free from most of the assumptions and misconceptions that have accumulated around them since the war. As a result, he provides readers with an assessment of the theater that helps them to understand what the actors in the region sought to accomplish and why they succeeded or failed. Anyone seeking to understand the course of World War I in the Middle East and its impact on the region's development would do well to read this book—not the least for its demonstration that the gap between plans and outcomes in Middle Eastern conflicts is far from new.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Scottsdale, Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is a podcaster with the New Books Network and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.

News Notes

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
2019 Conference of Army Historians

CMH will host the 2019 Conference of Army Historians (CAH) at the Fort Eustis Club on Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, from 22 to 26 July. The conference is open to Department of Defense historians, archivists, and museum specialists, as well as historians from other government agencies, civilian academia, and the general public. The CAH is a biennial event dedicated to the professional development of the military historians, archivists, and museum specialists of the Army History Program (AHP). The theme of this year's conference is *Creating a Twenty-First Century Army History Program.* The conference, which has no registration fees, will consist of a series of workshops and roundtables, punctuated with special topic presentations focused on the important and challenging aspects of the AHP. For more information, or to request the agenda or a registration form, please contact Mr. Thomas Crecca at thomas.w.crecca.civ@mail.mil.

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CHIEF' HISTORIAN'S FOREWORD

Continued from page 4



In 1981, sixteen years after starting work, CMH had not yet put a Vietnam book into print. Nine of the twenty-three volumes had not yet gotten underway. Two authors had been assigned to topics that had grown to two-volume length, meaning that two books were awaiting completion of their companion before they could get started. Twelve were in some stage of actual progress, albeit very slow in some cases. One of the two authors originally assigned to the first book on planning and support was still working at it fifteen years later—as an additional duty. Never satisfactorily completed, the Center later dropped it from the series.

The Vietnam histories finally began to see the light of day in 1983 with publication of *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960*. That same year, the chief of military history planned to complete an eighteen-volume Vietnam series in five years. Two more books followed in 1986 (*Images of a Lengthy War* and *Military Communications*). Another pair appeared in 1988 (*Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973* and *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973*). Only two additional books made it into print in the following decade (*Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968* and *Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967*). CMH has published five more since 2000: *Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966; MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967; MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973; Engineers at War;* and *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968*.

Work continues. The volume covering logistics from 1964 to 1967 is to undergo external panel review in May and should be published toward the end of 2020. That author will then begin the second logistics volume covering the remainder of the war. Another historian has written twelve of eighteen chapters for the middle volume on advice and support and he should complete a draft by the middle of 2020. The Center has a thousand-page manuscript in hand for the combat volume covering 1968 to 1973, but it is incomplete. We plan to break it into two volumes, each to be finished by a different author once we obtain contract money to do the work. Those books will wrap up the series, as it is now envisioned, at seventeen volumes.

A number of factors contributed to the series stretching out toward six decades. One was the primacy of the Green Books, which were still in progress through the 1990s. Another delay resulted from staff cuts at the Center that began after the end of the Vietnam War and have recurred several times since. In some cases, the effort to shorten the process did not work. For example, to reduce the size of the series, CMH combined all three planned logistics volumes into one in 1985, but that merely meant that the topic became overwhelming and the book remained unfinished three decades later. The frequent diversion of authors to other tasks, assignment of poorly qualified historians or part-time authors, the promotion of the best writers into supervisory billets, and sometimes contradictory or insufficient editorial guidance added considerable delay. The slowdown from those causes, coupled with the sheer scale of some topics, stretched them out over so many years that the original authors moved on, resulting in additional time lost as new historians got up to speed on the projects.

The Center did not specifically look back at the Vietnam experience when crafting the plan for the Tan Books, but it already was addressing some of the ongoing problems that had plagued book production in recent decades. A primary goal is obtaining official approval for the Tan Books from the top levels of the Army to ensure that adequate resources are available. The Book Process Standard Operating Procedure attempts to minimize sources of delay and we are looking to harness the entire Army Historical Program to contribute to the series. Time will tell whether our efforts prove effective in producing each book in an average of six years and the overall series in two decades.

NOTES

1. David F. Trask, A Brief History of the Series *The U.S. Army in Vietnam*, Dec 1981, chief historian files.
2. Ibid.

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NEW FROM CMH

THE GREAT WAR

U.S. ARMY ART
U.S. ARMY ARTIFACTS

ARMYHISTORY
The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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ARMY HISTORY

l 2019 PB 20-19-4 (No. 113) Washington, D.C.

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.


PAYING THE RENT

My U.S. Navy counterpart, R. Adm. (Ret.) Samuel J. Cox, has a saying that at the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), "heritage pays the rent for history." What he means is that heritage promotion programs, distinct from academic and official historical work, raise NHHC's profile in the service, foster esprit de corps, and demonstrate relevance to nonhistorians. Crucially, they give the organization's research, writing, and official historians the space and opportunity (as well as the budget and force structure) they need to do their critical work. We know that historical work, especially full-length published projects, takes significant time. The benefits and importance of this work often are not clear to leaders and staffs who are focused on the here and now.

As CMH becomes a full-fledged subordinate of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on 1 October and takes on additional enterprise missions for the Army, we will continue to have conversations about how heritage work and historical work are important in different ways, but can use the same themes and materials. The end product for both should be greater historical literacy and overall effectiveness across the force. I hope that the Educate-Inspire-Preserve motto remains an "elevator speech" for our missions and I encourage every member of Career Program 61, as well as all of the Army's history educators, to be mindful that heritage and history both have value in different ways at different times. What should be constant are the rigor and quality that we apply to everything we do.


Heritage programs and products can be a critical facilitator for two of TRADOC's primary missions: recruiting and initial entry training. We are excited to begin collaborating with U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the TRADOC Center for Initial Military Training. The service, exploits, stories, and personalities of more than 240 years of Army history, innovatively delivered to various audiences, should be a wellspring of inspiration for American citizens to serve in their Army. Already, the Army Museum Enterprise is positioned virtually everywhere citizens enter the service and become soldiers, and impending reform initiatives will ensure that we offer high-quality museum programs to the force.


All of these "rent" payments can whet the force's appetite for our historical education and publications. The end result is a force with improved perspective and critical thinking skills and a vibrant workforce of historians, archivists, and museum professionals who remain at the forefront of their scholarly communities. I always appreciate your good ideas for both history and heritage programs, so keep them coming as we continue to educate, inspire and preserve.



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NEWS NOTES





New Publications from CMH

The Center of Military History (CMH) is pleased to announce the publication of two new titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War and the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series. The first, *The Drawdown, 1970–1971*, tells the story of how the U.S. Army executed a fighting withdrawal from Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. It examines the strain soldiers experienced from fighting an unpopular war which, for America at least, was winding down gradually. Included in the story are the incursions into Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971, as well as many engagements inside South Vietnam. By December 1971, the United States still had 157,000 military personnel in South Vietnam, but only 12,000 of them were combat infantry. The United States would remain at war for more than a year, but the days of offensive ground operations by the U.S. Army had come to an end.

The second publication, *The Russian Expeditions: 1917–1920*, relays the story of the Army's little-known expeditions in Russia at the end of the First World War. In early 1917, the Allied coalition in World War I was in crisis as German pressure pushed the Russian Empire to the brink of collapse. Desperate to maintain the Eastern Front against the Central Powers, the Allies intervened. However, with their resources committed elsewhere, they needed a source of military forces for deployment to Russia. President Woodrow Wilson agreed to supply American troops for two expeditions: the American North Russia Expeditionary Forces and the American Expeditionary Forces–Siberia. Unfortunately, there was no specific or long-term objective in Russia. Without a clear mission or tangible achievements, the expeditions eventually faded into obscurity.

These booklets have been issued as CMH Pub 76–7 and 77–9, respectively. Both publications are available in PDF format on the CMH Web site and will be available in hardcopy for Army requisition from the Army Publishing Directorate and for purchase by the public from the Government Publishing Office.


87th Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

The 87th Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History (SMH) will convene at the Crystal Gateway Marriott in Arlington, Virginia, on 30 April–3 May 2020. Hosted by the Army Historical Foundation (AHF), the theme of the conference is "Policy by Other Means." Meeting information, including the call for papers, the SMH 2020 Panel Builder, and hotel room reservations, can be found on the SMH web site at http://www.smh-hq.org/smh2020/index.html. Additional information is located on the AHF web site at https://armyhistory.org/smh2020.

CMH Wins Two AHF Distinguished Writing Awards

CMH is the recipient of two AHF Distinguished Writing Awards. The first, "America's Army of Democracy: The National Army, 1917–1919," by John A. Boyd, appeared in the Fall 2018 issue (No. 109) of *Army History* and won in the Army Professional Journals category. The second, *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, won in the Reprint category. The Historical Products Division at CMH edited and updated this volume—the layout was completely revamped, approximately 85 percent of the photographs were replaced with high-resolution scans of the original pictures, and all of the maps were redrawn. The book is available for download in both PDF and ePub formats at https://history.army.mil/news/2018/180416_battlefieldOfEurope.html.

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Photograph by Peter Gabriel, courtesy of the New England Ski Museum

"The Best Substitute"

U.S. Army Low-Mountain Training in the Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains, 1943–1944

By Nathan A. Marzoli

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Courtesy of Robert C. Whitsell

(Above) An Army camp in the West Virginia Maneuver Area (WVMA) near Bowden, c. 1944
(Left) Soldiers climb up Champe Rocks, c. 1944

A cloud of dust kicked up behind a solitary jeep as it sped along a rough and winding mountain road. The driver, Pvt. Anthony Silvia of the 305th Infantry, 77th Infantry Division, shivered in the brisk late-November air, but he had an important message to deliver to 3d Battalion headquarters. Suddenly, something—possibly an unexpected sharp turn in the road, a patch of ice, or simply fatigue—caused him to lose control of the vehicle, sending the jeep careening over a cliff and into a deep ravine. Private Silvia was lucky. He crawled away from the wreck, badly shaken but with only minor injuries. Although his regiment was on maneuvers in the United States, Silvia received an intimate lesson in the challenges of conducting combat operations in mountainous terrain.[1]

These lessons were exactly why the U.S. Army had Private Silvia and the rest of the 305th Infantry tramping around the mountains of West Virginia for two weeks in November 1943. Even before the United States entered World War II, the Army had begun training a small number of troops for combat at higher elevations where snow and ice lay year-round. But this program was limited and highly specialized; it was much more likely that standard units would have to be employed in "low-mountain" terrain, where no timberline or summer snow existed. Luckily, the Appalachian Range and its Allegheny Mountains were easily accessible for units stationed on the East Coast and closely mimicked this landscape. The proposed invasion of Sicily—a rugged and craggy island with a poor road network—in early 1943 created an immediate need to prepare units for combat in this type of terrain. Thus, the Army finally went forward with a low-mountain training program. Initially in the George Washington and Jefferson National Forests of Virginia and then in the Monongahela National Forest of West Virginia, the Army conducted a series of mountain maneuvers from 1943 to 1944 for the units of seven different standard infantry divisions: the 28th, 31st, 35th, 36th, 45th, 77th, and 95th.[2]

Even considering the relative brevity of these maneuvers, the low-mountain training program was a key part of the U.S. Army's success in World War II. It did not matter that the Army never planned to transform these divisions into specialized troops; the true importance of the maneuvers was that they proved standard infantry divisions—with slight modifications—could operate effectively in rugged terrain. This allowed the Army to limit the scope of costly specialized training and instead devote resources to employing more versatile standard divisions in mountainous operational theaters. Furthermore, the maneuvers conducted in Virginia and West Virginia from 1943 to 1944 provided soldiers with the skills necessary to survive and succeed against an enemy entrenched in rough and hilly terrain. The hard-fought successes of the standard infantry divisions in places like Sicily and continental Italy prove that the low-mountain training program was a true bright spot in the U.S. Army's training of ground combat troops during World War II.[3]

The Origins of the Low-Mountain Training Program

The low-mountain training program originated before the United States even entered World War II.[4] As war raged around them for two years, the U.S. Army was aware it soon could become ensnared in a conflict in any corner of the globe. "No theater for the employment of American troops can be dismissed from consideration as fantastic," reported a 1940 War Department G–3 memo.[5] The Army was particularly interested in mountain and winter warfare. Given the initial victories of the highly specialized Finnish winter troops against Soviet forces in December 1939, the abject failures of standard Italian divisions in Albania, and a report that the Germans were preparing specialized troops for use in Alaska and the Canadian and American Rocky Mountains, it was clear some contingent of U.S. soldiers should train for operating in such an

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General McNair



United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Onslow S. Rolfe (left), shown here as a brigadier general, speaking with displaced persons near Landsberg, Germany c. 1945.

environment. "While it appears improbable at the moment," the same memo cautioned, "it is conceivable that our ability to fight in winter terrain might be of major, even decisive importance."[6]

Despite the considerable interest within the War Department to establish a mountain and winter warfare training program, Army leaders also shared a major concern with the practicality of organizing units for such highly specialized missions. An army confronted by a major war needed to conserve resources for more versatile conventional training, and to some high-ranking officers, particularly Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the chief of staff for General Headquarters, U.S. Army (GHQ), it seemed illogical to address a specific combat situation that might never materialize. The proponents of alpine training eventually won out. But as a compromise, the program initially would be limited in scope.[7] Instead of immediately organizing an entire specialized division, McNair believed that "efforts for the present [should] be directed toward the development of an infantry battalion and an artillery battalion, capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain and containing a minimum of pack transportation and a maximum of motor transportation."[8]

The Army inaugurated the program on 15 November 1941 with the activation of a reinforced battalion of the 87th Infantry Mountain Regiment (soon redesignated as the 87th Mountain Infantry), commanded by Lt. Col. Onslow S. Rolfe, at Fort Lewis, Washington. Although they did not yet have a definitive mission—Rolfe was unsure if he was to prepare a cadre for future mountain training or a combat unit for use overseas—this small group spent their first winter conducting basic military training and taking ski instruction at nearby Mount Rainier. The following year, Army Ground Forces (AGF), the successor to GHQ, expanded this limited program. On 3 September 1942 at Camp Carson, Colorado, the Army activated a Mountain Training Center. Its primary mission was to train Rolfe's troops. On 16 November, it moved to the newly constructed Camp Hale, 9,000 feet above sea level at Pando, Colorado. The 1st Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry, therefore transferred from Fort Lewis to Camp Hale and the remainder of the regiment was activated, with the existing four pack artillery battalions consolidated into the 89th Mountain Artillery. A cavalry reconnaissance troop formed from the 4th Cavalry, a unit that had some prior experience in winter-warfare training. Signal, medical, quartermaster, engineer, ordnance, military police, antitank, and antiaircraft units also were activated, along with a headquarters company.[9]




U.S. Army

Camp Hale, Colorado, c. 1943

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By the spring of 1943, these troops had not formally organized into a division, even after spending the winter under the auspices of the new Mountain Training Center. But General McNair still allowed the mountain and winter warfare program to expand its scope and mission. As the Army ramped up its plans for Operation Husky, the proposed Allied invasion of Sicily, AGF recommended that the standard infantry divisions slated for the landings participate in limited maneuvers in a mountainous environment similar to that of the island. They decided that the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia—specifically, the sprawling Pedlar and Glenwood Districts of the George Washington and Jefferson National Forests, located roughly one hundred miles west of Richmond—with its "heavy undergrowth, numerous large streams, limited observation and poor road net" would be an ideal location to conduct the training.[10]



Soldiers stand in formation at Camp Hale, Colorado, c. 1943

Training in the Blue Ridge of Virginia

In early 1943, a team of officers and men from the Mountain Training Center departed the snowy Colorado peaks of Camp Hale for the rolling Blue Ridge, where they would serve as technical advisers at a maneuver area created specifically for the new low-mountain training program. AGF established the headquarters in the foothill town of Buena (pronounced locally as "B-yew-na") Vista, Virginia, and constructed two main camps for trainees in or near the surrounding national forest. One, located near the logging community of Lowesville, was known as North Camp, whereas the second, at Arnold Valley along the James River, became South Camp. The 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions, both slated to participate in Operation Husky, were scheduled to train at the newly christened Buena Vista Maneuver Area from 1 March to 15 April 1943.[11]

The main objective of the training program as laid out by AGF was simple: "to familiarize the units with operations in mountainous and primitive terrain." More specifically, AGF designed the program to (1) "accustom units to the conditions of mountain operations, characterized by independent action of small infantry units supported by artillery to seize key terrain features in order to open lines of advance for wheeled vehicles"; (2) to "train in deliberate operations with limited objectives from one terrain phase line to another, developing keen appreciation of terrain on the part of all commanders"; (3) to "obtain superior conditioning of troops"; (4) to "train infantry units . . . to operate without transport, carrying only essential weapons, ammunition, and rations"; (5) to "train artillery units . . . to support infantry action in mountainous country [which] will require practice in the maintenance of communication, liaison, and the selection of battery positions to overcome difficulties imposed by the terrain"; (6) to "develop the ability of supply agencies to operate along canalized lines of communication and to improvise the necessary means to overcome nature obstacles peculiar to the terrain"; and (7) to "train the divisional engineers in the hasty extension of roads, and the improvement of trails in rock and primitive terrain [which] will require continuous reconnaissance and planning to make the maximum use of existing roads and trails in the area and the establishment of a well controlled block system to prevent traffic snarls on the narrow roads."[12]




Soldiers marching with skis at Camp Hale, Colorado, c. 1943

From each division, the regimental combat teams (RCT)—provisional combat organizations formed by augmenting an infantry regiment with supporting units to make it autonomous—were to participate in exercises for about ten days.[13] AGF divided the training into two phases. The first segment, lasting about five days, consisted

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of preliminary exercises and marches to acclimatize soldiers to the rugged terrain. The second phase was a series of free, two-sided maneuvers under simulated combat conditions. A small number of selected men, approximately five to ten per rifle company, one artillery liaison detail per light artillery battalion, and five men per regimental intelligence platoon, also received instruction at an assault rock-climbing school. Two officers and seventeen enlisted instructors from the Mountain Training Center staffed the school. Although these men resided at South Camp, the rock-climbing training area was actually further along the James River, near Balcony Falls. In addition to receiving lessons in knot tying, rappelling, belaying, and piton use, these soldiers learned how to properly move heavy weapons, such as the 81-mm. mortar, using a rope and pulley system.[14]

Owing to the hurried establishment of the new maneuver area, AGF inspectors found the Mountain Training Center staff "a little wobbly on some of their technique and procedure," but the technical advisers also proved their value by quickly picking up on major issues within the RCTs of the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions.[15] Most notably, they found a disturbing lack of effective leadership at the squad, platoon, and company level; complacency in security measures; inadequate reconnaissance of roads and trails; and poor physical conditioning of the soldiers. By drawing commanders' attention to these issues, the technical advisers provided them with the necessary tools to better prepare soldiers for combat and to help save lives.[16]

The training also proved to AGF that a standard triangular division could operate in low mountains, given certain conditions. First, division personnel had to be in peak physical shape, because of the obvious differences encountered from operating on level ground. Second, the standard division needed some sort of road network—albeit even a primitive one—that permitted the use of 2.5-ton trucks and 105-mm. field howitzers. Even then, a large number of vehicles tended to keep a division road-bound and dangerously inflexible. To mitigate this, the Mountain Training Center recommended pooling surplus vehicles, while also touting the quarter-ton jeep as the only truly reliable vehicle in mountainous terrain. When moving off-road, divisions packed all heavy equipment—the heavy infantry weapons, radios, and ammunition—on the backs of the soldiers, usually using a packboard. This device allowed men to more effectively carry equipment in small loads—not exceeding forty pounds—on their backs. Machine gun and mortar teams, as well as artillery, signal, engineer, and medical units, all required packboards to carry their special items and equipment.[17]

The maneuvers at Buena Vista also underscored the necessity of decentralization of command and resources during low-mountain operations. "The Commander's ability to influence an action will be limited by poor road nets for moving reserves, hill masses which mask his supporting fires, and poor communication," Capt. Robert C. Works, a technical adviser from the Mountain Training Center, remarked in the notes he compiled for AGF following the Virginia maneuvers. Works emphasized that the rugged terrain and limited road networks could isolate a unit at any time, making it vulnerable to an enemy ambush; for this reason he recommended that units as small as the platoon be self-sufficient for extended

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periods. Mountain operations therefore called for three levels of small unit combat teams, in addition to the standard RCTs. The largest such unit would be a battalion combat team, consisting of an infantry battalion, an antitank company platoon, a squad of an antitank mine platoon, a cannon company platoon, a battery of the 105-mm. howitzer battalion, and an engineer squad. Next came the company combat team, consisting of an infantry company, two sections of infantry platoons from another company, and a section of an antitank platoon. The smallest echelon of suggested autonomous units was the platoon combat team, consisting of a platoon of infantry, a mortar squad, and one section of machine guns, either light or heavy. Captain Works believed training in these organizations was essential because it allowed a rifle platoon leader to better understand the capabilities of his attached enlisted men and their diversified weapons.[18]

Whereas these lessons in low-mountain operations obviously were invaluable for the soldiers of the two divisions about to land in Sicily and continental Italy, the maneuvers at Buena Vista were also important to AGF and the maturation of the training program. The alpine troops training at Camp Hale certainly were important in case the need for such soldiers arose, but the Virginia maneuvers made it clear that a slightly modified standard division could also train to handle mountain warfare in all but the most extreme combat scenarios. Fortuitously, this matched General McNair's preference that AGF concentrate on the production of standard units, and only provide specialized training when it absolutely was needed. AGF therefore had a clear justification to continue the low-mountain training program, especially given the escalating fight in Italy.

Because of some concerns about the maneuver area in its Virginia location—the Army had butted heads with the National Park Service, the National Forest Service, and the city of Lynchburg—and that the maneuvers of the last combat team had been delayed forty-eight hours due to forest fires, AGF decided to shift the maneuver area west and away from the Blue Ridge. In the Allegheny Mountains of West Virginia, the Army would continue training the divisions assigned to the XIII Corps.[19]

The West Virginia Maneuver Area

On 23 June 1943, the Army sent an official news release to local West Virginia newspapers announcing the opening of a new maneuver area, headquartered in the city of Elkins in Randolph County. The area was massive; it spanned five counties and AGF created it through the purchase and lease of 2,180,742 acres in and around the Monongahela National Forest. The command of the entire operation fell to the XIII Corps. Service units were the first soldiers to trickle into Elkins. The 94th Signal Battalion transferred from Buena Vista to install and maintain a system of communications throughout the maneuver area, and the 63d Quartermaster Battalion arrived to furnish the laundry services for up to 40,000 personnel. A number of other service troops soon arrived in Elkins as well, including the 44th Evacuation Hospital, and various quartermaster, military police, engineers, ordnance, and other support elements.[20] Thirteen officers from the Mountain Training Center, which effectively became the Mountain Training Group in the summer of 1943, would continue to serve as technical advisers for each RCT during these maneuvers.[21]

RCTs from five infantry divisions in the XIII Corps received instruction in low-mountain operations at the new West Virginia Maneuver Area. The first to arrive was the 28th Infantry Division,



Downtown Elkins, West Virginia, c. 1940




A view of the Canaan Valley, c. 1944

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
consisting of the 109th, 110th, and 112th RCTs, which trained from 1 August to 30 September 1943. They were followed by the 31st Infantry Division from 25 September to 20 November 1943, consisting of the 154th, 155th, and 167th RCTs; the 77th Infantry Division from 10 October 1943 to 12 January 1944, consisting of the 305th, 306th, and 307th RCTs; the 35th Infantry Division from 21 February to 28 March 1944, consisting of the 134th, 137th, and 320th RCTs; and lastly, the 95th Infantry Division from 18 April to 27 June 1944, consisting of the 377th, 378th, and 379th RCTs.[22] The 343d Medical Group also received six weeks of training in December 1943 and January 1944 to test the limits of battlefield casualty evacuation and treatment in hazardous winter weather and craggy terrain.[23]

The training program at the West Virginia Maneuver Area naturally built upon the lessons learned with the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions at Buena Vista. The focus of the training continued to be on physical conditioning and the decentralization of command. During the first week, trainees received instruction in mountain and night driving, packboard usage, and cross-country marches for physical conditioning, and concluded with squad, platoon, and company exercises.[24]

The second week of the training consisted of two battalion and two RCT problems. During the first RCT exercise, which lasted roughly two days, one battalion combat team detached as the "Red" force to operate against the rest of the RCT (labeled "Blue" forces). The 305th RCT, for example, held regimental exercises near the small community of Jenningston on Dry Fork. Late on the evening of 27 November 1943, commanders received information that the hypothetical "Red Division" was concentrating in the vicinity of Piedmont, 45 miles to the northeast, and had sent forces to the west. Red patrols had also been sighted nearby along the Dry Fork. The RCT was to attack at 0700 the following day. Their goal was to



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
A present-day view of Seneca Rocks

establish a bridgehead over Dry Fork, with the objective of moving north and east to seize a high ridge running from Pointy Knob #1, to Chimney Rock, to Pointy Knob #2, and destroying all enemy forces encountered along the way. The cannon company was to fire on Red positions both north and south of the Jenningston bridge, and the antitank company was to establish road blocks and protect approaches from the rear. This field exercise went relatively well for the combat team; after some heavy "fighting" with Companies A and D, 302d Engineers (Red), 2d Battalion, successfully captured Pointy Knob #1 by 0900 the following morning. The battalion wrestled Chimney Rock from the Red forces by midday, and even managed to capture three ambulances, an antitank gun, and three jeeps before the technical advisers terminated the problem at 1245 on 30 November.[25]

The combat teams reunited for the second, shorter RCT maneuver, which pitted them against a theoretical enemy to allow for live-fire exercises.[26] This regimental maneuver kicked off for the 305th RCT at 0830 on 2 December 1943. Technical advisers informed commanders that a hypothetical enemy held a line of high ground at the very northern end of the Canaan Valley, stretching from Brown Mountain to Cabin Mountain. The 1st and 2d Battalions, with two companies of the 302d Engineers attached, led the attack from the 305th's initial line near Bearden Knob, approximately 1.5 miles to the south. The 3d Battalion remained in reserve, and the cannon and antitank companies positioned themselves on the west slope of Cabin Mountain to provide fire support and to repel an enemy mechanized counterattack from the north.[27] Although these final exercises were brief—they usually lasted only a few hours—it was excellent practice for all the units involved, especially the artillery battalions and mortar teams.[28]

The assault rock-climbing school first established at Buena Vista continued to be a part of the West Virginia program's curriculum. At a base camp in Seneca, thirty-two soldiers and three officers from the 10th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop provided climbing instruction to roughly 200 officers and enlisted men from each RCT using the nearby Seneca and Champe Rocks.[29] The XIII Corps told the incoming combat teams that potential trainees did not need any special talents—they just had to be "men with average strength and common sense"—but preferred soldiers from rural or mountain areas.[30] The instruction at the Seneca school was extensive, and covered a variety of subjects in twelve training periods over fourteen days. Each class consisted of the instructor and ten trainees. During the first half of the training, the instructor taught students the proper use of ropes, how to tie knots, and belaying on specially built wooden towers, nicknamed "corn cribs." Before moving to the next phase, the instructors washed out the four weakest men. The remaining six students, forming two rope parties of three men each, received another week of advanced—and potentially dangerous—training on the Seneca and Champe Rocks. Using the exposed rock faces as teaching tools, the instructors taught soldiers the use of hand and foot holds, rappelling, piton usage, party climbs, night-climbing techniques, and basic medical evacuations.[31]

Feedback on the entire training program from AGF inspectors, Mountain Training Group personnel, and the RCTs reiterated many of the lessons learned from the earlier maneuvers in Virginia. Much like the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions, most of the faults reported by the Mountain Training Group stemmed from inexperience within the RCTs. One recurring problem was the failure of soldiers to use appropriate cover



A present day view of Champe Rocks

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Soldiers practice rappelling off a "corn crib" near Seneca Rocks, c. 1944

and concealment during tactical exercises. While on the march, entire companies needlessly silhouetted themselves against the sky by walking upright on exposed ridges. In the case of the 307th RCT, technical advisers and maneuver umpires noticed it on five separate occasions.[32] Things were not much better when units engaged the "enemy." During a visit to the exercises of the 31st Infantry Division in November 1943, inspectors found three batteries of the 116th Field Artillery Battalion in poor tactical positions; the soldiers had arranged the guns too closely, and the only visible concealment was from branches of leafless trees.[33] Infantry units of that division also displayed a disinclination to dig in when confronting enemy forces. Inspectors caught Companies A, I, and K of the 167th Infantry in the front lines "either sitting or lying in the open making no effort to take cover and concealment." Even with the enemy less than fifty yards away, Company H was "grouped together sitting by the side of the trail, [with] their weapons still on [their] packboards."[34]

Ineffective small-unit leadership was another recurring issue. Mountain Training Group personnel frequently found units completely in the dark about their current situation, and command and control suffered.[35] During the maneuvers of the 77th Infantry Division in December 1943, the headquarters of the 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry, set up their command post approximately 2.5 miles away from the frontline units—a distance great enough that Company F actually lost contact for six hours.[36] In the case of the 31st Infantry Division's 167th RCT, umpires frequently halted the maneuvers so both the Red and Blue forces could untangle themselves and reorganize.[37] Poor leadership was also apparent in the general failure of units to implement proper security measures. Mountain Training Group personnel docked combat teams for not employing guards while in assembly areas, keeping security elements too close to the main body of troops, and allowing soldiers to bunch together while the "enemy" was nearby. During the exercises of the 35th Infantry Division, for example, the 2d Platoon, Company F, 134th Infantry, was ordered to cross an icy stream during a hill attack. Although the men waded through the frigid water with little complaint, platoon leaders positioned insufficient men on the opposite bank to protect the crossing of the rest of the unit. Groups of between fifteen and twenty men also clustered together dangerously while preparing to cross.[38]

The maneuver area's umpiring system may have been partly to blame for the poor quality of leadership within the RCTs. Due to their limited availability, the expert technical advisers from the Mountain Training Group generally only served as umpires at the battalion and regimental level. Some at AGF even criticized this setup because they thought it deprived commanders of technical expertise during crucial aspects of the training.[39] At the platoon and company level, the XIII Corps tagged the junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) of the RCTs as umpires, yet provided them with only a single day of preliminary instruction so as not to interfere with the rest of the maneuvers. Although devised out of necessity, this system negatively affected the training by leaving inexperienced officers and NCOs in command of companies and platoons, and too many inadequately trained umpires in charge of evaluating the maneuvers.[40]

Consequently, the after action reports of the RCTs are littered with complaints about the quality of the umpires. On one fire mission of the 117th Field Artillery Battalion, an umpire clearly did not take the time to read Field Manual (FM) 105–5: *Umpire Manual*, which specified that prone infantry under artillery fire usually only suffered 1 percent casualties, per battery, per minute. He therefore credited the battalion

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Mountain Training Group officers' tents at the Seneca Rocks climbing school, c. 1944

with inflicting a preposterous 70 percent casualties on one Red rifle platoon.[41] The commander of the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division, reported that the umpires were "too hasty in putting up the white flag when point contacts the enemy," which interfered with his ability to properly simulate combat conditions. As evaluators, the umpires also did not have to operate tactically; when they sped around the "battlefield" in their vehicles, they choked up convoys, motor pools, and dispersal areas.[42] The XIII Corps did attempt to improve the umpiring system for each successive combat team, but the director of the West Virginia Maneuver Area bucked any efforts to implement radical change and instead insisted the umpiring methods were the "best that can be arrived at under existing circumstances."[43] AGF clearly believed the limited scope of the training did not necessitate any major changes, and the standard infantry divisions would get the same benefits even with a faulty umpiring system.

Despite these flaws in the training, the combat teams still learned important lessons in low-mountain warfare. Weather is unpredictable at higher altitudes, and winter usually comes early to West Virginia. The 77th Infantry Division, which arrived at the maneuver area in October 1943, endured perhaps the worst weather of all the combat teams. (Ironically, they ended up in the Pacific Theater.) After suffering through subzero temperatures during the battalion exercises, the XIII Corps actually canceled the 307th RCT's final regimental exercises because a blizzard struck the maneuver area. Fierce winds whipped snow over the hills, limiting visibility to less than fifty yards at times and coating weapons with ice. The conditions were so bad that Lt. Col. C. E. Morrison, the acting director of the Maneuver Area, commended the soldiers of the combat team for their "fine degree of discipline" and overall lack of grumbling despite adhering to strict regulations prohibiting the lighting of fires while on tactical exercises.[44] Spring brought warmer weather for the combat teams of the 35th and 95th Infantry Divisions, but melting snow and rainstorms dangerously flooded local waterways. In March 1944, a soldier from the 35th Infantry Division floundered while trying to cross the swollen Blackwater River, just south of the town of Davis. A captain, with a rope tied around his waist, plunged into the frigid waters to try and rescue him, but the raging current swept both of them down Blackwater Canyon. A third man tried to rescue the two stricken soldiers farther downstream, but he too lost his balance in the freshet and splashed into the roaring waters. All three soldiers drowned, and only one man's body was recovered.[45]

The combat teams also found that simply moving from Point A to B sometimes presented a herculean challenge, as the few roads in the maneuver area were winding and narrow and easily jammed with vehicles.[46] The road network was so bad

Composite file strip images: Soldiers training at Seneca Rocks, c. 1944



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during the maneuvers of the 35th Infantry Division that Battery C, 161st Field Artillery Battalion, had to winch their trucks and guns into position, slowing them down to a rate of one mile every three hours.[47] Given these transportation challenges, many officers requested additional driver training that covered correct transmission usage on steep grades, precaution against straining motors, the value of chains and winches, and the unusual hazards encountered in blackout driving. One oddly specific request came from the commander of the 306th Infantry; the XIII Corps recommended that drivers decrease the maximum speeds for gears by two-thirds while on mountain roads, but some of the men of the regiment had trouble doing the math in their heads and requested new and more exact reference stickers in the cabs of their trucks before entering the maneuver area.[48]

Moving off-road certainly was not any easier. The antitank and cannon companies found it almost impossible to move their 37-mm. and 57-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers in places without roads. Units instead found the more portable 81-mm. mortars much more effective at providing fire support, especially when massed together under regimental control.[49] Combat teams frequently clamored for more instruction in the use of packboards and pack mules, especially after reports from Italy testified to their usefulness in rugged terrain that lacked adequate roads.[50] In March 1944, the Mountain Training Group answered by transferring the 254th Quartermaster Pack Company from Camp Carson to Elkins.



Pack mules and their handlers ford the Dry Fork, c. 1944

Using a similar format to the Seneca school, the 254th, with their 292 animals, conducted an animal management and packer's school in the vicinity of Gladwin, West Virginia, for around 200 men from each RCT of the 95th Infantry Division.[51]

Medical personnel arguably became the most familiar with these unique challenges of transportation. Upon entering the maneuver area, the medical units of each combat team traveled to a separate casualty evacuation school. Much of the initial phase of this training was similar to that conducted by the rest of the RCT—with a focus on physical conditioning—but these students also learned how to secure patients to litters and carry them over cliffs, up and down steep slopes, and across crevices and streams, using a variety of innovative carries and rope methods. The instruction culminated in a night exercise, where soldiers established battalion aid stations near a summit and treated twelve litter casualties before evacuating them to the base of the mountain using a six-man belaying team.[52]

The medics spent the final phase of the training applying these learned techniques during the battalion and regimental maneuvers with the rest of the RCTs. Medical umpires—NCOs from the RCTs' medical units—generally tagged the simulated casualties, with ten casualties per battalion



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Daniel B. Strickler, shown here as a major general, c. 1951

"highly beneficial" because the troops had "attained greater physical endurance," which even trumped in value learning to "cope with the difficulties of mountain fighting, control, and supply."[57] Another battalion commander reported the program brought his men "to a state of physical hardening" that would enable them to endure even more extensive training in the future.[58] Yet this excellent physical conditioning came with a cost; many commanders reported their men needed more food than the standard ration because of the strenuousness of traversing the rugged terrain under simulated combat conditions. The requests for additional rations were never granted, however. The XIII Corps responded that the permanent service troops had adjusted and got along just fine with the standard ration.[59]

It was clear the low-mountain training program, even with its flaws, was extremely valuable for the troops that received it. Operations in the mountains posed "a difficult problem in time and space that can only be understood by actual service in [that] terrain," as one battalion commander reported. "I feel this . . . training has given every Officer and man of this Command," he continued, "a broad prospective in the differences in operating here and in the normal terrain."[60] Reiterating this opinion, an officer of the 154th Infantry thought the RCT exercises were worthwhile because they "ably presented the many problems and difficulties to be surmounted that [they were] intended to illustrate and emphasize."[61] Lt. Col. Daniel B. Strickler of the 109th Infantry called the training program "well balanced," as it "[challenged the] interests and enthusiasm of all officers and men," and impressed upon them "the value of camauflage [*sic*], control between units in mountains, and all around security."[62] Col. James A. Webb of the 167th Infantry praised the training program by reporting it was "of material benefit," and expressed his utmost appreciation to the technical advisers for their hard work during the maneuvers.[63] Despite this obvious success of the training program, however, the increasing demands for manpower for the expanding war in Europe would soon prove to be the death knell for the West Virginia Maneuver Area.

Closing of the Maneuver Area and the End of Mountain Training

The entire U.S. Army mountain and winter warfare training program neared its end when the specialized alpine troops—now formally designated as the 10th Mountain Division—training at Camp Hale began preparations for their move overseas in mid-1944. With no soldiers left to instruct, the Army inactivated the Mountain Training Group, and transferred the majority of the remaining personnel to the 10th Mountain Division before it departed for Italy. This did not immediately affect the instructors and technical advisers who remained at the West Virginia Maneuver Area, as they had been permanently transferred to the XIII Corps in March 1944.[64] But all divisional maneuvers in the United States were on the decline. The Zone of Interior had been largely stripped of service units to meet the increasing demands overseas, and not enough troops remained to assist entire divisions during field training. AGF closed the large California-Arizona Maneuver Area in April, and canceled maneuvers in Tennessee and Louisiana as the readiness dates for participating divisions loomed.[65]

The writing clearly was on the wall for the West Virginia Maneuver Area and the low-mountain training program. AGF G–3 seemed to have always been keen on the training the XIII Corps conducted in the Alleghenies. Assistant Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. John M. Lentz, in a January 1944 conversation with the XIII Corps G–3, said that he "would like to keep it going if it is not an undue hardship," because it was "a good toughening set-up." But by that spring and summer, the demands for soldiers overseas simply would not allow for the program to continue. The final units to participate in the mountain maneuvers were the RCTs of the 95th Infantry Division, which departed Elkins only a few weeks after D-Day. The headquarters of the West Virginia


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General Lentz (center) with unidentified officers, c. 1945

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A present-day view of the Canaan Valley

on rest periods in reserve or in rear areas from late 1943 into the spring of 1944. The 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions received a refresher course on what they learned only months earlier in Virginia, but it was entirely new material for the soldiers of the 3d, 34th, and 88th Infantry Divisions.[69]

In the end, none of the divisions that trained at the West Virginia Maneuver Area operated in terrain like that of the Mountain State. The 28th, 35th, and 95th participated in the drives across France and Germany, and the 31st and 77th battled jungles and the Japanese in the Pacific Theater. Nevertheless, the specialized training was beneficial to these five infantry divisions. The extremes of the rugged terrain had a tendency to magnify problem areas; a member of the XIII Corps G–3 section had it right when he claimed the battalion and RCT exercises highlighted "weaknesses that divisions didn't know existed." In other words, the intricacies of mountain warfare itself may not have been of the utmost import to these units, but the maneuvers did help to make leadership aware of specific problems that, if not corrected, could cost lives once they got into a combat zone.[70]

The Army may have closed the doors at the West Virginia Maneuver Area by summer 1944, but lessons learned by both the RCTs and the technical advisers from the Mountain Training Group provided valuable material for two important field manuals published in November and December 1944: FM 70–15, *Operations in Snow and Extreme Cold,* and FM 70–10, *Mountain Operations.* Whereas the former dealt primarily with conditions encountered with the 10th Mountain Division at Camp Hale, *Mountain Operations* included much of the knowledge gained in Virginia, West Virginia, and Italy, including the necessity of decentralization of command, the difficulties of employing heavy artillery and large vehicles on narrow mountain roads and trails, the importance of the 81-mm. mortar, and the intricate details of military rock climbing taught at the Seneca school.[71] From that point forward, U.S. Army soldiers preparing to enter combat in rugged terrain could learn from these new field manuals without having to participate in a special two-week program. This was the intrinsic value of the training. It was not important for every RCT to participate in the maneuvers, but the lessons learned from the few that did provided the Army with the knowledge and experience to publish doctrine for mountain operations instruction to any units that needed it in the future.

With this in mind, it is hard to consider the maneuvers conducted near Buena Vista and Elkins anything but a success. The Army proved it could identify a problem area and quickly scrape together an effective training program to increase the potency of its soldiers, even if the instruction was brief and only directly involved a limited number of units. This entrepreneurial and adaptive spirit, showcased by the brief but invaluable training program conducted in the mountains of Virginia and West Virginia,

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ultimately helped the U.S. Army fight and win battles of the Second World War.

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Editor's Note

The managing editor thanks the staff of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntington District, for their assistance in acquiring images for this article.

Notes

1. Msg to Commanding Ofcr (CO), 3d Bn, 305th Inf, 29 Nov 1943, Folder Unit Jnl File 77th Inf Div 305th Inf Regt, West Virginia Maneuver Area (WVMA) 28–30 Nov, Box 9903, Entry 427, Rcds of the Adjutant Gen, Record Group (RG) 407, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP); 77th Division Association, *Ours to Hold It High: The History of the 77th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 560.

2. Capt Thomas P. Govan, *The Army Ground Forces: Training in Mountain and Winter Warfare,* Study No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), p. 9.

3. For more on the training of ground combat troops during World War II, see Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, The United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003).

4. For more works on the Mountain Training Center and the 10th Mountain Div, see: Capt John C. Jay, *The Army Ground Forces: The Mountain Training Center,* Study No. 24 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946); Peter Shelton, *Climb to Conquer: The Untold Story of World War II's 10th Mountain Division Ski Troops* (New York: Scribner, 2003); Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971); McKay Jenkins, *The Last Ridge: The Epic Story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the Assault on Hitler's Europe* (New York: Random House, 2003); A. B. Feuer, *Packs On!: Memoirs of the 10th Mountain Division* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004); Curtis W. Casewit, *Mountain Troopers! The Story of the Tenth Mountain Division* (New York: Crowell, 1972).

5. Govan, Study No. 23, pp. 2–4.

6. Ibid.

7. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, The United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), p. 339.

8. Govan, Study No. 23, p. 4.

9. Ibid., pp. 4–8.

10. Ibid., pp. 7–9; Rpt, Col David L. Huffner, Director, Mountain Training Center (MTC), Buena Vista, Va., 15 Apr 1943, sub: Rpt on the training conducted by this HQ in the George Washington National Forest, Pedlar District, and Jefferson National Forest, Glenwood District, per instructions CG AGF's, Folder Buena Vista, VA MTC Feb–Apr '43, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds of HQ Army Ground Forces (AGF), RG 337, NACP.

11. Govan, Study No. 23, p. 9; Rpt, Huffner, 15 Apr 1943, sub: Rpt on the training conducted by this HQ in the George Washington National Forest, Pedlar District, and Jefferson National Forest, Glenwood District, per instructions CG AGF's. The Army leased two houses (staff officers' quarters and infirmary), a garage (HQ), and a hotel (enlisted quarters and mess) in Buena Vista. The 76th Div provided HQ troops, whereas the 94th Signal Bn constructed and operated the umpire control system. The 36th Inf Div ultimately was removed from the Sicily operation because it was deemed to be too inexperienced. It did, however, eventually land in Italy. Schedule, A Div, HQ, MTC, Folder Buena Vista, VA MTC Feb–Apr '43, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds of HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

12. Ltr, HQ AGF to Commanding General (CG), Second Army, 22 Feb 1943, sub: Mountain Training Dir, Folder Mountain & Jungle Training, Box 664, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

13. Ibid.

14. Ltr, HQ AGF to CG, MTC, 2 Mar 1943, sub: Mountain Training Dir, Folder W.Va. Maneuvers 1943, Box 734, Entry 55, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Photo, Hauling 81mm Mortar, Folder Buena Vista, VA MTC Feb–Apr '43, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Rpt, Huffner, 15 Apr 1943, sub: Rpt on the training conducted by this HQ in the George Washington National Forest, Pedlar District, and Jefferson National Forest, Glenwood District, per instructions CG AGF's.

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16. Memo, HQ MTC, sub: Principle [*sic*] Errors Noted on Maneuvers, Folder Buena Vista, VA MTC Feb–Apr '43, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

17. Rpt, Brig Gen O. S. Rolfe to CG, AGF, 4 Apr 1943, sub: Rpt on Mountain Training; Notes, Capt R. C. Works, sub: Notes on Mountain Warfare. All in Folder Buena Vista, VA MTC Feb–Apr '43, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

18. Notes, Works, sub: Notes on Mountain Warfare.

19. Rpt, Huffner, 15 Apr 1943, sub: Rpt on the training conducted by this HQ in the George Washington National Forest, Pedlar District, and Jefferson National Forest, Glenwood District, per instructions CG AGF's; Govan, Study No. 23, p. 9; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* p. 340; Ltr, CG Second Army to CG, MTC, 7 May 1943, sub: Mountain Training Instructional Team, Folder Mountain Binder #1, Box 1280, Entry 55A, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

20. Donald L. Rice, "West Virginia Maneuver Area," *Goldenseal* 33, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 16; Station List of the Army of the United States (CONUS) 1 Sep 1943, p. 403, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.; Memo, HQ AGF to Asst Chf of Staff, G–4, 26 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt of Inspection Trip, W.Va. Maneuver Area, 24 Aug 1943, Folder AGF Staff Visits and Inspections Binder #5, Entry 55A, Box 1258, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Memo, HQ XIII Corps, 21 Jul 1943, sub: W.Va. Maneuver Area Administrative and Supply Plan, Folder W.Va. Maneuvers 1943, Box 732, Entry 55, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

21. Low Mountain Instructional Team for One Regimental Combat Team—W.Va. Maneuver Area, Folder Mountain & Winter Training Background, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen

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Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Jay, Study No. 24, pp. 111–12. The 10th Light Div absorbed most of the MTC personnel when the MTC was activated on 15 Jul 1943. A new Mountain Training Grp was set up in its place. Leftovers from the MTC, as well as ofcrs and men from the 10th Reconnaissance Troop, 87th Mountain Inf, and other various units filled the Grp. The Grp's job was similar to that of the MTC, but it placed more emphasis on instructional teams of men and officers which would be sent to other camps to give specialized training to standard Army units. To relieve the 10th Light Div of administrative surplus units, and to assist other AGF units in the alpine, low-mountain, and winter training, the 15th HQ and HQ Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army was also activated on 23 Oct 1943; the Mountain Training Grp fell under its purview.

22. Tab A, sub: Low Mountain Training, Folder Mountain and Winter Warfare Background, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Memo, sub: Schedule for W.Va. Maneuver Area Training, Folder 95th Inf Div—Trng Memo 1944, Box 4164, Entry 37042, Rcds of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, RG 338, NACP; Memo, R. L. Cook to Gen Donovan, 14 Apr 1944, sub: Schedule of Training Activities in WVMA for Units of the 95th Div, Folder W.Va Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

23. MFR, AGF G-3, 22 Dec 1943, sub: Telephone conversation, Gen Lentz, G-3, AGF, to Col Stanton, G-3, XIII Corps, 1535 this date, Folder Mountain and Winter Warfare Background, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Rpt, Lt Col C. E. Morrison to CG, XIII Corps, 11 Jan 1944, sub: Rpt on 343d Medical Grp, Folder Training 1944, Box 12, Entry 50006, Rcds Army Orgs, RG 338, NACP.

24. Memo, HQ XIII Corps, 4 Feb 1944, sub: Mountain Training, Folder W.Va Maneuver Area, Box 72; Memo, Director WVMA, 3 Dec 1943, sub: Detailed Schedule and Administrative Instructions-CT 307, Folder Light Divs and Mt. and Winter Warfare, Box 70. All in Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

25. HQ, 305th CT, FO #1, 28 Nov 1943, Folder Unit Jnl File 77th Inf Div 305th Inf Regt, WVMA 28–30 Nov, Box 9903, RG 407, NACP.

26. Memo, HQ XIII Corps, 4 Feb 1944, sub: Mountain Training; Memo, Director WVMA, 3 Dec 1943, sub: Detailed Schedule and Administrative Instructions-CT 307.

27. HQ, 305th CT, FO #1, 1 Dec 1943, Folder Unit Jnl File 77th Inf Div 305th Inf Regt, WVMA 28–30 Nov, Box 9903, RG 407, NACP.

28. Jnl, 305th Combat Team, 1–2 Dec 1943, Folder Unit Jnl File 77th Inf Div 305th Inf Regt, WVMA 28–30 Nov, Box 9903, [Entry #], RG 407, NACP.

29. Low Mountain Instructional Team for One Regimental Combat Team—W.Va. Maneuver Area, Folder Mountain & Winter Training Background, Box 71, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP; Jay, Study No. 24, p. 79.

30. Memo, HQ, XIII Corps to CG, 35th Inf Div, 8 Feb 1944, sub: Mountain Training, Encl 1, Folder Training 1944, Box 12, Entry 50006, Rcds Army Orgs, RG 338, NACP.

31. Robert C. Whetsell, "WWII Assault Training at Seneca Rocks," *Goldenseal* 33, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 10; Jay, Study No. 24, p. 79.

32. Rpt, Maj L. H. Berning to CG, XIII Corps, 30 Aug 1943, sub: Training of Combat Team 112; Rpt, Lt Col C. E. Morrison to CG XIII Corps, 26 Dec 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-307, 77th Inf Div; Rpt, Col A. W. Gower to CG, XIII Corps, 4 Nov 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-306. All in Folder W.Va Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

33. Rpt, Brig Gen J. G. Christiansen to CG, XIII Corps, 23 Nov 1943, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 9–14 Nov 1943, Folder W.Va. Maneuvers 1943, Box 732, Entry 55, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

34. Lt Gen L. J. McNair to CG, XIII Corps, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 23–25 Sep 1943, Folder W.Va. Maneuvers 1943, Box 732, Entry 55, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

35. Rpt, Col A. W. Gower to CG, XIII Corps, 4 Nov 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-306; Memo, Lt Col Robert L. Cook for A.C. of S., G-3, AGF, 30 Oct 1943, sub: Observations During Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 25 Oct 1943. All in Folder W.Va Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

36. Rpt, Morrison to CG, XIII Corps, 26 Dec 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-307, 77th Inf Div.

37. McNair to CG, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 23–25 Sep 1943.

38. Memo, Director's HQ, WVMA, sub: Comments on CT-109, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area; Brig Gen J. G. Christiansen to CG XIII Corps, 2 Mar 1944, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 24–26 Feb 1944, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area. All in Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

39. Christiansen to CG, 2 Mar 1944, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 24–26 Feb 1944.

40. Rpt, Col A. W. Gower to CG, XIII Corps, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Training of Combat Team 167, 31st Inf Div, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72; Rpt, Col A. W. Gower to CG XIII Corps, 4 Nov 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-306, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72; Rpt, Col W. Chapman to Director, WVMA, 26 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72; Ltr, Maj Gen A. C. Gillem to Lt Gen McNair, 13 Jan 1944, Folder Mountain & Winter Training Background, Box 71. All in Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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42. Rpt, Maj Harold S. Martin to Director, WVMA, 22 Aug 1943, sub: Recommendations for units receiving Mountain Training (Second Period), Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29; Rpt, Berning to CG, 30 Aug 1943, sub: Training of Combat Team 112; Rpt, Lt Col William S. Houghton to CO, 112th Inf, 13 Aug 1943, sub: Recommendations after second 6-day Training Period, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29; Rpt, Col Stephen S. Hamilton to Director HQ, WVMA, 21 Dec 1943, sub: Rpt on Training and Equipment of WVMA, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29; McNair to CG, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 23–25 Sep 1943. All in Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

43. Rpt, Gower to CG, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Training of Combat Team 167, 31st Inf Div.

44. Rpt, Morrison to CG, 26 Dec 1943, sub: Rpt on CT-307, 77th Inf Div.

45. "Three Soldiers are Drowned in Canaan Valley," *Grant County Press*, 30 Mar 1944.

46. Memo, Director's HQ, WVMA, sub: Comments on CT-109; Rpt, Col Edward M. Starr to Director HQ, WVMA, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt at the end of First Phase of Training; Rpt, Col W. Chapman to Director, WVMA, 26 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt All in Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

47. Christiansen to CG, 2 Mar 1944, sub: Visit to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 24–26 Feb 1944.

48. Rpt, Lt Col Daniel B. Strickler to CO, Director's HQ XIII Corps, 16 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt on First Weeks Training; Rpt, Maj Henry A. Thouron to Director HQ, MTC, WVMA, 16 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt on Training; Rpt, Lt Col Adam J. Drebelbies to Direct HQ, WVMA, 13 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt of Bn Cdr at end of Second phase in West Vriginia [*sic*]

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Maneuver Area; Rpt, Starr to Director HQ, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt at the end of First Phase of Training; Rpt, Chapman to Director, 26 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt All in Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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50. Rpt, Gower to CG, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Training of Combat Team 167, 31st Inf Div; Rpt, Thouron to Director HQ, 16 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt on Training; Rpt, Lt Col Adam J. Dreibelbies to Director HQ, WVMA, 6 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt of Bn Comdr-End of 1st Six-day training Period; Rpt, Maj Harold S. Martin to Director, WVMA, 16 Aug 1943, sub: Recommendations for future units receiving Mountain Training; Rpt, Lt Col William S. Houghton to Director HQ, 13th Corps, 7 Aug 1943, sub: Recommendations after 6 days of Mountain Training; Rpt, Lt Col Frank D. Miller to Commanding Ofcr, 307th CT, 21 Dec 1943, sub: Recommendations on Mountain Training; Memo, Col Carl H. Jark for A.C. of S., G-3, AGF, 28 Feb 1944, sub: Inspection Trip to W.Va. Maneuver Area, 24-26 Feb inclusive; Rpt, Hamilton to Director HQ, 21 Dec 1943, sub: Rpt on Training and Equipment of WVMA; Rpt, Chapman to Director, 26 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt. All in Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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52. Rpt, Capt Morris Herman and 1st Lt William F. Loomis to Director's HQ WVMA, 9 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt of Training; Rpt, Maj Cecil F. Barber to Director's HQ, WVMA, 4 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Training Program. All in Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

53. Rpt, Capt Morris Herman and 1st Lt William F. Loomis to Director's HQ, WVMA, 26 Sep 1943, sub: Rpt on Medical Evacuation during RCT 167 Maneuvers; idem, 9 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Medical Evacuation during RCT 154 Maneuvers; idem, 27 Oct 1943, sub: Rpt on Medical Evacuation during RCT 306 Maneuver. All in Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

54. Rpt, Morrison to CG, 11 Jan 1944, sub: Rpt on 343d Medical Grp.

55. Ltr, Gillem to McNair, 13 Jan 1944.

56. Rpt, Dreibelbies to Director HQ, 6 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt of Bn Comdr-End of 1st Six day training Period.

57. Rpt, Houghton to CO, 13 Aug 1943, sub: Recommendations after second 6-day Training Period.

58. Rpt, Lt Col Daniel B. Strickler to CO, Director's HQ XIII Corps, 16 Aug 1943, sub: Rpt on First Weeks Training, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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60. Rpt, Lt Col Thomas J. Noto to Director HQ, WVMA, 22 Aug 1943 sub: Mountain Training, Folder W.Va. Maneuver Area, Box 72, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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69. Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 340; Memo, Lt Col Robert L. Cook for Gen Donovan, 21 Feb 1944, sub: Mountain Training Activities; Rpt, Col H. J. P. Harding for AGF board G-3 Section, 15 Mar 1944, sub: Rpt of Intervs with Ofcrs Named Below on Subject of Mountain Warfare Training; Allied Force HQ, Training Memo #47, 17 Sep 1943, sub: Mountain Warfare Training for U.S. Forces; HQ Fifth Army, Training Memo #66, 27 Oct 1943, sub: Mountain Warfare Training. All in Folder Light Divs and Mt. and Winter Warfare, Box 70, Entry 29, Gen Rcds HQ AGF, RG 337, NACP.

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NMUSA Feature



NMUSA Volunteer Program

The National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) has taken another step forward by opening applications for their Volunteer Program. NMUSA is now accepting applications for volunteers who will work alongside the official staff to provide visitor support when the museum is open and operating.

Zelpha N. Anderson, chief of the Visitor Services Division, says she is looking for individuals who are passionate about the U.S. Army and sharing the stories of the men and women who have worn the Army uniform throughout our nation's history. There will be a variety of volunteer opportunities, such as visitor services, special events, tours, education, outdoor activities, and administration. Through the application process, interested volunteers will have the opportunity to share their skills, interests, and abilities to help match them to a volunteer position.

The museum anticipates approximately 750,000 visitors annually and will be open every day of the year except 25 December. "The museum will be a premier travel destination and will offer an assortment of programs and events in addition to tours of the historic galleries," explained Anderson, "and we will need a robust volunteer force to ensure an outstanding visitor experience."

Anderson says her goal is to gather a group of 300 volunteers who are trained and ready for the NMUSA's opening in 2020. The volunteer application is available now; interviews will begin late this summer and training will begin in the fall. "I am so excited to begin this phase of the project because of the enthusiasm we're seeing from those who are interested in volunteering," remarked Anderson. "Veterans, history lovers, Army family members, local residents . . . they are all stepping forward with passion and offering to share their talents and time with us at the museum."

The museum staff also has a goal of developing a volunteer corps that will reflect the diversity of its visitors and of the Army, and encourages all to apply. "You don't need a specific degree or work experience to be a volunteer," emphasized Anderson. "What we need is you!"

To learn more about volunteering at NMUSA, or to apply, visit armyhistory.org/museum-volunteers.

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YANK

MAGAZINE CARTOONS

BY SARAH G. FORGEY

One of the most underexhibited bodies of work in the Army Museum Enterprise's art collection is a group of over 1,000 World War II illustrations produced by more than one hundred artists for *Yank, The Army Weekly*. Published between June 1942 and December 1945, enlisted personnel entirely produced the content for *Yank* and intended it for an audience of other enlistees. The artwork includes sketches by eyewitness soldier-artists, hand-drawn maps, and cartoons.

The cartoons included in *Yank* were the highlight of the magazine for many readers. The cartoons cover themes that were intrinsic to the daily lives of soldiers, such as the slowness of mail delivery, terrible food, inconsistent orders, and the relationship between officers and enlisted troops. Many of these themes are timeless and relatable to soldiers of every era. For this reason, several *Yank* cartoons will be exhibited in *The Art of Soldiering*, the opening art exhibition at the National Museum of the United States Army.

Works by two significant *Yank* cartoonists, Sgt. Bil A. Keane and Sgt. George Baker, will be included in the exhibition. Sergeant Keane is best known as the cartoonist of the popular comic strip *The Family Circus*, which was inspired by his own domestic life. He began his career in the late 1930s with a self-published satirical magazine titled *The Saturday Evening Toast*. During World War II, he served as a cartoonist on the staff of *Yank* and also drew a comic strip for *Stars and Stripes*. After the war, he produced long-running local content for the *Philadelphia Bulletin* and launched *The Family Circus* in 1960.[1] Sergeant Baker is best known as the creator of "The Sad Sack," a character he created in the first issue of *Yank*. Before the war, Baker was an animator for Walt Disney Productions and worked on the films *Pinocchio*, *Fantasia*, *Dumbo*, and *Bambi*. He was drafted in June 1941 and assigned to the Signal Corps to create animated content. After winning a cartoon contest, *Yank* hired Baker. His character "The Sad Sack" became one of the most popular of World War II, representing the experiences and frustrations of soldiers in the Army.[2]


Sergeants Keane and Baker produced the cartoons shown on these pages for *Yank* during World War II. See them as part of the inaugural art exhibition, *The Art of Soldiering*, when the National Museum of the United States Army opens in 2020.

NOTES

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


Sgt. Bil Keane, *Hot Dogs Again*, ink on paper, c. 1945




Sgt. Bil Keane, *Rank Latrine*, ink on paper, c. 1942

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Sgt. George Baker, *Snack*, ink on paper, c. 1943



Sgt. George Baker, *Planning*, ink on paper, 1944

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Sgt. Bil Keane, *I Like Bully Beef, My Meals Taste Good, and Everything I Eat Agrees With Me*, ink on paper, c. 1943

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COMMENTARY

PERSHING'S "OPEN WARFARE" DOCTRINE IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

By Gene Fax

In May 1917, John J. Pershing became the first American general since the Civil War to lead a field army of more than a few thousand men. For most of the intervening time, the U.S. Army had had three main missions: protecting the coasts, quelling labor unrest, and chasing—but rarely fighting—Indians.[1] Pershing himself operated against Indians in the west, the Spanish in Cuba, Moros in the Philippines, and Pancho Villa in Mexico. None of these prepared him or the Army for the all-consuming war then going on in France. Pershing and the Army were largely unfamiliar with modern weapons, tactics, and logistics.

Yet Pershing knew how he wanted his new Army to fight. The trench-bound stalemate of the Western Front was not for him. "It was my opinion," he wrote in his memoirs, "that victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."[2] Americans, he believed, were inherently superior to the soldiers of other nations in their initiative and their aptitude for marksmanship.[3] In his statement of training principles he declared, "The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle."[4]

Pershing himself had observed the Russo-Japanese War, the first major conflict to use modern weapons. In his reports he described the results when Japanese infantry—paragons of aggressiveness—attacked strong entrenchments defended by machine guns and artillery. At the Siege of Port Arthur, Manchuria, almost all

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


(Left) 42d Division patrol near Hassavant Farm, France, 14 September 1918
(Above) View near the jump-off line of the 77th Division, 26 September 1918


of the infantry assaults failed with heavy losses; by the time the city surrendered, the Japanese had lost 65,000 men killed and wounded out of a maximum strength of 80,000. Replacements kept the Japanese army at full strength most of the time.[5] Yet virtually every training program and order Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) would publish contained some variant of this exhortation: "The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence . . . [T]he fundamental ideas enunciated in our drill regulations, small arms firing manual, field service regulations and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers."[6] The regulations and manuals to which he referred derived ultimately from the combat doctrine developed by Maj. Gen. Emory Upton during and after the Civil War and took no notice of four years' worth of events in France. The Infantry Drill Regulations (IDR) of 1917 relegated machine guns to emergency use only. Artillery's sole mission was to support infantry attacks. The artillery's own service regulations, occupying three volumes, said of its combat role only this: "The reason for the existence of Field Artillery is its ability to assist the other arms, especially the Infantry, upon the field of battle."[7] That was it. The IDR ignored tanks and aircraft. To Pershing these were distractions from the rifle-and-bayonet assaults that capitalized on the unique character of the American soldier: individual initiative, aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and high morale.

Actually, the history of American arms demonstrated just the opposite—that the infantry charge with rifle and bayonet was usually ineffective and always costly. When the Americans won, it was generally by other means. In the Revolutionary War, the colonial militias were useless in pitched battle and the Continental Army, trained by professionals like Baron von Steuben, was never able to meet the British Regulars on equal terms. They lacked the discipline to maneuver in combat and the expertise in volley fire that characterized the warfare of the period.[8] General John Burgoyne lost at Saratoga mainly because American militia, fighting as guerrillas, wore down his army while it was on the march. He surrendered when he failed to break Maj. Gen. Horatio L. Gates' defensive line and lost all hope of resupply for his badly depleted forces.[9] Gates then wasted an army by facing General Charles Cornwallis in a stand-up fight at the Battle of Camden, South Carolina, in 1780. A British contingent, slightly more than half the size of the Colonial force, routed the Americans, militia and regulars alike. At General George Washington's urging, Congress sent Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene to replace Gates, who, with other leaders such as Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, had conducted a successful partisan campaign against local British detachments. The final victory at Yorktown was a traditional siege operation, directed largely by America's French allies.[10]

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General Pershing



General Upton



General Howard, c. 1905

In the Mexican War, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott captured Veracruz, Mexico, by siege and Mexico City by maneuver, avoiding fighting as much as possible. His subordinate Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor believed in the bayonet as a primary weapon and disdained artillery. Taylor commanded 5,000 volunteers, most of them frontiersmen, plus a small force of regular artillery and dragoons. Ignoring orders to establish a defensive line, he advanced his little army to an exposed position deep inside Mexico. When General Antonio López de Santa Anna, commanding an army four times as large, moved to cut him off, Taylor retreated fifteen miles to a better position near Buena Vista, Mexico, to await the Mexican attack. Santa Anna maneuvered his troops brilliantly, at one point putting several American regiments to flight. But Taylor's artillery came up at just the right moment. Serving as a rallying point for the infantry and pouring fire into the Mexican ranks, the guns turned the tide. Santa Anna retreated with between 1,500 and 2,000 casualties; the Americans suffered fewer than half that.[11]

For Pershing's generation, the Civil War was the wellspring of Army doctrine. Pershing, who graduated West Point in 1886, was steeped in that war's history. The two superintendents while he was there—Major Generals Oliver Otis Howard and Wesley Merritt—had been well-known Civil War commanders. He remembered being impressed by visitors such as Generals Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan.[12] The Army War College, founded in 1901, pioneered the intensive study of Civil War battles, including tours of the major eastern battlefields. The emphasis was on battles of maneuver—First and Second Bull Run, the Peninsula Campaign, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania Court House in Virginia, Antietam in Maryland, and Gettysburg in Pennsylvania. But the most strategically important campaigns—Vicksburg, Mississippi, which cut the Confederacy in two; and Petersburg, Virginia, which ground the rebel army down until it ran out of men—were classic trench warfare operations and received little attention.[13] There were exceptions—First and Second Bull Run and Chattanooga, Tennessee, come to mind—but usually, even in that war of movement, the bayonet charge was a deadly mistake. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's assaults on General Robert E. Lee at Antietam, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's fourteen separate charges at Fredericksburg, General Braxton Bragg's repeated attacks on Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans' line at Stones River, Tennessee, all failed to achieve a tactical victory. Most infantry assaults, such as those in Grant's Overland Campaign, produced only mutual carnage, not a breakthrough. As crafty a tactician as Lee was, he suffered defeat on the three occasions he launched a frontal assault: Malvern Hill in the Peninsula Campaign, Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, and the attempt to retake Fort Harrison outside Richmond, Virginia.[14]

The charge with rifle and bayonet did not need the trenches of Petersburg to be rendered obsolete. It succumbed to the superiority of defensive weapons. The old smoothbore muskets had been effective only to one hundred yards, so infantry could get within bayonet-charging distance before they risked being hit by gunfire. The development of the minié ball and the consequent adoption of the rifled musket as the standard infantry weapon in the 1840s and '50s tripled that range. It cut down many attackers long before they could get close enough to use their bayonets. Frontal attacks became too costly to pursue—although it took some time to realize this—and the bayonet itself became obsolete as a weapon. In Grant's campaign in the summer of 1864, Union doctors recorded only thirty-seven bayonet wounds. In the entire Civil War, they noted only 922 bayonet wounds among the many hundreds of thousands of casualties treated.[15] Perhaps in advocating the infantry assault with fixed bayonets, Pershing had in mind Grant's capture of Missionary Ridge outside Chattanooga or the counterattack of the 20th Infantry Regiment, Maine Volunteers, at Little Round Top in Gettysburg. No doubt he recalled the charge up San Juan Hill, Cuba, in which he participated—although embedded journalist Richard Harding Davis reported that no troops used bayonets there.[16] But those seem thin precedents for a two-million-man Army fighting a mechanized war.

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General Merritt



Richard Harding Davis, c. 1901

World War I did indeed bear out the historic role of the American infantryman with his rifle and bayonet, but not in the way Pershing intended. On 6 June 1918, four battalions of the 4th Brigade, U.S. Marines, part of the U.S. 2d Division, advanced through a wheat field toward Belleau Wood in northeastern France, bayonets fixed and rifles at port arms, but without an artillery barrage. German machine guns scythed them down. The Marines took the wood a bit more than three weeks later after it had been thoroughly shelled.[17] In mid-July at nearby Soissons, the same division virtually repeated its performance, complete with wheat field. This time, utter surprise and the weak German positions allowed it to advance, but with inordinate casualties; by the end of its first two engagements almost half the division had been killed or wounded, gone missing, or been taken prisoner.[18] Pershing's staff concluded nevertheless, "The rifle again proved to be the chief weapon of the infantry soldier."[19]

In fact, Pershing's "open warfare" was merely a vague principle—almost a slogan—devoid of tactical content. The general asserted but never explained how an infantry charge would gouge the German machine gunners and artillerists out of their trenches and emplacements and hurl them into the green fields beyond.[20] Nor did he explain why the Americans would have greater success than the French had in 1914, when the same tactics earned them nothing but 300,000 to 400,000 casualties. By early 1918, the French, British, and German armies had developed combined-arms tactics that would shatter the static battlefield. But Pershing was not interested in learning from them. None of the many training manuals and schedules put out by his headquarters contained the examples, problems, map exercises, and maneuver plans that his officers needed to turn "open warfare" into a reality. None of them even had the phrase in their titles. Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, then commanding I Army Corps, complained in a letter to General Headquarters on 1 April 1918 that none of the literature he had received explained how his division commanders should prepare their soldiers for open warfare. In March 1918, when the Germans stormed over the old Somme battlefield, destroying one British army and gravely damaging another, Pershing ascribed their success to "the intelligent initiative of junior officers and superiority of fire," and added, "Americans have inherent qualities in both these respects far superior to those of the Germans."[21] He ignored the true reasons for the German victory: infiltration by small, specialized units armed with a variety of infantry weapons, including grenades, light machine guns, and flamethrowers; combined-arms tactics with infantry, artillery, and aircraft providing mutual support; and intensive training in the new techniques months before the assault. Rifle fire and the bayonet were negligible contributors.



1st Division Infantry on Montrefagne, north of Exermont, France, 11 October 1918

What is remarkable is that the soldiers of the AEF *did* possess individual initiative, aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and high morale—even the Germans acknowledged that. One of their intelligence officers reported after Belleau Wood, "The individual soldiers are very good. They are healthy, vigorous and physically well developed . . . The troops are fresh and full of straightforward confidence. A remark of one of the prisoners is indicative of their spirit:

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General Liggett, c. 1910

'We kill or get killed.'"[22] What they did not have was either an effective combat doctrine or the training to exercise it if they had it. Instead, the Americans taught themselves modern offensive methods while they were fighting: advancing in small formations, using cover and fire-and-maneuver tactics, employing machine guns to support the advance, and digging in in anticipation of enemy artillery fire. They never did master the skills needed to work effectively with tanks and aircraft, which were too technical to learn on the battlefield. General Liggett, replacing Pershing as commander of First Army, reorganized the artillery so that light and heavy guns could quickly assist the infantry wherever support was needed.[23] The AEF taught itself in nine weeks the methods it had taken their allies four years to develop. Even so, it was the British and French who dominated the battlefield in the last months before the Armistice.

In the end, Pershing had to accept the reality of the battlefield, at least temporarily. On 29 August 1918, his headquarters issued combat instructions declaring that the conquest of the enemy's main line of resistance, estimated to be three to four kilometers deep, called for "trench warfare methods . . . the operation must be planned in great detail and carried out according to a fixed schedule."[24] His orders for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, to begin on 26 September, specified a set-piece battle: rigid divisional boundaries, artillery preparation followed by a creeping barrage, all divisions to attack straight ahead, and prescribed phase lines for the advance. But he still put his faith in the vigor and initiative of the American infantryman. He set the first day's objective at a line as much as twenty kilometers beyond the jump-off position—a one-day penetration that none of his allies had ever achieved.[25] That line was not reached until 15 October.

Pershing maintained to the end of his life that the American rifleman, aided but not superseded by tanks, air, and artillery, was the primary weapon of war. In his memoirs, published in 1931, he wrote,

> [T]he principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point [i.e., as derived from the Civil War] remain unchanged . . . The American soldier, taught how to shoot, how to take advantage of the terrain, and how to rely upon hasty entrenchment, shall retain the ability to drive the enemy from his trenches and, by the same tactics, defeat him in the open.[26]



An American 75-mm. gun firing toward Montsec from a position near Beaumont, 12 September 1918

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American soldiers advancing to attack at Cantigny

In fact, it was the rapid improvement in American skills, especially in the use of combined arms, along with the deterioration of the German Army, which allowed the AEF to claim its share of the victory. But the war-winning breakthrough that Pershing promised his infantry doctrine would deliver never came.


Gene Fax originally trained as a mechanical engineer and spent the first eight years of his career conducting research and tactical studies under contract to the U.S. Navy. He is chairman and cofounder of The Cadmus Group, Inc., which does program development, evaluation, and policy research in environmental protection, energy efficiency, sustainable development, climate change, and homeland security. He is the author of *With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon* (Oxford, 2017), the product of seventeen years of archival research in Washington, Baltimore, Paris, West Point, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Gene is a member of the Society for Military History, the Western Front Association, the National World War I Museum and Memorial, and the Army Historical Foundation. More on Gene and his writings can be found at genefaxauthor.com.

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BOOK REVIEWS



A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror

By Ali Ahmad Jalali
University Press of Kansas, 2017
Pp. xvi, 617. $34.95

Review by Reagan Fancher

Since the devastating terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the nation of Afghanistan has been thrust onto the global stage as the central front in the "War on Terror" declared by President George W. Bush after that infamous day. Seventeen years later, the country remains a battlefield, as U.S. troops and their NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Afghan allies continue to persevere in what seems to be an unending war with Islamist insurgents including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and increasingly, the Islamic State. Author Ali Ahmad Jalali brings his unique insight into the country's tumultuous history in his thoroughly researched book, *A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror.*

As a veteran mujahideen or "holy warrior" of the Afghan resistance against Soviet Union occupation forces in the 1980s, Jalali is uniquely qualified for the task of writing a detailed history of his country's military experience throughout the centuries. Jalali's choice of title for his magisterial work could not be more suitable, as the course of Afghanistan's rich history has been largely decided by military affairs and their outcomes. Indeed, the author almost sells himself short in the book's subtitle, as the story of Afghanistan's military history begins well before the "Great Game" waged by Britain and Russia throughout the nineteenth century.

Jalali begins his work with a brief but detailed description of Afghanistan's early history and the impact of geography on the country's development. The combination of high, snowcapped mountains in the country's north, center, and southeast, and open, arid deserts in the south-central and southwest regions has long determined the routes by which invading armies arrived. The Arab-Islamic conquest of the region, which began in 642, for example, was carried out via "two axes" from the north and south, converging in the Sistan-Herat plain in the west, as the Hindu Kush mountains to the east prevented such a convergence of forces (p. 30).

Strategic successes such as those enjoyed by the Arab invaders reinforce Jalali's argument that, contrary to popular perception, Afghanistan is not unconquerable, so long as outsiders possess a degree of patience and piety comparable to that of the Afghans. One of the book's most interesting points is the author's coverage of the Afghan Durrani Empire. The modern state of Afghanistan emerged in 1747 under the bold, decisive leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who united the ethnic Pashtun majority and extended the nation's borders across the Indus River. Ahmad Shah's military successes against the Islamic Moguls and Hindu Marathas altered the development of South Asia. Jalali brilliantly calls attention to the regional, if not global, ramifications of the Afghan Empire's advance. At the 1761 Battle of Panipat, Ahmad Shah inflicted a decisive defeat on the Marathas by employing a patient defensive strategy combined with light, agile forces against the aggressive, slower-moving, and heavy troops of his opponents. Jalali points out that this outstanding victory drove the Marathas out of northern India, destroyed their domestic political unity, alarmed Britain, and paved the way for the subsequent conquest of India (p. 75).

Moving into the twentieth century, Jalali provides a highly informative description of Afghanistan's relations with Britain and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the First World War. Anti-British sentiment had been brewing since the Ottoman Caliph's declaration of jihad, and in 1919 tensions boiled over, triggered by a border dispute resulting in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Many Afghans perceived this brief but bloody affair as a successful act of defiance and it resulted in the young King Amanullah emerging as a celebrated national hero.

One of the book's greatest strengths lies in Jalali's meticulous dissection of mujahideen and Soviet tactical operations during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989). He points out that while the mujahideen insurgents essentially operated as light infantry, they nevertheless excelled at the employment of heavy weaponry, including heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, mortars, and rockets, against Soviet troops. This gave them more "staying power" in the field once a guerrilla ambush was underway (p. 392).

Soviet military operations often were spearheaded, or at least supported by, airborne assault troops and special forces including elite KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Intelligence Directorate) commandos, as well as armored sweeps and insertion of elite units supported by attack helicopters or fighter-bombers. Jalali states that before the mid-1980s, Soviet operations "were conducted in a conventional way along the main roads and valleys and other axes by heavy columns of motorized rifle formations" which he says "produced no desirable results" (p. 395).

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
Jalali makes a key point when referring to Mikhail Gorbachev's Politburo speech on 13 November 1986. It was in this speech that the Soviet General Secretary finally acknowledged the Soviet Union's failure to defeat the mujahideen—an important point as it took almost until the end of the year for a Soviet leader to do so. It is little wonder, then, that the war's bloodiest chapter occurred in the late 1980s with Gorbachev at the helm, stubbornly insisting on two more years of murderous futility (p. 421).

Incidentally, the book's greatest weaknesses also relate to the topic of the Soviet-Afghan War, particularly when the author refers to the role of Arab jihadists in the conflict. Jalali cites the memoir of Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf when describing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and ISI aid to Afghan Islamist insurgents. He then alleges that the United States "even helped create an international network of militant Islamists to fight with the Mujahedin in Afghanistan" (pp. 382–83). I find Jalali's claim curious, because it is repeatedly and thoroughly refuted in Brigadier Yousaf's memoir, *Afghanistan–The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (South Yorkshire, 1992). Furthermore, Yousaf points to the complete financial independence of wealthy Arab nongovernmental organizations and the importance of this aid for the Afghan Islamists in the field.

When discussing the 1989 Battle of Jalalabad between the mujahideen and Communist regime forces, Jalali mentions "another group" which briefly captured the Jalalabad airfield (p. 430). Jalali does not mention that this group included Saudi jihadist Osama bin Laden and his all-Arab guerrilla unit who fought their way onto the airport's apron before being driven back, as described by former CIA officer and historian Michael Scheuer in his excellent biography, *Osama bin Laden* (New York, 2011). This incident deserves attention, providing a key example of al-Qaeda's early capabilities in insurgency combat.

Overall, Jalali's effective use of primary and secondary sources from a diverse range of participants in Afghanistan's military history makes for a fascinating and important read. Utilizing Afghan, Indian, Pakistani, British, Soviet, and American accounts, the book comes closer than any other thus far in painting a complete picture of the turbulent history of this fascinating nation. It will prove a useful and important resource to both historians and military professionals in understanding Afghanistan and its increasing importance in world affairs.

Reagan Fancher earned his bachelor's and master's degrees in history at the University of Louisiana at Monroe and is working toward his Ph.D. in history at the University of North Texas. His main area of interest is military affairs relating to the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia, and the Islamist mujahideen insurgency in the Soviet-Afghan War. He has also studied military affairs relating to the Soviet Union and the Red Army in the Second World War.



The Printer's Kiss: The Life and Letters of a Civil War Newspaperman and His Family

Edited by Patricia A. Donohoe
Kent State University Press, 2014
Pp. xxvii, 300. $39.95

Review by David B. Parker

On 27 November 1863, Will Tomlinson, a peripatetic newspaperman in Ohio known for his prowar Democratic politics, his temper, and his drinking, got into an argument with a Copperhead (an antiwar Democrat). The argument turned violent and ended with Tomlinson shot, an injury from which he would die two days later. His widow, Eliza Wiley Tomlinson, lived until 1885. When she died, their two children, daughter Belle and son Byers, divided up the 300 or so letters that their parents had written to each other. Fast forward to 1970, when Patricia Donohoe, an English teacher, Presbyterian minister, and Byers' great-granddaughter, came across Byers' half of the letters in a cracker tin where her grandmother had kept them. Unbeknown to Donohoe, Belle's descendants had sold her share of the family letters, and they began showing up on eBay. Donohoe was able to buy almost all of them. Thus was born the collection that forms the basis for *The Printer's Kiss: The Life and Letters of a Civil War Newspaperman and His Family.*

The title of the book—Donohoe tells us that "a printer's kiss" is the name given to the first satisfactory impression to come off a printing press—is enigmatic, and it has several meanings here. English-born Will Tomlinson moved to Ripley, Ohio (via Canada and New York), just across the river from Kentucky, in the early 1840s. There he established a Democratic antislavery newspaper, *Freedom's Casket* (slogan: "Principles—not prejudice"), and married Eliza Wylie. A few weeks after the wedding, Tomlinson took his bride to Piketon, Ohio, where he had already started a second newspaper. (The *Casket* lasted fewer than ten issues.) This set the stage for their marriage. Over the next twenty years, Tomlinson moved from town to town, starting a total of ten newspapers. Sometimes Eliza and the children went with him, and sometimes they stayed in Ripley, where Eliza had family.

Of the almost 300 letters that Donohoe had in her possession, 124 ended up in the book, and all but twenty of them are from 1861 and after. As the Civil War approached, Tomlinson was in Cincinnati, where he worked for the *Daily Gazette*, a Republican paper. In a letter to Eliza in December 1860, as the southern states began to secede, the antislavery newspaperman blamed the abolitionists, who "have finally done their work, and instead of the Union strong, great and respected, we are to become a divided, quarrelling, and unhappy people" (p. 53). Elsewhere he called abolitionists "a miserable faction of false philanthropists and banded political renegades and public plunderers" (p. 57). This is one of the valuable lessons in the book: politics and racial attitudes were not as absolute and unambiguous as we like to think.

In April 1861, Tomlinson joined the Fifth Ohio Infantry as quartermaster. Back in Ripley, Eliza worried about his safety but

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
urged him on. "Do not be rash in risking your person," she wrote. "Dodge the bullets, and hustle them back with fatal aim" (p. 131). Her letters told of the children and other family and friends, and of her efforts to keep everything going on her own. His letters spoke of the boredom of camp life and the difficult task he faced provisioning his men.

In late summer, Tomlinson was elected captain of a company that was ordered to root out enemy guerrillas in western Virginia. In early November, they rounded up and murdered three rebel bushwhackers. Drinking was perhaps a factor; certainly poor judgment was. As a result, Tomlinson was discharged and lost his chance to command a company of African American soldiers, something he had hoped to do.

His service ended, Tomlinson returned to Cincinnati, where he wrote in the *Gazette* with increasing virulence against Copperheads (especially Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham). He also contributed a half dozen "letters" to the *Ripley Bee* on various war-related topics. In his letters to Eliza, Tomlinson shared his despondence over the Union's lack of military success. Eliza wrote of her growing concern of a Confederate invasion, especially with escaped prisoner John Hunt Morgan on the loose in Kentucky. In late summer 1863, she apparently accused Tomlinson of whoring, gambling, and general "debauchery." That letter is no longer extant, but a few pages of his response are included in the book. He denied all except the debauchery: "I take it that means drinking. I do drink. I drink a great deal" (p. 229). With the exception of a letter dated 17 November 1863, that was his last to Eliza.

The Printer's Kiss is a solid addition to Kent State University Press's Civil War in the North series. While the letters actually tell us little about the Civil War, they remind us that the war involved not just soldiers, but also families, and those families were built on the personalities and frailties of those who composed them. The Tomlinsons certainly had their dispositions and weaknesses. Patricia Donohoe did a wonderful job editing and annotating her great-great-grandparents' letters, providing context where needed and filling the holes in the stories that the letters tell. Those interested in the human side of the Civil War will enjoy and learn much from this book.

Dr. David B. Parker is professor of history and assistant department chair at Kennesaw State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina. He is the author of *Alias Bill Arp: Charles Henry Smith and the South's "Goodly Heritage"* (Athens, Ga.: 1991), on the Confederacy's most famous humorist, and the editor, with John D. Fowler, of *Breaking the Heartland: The Civil War in Georgia* (Macon, Ga.: 2011). He has also written on Civil War textbooks and religion in Civil War Florida.



A Campaign of Giants: The Battle for Petersburg—Volume One: From the Crossing of the James to the Crater

By A. Wilson Greene
University of North Carolina Press, 2018
Pp. xiv, 712. $45

Review by Charles R. Bowery Jr.

In the preface to his magisterial new book on the opening battles of the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, A. Wilson Greene offers the modest disclaimer that "I am under no illusion that my work is definitive" on the topic of the Civil War's longest and most complex campaign. If any project could claim such status, Greene's projected three-volume series would be it. Eagerly anticipated by both Civil War scholars and enthusiasts, volume one of *A Campaign of Giants* covers the campaign's first phase, from the disengagement of the Union and Confederate armies at the Battle of Cold Harbor, through the crossing of the James River, and the first three of the eight separate clashes that make up this sprawling military drama.

Greene has long been acknowledged as the preeminent historian of this campaign, building on his years of experience in the Petersburg area. He is the former president of the Pamplin Historical Park and the National Museum of the Civil War Soldier. In 2000, he authored the best account to date of the final battles of the campaign and in 2006 he wrote a survey of the wartime experiences of Petersburg and its population.[1]

In contrast to other, more extensively chronicled Civil War campaigns, Richmond-Petersburg has received comparatively slight attention from scholars over the years, perhaps because of the sense of inevitability that lies over it. This point of view ignores the very real contingencies at work in the war's last year, as Generals Ulysses S. Grant, George Gordon Meade, Benjamin F. Butler, Robert E. Lee, and P. G. T. Beauregard met in the Confederacy's seventh-largest city and its logistical hub for all Southern operations in the Eastern Theater. The campaign still has much to tell us about the war. A few new works have joined the small number of standards over the past decade, but the campaign's length and complexity make it difficult to write about in a way that is authoritative, yet readable and approachable. Greene does this, and the result is an exceptional work of military history.

In chronicling the first phase of the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, Greene addresses several of its more controversial moments. One is Grant's failure to capture Petersburg on 15 June 1864, after successfully deceiving Lee on his true intent for seventy-two hours and possessing an overwhelming numerical advantage over Beauregard's forces defending the city. Greene provides an evenhanded analysis, with a minute-by-minute recounting of the actions of both sides as Union forces crossed the James. He demonstrates that a constellation of failures, from soldiers and junior officers to senior commanders, combined with battlefield friction and a skilled Confederate reaction, led to perhaps the greatest missed opportunity of the war. Greene also offers a judicious analysis of the actions of federal forces during the first series of clashes along Petersburg's eastern approaches, putting to rest persistent legends about Union forces refusing to attack. He mines contemporaneous

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primary sources on both sides, rather than relying on postwar memoirs, to convey the overwhelming fatigue, stress, fear, and combat loss that combined to stretch the Union armies to the breaking point.


After a straightforward account of the moves and countermoves of both sides during June and July and a survey of life in and around the city of Petersburg. Greene then concludes the volume with a detailed, compelling account of the Battle of the Crater, and offers a fresh, informative analysis of the most well-known incident of the campaign. Even here, the author puts a renowned tactical event into its proper operational context, with sufficient treatment of Grant's operations on the north side of the James River at Deep Bottom. Greene addresses the undeniable racial components of the fighting at the Crater, and ably assesses the political, physical, and moral impacts of the battle on both sides.

Scholars and enthusiasts of the Eastern Theater of the Civil War now have the first installment of this long-awaited project. The three volumes of *A Campaign of Giants* will be the last word on the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign for a long time to come.

Charles R. Bowery Jr., a retired Army colonel, is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a former military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He served as an Apache helicopter pilot in Iraq, and commanded an attack helicopter battalion in Afghanistan. He is the coeditor of *The Army War College Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign* (Lawrence, Kans., 2014).

NOTE

1. A. Wilson Greene, *Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign* (Mason City, Ia.: Savas Publishing Co., 2000); A. Wilson Greene, *Civil War Petersburg: Confederate City in the Crucible of War* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006).



The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I

By Peter Hart
Oxford University Press, 2018
Pp. x, 453. $34.95

Review by Peter L. Belmonte

In the opening paragraph of *The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I*, Peter Hart, oral historian at Britain's Imperial War Museum (IWM), asks readers to put themselves in the place of soldiers in the final days of World War I, preparing for yet another bloody assault. Hart reasons:

> The temptation to shirk must have been enormous. Yet, for the most part, men dug deep within themselves to summon up the resolve to fight on and 'finish the job.' For many it would prove to be the greatest sacrifice (p. vi).

To "finish the job," Allied commanders "had to take risks that would have seemed reprehensible a few months before . . . " (p. x). Hart thus examines the final four months of the war, reflecting "the essence of what happened in battle—and why" (p. x). To do this, Hart marshals a variety of firsthand accounts of the fighting, including some unpublished transcripts from oral history recordings held in the IWM. The author admittedly, and understandably, writes from an Anglocentric point of view. Accordingly, most of the eyewitness accounts are from British and Dominion forces, but there are ample American descriptions and some German narratives sprinkled in as well.

Hart begins by surveying the dire straits in which all combatants found themselves in 1918. Each army had lost unimaginable numbers of men in the bloody struggles to this point, and it was recognized that the infusion of millions of American troops, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), would turn the tide in the Allies' favor. The series of German offensives from March through July 1918 resulted in territorial gains at a high cost to the Germans. But Allied leader Marshal Ferdinand Foch rightly saw this as an opportunity to counterattack and drive the depleted German forces back. The Second Battle of the Marne in July was the beginning of the end for the Germans. Following this, Foch met with the other Allied leaders to put forth his thoughts about the current situation and his ideas for the way ahead. These ideas culminated in his proposal for a series of offensives, launched in a four-day sequence, designed to push the Germans back without giving them time to organize any more defensive lines.

In addition to eyewitness accounts, Hart includes his analysis of the evolution of British tactics during the final months of the war. He sees the Battle of Amiens in early August 1918 as a turning point in that regard, as it marked a definite change in tactics and operational scope. The author calls Amiens an "All Arms Battle" (p. 42), what Americans would call a successful use of combined arms. Furthermore, he contends that British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig learned the valuable lesson that "persevering with any offensive beyond a few days would result in diminishing returns" (p. 44). Maybe so, but the Allies still made plenty of attempts to break through to "open warfare" well after August. These attempts were driven by Marshal Foch, and they comprise the final few months of combat during the war.

The bulk of the book consists of chronological accounts of each of the Allied offensives starting with the AEF's Meuse-Argonne Offensive on 26 September. The subsequent battles, each launched on consecutive days, include the Battle of Canal du Nord, the Fifth Battle of Ypres, the Battle of Courtrai, and the Battle of St. Quentin Canal. Hart devotes a chapter to each of these actions with subsequent chapters devoted to describing the progress of each battle and the development of the overall strategic picture.

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
The eyewitness accounts range from General Haig's diary entries to transcripts of oral history interviews of soldiers and officers conducted decades later. These work together to give us insight into the thoughts of men engaged in the war at a variety of levels. They show us the difficulties of command when diplomacy and politics are mixed with strategic military planning, and they show us the horror of war at the personal level. As an example of the latter, consider this description of what an American rear-echelon soldier discovered when he examined the ground after a battle:

> In some places the men had been killed by bullets; but in others they were blown to pieces by shells; an arm here with the hand gone, and a leg there with the genitals hanging to it, or a solitary head which seemed to accuse civilization with its silence! In one place I found a stomach lost in the grass, while wound around the limbs of a nearby tree were the intestines. The whole ridge had a stench so horrible and so repulsive that all the ghastly sites [*sic*] seemed indescribably worse! (Pvt. Arthur Yenson, 7th Engineer Train, 5th Division, p. 339)

The author's description of the political and military maneuvering that led to the Armistice provides a helpful summary of this complicated process. Of the Germans in particular, Hart writes: "All this political wrangling leaves an unpleasant taste in the mouth when one considers that men were being maimed and dying in large numbers with every day that passed" (p. 263). Hart adopts a pragmatic view of the problems that the Allies had to contend with, and his tone is much less harshly critical of Allied leaders than that of some other historians. American readers will appreciate Hart's evenhanded and thoughtful analysis of the problems faced by the AEF. The author reveals what most students of the AEF already know: the same problems for which the Americans came under heavy criticism also bedeviled the British and French at the same time. Shortcomings in tactics, leadership, supply, and transportation were not unique to the AEF, as Hart's fine commentary on these issues shows. Despite these shortcomings, the Allies persevered and triumphed. In no small part this was due to Marshal Foch, of whom the author writes: "[Foch] was the true architect of victory. Foch provided the drive and the intellectual coherence that bound together what might have been a series of disparate offensives into one coherent whole" (p. 328).

Thirty-six photographs and several maps enhance the text, while supporting material includes a bibliography and thorough endnotes. The maps, with detail only down to the division level, are adequate and allow the reader to follow the battles. Hart has produced a thoughtful, well-written account of the final months of the war. It is highly recommended for those who would like to learn more about the war's final, bloody battles.

Maj. Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret.), holds a master's degree in history from California State University, Stanislaus, and is the author of several books including *Italian Americans in World War II* (Dixon, S.C.: 2001), *Days of Perfect Hell: The U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, October–November, 1918* (Atglen, Pa.: 2015), and (with Alexander F. Barnes) *Forgotten Soldiers of World War I: America's Immigrant Doughboys* (Atglen, Pa.: 2018).



African American Officers in Liberia: A Pestiferous Rotation, 1910–1942
By Brian G. Shellum
Potomac Books, 2018
Pp. xxvii, 271. $21.95

Review by Frank L. Kalesnik

The first colonists from the United States arrived in West Africa in 1820. Free people of color and/or former slaves, they and their descendents came to be known as Americo-Liberians. Established in 1847, the Republic of Liberia modeled itself politically after the Unites States. Socially, it replicated the antebellum South, with the Americo-Liberians assuming the roles of their former white masters and treating the indigenous population as their inferiors. This led to frequent conflicts, often resulting in armed intervention by U.S. Navy warships. Formed in 1908, the Liberian Frontier Force suppressed rebellions internally, and protected the borders from encroachment by neighboring British and French colonies. From 1910 to 1942, officers recruited in the United States led the force, with the American military attaché exercising oversight. These men were African Americans, and they frequently led the Frontier Force in combat against indigenous Africans.

The subtitle of this book refers to the tropical ailments these officers encountered and often died from. Their ancestors might have been African, but they had entered a different world, and the experience often proved difficult, frustrating, and frequently fatal. The military attachés were all professional soldiers, and most of the officers contracted to lead the Frontier Force were veterans, often of combat in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, or the First World War. The Liberian government preferred West Point graduates, though some soldiers were enlisted men originally who rose through the ranks.

The most famous of these is Benjamin O. Davis Sr. He served as an officer of Volunteers in the Spanish-American War, then enlisted in the Regular Army, and ultimately retired at the rank of brigadier general in 1948. Charles Young, a West Point graduate commissioned in 1889, rose to the rank of colonel. He served as military attaché twice, first from 1912 to 1915, then from 1920 until his death in 1922.

Brian G. Shellum, the author of *African American Officers in Liberia*, wrote two other books on Young, *Black Cadet in a White Bastion: Charles Young at West Point* (Lincoln, Neb.: 2006) and *Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment: The Military Career of Charles Young* (Lincoln, Neb.: 2010). Making extensive use of primary source material from both the National Archives and the National Afro-American Museum and Cultural Center in Wilberforce, Ohio, Shellum describes the experiences of seventeen men from a variety of backgrounds. A useful appendix provides excellent descriptions of their careers.

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
The author examines a variety of topics from several angles. These include the relationship between the United States and Liberia, not just militarily, but diplomatically, economically, politically, and socially as well. The officers' involvement in the perpetual conflicts between Americo-Liberians and local tribes reveals the overlooked role African Americans played in the imposition of colonial rule on indigenous Africans. Their relationships with Liberian officials were also problematic. The Americans frequently perceived their counterparts as being incompetent and corrupt, whereas the Liberians they clashed with saw the Americans as being intrusive and overbearing. Liberia's financial woes caused problems for the Frontier Force, and their impact on foreign relations are a major theme in the book. In addition to shortages of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food, there were occasional mutinies by infrequently paid troops.

The situation from the American domestic perspective is also interesting. Policies changed with presidential administrations—from broad foreign and economic policy considerations to the details of assigning diplomatic and military personnel to Liberia. The personnel were almost exclusively black and often representative of the African American community's elite. Despite their impressive careers, segregation limited the opportunities available to these men. They could serve in African American regiments, as professors of military science at historically black academic institutions, or as military attachés in Liberia.

Firestone began using Liberia as a source of rubber in 1927. This boosted the national economy, and provided a vital raw material during the Second World War. This led to a direct and greatly increased military presence in Liberia. The construction of an airfield made Liberia an important logistics hub, and its value as an American outpost in postcolonial Africa continued during the Cold War. A military coup in 1980 ended 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule. Twenty-five years of turmoil, to include bloody civil wars, followed.

African American Officers in Liberia is an important book in several ways, and will appeal to readers from a variety of backgrounds. Military professionals will find some valuable insights into what currently are referred to as "advise and assist" and "foreign internal defense" missions. The challenges American soldiers faced in Liberia a century ago will seem quite familiar to those serving in Africa today. Students and scholars with an interest in African history will also find this book useful, as will those who want to learn about a neglected aspect of American history. This is a highly readable, well-researched study. I look forward to reading the author's two books on Charles Young.

Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik earned his bachelor's degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (1983), and his master's degree (1989) and Ph.D. (1992) in American history at Florida State University. He has taught at the Virginia Military Institute and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and was a command historian for both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. He also served twenty-two years as a Reserve officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. Kalesnik is currently the command historian for Marine Forces Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.



Sabers Through the Reich: World War II Corps Cavalry from Normandy to the Elbe

By William Stuart Nance
University Press of Kentucky, 2017
Pp. xi, 353. $50

Review by Alan M. Anderson

Seventy-five years ago, after the successful D-Day landings in Normandy, the American Army began the advance that eventually would lead it, ten months later, to the banks of the Elbe River. Mechanized cavalry reconnaissance groups, consisting of two battalion-sized cavalry squadrons that typically were assigned to corps or armies at the operational level, led much of that advance. William Stuart Nance's book, *Sabers Through the Reich: World War II Corps Cavalry from Normandy to the Elbe*, focuses on the operational history of those cavalry groups. Nance's essential argument is that these mechanized cavalry groups "proved vital to the overall success of the army" (p. 8) during the campaigns through France and Germany to the Elbe.

Nance, a serving armor officer, begins by asserting, "Much of what we know about American operational art in the Second World War is incomplete or wrong" (p. 1). As historian Robert Citino points out in his foreword to the book, this is "a bold statement" (p. ix). Nance's emphasis is much more on addressing the "incomplete" portion of his declaration than on establishing errors in previous works. As Nance points out, nearly all of the research and writing to date has focused on the challenges the American cavalry branch faced as technological developments led to mechanization during the interwar years, or on the development of cavalry doctrine in the early 1940s. He expands beyond the previous works of such historians as Louis A. DiMarco, George F. Hofmann, and Matthew D. Morton, none of whom presented in their writings a complete or full operational analysis of the corps-level mechanized cavalry groups that participated throughout the campaigns in northwest Europe. Nance fills this void in the historiography and presents "a basic construct of what happened in Europe" (p. 8). He generally succeeds in showing that "despite a flawed doctrine and less than ideal organization, the end result was a successful cavalry force, thanks to the innovation, courage, and adaptability of the cavalrymen and their leaders" (p. 35) in the European Theatre of Operations during World War II. He concludes:

> The tasks that the cavalry conducted were essential to the overall success of the field armies and corps committed to this theater of operations. While not decisive by themselves, these missions enabled the army to conduct the critical moves to win the war. The supportive nature of these shaping operations meant that they rarely

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received much attention, but they were still absolute prerequisites to success in the main effort (p. 266).


Beginning with the breakout in Normandy, and continuing with the race across France, the German resistance as the Allies reached Germany's borders in the fall of 1944, the setback during the winter of 1944–1945 in the Ardennes, and the final rush across Germany, Nance describes the operations of the American cavalry. His analysis is almost purely at the operational level. He rarely provides any detailed description of the actions of particular cavalry troops or individuals. In each chapter, he describes how the actions of the cavalry fulfilled one or more of their traditional tasks of reconnaissance, security operations, force mission economics, and liaison with larger units. Nance recognizes that the missions performed by the cavalry could have been accomplished by other units. However, the structure, equipment, and firepower of the cavalry units caused them to be the best-suited force available, especially if augmented by other elements, such as combat engineers, tank destroyers, or mobile artillery. According to Nance, the regiment-sized cavalry groups had "an impact on the battlefield [that] proved consistently larger than that of any other equivalently sized unit" (p. 268). Indeed, cavalry squadrons often assumed responsibility for fronts previously held by regiments—units four times their size.

With few exceptions, Nance concludes that the cavalry's actions contributed to the success of the corps to which it was attached, even in instances of apparent failure. For example, at the beginning of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the scattered defenses of the two squadrons comprising the 14th Mechanized Cavalry Group failed to protect the junction between V and VIII Corps, leading to the destruction of the cavalry group and 106th Infantry Division as combat-capable units. Yet at the same time, the 102d Cavalry Group "prevented a bad situation from getting worse" and "proved that a successful security operation can set the stage for even more successes later in a battle" (p. 158).

Sabers Through the Reich adopts a mechanistic methodology in each chapter, which generally are devoted to a single campaign or major operation. In each chapter, Nance moves army-by-army, and then corps-by-corps within each army, describing the operations of each cavalry group or squadron assigned to them. However, he is inconsistent in his approach. For example, Chapter 6, which covers the Battle of the Bulge, first discusses the operations of the cavalry units that were part of the First Army, followed by the Third, Ninth, and Seventh Armies. The next chapter, on the drive to the Rhine River, begins with the Third Army, and then considers the Ninth, First, and Seventh Armies' operations, in that order. Nance could have used a geographic (i.e., north to south) or a more unified approach to his analysis of each cavalry group or squadron, such as type of mission assigned. His book also would have benefited from more photographs (there are only three) and much better maps (often only marginally helpful). A fuller discussion of life and combat at the cavalry troop level also would have added to the book's readability and would have better illustrated the experiences of the individual troopers as they performed their missions.

These nits aside, *Sabers Through the Reich* is an important and welcome contribution to the history of the United States cavalry during World War II. The operations of the mechanized reconnaissance cavalry during World War II have long been neglected and ignored. Nance's book ably fills this void in the literature.

Dr. Alan M. Anderson received his Ph.D. from the Department of War Studies at King's College, London. He received his J.D. degree from Cornell University and a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. The U.S. Naval War College awarded him the 2009–2010 Edward S. Miller Research Fellowship in Naval History. He has presented research papers at various regional and national history conferences, including the Society for Military History annual meeting. He is a contributor to four books from ABC-CLIO publishers on various military history topics and has published book reviews in numerous journals, including the *Journal of Military History*.



Beyond the Beach: The Allied War Against France
By Stephen Alan Bourque
Naval Institute Press, 2018
Pp. xviii, 353. $34.95

Review by Jeffrey T. McGovern

With *Beyond the Beach: The Allied War Against France*, Stephen Alan Bourque wants to expand the dominant narrative of the Allied air campaign flown against Nazi Germany's military-industrial complex. To realize this, he prompts the reader to rethink the historical narrative of Operation OVERLORD's air campaign by linking its impacts to that of the French citizenry rather than to the destruction of German military targets. In doing so, his aim is to give voice to the noncombatants who are often unrecognized in English-language publications about the liberation of Allied Europe.

In the Preface and in Chapter 1, Bourque argues that the consequences of war for friendly civilian populations, specifically for the French, is often an underrepresented story, if not completely omitted. To help the reader rethink OVERLORD's air campaign, Bourque argues that three perspectives need to be examined together: that of the Anglo-American leaders; the Allied Air Forces as represented in operational histories; and lastly from the French citizens who experienced the life-and-death effects of the air campaign. By critically examining these together, Bourque wants us to recognize that even within this "Good War's" liberation of Western Europe, the

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war had unsightly consequences that do not fit neatly into the Allied powers' national narratives of World War II.


The next two chapters are designed to give the reader the operational picture, that is, Operation OVERLORD's aims, where was it fought, and how Allied political and military leadership decided on the conduct of the air campaign to ensure success. Regrettably in the second of these two, "Eisenhower's Command," it becomes apparent that Bourque is not a student of World War II air power history. From such small details as repeatedly referring to the U.S. Army Air Forces as the U.S. Army Air Force (without the "s"), to mixing up aircraft types and missions, to errors in orders of battle, he demonstrates a lack of intimate knowledge of World War II air power in the European and Mediterranean theaters. In the end, however, this does not greatly detract from his goal of having the reader rethink the narrative of Operation OVERLORD's air campaign. Bourque's desire is to bring the French citizenry's stories into the mainstream rather than to retell an air power story. While these errors might distract a more sophisticated student's faith in the author's military operational and tactical narrative, they do not take away from adding the French citizenry's perspective to the narrative.

Bookended between these introductory chapters and a concluding chapter, Bourque has included eight topical chapters, essentially target portfolios, that cover: "Airfields and Ports," "Industry," "Crossbow," "Fortitude," "The Rail Centers," "The Bridges," "The Landings," and "The Towns." Each chapter's information is somewhat formulaically laid out: the air campaign's operational goals and executions; descriptions of the local areas (albeit more touristic than relevant to the book's thesis); impacts on the local French populations (some chapters with more and some with less detail presented); and a limited analysis of the air campaign's success or failure to achieve its tactical goals. Taken separately, each chapter provides a unique combination of the operational and tactical perspective with the viewpoint of local citizens who were on the receiving end of aircraft weapons. This combined assessment is often missing from studies of air campaigns and from studies of noncombatants.

Unfortunately, *Beyond the Beach* largely ignores an already existing, though limited, body of literature that addresses the author's goal. Even after mentioning such authors as Andrew Knapp, Claudia Baldoli, and Richard Overy, Bourque repeatedly emphasizes that the story of the citizens of the Allied countries that were occupied by Nazi Germany are left out of the histories of World War II. In his limited literature review, he cites mostly popular historians (such as Max Hastings and Stephen E. Ambrose) and overarching military operational histories (for example, the "blue" and "green" book series). In noting the lack of mention of Allied noncombatants in these mainstream histories, he is correct, but he is incorrect to assert that it was and is not a recognized, discussed, and written-about aspect of World War II in more specialized historical literature. From General Carl A. Spaatz's and Prime Minister Winston Churchill's discussions of the impact of bombing Allied citizens during the war to the authors listed above, Bourque adds to but does not, as implied in his Preface, "discover that more than seventy years ago, as part of the Northwest European Campaign against Nazi Germany, the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth unintentionally waged an air war against France" (p. xii).

Again, *Beyond the Beach*'s broad intent of opening the aperture wider to include a more complex definition of collateral damage when it comes to examining historical air campaigns is laudable. Bourque's particular goal of opening our eyes to a more comprehensive understanding and remembrance of the wounded, killed, and/or displaced French allies in the implementation of Operation OVERLORD is equally commendable, but not groundbreaking. Ultimately, in presenting these perspectives, Bourque manages to entangle the simplified narrative of the liberation of France and the complex series of events that more closely reflects that liberation's reality. In the book's conclusion, Bourque presents new questions and leaves other questions unanswered, but perhaps in doing so, the reader will ponder further on the costs of total war.

Dr. Jeffrey T. McGovern is a historian for the United States Air Force and a contract historian for the staff ride programs of U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe. After eight years of service in the U.S. Army, he received his bachelors' and his master's degrees from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a Ph.D. from the University of Arizona. Currently, his research focus is on the Troop Carrier Forces in the European and Mediterranean Theaters during World War II.



The Malmedy Massacre: The War Crimes Trial Controversy
By Steven P. Remy
Harvard University Press, 2017
Pp. x, 342. $29.95

Review by Wilford H. Ross

By 1947, for many people, the dead men lying in the snow at Malmedy had been forgotten. It was easy to forget them; they were no longer able to plead for themselves. Their killers wrote petitions alleging absurd and easily disproved stories of horrible abuse at the hands of their interrogators, primarily German-Jewish refugees. Those petitions were spread by their lawyers through a network of sensation-seeking newspapers, gullible churchmen, conniving politicians, and the growing German veterans' lobby. For various reasons, these amazing stories were believed. And these stories, false though they are, have become for many the accepted truth of the Malmedy massacre trial. This is the sad and frustrating conclusion one gets from reading Steven P. Remy's important new book about one of the most tragic chapters in the Army's history.

On 17 December 1944, during the Battle of the Bulge, over one hundred American soldiers of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion surrendered to Waffen-SS troops of *Kampfgruppe* (Battlegroup)

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Peiper. The German troops gathered them into a snow-covered field near Malmedy, Belgium, and suddenly opened fire on the prisoners of war. They killed eighty-four soldiers during this onslaught. This number included wounded soldiers who were then administered coups de grâce by the SS troopers. Several American soldiers escaped and told the tale.

This is, of course, a bare-bones account of what we know as the Malmedy massacre. Remy, an associate professor of history at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York, examines the war crimes trial of the perpetrators of this massacre, and the amazing controversy that followed their convictions. The conclusion he reaches is that much of the history about the Malmedy massacre and the subsequent trial is wrong—sometimes horribly so.

After the war in Europe ended, the U.S. Army set about finding and arresting the SS troopers it believed, based on battlefield intelligence, participated in the atrocity at Malmedy. Eventually, seventy-four former Waffen-SS troopers, from privates to Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper, the battlegroup's charismatic commander, and *Sixth Panzer Army* commander General Sepp Dietrich, were prosecuted at Dachau for the massacre in 1946. All were convicted. Forty-three received the death penalty. The rest got sentences ranging from ten years to life in prison. However, none of the condemned men were executed and all were released from prison within ten years of conviction.

The Army faced difficult problems in trying the Malmedy killers. Although there were soldiers who survived the massacre, none of them could specifically identify any of the perpetrators. The SS troopers would have to convict themselves, or others. To do this, the Army interrogated them over many months using psychological methods, some of them experimental, to get the Germans to talk and eventually confess to what had happened at the deadly crossroads.

In preparation for interrogation of the prisoners, the Army created a small cadre of German-speaking Americans, trained them in interrogation techniques, and sent them to Europe. But almost all of them were recently naturalized German-Jewish refugees. After the trial and convictions, this fact became one of the major issues for complaints about the trial. There were allegations that the interrogators were so incensed by the Holocaust that they physically tortured the prisoners—breaking jaws and teeth, crushing testicles, and sticking lighted matches under fingernails. This was in addition to accusations of severe forms of psychological torture such as fake executions. None of this, in reality, was true. [All of it, in fact, could have been easily disproved.]

Remy does a very good job in describing the interrogators, their training, their techniques, and what the former German soldiers confessed. I found this process history fascinating, but I am a judge and former Army Judge Adjutant General (JAG) officer. Others might find it dry. It is important, though, in showing that the confessions of the Germans were voluntary, and not the product of excessive coercion.

That is not to say that the interrogations were perfect. Several of the techniques they used, though acceptable at the time, would not be tolerated now. There were incidents of physical intimidation used against the prisoners, but certainly not the tales of torture retailed by the prisoners and their lawyers after the trial.

There were also issues with the trial itself. Mass trials are always problematic. The seventy-four defendants had to wear placards with numbers on them to identify themselves to the court. The format of the trial was not conducive to the defense. The lead defense counsel, Col. Willis M. Everett Jr., a patrician Atlanta civil lawyer, felt he and his colleagues had been set up to fail. But, legally speaking, the trial was sufficient for its time, the evidence sufficient to support the verdicts, and the sentences were, in the main, just.

It is in describing the aftermath of the trial that Remy really hits his stride. As stated, the prisoners asserted an astounding number of petitions that alleged amazing acts of torture inflicted by Army interrogators. Yes, condemned prisoners do such things. What is amazing, and more than a little disappointing, was the gullibility of the American press, politicians, and religious figures. Less than two years after the massacre, all of these entities hopped on the bandwagon accusing the Army of running a show trial as bad as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union would have. The lead prosecutor, Lt. Col. Burton L. Ellis, became incensed that his people had to force the interested parties to listen to them. It was easier to attack the Army then to disprove the allegations. But, over the years, the strain of defending the process and convictions just got to be too much. Sentence after sentence was reduced, prisoner after prisoner was released. Finally, in 1956, Joachim Peiper was released. And everyone involved, other than the families of the dead and the prosecution team, gave a sigh of relief that it was over.

So why is this book important? The author sets out how most of the basic texts involving the Battle of the Bulge, and Malmedy in particular, continue with the myths of torture. Even more telling is a simple search on the internet. There are video "documentaries" and Web sites that retell the torture allegations, or falsely state that all the condemned of Malmedy were hanged.

A war crime occurred at Malmedy. Thousands of American and German soldiers fought at the Bulge. Hundreds of Americans were taken prisoner. Yet only at this one crossroads was there a mass killing, and the soldiers who were convicted, including their commanders, were responsible for the dead soldiers lying in the snow. That is the ultimate fact, and it is one the Army has a responsibility to tell. It is time to use all the Army's historical resources to give an accurate version of all the events surrounding the massacre, and the trial. The soldiers who died at Malmedy deserve no less.

Wilford H. Ross is an administrative judge with the Department of Defense, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. He has held this position since 1993. A 1980 graduate of Creighton University School of Law in Omaha, Nebraska, he served five years in the Army JAG Corps in Germany and California. He has written articles on security clearance adjudications, the combat art of World War I, President Ronald W. Reagan, and the artist Rockwell Kent. These articles have been published by the American Bar Association, the *Los Angeles Daily News*, *On Point*, and other publications.

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CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

JON T. HOFFMAN



FROM VIETNAM TO GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS

In the last issue, I recapped the history of our Vietnam series. We took a significant step at the end of May when an external panel reviewed the draft manuscript for the volume covering the logistics effort from 1964 through 1967. The panel members were a mix of Army logisticians and historians with logistics or Vietnam expertise—and some fit in both camps. Retired Lt. Gen. Patricia E. McQuistion is a former deputy commander of Army Materiel Command. Retired Col. Paul L. Miles was an engineer in Vietnam and later a history professor at Princeton. Retired Col. Christopher R. Paparone served in several contingency operations, was a dean at the Army Logistics University, and currently teaches at the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University. Col. Robert A. Law is director of the Department of Logistics and Resource Operations at the Command and General Staff College. Dr. Edgar F. Raines was a longtime historian at the Center of Military History (CMH) and is the author of *The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983* (CMH, 2010). They provided an independent assessment of the manuscript and valuable ideas about how to make it even better. It will take a few months for the authors to revise the work based on the panel's comments, but that volume is much closer to the finish line now.

Our second year of the graduate research assistant (GRA) program has matched the expectations set by the initial group in 2018. We again had five students from leading military history departments. Three worked in Histories Directorate and two with Field Programs Directorate.

Daniel P. Curzon, from Ohio State University, did his dissertation on the strategic competition between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan along the Pacific Rim between 1880 and 1920. That made him a natural fit to research and write part of the Russian intervention pamphlet that will be the next installment in our World War I campaign series. John J. Mortimer from the University of Southern Mississippi brought an eclectic background, having done a master's thesis on the role of the longbow in the Hundred Years' War, while his dissertation is focused on U.S.-Soviet relations in the Middle East during the Reagan presidency. The latter was good preparation for him to work with our author writing the monograph covering the Army in the Persian Gulf from 1991 to 2001. He also wrote an information paper for the Central Command history office on Army deterrence operations in the 1990s and received an award from the State Department for locating records needed for a volume in their Foreign Relations of the United States series. Courtney M. Vojtko from Texas Tech University did her master's thesis on strategic bombing in World War II and had just completed her general exams before starting work here at CMH. She supported the author working on a volume of the "Tan Book" series covering the surge in Iraq. Among other tasks, she updated the order of battle and researched and wrote a paper on the reaction of Iraqi civilians to the Surge.

Joel M. Hebert of the University of North Carolina did his dissertation on British decolonization in the 1980s, which included a look at the Falklands War. We assigned him to handle a request from the Army Science Board to evaluate its records and write a history of that organization. We would never have been able to accomplish this with our organic resources, but Joel researched and wrote the account in less than a year. In addition, he performed yeoman service collecting information and updating the *Army Historical Directory*, which enabled us to publish it for the first time in digital format. Shane D. Makowicki of Texas A&M University did his dissertation on the impact of Union operations in North Carolina in 1862. That allowed him to step right into our Civil War–heavy staff-ride program, where he has excelled. He has participated in all phases, from research and preparation through leading rides on the ground. In the process, he received recognition from numerous senior leaders and units. Additionally, he researched and wrote half of the forthcoming World War I campaign pamphlet covering occupation and demobilization.

The GRA program continues to prove its worth as a valuable supplement to our full-time staff, as well as an outstanding development system for future civil service and contract historians. It is fast becoming one of the primary farm teams for the Center, the Army Historical Program, and other Department of Defense history offices.

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